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Chapter 1. Introduction  
!
The present study focuses on Polish EU officials in Brussels, who mostly arrived in Belgium 
shortly after the accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004.  
The research objectives of the project are twofold: 
(1)!to offer an insight into the social and cultural integration1 of Polish EU officials, 
but also, more generally, into their social life;  
(2)! to explore the identification patterns of the research participants. 
As regards the first objective, the main research question is: how does the social life 
of the Polish EU officials in Brussels look like from their own perspetive and what does it tell 
us about their cultural and social integration. The research should explain what happened and 
why: with whom (and with what intensity) they socialise, but also what are the feelings, 
convictions, and attitudes at the origin of their choices. The theoretical anthropological frame 
of it is Eriksen’s (2007) approach to “complexity” in social and cultural integration. I will 
apply some elements of this approach, where the author makes a distinction between criteria 
of social inclusion and exclusion and those of cultural inclusion and exclusion, both from the 
perspective of the immigrant and that of the indigenous society. This brings me to more 
specific questions I am trying to address in this thesis. How do they live? Whom do they 
socialise with? How do they understand integration? Do they feel integrated? How do they 
perceive other groups of population and how they think they are perceived? What ties have 
they made in the new environment and what ties do they maintain with their homeland?  
Furthermore, throughout my research I kept coming back to the issue which is central to any 
community: where, how, and by whom are the boundaries (i.a. Barth 1996, 1998, 2000; A.P. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!I use this term in two senses throughout my research: in a broader sense used by Eriksen (2007), embracing 
both social and cultural integration, and in the sense given to it by my research participants who understood it as 
becoming a part of the society and deep penetration into that society’s structures, as opposed to “adaptation” 
understood as acquiring an ease in everyday contacts, understanding the cultural codes, usages and behavior 
patterns of the “locals”.!
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Cohen 1994, A.P. 1998) created, maintained, transformed, or abandoned? How are the 
boundary markers defined? Is the researched group subject to any boundaries imposed from 
the outside? I will also refer to other literature, notably on “realms” (social spaces) (Lofland 
1989, 1998) and on transnationalism (i.a. Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1995; 
Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc 1995; Colic-Peisker 2006; Vertovec 2009). Out of 
various relevant concepts and theories originating both in anthropology and in other 
disciplines, I chose only a few which seemed to be most suitable for my research. 
Concerning the second objective, the main question to be addressed is: what kind of 
identification can Polish EU officials experience? More specific questions follow: what 
Polishness means for them? What does it mean for them to be European? Have they become 
more European since they started their career in the EU institutions? What is the relationship 
between their Polishness and their Europeanness? 
 I will firstly examine how Polishness is understood, manifested, and sustained in the 
specific conditions of living and working abroad in a highly international environment as 
well as in the context of socio-cultural interactions with different groups inhabiting Brussels. 
Secondly, I will look at the emergence of the European dimension of their identity and its 
relation to the national component. This research therefore aims to find out whether Polish 
EU officials are becoming more European via the process of enmeshing into the EU 
institutions and its culture. I will investigate their own understanding of Europeanness and 
what being European means to them. 
If Lyn H. Lofland distinguishes attitudes and practices related at the “public”, the 
“parochial”, and the “private realms” (1989, 1998), my research has been performed, to a 
significant extent, in what I would qualify as a semi-private realm. 2 The latter is not open for 
everyone, ethnically and socially speaking, but features an ethnic and social private-like 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In this thesis I refer to a semi-public realm as a “parochial realm”, as defined by Lofland (1989) following 
Hunter (1985), see also footnote 121. I will also refer to semi-private realms, which I see as semi-public realms 
with access restricted to Polish EU civil servants. 
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character. Many of my informal conversations, and much of my participant observation, takes 
place in such semi-private realms, often created by the Polish and, very probably, also other 
EU civil servants. 
The use of references to “semi-public”, “parochial” and “semi-private” realms 
requires short explanation. These concepts are used in different meanings. Ali Madanipour 
refers to “a semi-private, semi-public realm, where a smaller number of urban residents may 
be aware of each other and of their differences from the rest of the citizens” (2003:209). This 
is similar to the “parochial” realm, as defined by Hunter (1985) and referred to by Lofland 
(1989, 1998).  Lofland (1973) also refers, in an earlier article to “semiprivate” space, 
understood as a public space in the process of “privatisation”, meant to become “private”. 
However, I will refer to “semi-private” realm in yet another meaning – as a variant of 
“parochial” realm, characterized by voluntary restriction of interpersonal networks to a 
specific ethnic or social category. It is, therefore, a private sphere planted in the parochial 
realm – like a “Polish table” in a pub.  
The theoretical underpinnings that this thesis relies upon (such as the concept of 
“integration”) are not limited to purely anthropological ones for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
an important part of the existing literature on expatriates and EU officials (see e.g., Favell 
2001a, 2003a, 2003b, 2008a; Suvarierol 2007, 2008, 2009; Cailliez 2004) refers to non-
anthropological concepts and theories. Such references are therefore useful to maintain a 
“dialogue” with the previous findings. Secondly, most of the participants in my study referred 
to these notions to describe their situation. I thus take an “emic” approach3 in “an attempt … 
to understand the conceptual system of the observed” (De Vos 1995:45). At the same time, I 
believe, the use of such cross-disciplinary instrumentaria does not deprive the thesis of its 
anthropological character.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Understood as “the insider’s … perspective of reality” (Fetterman 1989:30). 
!10!
1.1. Outline of the content 
The dissertation consists of five main parts.  
Chapter 1, following a brief introduction and presentation of the research field, 
sketches the research context and discusses the theoretical framework of this thesis. At the 
first step, it concisely describes various categories of Poles in Belgium. It then introduces the 
concept of elites and reflects on the elitist character of EU officials. This is followed by 
sections presenting the EU Commission and its employees. Subsequently, it concentrates on 
the relation between the specific character of Brussels (as a model of a plural society without 
a well-defined core) and the presence of EU institutions in the city.  
The consecutive  Chapter 2 offers an overview of the concepts relevant for this 
dissertation, as well as a review of the literature concerning these concepts, allowing me to 
contextualize the results of my research: (1) community and criteria of exclusion and 
inclusion (including the role of boundaries; stereotypes and their impact on adaptation and 
socialising practices); (2) migration, mobility and movers; (3) adaptation and integration 
(including transnationalism, with a special focus on the body of literature concerning 
integration in Brussels). This general conceptual framework will be followed by an overview 
of the literature concerning (4) highly skilled professionals (expatriates and EU officials), and 
their socialising patterns. Eriksen’s (2007) multidimensional approach to social and cultural 
integration will provide the over-arching anthropological framework. 
Further concepts explained in this chapter relate to the second objective of my 
research and pertain to (5) identification and its bases (including theoretical considerations on 
ethnicity, nation and nationalism with a specific emphasis on the distinction between “civic” 
and “ethnic” models), and (6) Polishness and its specificities related to the historical 
background. Subsequently, the key themes in literature on (7) several concepts related to 
Europe, which are relevant for my dissertation, and on (8) European identity (with a 
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particular focus on its very possibility, its components, the process of engrenage, as well as 
on the impact of mobility on feeling European) will be explored.  
This theoretical background will serve to situate the results of my research. 
Chapter 3 explains my methodological choices and addresses related challenges and 
shortcomings. These are notably linked to the “elite” character of the researched group and to 
me being a “quasi-insider”. The chapter describes the research process, its sites and 
participants, and contains a presentation of the methods employed in the study. It also 
explains how the data were analysed and reflects on the ethnographic character of my study. 
Chapter 4 presents the research findings and discusses and summarizes the research 
results. It is based on 50 questionnaires, 21 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, and 
participant observation mostly conducted during social and cultural events. As regards the 
part on adaptation and integration, the text is structured following the logic of Eriksen’s 
approach to integration as presented in his article on complexity (2007). The first four 
sections correspond to the various factors affecting integration (in the broader sense used by 
Eriksen), notably: (1) the characteristics of the newcomer group, consisting of the 
presentation of my interviewees and their path to Brussels, short life histories of each, their 
motivation for coming to Brussels, and the spaces they occupy; (2) the perception of the “host 
environment” by the incoming group, including the perception of Brussels and life in the city, 
as well as the perception of one important group of the inhabitants, namely other Poles in 
Brussels. At this stage certain broad understanding of the possible directions of integration 
should become possible (integration with a larger society or with a specific community?). 
The dissertation follows with sections pertaining to attitudes and perceptions directly related 
to both the cultural integration (close to the genuine concept of adaptation, as defined by my 
research participants themselves) and social integration of Polish EU officials in Brussels. 
First comes a section on the (3) attitudes, preferences, and strategies of the newcomer group. 
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In this context, I elaborate not only on their understanding of the crucial concepts and on their 
experiences regarding (what they call) integration and adaptation, but also on their settlement 
choices, their daily life (with a focus on a possible change in lifestyle as an outcome of 
working for EU institutions), their frequenting of Belgian or “expat-oriented” spaces, 
associative life, and interest in local matters, social life (especially on the patterns of making 
friends and the evolution of social contacts, both private and work-related), and so forth. This 
is followed by a section on the attitudes of the “host society”, as perceived by the research 
participants, with a special focus on the stereotyping of Polish EU officials in their “double 
scapegoat” role. Finally, I complete this picture with considerations related to links between 
Polish EU officials and their home country to see if one can refer, in their case, to the concept 
of transnationalism.  
Throughout these sections, I adopt a predominantly emic perspective, and thus the 
descriptions of the “host environment” are based mostly on the perception of it by Polish EU 
officials. Therefore, it can by no means be considered a source of knowledge about the city or 
its inhabitants. What affects the integration of the incomer group is more how the 
environment is perceived than how it actually is (if the latter can at all be claimed) or how it 
is seen by the researcher or other observers.  
The last sections concern the identity of Polish EU officials in Brussels. The purpose 
of this part of the research is to find out if we can observe, in their case, the emergence of a 
supranational, European identity. After a short discussion of the basic identitary choices 
expressed by my research participants, I continue with a more in-depth analysis of their 
Polishness. The aim is not only to verify to what extent they “remain Polish”, but also to 
understand the type of Polishness they represent, the shared myths which are at the origin of 
their ethnic and national identity. This will be followed by a reflection on the European 
identity of Polish EU officials – its relation to Polishness, its nature and basis.  
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Each section is followed by conclusions summarising the main findings and (where 
relevant) comparing them with the existing literature. The concluding chapter includes more 
general conclusions and some overarching considerations pertaining to the most interesting – 
in my view – findings presented in my thesis. I also attempt to flag possible new areas of 
inquiry to be addressed in the future. 
It must be stressed that this dissertation does not intend to provide an organization 
case study as such, but instead focuses on the private life of Polish EU officials.  
1.2. Presentation and the added value of my research  
As Charlotte Aull Davies observes, “all researchers are to some degree connected to, or part 
of, the object of their research” (2008:3). This is so in my case: firstly, I am an “expat” in 
Brussels myself, secondly, I am Polish, and thirdly, my husband is an EU civil servant. I 
arrived in Belgium in 2005, together with my partner, who had obtained a permanent job in 
the EU Commission, and thus more or less at the same time as many of my research 
participants. I could observe how the “community” of Polish EU officials in Brussels was 
“born”4 and I have become increasingly interested in what form it will take, if it will evolve 
in time, and how. In fact, I witnessed many phenomena described by my respondents, yet at 
the same time from a slightly different angle. As I had the opportunity to observe this process 
from the very beginning, I assumed I was well placed to conduct an anthropological study on 
this community (although I knew I would remain subject to some typical restrictions related 
to the “elite” character of my research group). For these reasons, studying Polish EU officials 
was somehow a natural choice. 
Undoubtedly, my aforementioned “quasi-insider” position, provided me with 
privileged, context-specific information over a long period of time and also facilitated access 
to this group. The present doctoral dissertation is a continuation of my previous research on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 To what extent we can refer to a community here will be discussed further in the thesis. 
!14!
Polish EU officials in Brussels, which I concluded with a Master’s thesis in Social and 
Cultural Anthropology, entitled “The Euro-Polish community in Brussels” (Rozanska 2009). 
The previous research has left me with some queries, and I have also broadened the scope of 
the study, adding new research themes and new participants.  
Since I have examined Polish EU officials from the beginning of their careers in 
Brussels, I have found it interesting to examine possible developments across time (once they 
felt more confident and possibly well settled in their new socio-cultural environment) to find 
out whether they feel at least partly integrated in Brussels, what integration means in their 
case, and whether their identifications have evolved and how.!
However, the subject of this dissertation was not chosen exclusively based on the 
convenience of my situation, but also because this specific group of EU officials in Brussels 
have been, until now, understudied. Indeed, there has been no similar study performed on the 
community of Polish EU officials in Brussels yet (nor on other national groups of EU 
officials except for the British (Cailliez 2004), who might be leaving Brussels in the near 
future anyway). I also find this group an interesting subject of anthropological study because 
I feel they might constitute a particular “third” category of foreigners in Brussels “standing” 
somewhere between the category of “migrants” and “expatriates”. Moreover, as EU 
institutions constitute a kind of “laboratory” of European consciousness (see e.g., Bellier and 
Wilson 2000a:17; McDonald 2012:542), I hope this research can feed reflection upon the 
future of the European identification.  
Even if there is, nowadays, a number of publications directly or indirectly related to 
EU institutions and EU civil servants from “old” member states,5 EU officials from new 
member states are still understudied. Most of the available publications on Poles in Brussels 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Among the most important literature of on subject, the following works should be quoted: Abélès (2000, 
2004); Abélès and Bellier (1996); Abélès, Bellier, and McDonald (1993); Bellier (1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 
2005); Bellier and Wilson (2000a, 2000b); McDonald (2002, 2012); Shore (1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007); 
Shore and Black (1994); Stevens and Stevens (2001); with focus on top Commission officials: Hooghe (2001, 
2005); Page (1997); specifically, on British EU civil servants Cailliez (2004).  
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and on EU officials date back to the time when Poland was not even a member of the 
European Union.  
There are also a few newer relevant positions, but none of them concerns exactly the 
same subject in a similar manner and they are mostly non-anthropological. Semin Suvarierol 
(2007, 2008, 2009, 2011) examined the social networking patterns of EU Commission 
officials of different nationalities. However, her research did not specifically concern Poles or 
even duly take into account the officials from the “new” member states. Both Favell (2001a, 
2003a, 2008a) and Gatti (2009) examined Brussels’ expats and not specifically the staff of 
EU institutions.  
The study of a group which is most similar is probably the research on “new” member 
states officials conducted by Carolyn Ban (2007, 2009, 2013) without distinction between 
specific nationalities. However, these studies mostly concerned the functioning of the 
officials in the work context and not issues related to their private life such as adaptation and 
socialization practices in the new cultural context.  
Except for Julie Cailliez (2004), the aforementioned authors scrutinised EU civil 
servants as a more or less homogenous category, without taking into account the possible 
impact of and specificities related to their nationality. This might leave the picture 
incomplete. Indeed, it can be expected that some specifically national characteristics of EU 
officials or their lifestyles might affect the process of integration and their perception of the 
new environment and hence their socialization in Brussels. Treating all EU officials as a 
single group, independently of their nationalities, does not allow us properly to take stock of 
linguistic, geographic, or cultural considerations, or to fully take into account the perception 
and self-perception of different groups of EU officials in Belgium. Such specificities could 
become apparent notably thanks to comparing characteristics of EU officials of a specific 
nationality with those of EU officials in general and interpreting possible deviations. 
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Furthermore, my research also concerns the identification patterns of Polish EU 
officials in the context of moving abroad and employment in EU institutions. No specific 
study on this issue has ever been performed.  
There are also some works conducted on the previous migration of Poles to Belgium 
(see e.g., Siewiera 1995; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2005; Goddeeris 2005; 
Galent, Goddeeris and Niedźwiecki 2009; Kuźma 2010, 2012-2013, 2013; Leman 1997, 
2000; Paspalanova 2006; Lambrecht 2007; Levrau, Piqueray, Goddeeris, and Timmerman 
2014), but these do not specifically concern highly skilled white-collar migrants.  
1.3. Setting the context 
Among the aspects relevant for my study, the most important are the Polish origin of the 
research participants, that they work in EU institutions, and that they live in Brussels. Before 
presenting the theoretical framework and the results of the research, it is worth explaining the 
context in which my research participants have evolved. !
1.3.1. Poles in Belgium  
Polish people living in Belgium originate in several migratory movements. As Idesbald 
Goddeeris observes, the Polish population in Belgium (Polonia) has consisted of different 
generations, different social classes, and come from different regions of Poland (2005:11).6 In 
addition to the most visible group of economic migrants from the North-Eastern part of 
Poland, there are also political refugees from communist Poland, as well as more recent 
groups, such as the staff of EU institutions and employees of EU-matters-related 
organizations and undertakings, notably NGOs, law firms, lobbyists, diplomatic 
representations of various levels, but also students and researchers. 
The collapse of the communist regime in Poland enabled an important migration of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Goddeeris (2005) for a more in-depth description and analysis. 
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Poles to the West, notably including short-term pendular migrants7 (Okólski 2006:11; see 
also Siewiera 1995:73-74; Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003:12; Morokvasic 2004:8, 19), 
defined by Marek Okólski as “incomplete migration” (1997:9-10; see also Okólski 2012).  
According to Johan Leman, at the beginning of 1996, the number of Poles in Brussels, 
as estimated based on the data of the Polish Catholic Mission, amounted to 15.000 persons 
(1997:28). Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska estimates that the number of Poles living in 
Belgium reached 30.000-50.000 in the late 1990s (2005:676), while Elżbieta Kuźma claims 
that today this number has risen to between 100.000 and 120.000 (2013:21). 
At the beginning of the century, the migrants coming from North-East Poland (and 
typically the region of Podlasie), mostly rural, traditionalist areas with scarce job 
opportunities, constituted the majority of the Poles working in Belgium (Grzymała-
Kazłowska 2001b:6-7).8 In many cases these people had poor job qualifications9 and little 
knowledge of the local languages and consequently performed simple, manual jobs on the 
“black market”10 (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:8; see also Siewiera 1995:80). They usually 
maintained strong ties across borders (Siewiera 1995:99). Most often they settled in the poor 
districts of Brussels (Siewiera 1995:95), such as Saint-Gilles, Schaerbeek, Anderlecht or 
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:15). Several authors emphasize the role 
of the Polish Catholic Church11 for the undocumented Polish migrants living in Belgium (see 
e.g., Leman 1997; Siewiera 1995; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005; Paspalanova 2006; 
Kuźma 2010; Lambrecht 2007). !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Also called “international circular labour mobility” (Okólski 2012:23). 
8 Nevertheless, there were also quite numerous migrant groups from other regions in Poland, such as Lubelskie, 
Silesia, and Pomerania (Pomorze) (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:7; 2005:679). 
9 As to the rest, Leman points to “very diverse employment backgrounds” including such professions as: 
“seamstresses, domestic helps, hairdressers, clerks, nurses, teachers and factory workers” for women, and 
“farmers, mechanics, masons, painters, carpenters and plumbers” for men (1997:29; see also Siewiera 1995:80). 
10 They overtook a certain niche in the Belgian informal labour market, notably cleaning works and the 
construction and renovation sector (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:15; see also Kuźma 2013:32), but also “health 
care and seasonal work in agriculture” (Kuźma 2013:32). 
11 Grzymała-Kazłowska mentions two “so-called ‘Polish churches’” in Brussels: Notre Dame de la Chapelle 
and St. Elisabeth in Schaerbeek (2005:684; see also Siewiera 1995:100). 
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The accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004 has triggered a completely 
new wave of Polish “movers” to Belgium involving highly qualified, educated individuals12 
such as: “doctors, engineers, IT specialists, business experts, etc.” (Galent, Goddeeris and 
Niedźwiecki 2009:25). According to Galent et al., in contrast to the previous waves of Poles 
migrating in the pre-accession time, the mobility of these more recent movers is no longer 
motivated by the urge to escape poverty, but rather by pull factors, such as opportunities for 
professional development and attractive salaries (Galent et al. 2009:25).  
However, the focus of my research is limited to only a small part of the wider 
category of Polish professionals in Belgium, the Polish EU officials who appeared only in 
2003 with the first auxiliary agents and grew to a more important number after Poland’s 
accession.  
According to the data available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Poland, in 2013 there were 2352 Poles employed in EU institutions (1440 in the EU 
Commission out of which 1087 were employed on a permanent basis; 395 in the EU 
Parliament of which 198 were permanent), while 327 persons were employed in EU agencies 
(MSW, 2013). Although this number also includes those employed in Luxembourg, the 
majority lived and worked in Brussels.13 
This new “wave” of Polish employees of EU institutions can be labelled “‘elite’ 
migrants” (Favell 2003b). 
1.3.2. EU officials as elites   
As George E. Marcus suggests, in the most general sense, “in the social sciences, elite has 
remained a flexible cover term that refers to rich, powerful, and privileged in any society, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12! Seppe Lambrecht (2007) calls part of them “the institutional migrants” including such categories as EU 
officials, diplomats, and employees of multinational companies. !
13 As the data from the new study “Brussels-Europe, the figures” shows, approximately 40,000 officials are 
employed in EU institutions (including stagaires) in the Brussels Capital Region (2016:30) (the data concerned 
end 2014 and 2015). See: https://visit.brussels/binaries/content/assets/pdf/figures_en_1.pdf.       !
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past or present, Western or non-Western” (Marcus 1983:3). Various authors when defining 
elites have emphasized the element of power and command in a society or in a certain field 
(Marcus 1983; Salverda and Abbink 2013; Schijf 2013; Scott 2008:32). Abner Cohen defines 
an elite as, “a collectivity of persons who occupy commanding positions in some important 
sphere of social life, and who share a variety of interests arising from similarities of training, 
experience, public duties, and way of life” (1981:xvi).  
 Do EU civil servants see themselves as elites? As my previous research (Rozanska 
2009) has shown, they mostly do not. However, they seem to be aware that they are 
sometimes depicted as such in the media, and thus it may affect their self-perception.  
As Favell, Feldblum, and Smith point out, “higher-end migrants” are usually referred 
to as “elites”, in contrast to “disadvantaged, lower class” migration (2007:16). Anne-Mieke 
Fechter explains that this qualification is usually based on their high income and elevated 
social status, but also on their “educational achievement and professional excellence” 
(2007b:163-164). Favell et al. observe that this, in many cases, might be a misnomer or 
exaggeration when assessed in the context of the social reality of their country of origin, 
where they may not come from an elitist background or be particularly successful (Favell et 
al. 2007:17; see also Favell 2001a:32). Vered Amit also reminds us that “privilege is relative” 
and the term “elites” should be interpreted depending on “particular social and political 
contexts” (2007:1).  
In this respect, it is important to make clear how the notion of “elites” is understood in 
the context of the present study and what exactly it implies. Favell et al. (2007) attach a lot of 
importance to the position of expatriates in their society of origin prior to expatriation. 
However, it is difficult to see why this measure should be applied to EU officials whose 
“expatriation” is not necessarily temporary. The approach of Favell et al. appears inadequate 
as applied to EU officials, since, independently of the status they would have had in their 
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countries, they changed it precisely by coming to Brussels and taking a position in the EU 
institutions. 
Elites are also referred to as groups holding social or cultural capital and thus having 
strong influence on societies (Shore 2002:4; Harvey 2011:433). These qualities can be 
roughly ascribed to at least certain members of my research group (even if most of them do 
not hold management positions, they may often still exercise significant influence on issues 
of big importance for Europeans just in expert positions). Importantly for this dissertation, 
John Scott makes the distinction between four “ideal types of elites”, notably, “coercive”, 
“inducing”, “commanding” and “expert” (Scott 2008:32-33). EU officials seem to belong to 
the last category. According to Scott,  
Expert elites are those whose specialized bodies of technical knowledge are organized into 
‘professional’ structures and practices. Lawyers, accountants, doctors, and investment 
advisers, for example, may all be involved in persuasive power on the basis of a claimed and 
accepted expertise. (2008:33). 
 
 Even if the author is clearly thinking instead of professional orders, EU institutions 
are also perceived as centres of expertise in EU-related matters. “Commanding elites”, says 
Scott,  
are those who legitimately occupy the top administrative positions in institutional hierarchies 
of management and control. In contemporary societies this characteristically takes the form of 
what Weber described as bureaucracy. Such ‘top’ bureaucratic positions are institutionally 
defined as those that carry strategic significance for a particular organization or form of 
association. (Scott 2008:33) 
 
 In the context of EU institutions, the meaning of “top positions” should be assessed in the 
context of functional relations between EU institutions and national administrations 
(specifically, their role in the implementation or coordination of policies).   
Ban also suggests that the difficulty of accessing positions in EU institutions, and 
notably the harshness of the competitive exam, contribute to the development of an elite 
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feeling among EPSO “laureates”,14 and strengthens a “sense of belonging to a very special 
elite, a value system that permeates the organizational culture” (2013:37). 
Furthermore, this laboriously achieved position comes with certain professional 
imperatives related to a certain vision of Europe and of the role of EU institutions and brings 
a number of privileges, the image of which is further exaggerated in society at large. As a 
result, they share the same interests and objectives and they defend them vis-à-vis other 
groups.15 As Ban concludes, EU officials “in several senses” belong to an elite (2013:37). 
Notably, she claims that they usually originate from “elite backgrounds in terms of social 
class and education”, earn high salaries and benefits, enjoy life-long employment, and 
perceive themselves as “belonging to a distinct elite group” (Ban 2013:37-38).!
These arguments hold even though, during my previous study (Rozanska 2009), my 
research participants, confronted with the question on their understanding of this notion 
(often associated with them in the media),16 tended to deconstruct the myth of Eurocrats 
referred to by journalists as the “European elite”, for example calling it “a profession like any 
other”.17 Indeed, as suggested by George Marcus (1983:9), “‘elite’ is a term of reference, 
rather than of self-reference” (as cited in Shore 2002:3).  
It should be kept in mind that one of the reasons why I am reflecting on this issue at 
the outset is the specific character of any research performed on elites. This is relevant 
especially as concerns the facility of access, the attitude of participants to the researcher, as 
well as, more generally, the power relations structuring the relationship between researcher 
and researched. For this reason, one needs to note certain objective factors such as low 
availability due to long working hours, difficult access resulting from their relative isolation, 
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14 An “EPSO laureate” is a person who has successfully passed the competition and been put on a “reserve list” 
of candidates for recruitment. 
15 Shore explains that “in order to constitute itself as an elite in the first place an elite group must develop its 
own particularistic set of interests, norms and practices to differentiate itself from the masses” (2002:2-3).                                !
16 See e.g., Calay and Magosse (2008).  
17 Amongst the factors indicating the elite status of Eurocrats some of my respondents emphasized: “a position 
of power”, “a lot of influence” or “good pay” (Rozanska 2009).!
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and high consciousness of members of the researched group of their image in society together 
with a clear interest in influencing it. From this perspective, even irrespective of the actual 
power held by my interviewees, the challenges in performing research on them are the same 
as those ascribed to elites in the literature. 
1.3.3. The EU institutions and their staff 
Most EU officials in Brussels work in the European Commission, the Council of the EU, or 
the European Parliament, with smaller numbers employed in the Committee of the Regions 
or the Economic and Social Committee. They are all subject to the same Staff Regulations 
and have the same obligations, rights, and privileges depending on their grade and staff 
category. The great majority of my research participants were employed in the Commission, 
a few worked in the Parliament.  
According to Cris Shore,  
Despite the popular stereotypes about a vast organisation run by an army of anonymous 
bureaucrats, the Commission’s day-to-day running is done by a small … staff of 
administrators, experts, translators, interpreters and secretaries, numbering some 20 000 … . 
This small size has led to a common “insider’s” view of the Commission as a compact, 
efficient, dynamic organisation. (2007:192) 
 
The European Commission, is organised into several Directorates-General and 
services (such as the Legal Service) the number and organisation of which varies frequently, 
as it is often re-shuffled following the attribution of portfolios to Commissioners. The 
structure of the Parliament is broadly similar. 
The EU staff, following the French administrative model, are “organised 
hierarchically according to grade and function” (Shore 2000:182). At the top of the hierarchy 
are AD-grade18 (former A-grade) officials who constitute the “administrative elite” and are 
“responsible for formulation and management policy” (Shore 2000:183). Shore points at “the 
high intellectual and professional calibre of the A-grade staff” (2000:189), who “frequently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 A-grade has been replaced by AD grade following the administrative reform in 2004. 
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hail from the most prestigious institutions [of education] of their home countries” (Shore 
2000:189). The previous B-grade and C-grade officials, regrouped under the AST category 
are “technicians, administrators and record keepers”, as well as “secretaries, clerics officers, 
typists and support staff” (Shore 2000:184).  
AD and AST are the categories of staff, with each of them further sub-divided into 
grades depending on seniority and (to a lesser extent) merit. As Shore emphasizes, “the 
normal career path for most officials ends at the [former] A4 rank, the higher posts being 
political appointments and not subject to the normal statutory provisions” (2000:186). 
“Among all grades”, says Shore, “posts are filled irrespective of nationality” (2007:190). 
However, as Ban claims, care is taken so as to ensure that “the staff reflect the population of 
Europe ... also within individual DGs and directorates” (2013:32).  
Moreover, another important division line in the EU Commission is the one between 
the permanent statutory officials, appointed “for life”, and different categories of temporary 
staff, ranging from the quickly expanding category of Contract Agents (with significantly 
lower salaries) to the faltering category of Temporary Officials (subject to the same rules 
under the Staff Regulation as permanent officials, but employed for a fixed-term contract). 
Only the permanent officials are recruited via concours. Moreover, there are also seconded 
national experts and the cabinet staff which are considered political positions and recruited 
accordingly.  
1.3.4. The heterogeneous culture of the European Commission 
Several authors argue that the European Commission, culturally speaking, is much less 
homogeneous than the outside world seems to think (e.g., N. Nugent 2002:1-2; McDonald 
2012:541). Most of the existing literature on the EU institutions concerns the European 
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Commission.19 However, as was mentioned before, the EU officials in other institutions are 
subject to the same Staff Regulation, the administrative structures are broadly similar, and 
officials can move to another institution without major problems. Also, based on my study 
(the majority of my research participants work in the Commission, but a few worked in other 
institutions, and several changed their institution during or prior to the research), it seems that 
the situation of the staff in all institutions is rather similar (with one interviewee clearly 
mentioning a difference). For this reason, the findings concerning the Commission can be 
extrapolated to EU institutions in general. 
 As Suvarierol observes, “the Commission presents a microcosm of Europe in terms of 
the diversity of cultural backgrounds, values, attitudes and languages” (2011:186). In fact, the 
European Commission’s organisational culture is praised by the EU staff for its 
“‘multilingual’ and ‘multinational’ character” (Shore 2000:153). On the other hand, Edward 
C. Page argues that this multinational character “create[s] distinctive linguistic barriers to 
communication within EU organizations” (1997:41).  
Abélès, Bellier, and McDonald claim that the “cultural cohesion” of the Commission 
is not perfect, as “it also generates strong centrifugal tendencies” (1993:5). Neill Nugent 
draws attention to “many elements and interests” present in the institution behind its uniform 
appearance (2002:2). For instance, several other authors point at the division between the 
North and the South,20 in terms of “symbolic geography” (Ban 2013:40; see also Abélès 
2004:18; Abélès et al. 1993:41; McDonald 2002:66; 2012:541; Suvarierol 2007:88).21 
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19 With the exceptions of some works by Abélès (1992), Scully (2005), Busby (2011, 2013), and Busby and 
Belkacem (2013). However, some of the works of Busby concern assistants, who are outside the scope of this 
study. 
20 During informal conversations, my research participants referred to much more specific cultural stereotypes 
being explored by their colleagues, such as mentions of someone being “very German” (usually referring to 
their lack of flexibility) or “typically French” (referring to a strong sense and fear of hierarchy or to the use of 
excessively complex and abstract mental constructions).  
21 As McDonald argues, “the attribution of ‘north/south’ changes contextually, but the countries generally in the 
north are Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, sometimes Belgium (and since their 
accession Sweden, Finland and Austria); those in the south are France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and, on 
certain points, Belgium” (McDonald 2002:66; see also Abélès et al. 1993:41). 
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Maryon McDonald adds that, following the 2004 enlargement, this dichotomy is sometimes 
complemented with the West versus East distinction (2012:541). 
 As Abélès et al. observe, the diversity of cultures within the EU institutions may 
provoke certain direct inconveniences (1993:49). As the scholars explain, “perceptions of 
what constitutes good manners change from one cultural world to another, and the mere fact 
of sharing a workplace is not seen to be enough to establish sociable relations between 
individuals brought up in different cultural registers” (Abélès et al. 1993:50). It is suggested 
that misunderstandings and conflicts at work are sometimes interpreted via the prism of 
cultural differences and the blame is sometimes put on a colleague’s cultural background 
(Abélès et al. 1993:51). McDonald even states that, despite positive accounts directed to the 
outsiders, “there were also complaints and tears behind closed doors internally, accompanied 
by manifest worry, anger, stress and illness” (2012:549). Marc Abélès stresses that culture is 
contextual and requires a clear point of reference (2004:15; Abélès et al. 1993:40). The 
Commission, claims the author, “constructs itself in relation to the outside worlds of clients 
and experts, member states and members of the European Parliament” (Abélès 2004:15). !
Shore reports that on a daily basis EU officials “flit between languages, depending on 
who has just joined or left the group” (2000:188; see also Bellier 1995:56). At the same time, 
such communication cannot duly take account of certain cultural aspects related to the use of 
registers, contexts, and so forth. As a result, “miscommunications do occur,” states Suvarierol 
(2011:188; see also Abélès et al. 1993:32).  
While drawing on her earlier work, Irène Bellier reports that the officials coined, in 
the process of social and cultural integration, a specific, artificial jargon, “‘Franglais or 
Frenglish’”, a hybrid of French and English (2002:82; 1995:56; see also Abélès et al. 
1993:32; Abélès and Bellier 1996:440; Bellier 2000a:154; 2000b:66; 2005:12; McDonald 
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2002:58; Shore 2000:188-189; Shore and Black 1994:292).22 Some authors report that 
Eurospeak is sometimes difficult to translate and understand for a person from the outside 
world (Bellier 2000a:154; Abélès et al. 1993:33). Bellier even claims that this jargon, while 
isolating the speakers from the outside world (2005:14), constitutes an “expression of a unity” 
of the EU officials (2000a:154).  
1.3.5. Recruitment of EU civil servants 
Abélès et al., as well as Bellier, emphasize that the decision to work for the EU in the early, 
pioneer phase of European integration was usually driven by idealistic motives related to the 
ideas that paved the way for the creation of the European Communities (Abélès et al. 
1993:16; Bellier 2002:88). However, the reasons for which people joined the institutions have 
changed and “material attraction became important: the high salary and stable employment 
drew young graduates to Brussels” (Abélès et al. 1993:17; see also Bellier 2002:88-89; Shore 
2000:140).  
EU officials are recruited by the institutions and “not seconded by national 
governments” (Shore 2000:139). Since the early stages of its construction, the European 
Communities have adopted a selective examination for entry into its service so as to secure 
high quality staff (Ban 2013:37; Bellier 2002:85; see also Shore 2000:191-192). Even if the 
majority of the staff is recruited after a competition (concours), Shore claims it is possible “to 
bypass the system” (2000:196-197). The competitions have been very difficult to pass, 
requiring in-depth knowledge of European Communities (and subsequently – Union) matters. 
Those who passed the two-part examination are on the “reserve list”. Although Shore insists 
that, “only half those who pass their exams and get on to the reserve list eventually find a job” 
(2000:190-191), this ratio actually varies from one competition to another.  
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22 This peculiar vernacular is characterised by mixed semantics, but also frequent use of the syntax of one 
language while speaking the other (McDonald 2002:58; Abélès et al. 1993:32). 
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The oral exam allows the overall profile of the person to be verified. Individuals 
communicating in several languages, with international experience, and without excessively 
nationalistic positions are more likely to integrate and thus have better chances of being 
selected (Ban 2013:33).  
Shore maintains that, in addition to familiarity with EU procedures, policies, and 
discourse, personal contacts also play a role in obtaining a job in the EU (2000:152). Both 
Shore and Abélès et al. emphasize that the career often starts in the College of Europe or with 
a stage in the institutions (Shore 2000:152; Abélès et al. 1993:16; see also Suvarierol 
2011:190). This experience allegedly facilitates the development of an allegiance to European 
ideals, but also sets up useful contacts (Shore 2000:152; Abélès et al. 1993:16) and “lays the 
foundations of a multinational Brussels network for many prospective EU officials” 
(Suvarierol 2009:421). 
1.3.6. EU officials from new member states: similar or different? 
Ban argues that, following the 2004 enlargement (as well as, to a lesser extent, after all 
previous enlargements), there has been a “‘we-they’ split” (2013:35) between the old and the 
new officials as the Central and Eastern European countries allegedly differed in terms of 
culture, economic development, and “recent political experience” (Ban 2013:2).  
 Although the reasons quoted by Ban are debatable (the democratic experience of 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal was similarly short, or even shorter at the moment of their 
accession, and the cultural distance of Orthodox Greeks might be seen as even greater), it 
cannot be excluded that former Communist Bloc countries could indeed be seen by their 
Western colleagues as culturally distant and unfamiliar. In the same vein, while referring, 
more generally, to Poland’s accession to the EU, Piotr Sztompka comments that, despite 
being inside, newcomers may still, initially, be treated as strangers by the incumbents and 
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might not immediately feel “at home” (2004:482). However, particularly given the working 
patterns which involve intensive contacts with other officials as well as, presumably, the 
above-average inter-cultural skills of EU staff, it would be very odd if any excessively 
stereotyped perception could extend beyond the first months of working together. 
 Ban draws attention to important commonalities between the nationals of the new 
member states, such as some shared “post-transition challenges”, a complex of being the 
periphery, and a fear of discrimination (2013:52). The perceptions of Westerners reflected 
these complexes and also had consequences for the perception of the EU officials from the 
new member states. Notably, Ban observes that there was quite a strong stereotype as regards 
their predominantly financial motivation for working in the EU institutions, originating in the 
assumption that the salary offered would be particularly attractive for nationals of these poor 
and underdeveloped countries (2013:160-161). In reality, according to the survey by the 
European Commission referred to by Ban and Vandenabeele (2009), the motivations of 
officials from “old” member states and those from new member states proved to be broadly 
similar (Ban 2013:161).  
1.3.7. “Eurocrats”: who they are 
EU officials are popularly referred to as “Eurocrats”, a portmanteau of “European” and 
“bureaucrat” (Bellier 2002:84; see also Abélès and Bellier 1996:438). It has become 
pejorative (Bellier 2000a:149; Bellier and Wilson 2000a:17) and now serves to emphasize the 
“technocratic dimension of the European construction” (Bellier 2002:84). However, in my 
thesis, I use this term in a neutral and purely descriptive sense. 
Conventionally, EU officials have a reputation of being “the most privileged public 
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officials in the world” (Shore 2000:193; see also Calay and Magosse 2008:481).23 They are 
exempted from national income tax and only need to pay a tax to the Union budget, deducted 
directly from their salaries. Various authors (e.g., Shore 2000:193-194; Bellier 2002:88) refer 
to their relatively high salaries, allowances, and other privileges (even if these have been 
substantially reduced over the last decades, especially after the so-called Kinnock reform 
came into force in 2004). They even repeat certain urban legends, such as the alleged right to 
purchase cigarettes on discount or about the Christmas gifts they would receive from their 
organization (Bellier 2002:88). Bellier sees in these privileges the origin of the changing 
motivations of officials to join the EU institutions (2002:88).  
On the other hand, the scholar also draws attention to the fact that despite the comfort 
of living, high pension, and other benefits, very often EU civil servants suffer from 
homesickness, especially those who live a longer distance from home and cannot (or find it 
impractical to) go back for a weekend to their country of origin (2002:86). Some of them 
resign and come back to their countries once they get an interesting job offer there (Bellier 
2002:85). As Bellier observes, EU civil servants are often confronted with criticism 
(2002:84). Most often they are blamed for being disconnected both from the national and the 
local realities (Bellier 2002:84; see also Shore 2000:168; Abélès 2000:45).  
1.3.8. Brussels 
The pluricultural character of Brussels influences, according to many authors (infra), the 
manner in which at least certain types of new settlers, including EU officials, integrate, as 
well as the “target” of this integration. On the other hand, the character of Brussels is also 
partly determined by the presence of the EU institutions.  
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23 Shore (2000) does not specify who exactly is of this opinion, while Calay and Magosse (2008) refer to local 
media reports. However, myself, I have heard this opinion on numerous occasions both in Belgium and in 
Poland.  
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1.3.8.1. The multifaceted and pluricultural character of Brussels 
The international character of Brussels is strongly related to its status of the seat of the EU 
institutions and of other international institutions (notably NATO) (Corijn, Vandermotten, 
Decroly, and Swyngedouw 2009:1). Shore refers to Brussels as “the heart of Europe” 
(2000:154), Bellier adds that the name of the city has become “a metonymy for the European 
Union” (2002:78; 2000b:59), while Favell even claims that Brussels is identified not only 
with the European Union, but actually with Europe (2008a:46).  
By contrast, Vincent Calay and Reinoud Magosse suggest that since the 1990s 
Brussels has been seen as “a cosmopolitan and multicultural city” not only in relation to its 
status as the capital of the European Union (2008:483; see also Genard et al. 2009:1-2; Favell 
2008a:48). Today, out of a total population of 1.175.173 of the Brussels-Capital Region, the 
number of foreigners amounts to 398.726 according to the figures from July 2015 from the 
Brussels Institute for Statistics and Analysis (BISA).24 As Favell observes, Brussels is a 
unique hybrid, home to successive waves of immigration composed of skilled professionals 
of various nationalities, including EU officials and corporate “expats”, but also of “guest 
workers” (from Spain, Portugal, Italy), and “colonial migrants” (from Congo, North Africa, 
or Turkey), and refugees (Favell 2008a:47-48; 196).  
According to Corijn et al., out of the group of over 110.000 people who settled in 
Brussels “because of its international function”, most are “relatively isolated and politically 
inactive” (2009:5). The authors suggest that the “European construction must assume more 
directly its responsibilities towards its capital”, but also that measures must be taken to 
integrate EU officials politically and in cultural and educational terms (Corijn et al. 2009:9). 
However, Favell explains the low participation in Belgian local elections by the persistent 
rooting of expats in their home countries or in Europe, and by the risk of being fined for 
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24 See: http://www.statistics.irisnet.be/themes/population/population#.VzxT7FcTl0.!
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abstention once registered as a voter (Favell 2010:201). Moreover, Favell claims that Belgian 
politics revolves around issues which are not of primary importance to foreigners (2010:207-
208). This statement needs to be nuanced. Local politics, concerning discussions about major 
infrastructural projects, such as the future of Brussels tunnels, the extension of the metro or 
tramway network, or the controversial establishment of the pedestrian zone in the centre of 
Brussels, relate to issues affecting the EU officials’ everyday life. Other, especially linguistic, 
issues (such as the famous Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde conflict) are, indeed, of a marginal 
interest for all those who are not Belgian nationals. At the same time, Favell draws attention 
to other forms of political involvement (2010:210). He claims that they “express their 
political opinions through their activism as consumers, and the kinds of choices they make 
about their lifestyles and culture in the city” (Favell 2010:210). 
As Calay and Magosse remark, Brussels is pictured rather pejoratively in the 
international press as “the face of the ‘European Moloch’” (2008:480). The international 
character of the city does not obscure another, less positive image. Brussels is subject to 
divergent and differently valued judgments: it can be referred to either as a wasteful “cesspit 
of poverty and poor management” and a dangerous and dirty city, or alternatively as “a 
powerful centre of economics and decision making”, the attractive main metropolis of 
Belgium, an “international centre of politics, as the capital of Europe, and even as post-
national cosmopolitan city” (Loeckx et al. 2012:6). As we will see, these imaginaries have 
also influenced the expectations of freshly arrived Polish EU officials. 
1.3.8.2. The impact of the EU institutions on Brussels  
The subject of my research is a group of fifty Polish EU civil servants and not the economic 
impact of the EU institutions on Brussels. It is possible not to discuss such economic aspects 
and to present the research group “in a vacuum”. However, I prefer to refer to the existing 
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literature which provides the economic context of my research group’s impact on the city 
they inhabit. This literature is obviously incomplete, since, for example, it does not 
exhaustively discuss the social-economic situation of all the inhabitants of Brussels. 
However, it gives an idea of different views on this subject, based on the scientific literature. 
 Calay and Magosse observe that there is a multitude of approaches to and intense 
debates about the role of the EU institutions in the city (2008:473). Jan Degadt mentions 
“large flows of money” due to their presence, spent predominantly within the Brussels 
Capital Region, “creating incomes, jobs and prosperity” (2008:232; see also Corijn, 
Macharis, Jans, and Huysseune 2008:1). Likewise, Shore suggests, the location of the EU 
institutions in Brussels has brought many economic benefits and employment opportunities 
(2000:157).25 In fact, 85 percent of EU officials’ salaries is spent in Brussels (Favell 
2001a:42). Bellier adds that their presence not only significantly improved the local economy 
while creating “thousands of jobs”, but has also enabled the development of “services linked 
to tourist sectors” (2002:78; see also Calay and Magosse 2008:482).26 Favell emphasises the 
positive impact of Europeans, both EU officials and “expats”, on the real estate market 
(2001a:42). Finally, Degadt suggests that the development of public transport in the city is 
also due to efforts of the Federal and Regional governments to attract EU and international 
institutions (2008:232). 
However, other consequences of the EU institutions’ presence in the city are 
perceived in a rather negative light. First of all, it is seen as the main reason for the 
destruction of many residential quarters, replaced by new offices (Bellier 2002:78; see also 
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25 As the data in the recent study “Brussels-Europe, The Figures” (2016) has shown, an extra 40,000 jobs in 
Brussels were created indirectly thanks to the presence of international organisations – in lobbying, journalism, 
regional representation, and other services like event organisation, hotels, and catering (representing 16.7% of 
total employment in Brussels). 
26 Calay and Magosse stress the EU institutions’ impact on the tourism economy of Brussels (2008:482). It is 
also thanks to them that Brussels has developed its entertainment services, such as shops, restaurants, and cafés 
that undoubtedly help to improve its economy (Favell 2001a:42). 
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Shore 2000:157; Calay and Magosse 2008:486).27 Favell deplores the demolition of 
numerous beautiful Art Deco buildings, especially in the new Schuman quarter, to free space 
for the construction of EU headquarters (2008a:48). Shore repeats a very frequent claim that 
the growth of the EU institutions triggered higher house prices in the city (2000:161; see also 
De Groof 2008:25; Calay and Magosse 2008:486), which has led to “the creation of 
residential enclaves or ‘ghettos’ of rich diplomats, Eurocrats and foreign businessmen” 
(Shore 2000:161; see also Corijn et al. 2008:1).  
However, Nicolas Bernard (2008) challenges the common assumption which 
attributes the rise of real estate prices mostly to EU officials, predominantly blaming local 
real-estate market players for artificially increasing prices (2008:278). Calay and Magosse 
suggest the imaginary Euro-Brussels is concentrated around the stereotypically presented 
European quarter and the European civil servants (2008:480). As they argue, the image of EU 
institutions has been created by the media coining imaginaries which are at the origin of the 
hostility towards them (2008:480). Due to the imaginaries present in the mass media, the EU 
is perceived as technocratic, undemocratic, and wasteful (Calay and Magosse 2008:480). EU 
officials are the main protagonists of the mediatised narratives on the “Brussels bureaucrats” 
and “the failed integration of the European Quarter’s in Brussels”, they are associated with 
secrecy, corruption, and money wasting and perceived as elitist, unrealistic, and uprooted 
(Calay and Magosse 2008:480-481).  
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27 Also, Shore observes that the presence of EU institutions has devastated the “infrastructure and architecture of 
the city”, while destroying and replacing 19th century houses with “high rise monuments of glass and concrete” 
without any planning, contributing to a “dramatic increase in traffic and pollution” (2000:157). In opposition to 
the simplistic, common view of the impact of Eurocrats on the spatial shape of the city, Annette Kuhk notes 
following Demey (2007) that even though the erection of the Berlaymont in the 1960s is considered a milestone 
in turning the housing area into a concrete office desert, the phenomenon of migration outside the centre had 
already started at the beginning of the past century, when 30% of the population fled to the suburbs, attracted by 
a better lifestyle there (Kuhk 2008:504). 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework 
!
My research allowed me to gather substantial number of accounts concerning the lifestyle, 
social relations, and identifications of my research group. Although my intention was to 
adopt a mainly emic perspective by permitting my research participants to express 
themselves using terms and elaborating on subjects of their choice, there are nevertheless 
limits to such an approach. First of all, I needed to formulate questions. These questions, 
although formulated in plain language and based on the categories used by my respondents 
(i.e. adaptation, integration, etc.), were necessarily conceived with a certain theoretical 
framework in mind and influenced by the existing literature on the subject and my previous 
research. Before describing the relations between my research group and other groups in 
Brussels, I need to name and define certain categories I will be using to analyse the material 
gathered such as, for instance, “community”, “boundaries”, “ethnicity”, “identity”, and 
“identification”, etc. 
2.1. Community and criteria of exclusion and inclusion 
Before examining the social and cultural integration of a group in a society, thus relations 
between individuals of a group and another group or groups, it is only natural to reflect on the 
relations inside the group and its actual scope. Hence the usefulness of referring to the 
concept of a community. Furthermore, while reflecting on who and why actually belongs to 
the community and how the community is delimited, reference to the concept of boundaries 
appears indispensable. Finally, stereotypes constitute a prolific source of markers that the 
members of communities use to establish what is inside and outside the boundaries. I will 
need these concepts to describe the “building blocks” (constituted by the researched groups 
and the host environment) for subsequect reflection on integration. For this reason, it seems 
justified to introduce these concepts together, from the start.
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2.1.1. The concept of community  
As Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing explain, in anthropology, “‘community’ is to be 
characterized in terms of: (i) common interests between people; or (ii) a common ecology 
and locality; or (iii) a common social system or structure” (2005:61). In socio-cultural 
anthropology, Amit defines a community “as a convergence of place, people, identity and 
culture” (2002a:15). By contrast, Warner describes a community in more functional, dynamic 
terms by focusing on interaction between interdependent individuals within social 
organization (1941:785-786).  
The definitions of “community” are, roughly, based on different criteria referring to 
the relations between individuals. These relations may be described in static terms of sharing 
(A.P. Cohen 2002:169), being identical or being different from individuals from outside the 
community, or in more dynamic terms of functioning as a whole. “Community”, as used in 
the present dissertation refers to commonalities of interests, perceptions, and situations, but 
also to the feeling of belonging which is at the origin of group institutions (e.g., ritual 
gatherings, specific channels of interaction) and solidarities. !
2.1.1.1. Community as a relational and symbolic construct  
Several scholars emphasize the relational but also oppositional character of the concept of 
community (A.P. Cohen 1985: 12, 58; Barth 1998 [1969]; see also Amit 2002a:45). In this 
context, and similarly to Barth (1998) [1969], they put emphasis on the notion of boundaries 
(A.P. Cohen 1985:69; Amit 2002a:45). As Anthony P. Cohen explains, boundaries delimiting 
communities are constructed symbolically and “mark the community in relation to other 
communities” (1985:58, emphasis in original). Although they are constructed around 
“elements which may, for certain purposes and in certain respects, be considered to be more 
like each other”, importantly, they also “mark off these elements from those which differ” 
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(A.P. Cohen 1985:14). Cohen perceives a “community” primarily as a symbolically 
constructed cultural creation (1985:38) and considers boundaries to symbolize the 
community, their perception being the essence of the community’s consciousness (A.P. 
Cohen 1985:74, 14). He states that boundaries may also remain “in the minds of their 
beholders” (1985:12). In this case, their perception both within and across the boundaries of a 
community may be different (A.P. Cohen 1985:12). Cohen stresses that the meanings of 
boundaries for different persons do not need to be the same (1985:13) since the crucial aspect 
remains “common ownership of symbols” (1985:21). Consequently, he perceives community 
not so much in terms of a social structure or social behaviour as of “thinking” in a particular 
manner, and thus as something symbolic (1985:98). 
Despite their importance, boundaries are not always considered sufficient to forge a 
collective identity which might be constitutive of a community. Notably, Richard Jenkins 
points out that group identification requires a minimal degree of similarity among members 
(2008b:132). He concludes that “without some commonality there can be no collectivity” 
(Jenkins 2008b:132). Likewise, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson insist that “be[ing] part of a 
community” implies also being “similar to others within the community in some crucial 
respects” (1997:17).  
Cohen (1985) understands “membership” as a “sense of belonging” which is shared 
among the members of a community as a result of shared culture, defined as adherence to “a 
common symbolic world” (Jenkins 2002:118). The aforementioned “sense of belonging” 
results from a feeling of similarity (Jenkins 2002:118).  
2.1.1.2. From geographically delineated community to community in mind 
As indicated by several scholars, communities were originally studied with a focus on 
location, a “physical place” (Blackshaw and Woodhouse 2010:64; Amit 2002a:42; Berg 
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2001:233; Wellman 1999:xiv), a bounded territory. This approach belongs to the past. For 
instance, Barry Wellman proposes that we should see community rather as “a preeminently 
social phenomenon”, a social network (1999:xiv). As mentioned, Anthony P. Cohen 
considered that “community exists in the minds of its members” (1985:98).  
Benedict Anderson argues that nearly all communities (perhaps except those among 
people in direct visual contact with each other) are imagined and therefore that differences 
between them only concern “the style in which they are imagined” (1996 [1991]:6). 
However, the imagined character of the community does not necessarily prevent it from 
being considered real (A.P. Cohen 2002:170). For Amit, whose approach is largely 
concurrent with Anderson’s findings, community has become a synonym for “any form of 
collective cultural consciousness” (2002b:6). In her view, what is imagined must necessarily 
be associated with its social realization (Amit 2002b:8). The crucial element of any 
community are emotions, empathy, and the feeling of closeness between its members (Amit 
2002b:18). These things, in Amit’s view, require “shared experiences, activities, places 
and/or histories” (2002b:18). As Amit puts it very relevantly to the research at hand:  
the members of a workforce are not likely to feel that they are members of a community if 
their relationship is based exclusively on their formal roles within the organization that 
employs them. If, on the other hand, they are able to extend this association into a more 
extended, voluntary sociability (lunch conversations, socializing after work, gossip, etc.) then 
they may well feel that they, or at least some of them, form a community. (2002a:58)  
!
One might add that the colleagues are even more likely to form a community if they are all 
foreigners in the society in which they live and work, are subject to seclusion and 
stereotypisation and are working on the realisation of the objectives determined in line with a 
common ideology which is not necessarily shared by other people.  
2.1.2. Boundaries 
In anthropology, the concept of boundary is often attributed to Fredrik Barth’s (1969) 
seminal monograph, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, and hence is associated with ethnicity 
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(A.P. Cohen 1998:26; 1994:63). According to Barth, a boundary “signifies a syndrome of 
ideas, ranging from an imagined line drawn on the ground, through various abstract 
separations and distinctions in realms of political and social organization, to a schema for 
conceptualizing the very idea of distinction” (2000:20). In a nutshell, Barth argues that “on 
the basic level of the concept, boundaries are assumed to separate what they distinguish” 
(2000:27). Thus, in the approach of one of the most important promoters of this concept, the 
definition of “boundaries” was functional, defined by their role or the direct consequence of 
their existence, namely “distinction” and “separation”. Similarly, Christopher Tilley 
describes the function of boundaries as “creating distinctions and marking out social 
oppositions, mapping social and cultural difference and Otherness” (1994:16-17). 
 Some scholars have tried to answer the question of what boundaries actually are. Ira 
Bashkow conceives of boundaries “as conceptual structures centered on symbolic contrasts 
or oppositions” (2004:451, emphasis in original). Anthony P. Cohen calls boundaries “the 
subjects of claim based on a perception by at least one of the parties of certain features – 
diacritical features – which distinguish it from others” (1994:63; see also A.P. Cohen 
1998:26). Such diacritical features may serve to define ethnic group identity, but also, for 
instance, “personal space” (A.P. Cohen 1994:63). According to Cohen, “boundary is 
essentially a matter of consciousness and of experience, rather than of fact and law” 
(1998:22; see also A.P. Cohen 1994:63).  
In Barth’s approach, boundaries could be understood as “divid[ing] territories ‘on the 
ground’; “more abstractly, ... [as] mark[ing] social groups off from each other”, but also as 
“provid[ing] a template for that which separates distinct categories of the mind” (2000:17). In 
the definition of social boundaries Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson observe that 
anthropologists often put emphasis on their faculty to “order social relations and mark 
membership in collectivities” (1999:19). They also refer to “cultural boundaries which 
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separate different worlds of meaning” (Donnan and Wilson 1999:19). Furthermore, they 
distinguish territorial boundaries that “are marked in geopolitical space” (1999:19).  
Thomas Hylland Eriksen observes after Barth that the focus on the boundaries’ 
function of separating ethnic groups from each other implies “a relational and processual 
approach to ethnicity”, defined through “its relationship to others, highlighted through the 
boundary” (2010:45; see also Leman 2014:93-108). According to Barth, sharing a culture by 
the members of a group should be looked at rather as a consequence of the organization of an 
ethnic group, not as its defining feature (1998 [1969]:11). As Barth’s famous statement goes, 
“the critical focus of investigation … becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not 
the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1998 [1969]:15). Eriksen (2007) even claims that 
social diversity can co-exist with cultural uniformity, or vice versa. This understanding of 
social boundaries will be very relevant for my research when analyzing the relations between 
my researched group and other Poles in Brussels and with other EU officials.  
Barth (2000) points out that boundaries, despite their potential to “divide and 
discriminate”, may also “enable the construction of relationships” (A.P. Cohen 2000:6, 
emphasis in original). As Cohen explains, boundaries let the members of communities define 
their membership in interaction with and by contrast to what remains outside the boundary 
(A.P. Cohen 1985:12).  
Anne-Meike Fechter refers to the case of expatriates who are “engaged in complex 
processes of constructing different kinds of boundaries, and a major part of their lives 
revolves around their negotiation and reinforcement” (2007b:26). In Leman’s research group 
Ghequière, Stallaert, Van de Vyver, Chang, and Leman himself applied the idea of culturally 
manipulative social boundary construction on various immigrant and non-immigrant 
communities, such as the Suryoye from Turkey, Spanish regionalism, the Hungarians in 
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Transylvania (Romania), the Yunnanese Chinese of Northern Thailand, and immigrants in 
general (Leman 1998). 
According to Barth, the pre-requisite for the existence of a boundary is common 
understanding of criteria for judgment – only then can two individuals come to the 
conclusion that one of them is a member of a social group and the other is not, as they both 
recognise and acknowledge their differences and similarities (1998 [1969]:15). The basis for 
this differentiation are not necessarily all the differences between them, but only those which 
they perceive as “significant”: Barth calls them “signals and emblems of differences” (1998 
[1969]:14). The choice of these emblems can be quite subjective.28 Barth is very clear on the 
fact that it is the dichotomization resulting from such features – and not these features 
themselves – which matter (1998 [1969]:14).  
Barth’s notion of “signals and emblems of differences” marking the boundary was 
developed in theories of ethnicity by Manning Nash (1989). Nash agrees that “boundary 
mechanisms are cultural markers of difference” (1989:10) and elaborates on the nature of 
such markers: “Index features [which] must be easily seen, grasped, understood, and reacted 
to in social situations” (Nash 1989:10). Nash insists that the “index features”, although the 
meanings attributed to them may vary from one group to another, must be visible also to non-
members (1989:10). As Nash suggests, those boundary markers which are of primary 
importance for the creation of a group’s identity are not always visible to non-members, and 
thus secondary and tertiary characteristics play the role of “index features” (1989:11). These 
features (“surface pointers”) may evolve in time and may include in particular taboos and 
special medical or economic practices (Nash 1989:11-12). Cultural “index features” may be 
the subject of stereotyping, based on caricature and exaggeration, which is a factor 
contributing to the drawing and maintenance of boundaries (Nash 1989:10).  
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28 Barth claims that “in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied” (1998 [1969]:14). 
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2.1.3. Stereotypes 
According to Eriksen, in social anthropology, stereotyping is understood as the production 
and use of “standardised notions of the cultural distinctiveness of a group” (2010:29). He 
adds that the phenomenon occurs independently of the power relations between the groups 
within a society, both with dominated and dominating groups (Eriksen 2010:29). Drawing on 
Ardener (1982) and Benson (1981), Maryon McDonald (1993) points out that stereotypes 
occur where the cultural categories of different groups of individuals do not match. 
McDonald elaborates on the construction of the categorical difference at stake: it is 
influenced by contemporary political and social ascriptions (hence evolving in time); it 
appears at boundaries, not necessarily corresponding to specific cultures understood as 
“homogenous wholes”; it is nested in an overarching discourse attributing meanings to 
persons and groups “in the worlds of the representers” (McDonald 1993:228-232).29 
As Eriksen emphasizes, stereotypes do not necessarily reflect any reality. Walter!
Lippmann qualifies stereotypes as “a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted” – a 
simplified portrait of the world, accommodating the observer’s habits, preferences, 
perceptions and emotions. Although incomplete, this drawing is safe and familiar (Lippmann 
1998 [1922]:95). It constitutes “the projection upon the world of our own sense of our own 
value, our own position and our own rights” (1998 [1922]:96). As Lippmann puts it, they are 
“the guarantee of our self-respect” (1998 [1922]:96). On the other hand, as McDonald 
observes, in Lippmann’s approach stereotypes “meant inaccurate representations … [and] 
seemed to betray a lack of ‘direct experience’ of the people so represented” (1993:221).  
As Eriksen goes on, stereotypes allow us to simplify and “order” complex social 
patterns in the perception of their holder and they provide us with criteria for classifications 
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29 As illustration, McDonald notably explains how the British or French understanding of “masculinity” and 
“feminity” contributed to the construction of mutual national stereotypes and how the British perception of the 
German language served to define stereotypically the cultural difference from the Germans (1993:230). 
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or typologies of kinds of people (Eriksen 2010:29-30; see also Rapport and Overing 
2005:344). They can also provide us with arguments in favour of certain privileges or of 
unequal access to resources, or alternatively (in the case of negative stereotyping of ruling 
groups) contribute to the empowerment of the dominated groups (Eriksen 2010:30). Finally, 
stereotypes play a pivotal role in the definition of boundaries and in the group’s self-
definition by contrast to the Other “by providing a tidy ‘map’ of the social world” (Eriksen 
2010:31).  
As already mentioned, Nash suggested that “index features”, perceived as “boundary-
marking features”, determine the membership of groups and define the “minimal cultural 
items ... involved in membership” (1989:10). As Nash goes on to say, such index features 
must also be visible to non-members of the group (1989:10). The same cultural 
characteristics which are proudly displayed by the members of the group can appear “comic 
or be derided by outsiders” (1989:10). As Nash concludes, “stereotyping is a form of 
caricature of cultural, index features of group differentiation; an emphasis and ranking of 
features that in itself helps mark the boundaries among different groups” (1989:10). 
As regards the role of stereotypes in the context of migration, Kay Daux observes that 
different groups of immigrants are valued differently by the host population depending on 
“group-specific stereotypes”, serving as “a set of distinctive frames through which 
immigrants … are viewed” (2006:67). Daux claims that the abovementioned stereotypes 
trigger differentiated treatment and actually determine the position and experience of 
different groups of immigrants in the society (2006:67). The stereotypes of a migrant group 
will have an important impact on adaptation in a host country, but also on identification 
patterns. Indeed, as Mariola Janeta suggests, in addition to the individual predispositions of 
an immigrant to cultural change, there is also another, wider group of elements influencing 
the adaptation process which is related to the attitude of members of a host society 
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(2011:258). In addition, Jenkins claims that categorisation via stereotypes affects group 
identity: the categorised group internalizes stereotypical description by another group, 
making it a part of its own identity (1997:70).  
2.1.3.1. Legacy of a stereotyped view of the Poles in Belgium 
The media “have an important influence on shaping of the public opinion, including also 
attitude towards ethnic and national minorities” (Janeta 2011:259). Meanwhile, as Galent et 
al. argue, “Poles seem to have a bad reputation in Belgian media” (2009:126). In fact, as 
Grzymała-Kazłowska suggests, Belgians approach Poles with some fear and anxiety, as they 
were often pictured as protagonists in criminal scandals and scoops (2001b:37-38), while 
Galent et al. add to this list “low-paid jobs, illegal work, and unlawfulness” (2009:126). 
However, Galent et al. also observe that the “old stereotypes are deconstructed” since 
Belgian employers do not perceive Poles as “lazy, traditional, religious, or criminal” (Galent 
et al. 2009:134). Moreover, they observe that new stereotypes, this time positive, seem to 
have emerged among some employers, referring to the image of “zealous, open-minded, and 
emancipated” people (2009:135). Nevertheless, it is suggested that “not all of the classic 
stereotypes have completely disappeared”, as Poles are still associated with excessive 
drinking (Galent et al. 2009:130, 135). 
Indeed, as Grzymała-Kazłowska argues: “in spite of encountering some negative 
national stereotypes such as associations with car theft, drunkenness, forgery and prostitution, 
the workers … interviewed [by her] felt needed and accepted in Belgian society” (2005:682). 
The group of Polish undocumented migrants researched by Grzymała-Kazłowska admitted 
that they did not feel discriminated against and that the attitude of Belgians toward them was 
either positive or neutral and often marked by sympathy and tolerance (2001b:36). 
Nevertheless, as Grzymała-Kazłowska emphasizes, friendship or any closer social contacts 
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were rather excluded (2001b:37; 2005:682) and “politeness, kindness, but also distance and 
reserve” were the characteristic features of Belgians’ attitude toward Polish migrants 
(2001b:37). 
As regards the Europeanness of Poles in Belgians’ perception, the authors find that: 
Poland’s Europeaness is not questioned, but many interviewees still point to a certain 
backwardness in Poland and other Eastern European countries. According to them, Poland 
lies behind and is only gradually catching up with Belgium and other Western countries. This 
primarily concerns economy. (Galent et al. 2009:144)  
 
Likewise, Grzymała-Kazłowska emphasizes that for Belgians Poles are Europeans, although 
slightly different as they belong to the Slavs who were under eastern influences and shaped 
by the communist system (2001b:35). In her study, Poles were also associated with poverty 
and seen as coming from an unstable and backward country in terms of economy and 
technology (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:35).  
Even though the way of life of the group of Polish EU officials is substantially 
different from the lifestyle of the “old” group of Polish immigrants to Brussels,30 which 
mostly involved labour migration from the underprivileged north-east of Poland, certain 
negative stereotypes nevertheless seem also to affect the perception of them by the host 
society.  
2.1.3.2. Stereotyping Eurocrats in Belgium 
Bellier claims that the Eurocrats are targets of severe criticism (2002:84). They are depicted 
as privileged (Abélès et al. 1993:23; Shore 2000:193) and are commonly resented (by 
Belgians) for their favourable professional conditions (Cailliez 2004:87; Abélès et al. 
1993:23) such as, among other things, high salaries, expatriate allowance, or job security, 
while Cailliez (2004) refers to a perception of EU officials as people who work little and earn 
too much. Moreover, the employees of the EU institutions are often blamed for being 
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30 This difference is related not only to their high level of education, linguistic skills, and social and legal status, 
but also to the fact that they belong to a wider category of EU officials. !
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disconnected both from national and local realities (Shore 2000:162). Abélès has called them 
“a kind of disconnected mutants, with no roots” (2000:45). 
The debate on budget cuts has shown how inaccurate their portrayal can be in the 
press. In an interview with Adam D. Rotfeld (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), a Polish 
journalist from Gazeta Wyborcza, Paweł Wroński, learned from his interviewee that EU  
officials have increased their earnings by 16% [sic] during the period of economic crisis.31 As 
Rotfeld added: “they start to be perceived as arrogant people, totally isolated from the reality, 
fiercely defending their privileges” (ibid.). In this and similar articles32 that appeared in 
Polish and foreign newspapers33 available on the Internet there can be found very spiteful and 
bitter comments made by readers. Remarkably, Polish readers did not refrain from sharing 
very harsh opinions with regard to, as they call them, “Brussels scumbags with deep 
pockets”; “leeches”; “idiots”; “Brussels loafers”; “wasters”; “moronic bureaucrats”; 
“scroungers”; “smart alecs”; “Polish cream of bureaucratic obtuseness”.34 One commentator 
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31 Wroński, P. (2012, November 23). A. Rotfeld, b. szef MSZ: Ustalono dobrą podstawę dalszych negocjacji”. 
Retrieved from 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,12915883,A__Rotfeld__b__szef_MSZ__Ustalono_dobra_podstawe_dalszych.html#
ixzz41mt35Vtp  
32 Szymańska-Borginon, K. (2012, November 14). Unijne oszczędności odbiją się na Polakach pracujących w 
Brukseli. Retrieved from 
http://www.rmf24.pl/ekonomia/news-unijne-oszczednosci-odbija-sie-na-polakach-pracujacych-w-
bru,nId,709702#utm_source=paste&utm_medium=paste&utm_campaign=other 
 
mapi, PAP. (2012, December 2). Wielka Brytania chce odchudzić unijną biurokrację. Retrieved from 
http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,147754,12966351,Wielka_Brytania_chce_odchudzic_unijna_biurokracje.html 
 
(2012 November 18). Polscy urzędnicy ofiarą cięć w unijnym budżecie. Retrieved from  
http://biznes.onet.pl/wiadomosci/ue/polscy-urzednicy-ofiara-ciec-w-unijnym-budzecie/ngxvp 
 
Jarecka, A., Deutsche Welle (2013 February 4). Nawet 21 tys. euro zarabia miesięcznie unijny urzędnik. To 
kilkakrotnie więcej od kanclerza Niemiec. Retrieved from 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,13347396,Nawet_21_tys__euro_zarabia_miesiecznie_unijny
_urzednik_.html 
 
Potocka, J., Zespol wGospodarce.pl (2013, June 5). Strajk eurobiurokratów - nie chcą cięć. Retrieved from 
http://wgospodarce.pl/informacje/4540-strajk-eurobiurokratow-nie-chca-ciec 
 
33 see e.g., comments to the Web log post: Open Europe Blog. (2013 February 5). Should we feel sorry for 
underpaid EU civil servants? [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.be/2013/02/should-we-feel-sorry-for-underpaid-
eu.html?showComment=1360233946340  
34 Original wording - translated from Polish.!
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stated: “in Brussels there are no Polish civil servants, there are only Polish-speaking Jews,35 
all of them with no exception”.  
There was a similar, although less heated, debate on the Facebook group “Brussels 
Expats” after one of the group members posted a link to an article on a strike by EU officials 
related to possible budget cuts (“Of course, I feel so sorry for the EU people that have to 
work a 40 hour week for 12,000 euro a month, and to dash it all, they have to retire at 65! 
Horror, shock, gasp”; “just one thing, the Commission money is also our money ... They 
don’t cultivate special trees to grow their own money! So each one of us is concerned by their 
strike as the EU salaries are financed by our taxes. I think what makes people NOT 
sympathizing with the European civil servants’ fight is both that they have job security (a 
precious jewel today) and reasonably good salaries, especially for the hours they do. By 
fighting to preserve their priviledges, it sends a very bad signal to the people who already feel 
that they are in their crystal tower and deaf to the difficulties of most EU citizens ... Previous 
revolutions tended to destroy priviledges not maintain them”; “if i am not mistaken, they are 
also not taxed ... off course they are having the right to strike but their benefits are scandalous 
during crisis!”).36  
Without discussing the broader issue of the appropriateness of cuts or the justification 
for the strike, it should be noted that these opinions are partly based on inaccurate data: only a 
small fringe of EU officials earn as much as 12000 euro per month, their revenue is taxed, 
although at a lower rate than for Belgians, they have not obtained a 16% salary increase as 
their salaries evolve based on factors such as the average increase of cost of living in several 
European countries and the evolution of the salaries of member states officials. 
The reason for this very negative attitude lies beyond the subject of this thesis. 
Among the explanations I heard most often from the EU officials themselves is the fact that 
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35 Internet fora in Poland attract proponents of conspiracy theories, including anti-semitic ones.  
36 Data retrieved from messages posted to: Brussels Expats group on Facebook. (2012, November 21; original 
spelling). 
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national politicians often blame “Brussels” for unpopular decisions which they actually 
supported in the EU Council. EU policies are not widely understood, partly because of an 
inadequate information policy. EU officials are perceived as those who take decisions 
without being subject to direct democratic control. Although the same can be said about any 
public officials, unlike domestic ones the EU officials are hardly ever someone’s neighbours, 
family members, or friends, as they are few and distant. Because of the nature of their tasks, 
they also have little professional contact with member states’ populations. As such, they are 
the perfect target for media or press criticism, which has progressively turned them into one 
of the most hated professional groups in Europe, a true “public enemy”. And they are 
obviously aware of this (e.g., Bellier 2002:84). 
2.1.3.3. Polish EU officials: a double scapegoat? 
Just because they are Eurocrats does not mean that the Polish employees of the EU 
institutions are not also subject to stereotyping about their nationality in addition to 
stereotyping about Eurocrats. Thus, in addition to the already not-so-positive image of EU 
officials, they have to deal with a stereotypical image associated with nationals of all “new” 
member states. Even before the accession, Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou 
reported the growing impression that Western European countries are “rather reluctant to 
include Eastern Europe” (2003:7). In fact, the nationals of the ten “new” East-and-Central 
European member states that joined the European Union in 2004 might be perceived 
differently by the local population37 from Western Europeans, as they might often be 
associated with a cheap and sometimes troublesome workforce. This specificity may affect 
their relations with Belgians, other EU officials, and, indirectly, other fellow nationals.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 I am aware of the fact that the local population is not homogenous from the ethnic, religious, cultural or 
probably yet other points of view. I explain the use I make of the word “local”, as well as the reasons for this, 
further in the text. See, especially, subsection 2.3.1.!!
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Originating in post-communist Europe and in spite of “Poland’s fierce attachment to 
the West” (Davies 2001:301), Poles may be regarded both by the host society and civil 
servants from the “old” member states as a different category of EU officials. According to 
Anna Triandafyllidou (2002), shortly before the accession Central and Eastern Europeans 
were perceived “in the actual member states’ public discourses, … as distant brethren or 
indeed as distant aliens” (Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003:7) and there were fears that the 
accession of Central and Eastern European countries could negatively affect the integration 
process due to their fundamental difference from the West (Góra and Mach 2010:22). The 
understanding of their history and attitudes was lower than for other European nations who 
had been closely linked to Belgium throughout ages, and indeed the recent history of these 
accession states was radically different (communist totalitarianism and concomitant 
economic, political, and cultural transformations).  
In addition to the particular perception of all “new” member states’ nationals, a 
number of stereotypes, such as a very strong anticipated attachment to Catholicism and the 
Church or strong inclinations to heavy drinking, specifically concern Poles. Polish people are 
also by far the most numerous group of Central and Eastern Europeans in Brussels and have 
been present there for quite a long time. As such, they are certainly subject to much stronger 
emotions and stereotypes than, for example, Czechs or Slovenians. Indeed, they may be 
aware of strong prejudices against the Eurocrats, but also fear extrapolation of negative 
stereotypes about Eastern Europeans. These stereotypes have become widespread in Belgium 
thanks to the other Poles in Brussels (stereotypes which mainly relate to illegal builders and 
cleaning ladies), allegedly perceived as “underdog” physical workers, often causing troubles. 
Thus, the Polish EU officials may expect that the Belgians would perceive them both 
as rich and over-privileged Eurocrats responsible, among other things, for skyrocketing real 
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estate prices and, at the same time, as representatives of a poor, backward, violent, and 
sometimes criminal immigrant community greedy for social benefits.  
2.2. On the road: movement and movers 
Having introduced the basic concepts necessary for the discussion of social and cultural 
integration, there is a need to briefly discuss the phenomena related to movement which are 
crucial for the definition of my research participants as a group. Indeed, they are all 
characterised by the fact that they have moved from one country to another. However, there 
are different kinds of movement and they produce different starting points for integration, so 
it is important to define the kind of displacement we are dealing with in the present study.  
2.2.1. Migration, mobility and boundaries 
Thomas Faist defines migration38 as “a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence, 
usually across some type of administrative boundary” (2004:18). Hans van Amersfoort 
makes a distinction between “permanent” and “temporary” migration, qualifying “staff 
members of multinationals, bureaucrats in international organizations” as belonging to the 
latter category, and emphasizing that “the causes and consequences of migration differ 
between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ migration” (1998:12).39 Val Colic-Peisker claims that, 
as traditionally conceived, “immigrants” are those who move for the purpose of permanent 
settlement in another country where they are expected to acculturate (2010:468; see also 
Favell 2008b:269-270; Olwig 2007:88)  and where they suffer from a disadvantaged position 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Even if, conventionally, “migration” is understood as “movement that occurs within national borders”, 
whereas “immigration” refers to “movement across national borders” (Brettell and Hollifield 2008:21 n. 1), 
Brettell and Hollifield apply the term “migration” with reference to “international migration” (2008:22 n.1). In 
this thesis I will follow the same terminology. !
39 Jeffrey H. Cohen and Ibrahim Sirkeci see a migration decision as issued from a complex and emotional 
process involving multi-layer considerations based on migrants’ “traditional beliefs, cultural expectations, and 
social practices”, involving often “family members, relatives, and friends” (2011:14).  
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on the labour market and from a lowered social status (Colic-Peisker 2010:468).40  
 If, traditionally, the movement of people across borders and the resulting relations 
with the host society were referred to and analysed under the notion of migration, this term is 
often not considered appropriate anymore to describe certain types of contemporary 
movement which are not conceived of as one-off displacement, possibly followed by 
integration in a new society. This phenomenon is better conceptualized by the notion of 
mobility (for a more in depth analysis of the concept see Salazar 2016). ! !
Mobility, as Tim Cresswell puts it, can be defined in the simplest way by a reference 
to a “displacement - the act of moving between locations” (2006:2). John Urry refers to 
several meanings of the term, notably to moving or being “capable of movement” (sometimes 
referred to as “motility”), but also to “mobility in the longer term sense of migration or other 
kinds of semi-permanent geographical movement” (2007:7-8). Weert Canzler, Vincent 
Kaufmann, and Sven Kesselring define mobility in broader terms, as comprising three 
elements: “movements, networks and motility” (the potential for movement) (2008:2).41  
Finally, as observed by Salazar, physical displacement is also commonly understood 
in association with “symbolic ‘moving up’, be it economic, social, or cultural” (2016:2). 
Some authors mention doubts that appeared at the end of 20th century as to the very 
pertinence of the notion of boundaries (Hannerz 2000:9; Donnan and Wilson 1999:10). 
Bashkow, by contrast, argues that globalisation has in fact galvanised certain phenomena 
related to boundaries, since, by intensifying flows across boundaries, it has increased the 
number of occasions at which people are confronted with boundaries (2004:454). Similarly, 
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40 The word “migrant” is often used to designate people whose movement is perceived as permanent, for 
purpose of starting new life and without assuming a return (Favell 2008a:101-102). The term “migration” is 
sometimes “negatively valued and often criminalized” (Beck 2008:29) and its studies usually focus on low-
skilled migrants (Olwig 2007:87; Fechter 2007b:21; Fechter and Walsh 2010:1197; Favell et al. 2007:16; Favell 
2003b:400). By contrast, the term “mobility” is positively valued and is “a general principle of modernity” 
(Beck 2008:28). 
41 Kaufmann, Bergman and Joye define “motility” as “the capacity … to be mobile in social and geographic 
space, or as the way in which entities access and appropriate the capacity for socio-spatial mobility according to 
their circumstances” (Kaufmann et al. 2004:750). 
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Noel B. Salazar and Alan Smart claim that “mobilities and borders are not antithetical” 
(2011:iv). Salazar argues that the process of globalisation, although favouring mobility and 
the creation of links, also contributes to “immobility, exclusion, and disconnection” 
(2013:60). Such boundaries can be notably related to “social class, gender, age, lifestyle, 
ethnicity, nationality, and disability” (Salazar 2013:60; see also Amit 2007:10).  
All these restrictions notwithstanding, there is indeed “the international cosmopolitan 
class” who are undisturbed by borders and who feel “at home in the world” (Hage 
2005:470).42 On the other hand, even if the life of such expatriates is unbounded by physical 
boundaries, they often remain constrained in other, subtler ways (e.g., social and cultural 
boundaries).  
2.2.2. High-skilled foreigners: privileged movers43 
As Robyn Iredale suggests, the proportion of “highly skilled migrants”44 in overall global 
migration is on the rise (2001:8). This group can be referred to as “professional, managerial 
and technical (PMT) specialists” (Salt 1997:5), usually holding “a university degree or 
extensive/equivalent experience in a given field” (Iredale 2001:8).  
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42! According to Ulf Hannerz, cosmopolitanism evokes “a willingness to engage with the Other”, openness 
towards various cultural experiences, and eagerness for immersion in other cultures (1990:239-241). David Ley, 
describes cosmopolitans as those, who are open for encounters with different cultures, ready to operate in 
unfamiliar contexts, without prejudices and on the basis of “equality and respect” (2004:159). The notion of 
“cosmopolitanism” appears in this thesis often in direct or indirect quotations – either by other authors or by my 
research participants. It is not always clear in what meaning it is used. In case of my research participants, it is 
probably used as a proxy to “deterritorialised”, “international” or “multicultural”. Myself, I refer to this term as it 
was defined by Hannerz (1990), but also with regard to “cosmopolitan transnationalism” (infra). 
43 Those higher-end migrants who do not fit the category of economic or labour migrants are also called, usually 
with reference to European or North American nationals moving for professional reasons, “‘privileged 
migrants’, ‘expatriates’ or ‘mobile professionals’” (Fechter and Walsh 2010:1198; see also Colic Peisker 2010; 
Fechter 2007b), or “‘elite’ migrants”, “transnational elites”, “global elites” (Favell 2003b:410-411). Leonard 
observes that such terms as “lifestyle migrants” (see also Benson 2011), “privileged migrants” and “mobile 
professionals”, refer to those “relatively affluent (and usually white) individuals”, whose purpose of movement 
is the improvement of their life quality, but also “upward social mobility” and “career enhancement” (2010a:2).  
44 John Salt distinguishes twelve different categories within the group of “temporary highly skilled migrants”, 
such as: “corporate transferees”; “technicians/visiting firemen”; health and education employees often working 
for non-governmental organisations; “project specialists”; “consultant specialists”; “private career development 
and training”; “clergy and missionaries”; “entertainers, sportspeople and artists”; “business people and 
independently wealthy”; academics, researchers and students; “military personnel”; and spouses and children of 
these categories (1997:6-8). 
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Much of the conceptualisation work concerning “expatriates” has been done in the 
context of developing countries and post-colonial settings (see e.g., Fechter and Walsh 
2010:1201; Fechter 2007b:160). However, the term has entered into the common language 
and is broadly used by EU officials in Brussels and by other mobile professionals themselves. 
For this reason, even though it is, indeed, crucial to distinguish between past findings which 
are relevant only in the “developing” countries and those which may have more universal 
usefulness, I decided to stick to the term “expatriate” which I will use interchangeably with 
the term “high skilled migrants” or “high skilled movers”. 
Several authors highlight the heterogeneous character of expatriates or the diversity of 
their lifestyles and living conditions (Fechter and Walsh 2010:1201; Fechter 2007a:36; 
2007b:6; Leonard 2010a:8). They differ as regards their educational level and occupational 
status and the forms of their mobility (Fechter and Walsh 2010:1200). If some of them take 
their power from the big transnational companies they work for, others are employed, for 
instance, in modest aid organizations or small and medium-sized enterprises (Leonard 
2010a:8).  
 Based on her research on Western expatriates in Indonesia, Fechter specifically draws 
attention to the phenomena of living apart from the local people and creating an “expatriate 
bubble” (Fechter 2007a, 2007b), also referred to as expatriate “enclaves” (E. Cohen 1977:16). 
The aforementioned observations do seem to apply to all privileged movers, including EU 
officials. Several authors emphasize the often transient character of an expatriate’s stay in a 
country, usually limited by the specified term contracts (see e.g., Amit 2007:9; Beaverstock 
2011:712; E. Cohen 1977; Farrer 2010; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014:23). This is why 
expatriates are believed to have no incentive to integrate with the host society. Erik Cohen 
suggests that they may even consciously seclude themselves in the expatriate environment, so 
as to protect their privileged status (1977:24). This strategy may appear rational in countries 
!54!
where their expatriate status in the host country gives them a significant advantage over the 
local population, but not necessarily in Belgium.  
Improved status45 may, as illustrated by Fechter (2007b:2), derive from increased 
wealth, stimulated by generous expatriation packages46 (see also Beaverstock 2011:712).  
Both Fechter and Leonard refer to the negative image of expatriates and the term’s 
negative connotations which are related to their alleged “greed, ignorance, and a personal lack 
of interest in the host society”; “luxury, leisure or moral decline abroad” (Fechter 2007b:3-4); 
or “lavish lifestyles, hedonistic pleasures and social irresponsibility” (Leonard 2010a:1).  
2.2.3. Mobility within the European Union: before and after the EU enlargement 
“We are not ‘migrants’, we are just ‘Europeans’” (Favell 2008a:103). 
Adrian Favell observes that internally mobile EU citizens “do not think of themselves as 
migrants” (2008b:274; 2008a:103). He calls intra-European movers “prototypical European 
citizens” (Favell 2005:1), able to “build lives – careers, networks, relationships, families – 
beyond the nation-state containers that once defined personal identity and personal history” 
(2008a:3).  
As Favell remarks, the successive Eastern enlargements contributed to important 
population moves (2008c:701). The populations of Western member states47 feared the 
possible consequences of the free movement of Eastern and Central Europeans (Favell and 
Nebe 2009:206).48 Favell suggests that the latter may indeed face some “formal barriers and 
subtler forms of prejudice” (2008a: ix; see also Favell and Nebe 2009; Favell and Recchi 
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45 Erik Cohen stressed that “contrary to most other types of migrants, the expatriates often actually gain status by 
their move abroad, rather than lose it” (1977:22).  
46A number of authors point out that the assumption, concerning the high financial and social status of 
expatriates is becoming less and less true, as a result of changing human resources policies. Notably, 
competition brings down the salaries of expatriates and reduces expatriation packages, while multinational 
companies tend to recruit local skilled workforce (Leonard 2010a:76; see also Amit 2007:3; Kurotani 2007:17).  
47 See e.g., http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/anti-immigrant-feeling-in-britain-is-on-the-rise-
according-to-major-new-research-9042307.html  
48 As Favell puts it, “West European states have shown themselves to be far less keen on the movement of 
people westwards than they are on the gold rush of Western capital East” (2008c:702). 
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2009:24). After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Eastern European immigrants were described in 
public debates as “profiteers, criminals, bogus, and simply floods of foreigners” (Verstraete 
2010:90). Favell and Nebe refer to multiple studies which denounce popular fears related to 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe and predict that the EU movers from these 
countries will end up becoming “indistinguishable from their mobile West European 
counterparts” (2009:205).  
2.2.4. Eurocrats: migrants or expats? 
The EU officials are neither standard “economic migrants” 49 who leave their home country in 
order to escape poverty, nor typical expatriates, even if they seem to share certain patterns 
with these categories.  
 Much like other Brussels expatriates, the EU officials differ from economic migrants 
with their usually high level of qualification and elevated professional and economic status 
(Gatti 2009:2, 5). Cailliez counts the EU officials among the “high status foreigners” 
distinguished by their high socio-economic status and qualifications, as opposed to 
“immigrants”, defined as “occupying a subaltern position in the socio-economic structure of 
the country of settlement” (2004:10-11).50 The latter do not leave their home countries for 
economic or political reasons or because of “the precarious life conditions”, and they do not 
fit into a traditionally conceived model of assimilation into the local population (Cailliez 
2004:10). Unlike “ordinary” migrants, the mobility of EU officials is triggered by a variety of 
professional reasons, not necessarily of a directly economic nature, such as the opportunity of 
new professional experiences, which can generally be characterized as “pull” rather than 
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49 Even if, e.g., Castles and Miller seem to conceive “highly-skilled personnel” as a sub-category of economic 
migrants (2003:178). 
50 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from French and Polish are my own. 
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“push” factors (Castles and Miller 2003). 51 It is important to stress that they do not “migrate” 
to Belgium as such; they move to work in the EU institutions.  
 However, the employees of the EU institutions do not entirely belong to the category 
of expatriates either. In most cases, “expats”52 stay in Brussels for a short time, whereas EU 
officials usually settle there for a long period of time since the statutory officials are granted 
life-long employment in sharp contrast to contractual agents and temporary officials53 who 
work on renewable fixed-term contracts.54 As Ann Stevens and Handley Stevens observe, EU 
civil servants do not assume that their stay will be temporary and hence do not usually keep a 
“career base in their country of origin” (2001:131). On the other hand, as the authors observe, 
based on the plans which Eurocrats make concerning retirement and their children’s future, 
“they do not expect or aim for total assimilation of their family into their country of 
residence” (Stevens and Stevens 2001:131). Undoubtedly, the perspective of life-long stay in 
Belgium together with the privileges and rights granted, should influence their integration and 
make it different from integration patterns both of ordinary “expatriates” and common 
migrants.  
 Although the EU officials differ in significant ways from corporate expatriates in 
developing countries living lives similar to those of colonial officials, they also have 
something in common with them. Indeed, as with foreign diplomats, they enjoy a number of 
distinctive privileges, such as special vehicle registration plates or a special travel allowance 
if their home is “sufficiently far away” (Stevens and Stevens 2001:131). Most importantly, as 
with ordinary expats, “the institutional lifestyle” of the EU officials and living in a “rarefied 
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51 “Push-pull” theories of migration conceive reasons for migration as based on a combination of “push factors” 
(forcing people to leave) and “pull factors” (attracting people to come) (Castles and Miller 2003:22; see also 
Van Amersfoort 1998:14). 
52 According to Nancy L. Green, “expat” is a “colloquial abbreviation” for “expatriate”, which was popularized 
in the 1960s in British colonies (2009:323). 
53 According to the statistics provided by the European Commission, in February 2016, there were 22.244 
permanent officials, 1.086 temporary staff, 6.679 contract agents and 2.891 others on the total of 32.900. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/europa_sp2_bs_dist_staff_en.pdf  
54 Many of temporary employees stay in Brussels after the end of their second term contracts, looking for 
employment in other DGs or other EU institutions. 
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environment” separate them from the host society (Shore 2000:6). 
2.3. Starting a new life: adaptation and integration  
Attempts to conceptualize social and cultural phenomena resulting from migration have led 
to the proliferation of notions describing the social and cultural consequences of the 
encounter between migrants and the host population. Adrian Favell and Jeanette Schoorl refer 
to various terms similar to integration, such as assimilation, absorption, acculturation, 
accommodation, incorporation, inclusion, and insertion (Favell 2001b:352; Schoorl 2005:2; 
see also Vertovec 2009:77; Bosswick and Heckmann 2006:2 also mentioning adaptation). 
According to Favell, the term “integration” has replaced these similar terms, some of them 
having become “politically unfashionable” (2001b:352).  
Interactions of migrants with the host country used to be assessed from the point of 
view of assimilation into the new society (Portes and Böröcz 1989:614; Colic-Peisker 
2006:211-212) in line with “methodological nationalism” (e.g., Amelina, Faist, Glick Schiller 
and Nergiz 2012; Glick Schiller 2010; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2012; Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller 2002, 2003).55 According to the dominant nationalistic logic, migrants “arriving with 
particular distinctive national norms” are perceived as “the fundamental threat to social 
solidarity” (Glick Schiller 2010:111).56 As a result of globalisation, the analytical paradigms 
have moved, and so have the “conceptualizations of the local, national, regional, and global” 
(Glick Schiller 1997:155). Tim Cresswell claims that culture is “hybrid, dynamic” (2006:1), 
while Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller point to growing interconnectedness, with 
fluidity and movement replacing fixed boundaries, structures, and sedentariness (2002:326). 
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55 Glick Schiller defines the term as “an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social and historical 
processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states” (2010:110-111), whose 
members “are assumed to share a common history and set of values, norms, social customs and institutions 
(Beck 2000; Chernilo 2007)” (Glick Schiller 2010:111; see also Glick Schiller and Salazar 2012:9). 
56 In fact, as Wimmer and Glick Schiller observe, “the different postwar theories of immigrant integration ... all 
presuppose that the relevant entities to be related are a nation/state/society (not necessarily a homogenous one) 
on the one hand, and immigrants coming from outside this nation/state/society on the other” (2002:310). 
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Today, people often belong to more than one culture and their social relations go beyond the 
boundaries of one society (Inda and Rosaldo 2007:21-23). Several scholars stress that 
migration is no longer a one-way movement followed by settlement and integration, but a 
much more complex process (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc 1992; Brettell 
2008:120; Colic-Peisker 2006:211; Faist 2000:190; Favell 2008b:270; Grillo 2007:208; 
Morokvasic 2004:19-20; Portes 1997, 2003; Vertovec 2001). Against this background, the 
very notion of assimilation of migrants had to be reconsidered. The question emerged as to 
what integration should actually stand for and what the immigrants should (and can) actually 
integrate with.  
In reference to the American context, Barbara Schmitter Heisler states that the 
concept of assimilation has been replaced by the concepts of integration, incorporation, and 
segmented assimilation (2008:84). She also points at the recognition of a plurality of different 
incorporation models (Schmitter Heisler 2008:85). 
A possible alternative to the classic model of “straight-line assimilation”57 (Gans 
1992; Alba and Nee 1997) into the host society, may constitute “segmented assimilation” 
(Portes and Zhou 1993), which recognizes that migrants might follow various trajectories and 
come to different outcomes (assimilating in different “segments” depending on e.g., their 
race, ethnicity, and class) and accommodating the idea of parallel attachments (Vertovec 
2009:79). This was conceptualised in the nineties by the researchers Portes and Zhou (1993) 
and entails that the host society cannot be regarded as monolithic (Colic-Peisker 2006:213). 
Eriksen alludes to segmented assimilation (without referring to it explicitly) when he 
mentions integration into a community (Gemeinschaft) as an alternative to integration into 
the society (Gesellschaft) (Eriksen 2007:1061, see infra)  
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57 In the classic model, assimilation is seen as “a largely one-way process”, entailing that “the minority group 
adopt[s] the core culture” of the host society (Alba and Nee 1997:830; see also Bosswick and Heckman 2006:6). 
In line with this model, assimilation followed a downward and straight line trend that would inevitably end with 
the eventual total disappearance of all traces of ethnicity after several native-born generations” (Gans 1992:44; 
see also Grzymała-Kazłowska 2008:43-44). 
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In this section I briefly explain the concepts related to the “adjustment” of Polish EU 
officials as referred to in my thesis.  
2.3.1. Complexity in social and cultural integration 
Eriksen (2007) proposes a view on social processes (and notably the integration of migrants) 
which takes into account the complexity of research perspectives and the situations 
researched. He argues that this approach lets us to go beyond single-factor reasoning and 
describe the researched patterns in a much more precise manner (without pretensions to 
exhaustiveness) and to reconcile different views and analyses. As applied to the analysis of 
relations between migrant groups and the host society, this approach allows one to multiply 
(legitimate) narratives, taking into account a variety of definitions of each of the groups 
involved, the differing attitudes and aspirations of such groups (open/closed), the type of 
relations and processes scrutinized (social/cultural), and the factors at the origin of the 
process (chosen/enforced) (Eriksen 2007).  
The example explored by Eriksen (2007) is not exactly the same as the subject of this 
research. It is true that my research group are not “ordinary” migrants but a hybrid between 
economic migrants and expatriates. There are, nonetheless, important similarities and the 
patterns of analysis proposed by Eriksen seem perfectly relevant.  
The first nuance must be introduced in defining the local society. Semantically, this 
term should embrace the totality of the Brussels population who are permanently settled there 
and considering themselves as such. However, this group is culturally diverse and not fully 
socially coherent. Without entering into details, it is enough to mention that it embraces, in 
addition to the French-speaking autochtonous majority, an important Flemish autochtonous 
minority, as well as several groups which are either viewed or see themselves as distinct on 
the basis of their religious, linguistic, or ethnic specificities. Whenever I asked questions 
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containing references to the local people, the answers of my respondents mostly suggested an 
understanding of this term as limited to the “mainstream” Belgians, thus tacitly excluding 
these culturally and socially distinct communities. For this reason, to be faithful to the “emic” 
approach, I use the term “local” in this meaning (unless otherwise specified and except for 
where the cultural categorisation is not relevant in a given case). Further specifications and 
sub-divisions are possible, based on such criteria as profession, lifestyle, political activism, or 
particular hobbies. However, although patterns of integration into, for example, the local gay 
community, Pentecostal community, or dog breeding community may indeed present 
important specificities, it was impossible to take them all into account, even if the relations 
between these sub-groups and the corresponding sub-groups of Polish EU officials might be 
substantially different than the relations between the “main” groups. Nevertheless, the 
accounts of my respondents and interviewees deviated sometimes from the mainstream due 
to the fact that they were, for example, involved in political activism or belonged to 
supranational associations (like the Rotary Club).  
Importantly, the local society in the broader sense also embraces, on one hand, other 
Polish people and, on the other, other EU officials and expats. These sub-groups needed to be 
considered separately, as they were, by their very nature, positioned very differently towards 
my research group as compared to other inhabitants of Brussels.  
Another important aspect is the determination of the actual aspirations of the research 
participants, as well as possible pressure from the host (Belgian) society, and thus the 
existence of internal or external pressure. Eriksen notes that: 
Minorities, it is often tacitly assumed, ought to be “integrated” into the host society, for their 
own benefit and that of greater society. However, since there are very important differences 
between the adaptations between individual immigrants, ethnic and religious immigrant 
groups, and between majority individuals, groups and greater society, some clarification is 
needed. What exactly is it that we are talking about when we say “cultural complexity”? 
(2007:1060) 
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In the case of my research group, this observation and the following question must be 
further nuanced. Intuitively, it is obvious that EU officials are not a minority in the same 
sense as ethnic minorities or typical immigrant communities, such as (for example) Turks or 
Italians in Brussels. On the other hand, if Eriksen’s reflections on the application of 
complexity to social and cultural integration may be far less relevant in the case of the 
majority of short-term expatriates, they may still be usefully applied to EU officials whose 
stay in Brussels is usually much longer.  
Different fractions or sub-groups of the local society may show unequal openness 
towards other groups, such as Polish EU officials. They may be willing to accept certain 
elements of their cultural difference or expect full submission to the local ways. They might 
be willing to include them in their social life or merely tolerate their presence. Similarly, the 
host society may either expect different newcomers to integrate in the new country or may 
not have such expectations, and this might also vary depending on its specific segment.58  
EU officials usually either come to Brussels as appointed officials, in which case they 
may envisage permanent, life-long settlement in Brussels, or at least with the objective of 
passing the concours and turning their contract into such a longer term appointment.  
However, individual motivations may differ. Some of my respondents may intend to 
leave the institutions after some time. Independently of whether they will actually do it or 
change their plan after a few years, the initial attitude may affect their lifestyle and their 
social relations. Some of these individuals might be willing to achieve a higher level of 
integration in Belgian society – both social, by participation in the social life and structures of 
the host society, and cultural, by learning the language and adopting certain elements of the 
lifestyle of the local people. Others might want to do it in a selective manner, for example by 
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58 I heard several French speaking Belgians expressing disappointment and lack of understanding for EU 
officials and their families for not mastering the French language. Equally, I spoke to several Flemish people 
who indirectly referred to the cultural integration of EU officials and other expats into the French-speaking 
majority as a factor contributing to the progressive loss of the Flemish character of the Flemish capital. 
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showing openness towards certain elements of the local society in the broader sense and 
excluding other elements (e.g., certain linguistic or immigrant communities). They might 
agree to socialize with Belgians, but refuse any other participation in social and political life, 
such as voting in local elections. They might tend to integrate socially but not culturally, 
sticking to their lifestyles and preferences, or vice versa.  
In this regard, it is worth mentioning Eriksen’s observation that integration may also 
occur at different levels, for instance at the level of the society and at the level of the 
community (2007:1061). In the case of my research group, one might consider their relations 
with Belgian society, but also with different communities, such as the Poles in Brussels, the 
other EU officials, and the international expatriate community. 
Finally, any sort of integration into Brussels may be associated with other, parallel 
social activities in Poland, other European countries, and Polish groupings in Brussels. 
Getting closer to the host society does not necessarily imply abandoning or even relaxing 
one’s ties with other countries or groups. This phenomenon, known as transnationalism, has 
been considered particularly common among expatriates. 
Obviously, this complex picture cannot be studied in its entirety in the context of one 
study. My research has concerned Polish EU officials in Brussels, hence certain external 
factors influencing their life in Brussels and their relations with the host society are referred 
to and taken into account only insofar as they come up with my research participants or based 
on earlier literature on the subject. Most importantly, my ambition is to describe and 
understand certain patterns concerning the adaptation and identifications of Polish EU 
officials in Brussels and not to give a full, detailed picture of this phenomenon or construct 
any universally applicable model. Therefore, some of the aforementioned aspects will serve 
only as a background; I refer to them with “inverted commas” to indicate the limited and 
somewhat conventional validity of my findings. 
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2.3.2. Integration 
Schoorl contends that integration is commonly defined as “the process by which immigrants 
become part of the social cultural and institutional fabric of the receiving society” (2005:1). 
Still, as Grzymała-Kazłowska and Łodziński observe, the term is used in different domains in 
different ways (for research purposes, but also e.g., in political discourses) and is traditionally 
understood in different manners in different countries (2008:245). Similarly, following 
Bosswick and Heckmann, integration may be “understood as the process of inclusion of 
immigrants in the institutions and relationships of the host society” (2006:1). 
John W. Berry distinguishes integration as one of the four acculturation strategies,59 
characterised by an interest in maintaining the original culture and in participation in the host 
society’s interactions (Berry 2005:704; see also Berry et al. 2002:354).  
This approach is echoed in anthropology by Eriksen who mentions “three principal 
strategies” applied by states “in their dealings with minorities”, notably, “segregation”, 
“assimilation”, and “integration” (2015:355-356). In short, “segregation” leads to a situation 
in which “the minority group becomes physically separated from the majority” (Eriksen 
2015:355); “assimilation” is seen as “a possible outcome” consisting in the eventual melting 
of a minority into a majority group (Eriksen 2015:356). Last but not least, “integration” 
“usually refers to participation in the shared institutions of society, combined with the 
maintenance of group identity and some degree of cultural distinctiveness. It represents a 
compromise between the two other main options” (Eriksen 2015:356).  
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59 Among the four acculturation strategies distinguished by Berry, “assimilation” stands for a strategy where 
individuals are keen on abandoning their cultural identity and are willing to melt in the dominant society, 
“integration” is a strategy, where individuals are interested both in participating in interactions within the 
dominant group and in maintaining their culture of origin, while interest in preserving one’s original culture 
coupled with reluctance to interact with the dominant group is qualified as “separation”. Finally, lack of interest 
both in preserving the original culture and in the absorption in the dominant society is qualified as 
“marginalization” (Berry 2005:705; see also Berry 1997:9). Berry also remarks that the choice of the strategy is 
sometimes imposed or influenced by the dominant group. In this case, the author re-qualifies assimilation, 
separation, marginalization and integration as, respectively, “melting pot”, “segregation”, “exclusion” and 
“multiculturalism” (Berry 2005:706). 
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Berry (1991) stressed that a necessary condition for integration to be successfully 
pursued by non-dominant groups is the openness and inclusiveness of the dominant society 
(Berry 1997:10; 2005:705). !
Schoorl identifies four significant dimensions of integration. These are: (1) “structural 
integration”,60 referring to the access of immigrants to “the major institutions of society, such 
as education, the labour and housing markets, the political system, health care services, etc.”, 
(2) “social integration”, concerning the intensity and nature of interactions with members of 
the host society, (3) “cultural integration” which stands for sharing “the same norms, values 
and preferences”, and (4) “the identity dimension” (Schoorl 2005:2; see also Alaminos and 
Santacreu 2009:101).  
As further developed by Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu, “social integration” 
refers to the migrants’ acquaintances, and its level can be measured by “the number and 
nationality of friends” and the ability to communicate in the host country’s language as a 
necessary condition for interaction (2009:102). According to the authors, “cultural 
integration” refers to preference for the host country’s culture, “their acceptance of values 
and lifestyles different from those of their country of origin” (2009:109), determining their 
“strategies for dealing with the new society of residence” (2009:103). “Cultural integration” 
cannot be easily measured, as it refers to subjective attitudes (Alaminos and Santacreu 
2009:110). The scholars add that integration is also influenced by the immigrants’ intention 
to stay or move further (or back). The authors also remark that the different levels of 
integration do not necessarily advance at the same pace. Importantly, as they argue, “in order 
to better understand the complex interplay between cultural and social integration, we need to 
know not only how migrants feel, but also how they feel they are perceived by the society 
around them” (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009:112). This is in line with the approach proposed 
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60 Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) refer to “structural integration” as “socioeconomic integration”. 
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by Eriksen (2007). 
This is the reason why I investigated the stereotyping and anticipated image of the 
Poles and EU officials during my research, as perceived and felt by the Polish EU officials 
themselves. The authors note that, “even in Western European societies, where cultural 
distance is not dramatic ... , EU citizens living abroad may still feel discriminated against” 
(Alaminos and Santacreu 2009:112). 
The concept of “social integration” has also been explored by Wolfgang Bosswick 
and Friedrich Heckmann (2006). The authors describe the phenomenon as “the inclusion and 
acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships and positions of a host 
society” (2006:11). As has been emphasized, immigrants do not necessarily integrate with the 
majority, and immigration can instead result in segregation following the “reproduction of 
ethnic identity and integration into an ethnic colony”, in “segmented integration into a 
subculture” or in marginalization (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006:11). 
The authors also further define “cultural integration” (understood as one of the 
dimensions of social integration) as referring to the acquisition of the essential competencies 
of the culture of the host society, implying “cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change” 
(Bosswick and Heckmann 2006:9-10). This meaning of “cultural integration” seems to 
broadly correspond to the meaning given by my interviewees and respondents to 
“adaptation”. 
2.3.3. Adaptation 
As defined by John W. Berry, adaptation, “refers to the relatively stable changes that take 
place in any individual or group in response to external demands” (Berry 2005:709; see also 
Berry 1997:13). While drawing on Ward (1996), Berry refers to adaptation as a double 
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phenomenon in that it is both psychological61 and sociocultural (2005:709). Its first aspect 
refers to “one’s psychological and physical well-being”, whereas the second refers to the 
ability to cope with everyday life in the new cultural context (Berry 2005:709; see also Berry 
1997:20; Berry et al. 2002:370).62  
Adaptation, as defined above, does not always bring the individuals concerned closer 
to the group they live in (ibid.). The response to external demands may actually take the form 
of resistance, separation, or active endeavours to change the group (Berry 2005:709; Berry 
1997:20; Berry et al. 2002:370) – in this case, the host society. The author suggests that the 
two aforementioned types of adaptation may have different dynamics in this respect: 
psychological adaptation involves “problems” in the initial phase and subsequent 
improvement, with possible remissions and a variable rhythm, while sociocultural adaptation 
“typically has a linear improvement with time” (Berry 2005:709; Berry 1997:20; Berry et al. 
2002: 370).  
The above definition seems to broadly correspond to the understanding of the notion 
which my research participants had. They perceived adaptation as a more superficial process, 
permitting them to live and function normally in a foreign society, as opposed to 
“integration”, perceived as a step further towards the host society. 
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61 Alaminos and Santacreu (2009) list indicators of a “psychological adaptation”. One of such indicators is 
homesickness with regard to “family, friends and food” (“primary groups”), the “civic culture of the migrants’ 
country of origin” (“social norms”) and its lifestyles, hence “traditions, customs, folklore, celebrations” 
(“culture”) (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009:117). 
62 Similarly, with reference to “adjustment” of expatriates, Aycan (1997) sees the process as a multidimensional 
phenomenon and distinguishes between psychological, socio-cultural and work adjustment. The first refers to 
“mental health or psychological well-being”, the second to the ability to smoothly function in the society 
(including “engaging in positive interpersonal relations with the members of the host society”), while the last is 
related to positive attitude to one’s work and ability to effective discharge of tasks (Aycan 1997:436-437). 
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2.3.4. Transnationalism  
As mentioned earlier, in the past immigrants were perceived as uprooted people who “come 
to stay” and “pledge allegiance” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1995:4) and were 
naturally meant to be incorporated into the new culture and society (Glick Schiller, Basch, 
and Szanton Blanc 1995:48; see also Rouse 1992:25-26). However, these days are gone 
(Vertovec 2001:574). Since the 1990s, the transnationalism perspective has gained in 
popularity and may be seen as an attempt to take into account the developments leading to 
the decline in popularity of the abovementioned “‘straight-line’ assimilation” model which is 
strongly rooted in “methodological nationalism” (Colic-Peisker 2006:212-213).  
Transnational migration can be defined as “the process by which immigrants forge and 
sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin 
and settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1995:48).63 As Eriksen observes, “transnationalism 
directs attention, rather, to a social existenceattaching individuals and groups not primarily 
to one particular place, but to several or none” (2015:313). Importantly, their “public 
identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state (Glick Schiller et al. 
1992a; Basch et al. 1994)” (Glick Schiller et al. 1995:48). According to Basch et al., a 
characteristic feature of “transnationalism” is “the multiplicity of involvements that 
transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies” (1995:7; see also Vertovec 2001:573).  
Steven Vertovec emphasizes “the complex relationships between modes of 
transnationalism and integration” (2009:79).64 As Vertovec goes on to say, migrants can 
become integrated into the new country, develop loyalty and a sense of belonging, and yet 
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63 However, Schmitter Heisler (2008) expresses her scepticism with the concept. While acknowledging the 
existence of the phenomenon, thus immigrants engaged in home-country related activities and maintaining 
intensive links within the home country, she challenges the need for conceptualization of this phenomenon 
(Schmitter Heisler 2008:96).  
64 Importantly, Marta Kindler contends that the transnationalist approach challenged the traditional idea that ties 
in the country of origin pose an obstacle to integration. On the contrary, transnational ties are perceived as a 
factor facilitating inclusion and functioning in the country of settlement (2008:71). 
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“the strongest senses of cohesion or belonging may remain with others in a homeland or 
elsewhere in a diaspora” (2009:78). As he stresses, this is not a “zero sum game” and various 
attachments do not need to be mutually detrimental while the connections established or 
maintained do not need to be total, but may well remain partial and selective (Vertovec 
2009:80).  
Many migrants still attach great importance to the social networks left behind in the 
country of origin (Hyvönen 2008:421), especially in the initial period after arrival in a new 
country (2008:431). As Heli Hyvönen suggests, this may be due to the challenges of living in 
a new country and the lack of social networks, but also to “confusion about the foreign society 
and its customs” (2008:431). Favell considers that, although links with family usually remain 
substantially intact, maintaining contacts with friends back home is often a challenge 
(2008a:203). 
Caroline B. Brettell remarks that the concept of transnationalism catches up with the 
development of new modes of communication and transportation that “have shortened the 
social distance between sending and receiving societies” (2008:120; see also Castles and 
Miller 2003:47; Vertovec 1999:451-452).65 According to Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 
highly-skilled professionals are even more likely than other categories of “movers”, to form 
or join transnational communities due to their easier access to the infrastructure which lets 
them cultivate such links (Portes et al. 1999: 224; see also Favell 2003b: 399, 401). However, 
this could be more true fifteen years ago when electronic means of instantaneous 
communication were more expensive and less widespread than today.  
Jonathan Beaverstock found that British expatriates in New York communicated on a 
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65!Basch et al. (1995) observes, it is not technology which enabled this phenomenon (see also Colic-Peisker 
2006:212; Portes et al. 1999:224; Vertovec 1999:447, 449), but transnational ties are rather due to social and 
economic factors, as, “the current moment of capitalism as a global mode of production that has necessitated the 
maintenance of family ties and political allegiances among persons spread across the globe” (Basch et al. 
1995:24). Grzymała-Kazłowska and Łodziński mention also the increase of knowledge and cultural competences 
of migrants among the reasons for the change (2011:22). 
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daily basis, via email, telephone, or video-conferencing with former colleagues, friends, and 
family back in their country of origin (2005:266). An important part of the social life of both 
categories of expatriates distinguished by Fechter (young professionals and family 
expatriates) consisted of contacts maintained through virtual space (2007b:54, 137-138; see 
also Butcher 2009:1364). The Internet was used to maintain existing (transnational) social 
networks and to get social support from family or friends at home (Fechter 2007b:137).66 
Based on her research on Croatian migrants in Australia, Val Colic-Peisker 
distinguishes between two types of transnationalism based on social class and cultural capital, 
namely the “ethnic” (bi-national) transnationalism of working-class migrants67 and the 
“cosmopolitan” (trans-national) transnationalism of middle-class professionals (2006:220). 
She describes “ethnic transnationalism” as “an enduring connection of migrants with their 
place and community of origin” (Colic-Peisker 2006:220) based on an “ethnic component of 
identity” (2006:220). By contrast, “cosmopolitan transnationalism” is based on their “de-
territorial, acquired … professional identification” as members of the global, mobile middle-
class and “transcends the ethno-national and territorial principle” (Colic-Peisker 2006:223). 
As she concludes, “‘cosmopolitan transnationalism’, develops through immersion of migrants 
into another culture and their cultural and identity extension and hybridization” (Colic-Peisker 
2006: 226). The middle-class professionals described in her study did not consider their stay 
in Australia to be final and, consequently, they “developed a type of cosmopolitan identity, 
using their Australian acculturation as a stepping stone” (Colic-Peisker 2006:222-223). 
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66 A few years earlier, Vertovec described “cheap calls” as “a kind of social glue connecting small-scale social 
formations across the globe” (2004:220). 
67 In the sense as described by Alejandro Portes and his colleagues who already in the 1990s pointed at “a 
growing number of persons who live dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and 
making a living through continuous regular contact across national borders” (Portes et al. 1999:217). Kay Deaux 
draws attention to the altered pattern on experiences of the migrants today: instead of being immersed in a 
foreign environment, one usually settles in a very similar community to the one at home (2006:25).  
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2.3.5. Integration and adaptation of expatriates in Brussels 
Favell refers to the common – as he sees it – idea that privileged, mobile professionals are 
subject neither to discrimination and barriers nor to the integrative pressure often experienced 
by poorer, “‘ethnic’ migrants” (2001a:18). They are perceived as those who can benefit from 
and capitalise on “their transnational lifestyles and mobility” without being exposed to the 
negative aspects of expatriation (Favell 2001a:18). Faist adds that their adaptation looks 
different from the adaptation patterns characteristic to labour migrants (2004:25).  
However, Favell, Feldblum, and Smith challenge this idea and claim that these 
“human capital-rich” people face similar problems of “discrimination, exploitation and/or 
exclusion” as other categories of foreigners (2007:21; see also Favell 2003b:423; Fechter 
2007a, 2007b).  
Also in Brussels, “expats” are believed not to integrate into the host society any better 
than other migrants (Gatti 2009:3). Cailliez does not see any point in speaking about the 
integration or assimilation of this population simply because “high-status foreigners” do not 
want it and instead they prefer to stick to their status of being foreigners (2004:10). On the 
other hand, Favell observes that the attitude of Belgians to European foreigners settled in 
Brussels is usually and increasingly (with successive enlargements) based on negative 
stereotypes (2008a:49).  
Favell contends that the life of highly skilled mobile professionals abroad, “liberated 
from ‘national’ lifestyles, values and constraints”, is “merely an extension of the life they 
would have back home” (2003b:402). As a result, Jonathan X. Inda and Renato Rosaldo 
remark that their trans-cultural and trans-national competencies take them away from “the 
nationalizing apparatuses of the nation-state” (2007:23). Favell claims that highly skilled 
professionals do not really have to, or are not eager to, integrate with Belgians because they 
feel adapted to the international strata of inhabitants of a “global city” (2008a:54-55; 
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2003b:413; 2001a:47). They are at least able to “acculturate selectively”, according to their 
specific needs and preferences (Favell 2003b:413). In this regard, Favell, Feldblum, and 
Smith refer to the integration of this group as “integration à la carte”, where individuals 
choose aspects of the host culture and sphere of life of the host society that they want to 
integrate with, a series of opt-ins and opt-outs (Favell et al. 2007:21). Favell (2001a) suggests 
that, for “free movers”, the heterogeneity of host societies changes the perception of 
integration. This is the case with Brussels which cannot be ascribed to one particular 
dominant culture and where a variety of cultures coexist within the city (Favell 2001a:47). 
According to the scholar, the multicultural character of the city provides multiple avenues of 
integration and favours the development of a “strong identification with the city” (Favell 
2001a:47). Therefore, Favell proposes an alternative to integration into Belgian culture, 
namely integration with the “international, multicultural city” (2001a:47; 2008a:54-55). The 
author suggests that the absence of “assimilative ‘national’ pressures” is a unique 
phenomenon which is specific to Brussels (Favell 2001a:4; 2008a:57). As he explains, even if 
foreign residents might actually have an interest in integration, they “should not be expected 
to integrate into Belgian social circles”, as Brussels is “a genuinely international space” 
(Favell 2001a:4; see also 2008a:55). The author claims that “European foreign residents” in 
Brussels are already well integrated in economic terms through their participation as 
consumers and service users, and in social and cultural terms through their participation in 
expatriate networks and cultural activities (Favell 2001a:47; see also 2008a:51). What Favell 
labels “integration into Brussels” (2008a:54) appears to be, in fact, integration into the 
expatriate, or more generally, international part of the city and the specificity of Brussels in 
this regard seems to be mainly the size of the affluent, non-economic-migrant, foreign 
population, but also the heterogeneity of the local population in a broader sense.  
However, Favell et al. saw drawbacks in what they referred to as “selective 
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integration” (2007:21). This type of integration hardly ever works in the sense that the 
foreigners effectively remain outside the host society and have little impact, politically or 
socially, on their functioning (2007:21). Indeed, the analysis of Favell must be read in the 
context of the objectives of such “integration into the city” (2001a:47). If what Favell means 
is the ability to function smoothly (what I will refer to, following the practice of my research 
participants, as “adaptation”), then, indeed, no extensive contacts with the host population are 
necessary. Participation in social and cultural life can also be secured, but if the objective was 
to influence local matters or even have some form of co-ownership of the city space, such 
segmented integration does not seem to be an adequate tool for achieving it. 
The question sketched by the authors quoted above comes down to the very notion of 
“integration”. Can one be “integrated into a city” (or rather the international segment of the 
city) without being “integrated into a country”? Being a service user or consumer may stand 
for integration only from an economic point of view. The question should be approached in 
abstraction from a political discourse, without any “should” or “should not integrate”.!
2.3.6. Integration of EU officials in Brussels 
In terms of integration, the situation of EU civil servants seems to be even more complicated 
than that of ordinary “expats” in Brussels. This is related to several factors, one of which is 
that by contrast with most of the “expatriates”, many EU officials have life-long contracts that 
bind them to the new country of settlement. Thus, it can be assumed that they have much 
stronger incentives to adapt and integrate. Undoubtedly, another important factor is the 
location of the EU institutions and the strong European presence in the city. As described by, 
inter alia, Shore (2000) and Bellier (2002), they are strongly embedded in their work-related 
environment. This specific process of engrenage (or “enmeshing”) is here understood as “a 
mechanism of institutional and ideological incorporation” (Shore 2000:148). It favours a 
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strong sense of community amongst the EU employees, a common lifestyle, and some 
specific “rituals”.68  
Suvarierol believes the EU officials prize the multinational, pluri-cultural character of 
Brussels (2009:424-5; see also Cailliez 2004:63) which facilitates their integration into the 
international strata of the city, as expatriates are open to new acquaintances (Suvarierol 
2009:425). On the other hand, as the author states after Cailliez (2004), some of them “never 
feel at home in Brussels”, perceiving it merely as a place of work (2009:425).  
Indeed, it is frequently assumed, that the EU civil servants do not integrate with the 
host society (Shore 2000:162). Favell argues that the perception of their unwillingness to 
“integrate into Belgian life” is, in fact, at the origin of the majority of negative stereotypes 
concerning them (2008a:54). While explaining the specific context in which the EU officials 
evolve in Brussels, Shore emphasizes the importance of “the social and geographical setting 
in which the Commission is located” (2000:153), while Favell refers to anti-European 
resentments among the local population, due, inter alia, to rising property prices (2005:13). 
The Eurocrats and the Belgians “live side by side but in separate worlds” (Suvarierol 
2009:425; see also Abélès et al. 1993:23; Shore 2000:162; Cailliez 2004:55, 83). Rudi 
Janssens explains this limited contact with the local population by the fact that EU officials 
“came to Brussels with a specific assignment that guaranteed employment” and have 
insignificant professional contact with Belgians both as colleagues and customers (as the 
institutions are “not part of the local economy”) (2008:433). Furthermore, they are segregated 
in space, as they settle in the same areas close to foreign schools (Janssens 2008: 433, 418).  
Cailliez draws attention to a somewhat related factor, linked to seclusion from the host 
society, notably the existence of spaces and a specific infrastructure reserved specifically for 
the employees of EU institutions and their families and aimed at the facilitation of the process 
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68 The concept of engrenage will be developed in a forthcoming chapter.  
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of moving to Belgium (e.g., kindergartens, international schools, and sport and cultural 
centres) (2004:23). Indeed, as Janssens observes, EU officials develop their personal networks 
via clubs and associations (2008:427). As Cailliez argues, “all these activities, associations or 
infrastructure” are at the basis of evolving in parallel to the host society (2004:55). At the 
same time, this parallel world does not prevent them from exploiting the other resources of 
Brussels (e.g., cinemas, commercial centres, bars and restaurants, sport clubs, museums, 
music festivals, etc.) (Cailliez 2004:55). 
2.4. Expatriates and EU officials in the host society 
The literature on highly skilled mobile professionals and the strategies they use in the host 
environment is relevant for the subject of my study, as my research group (as it will be 
explained) shares many characteristics with this category of mobile individuals (that I will 
refer to as expatriates). However, they also differ on several respects from, usually 
“sedentarised”, employees of the EU institutions. I will therefore complement the picture 
with the existing literature dedicated, more specifically, to EU officials.  
2.4.1. Creation and manipulation of “social boundaries” in the expatriate world  
Anne-Meike Fechter stresses the importance of boundaries in shaping expatriates’ lives 
abroad and their contacts with the local population (2007a:35, 37; 2007b:17). Fechter 
suggests that corporate expatriates are “externally bounded”, however, as she stresses, these 
boundaries not only separate them from the local environment, but also divide the expatriate 
world internally (2007a:37). As she notes, expatriates deliberately erect, maintain, and use 
boundaries and modify spaces so as to distance themselves from the country they live in, in 
this case, Indonesia (Fechter 2007a:37; 2007b:26).69 Expatriates themselves often employ 
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69!Fechter observes that the older expats with family usually try to reproduce their national ways of life, while 
“young professionals seem to aspire to more international, ‘global’ lifestyles” (2007b:129). As she explains, 
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such metaphors as living in a “bubble”, “bunker”, “ghetto”, “hothouse”, “golden cage”, or in a 
“Disneyland” to describe their situation (Fechter 2007a: 37-38; see also 2007b:41, 151-152). 
Fechter also refers to Favell (2003b:401, 423; 2004) who argues that privileged “migrants” 
can also be the victims of boundaries imposed on them by the host society (Fechter 2007b:23-
24, 26; see also 2007a:34-35). 
 The expatriate “bubble” embraces not only their social contacts but also spatial 
arrangements (Fechter 2007b:73) which are one of the examples of the premeditated use of 
boundaries.  
2.4.2. Within the boundaries: the social life of expatriates 
In the academic literature, expatriate communities are often pictured as “socially self-
sufficient and isolated” (E. Cohen 1977:60), or metaphorically referred to as “living in a 
bubble” (see e.g., Butcher 2009:1362; E. Cohen 1977:57; Farrer 2010:1224; Fechter 
2007a:47; 2007b:41, 151; Leonard 2010a:72). Manuel Castells describes corporate elites as 
creating homogenous and distinctive communities, disembedded from the local population 
(2010 [1996]:446-447). National expatriate communities create their own “communal 
services and organizations” such as different associations, clubs, schools, and religious 
institutions that help them live as if they had never left home (E. Cohen 1977:36-37; see also 
Coles and Walsh 2010; Fechter 2007a, 2007b; Leonard 2010b, 2010a). As Jonathan V. 
Beaverstock notes, the social networking between expatriates is particularly important in the 
early period shortly after arrival (2002:535). !
 Pauline Leonard claims that the workplace is often “the first point of entry to the new 
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“family expatriates”, tend to live in a kind of social ‘bubble’, separating them from both local population and 
other communities of expats, and their social circles are restricted to co-nationals (Fechter 2007b:128), while 
“young global professionals” usually socialise with other expats, although still remain separated from the local 
population (Fechter 2007b:10, 129). Fechter adds yet another category, notably, “non-corporate expatriates”, 
who decided to come on their own initiative, often out of the interest in the local culture and people (2007b:140). 
These expatriates avoid being closed in any “bubble”, usually seek contact with the locals, while their lifestyles 
often do not differ from those of the Indonesians (Fechter 2007b: 140-142). 
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life”, and, as such, significantly affects the “social and personal relations and identities” of 
newcomers (2010a:3; see also Beaverstock 2005:261).70 Beaverstock’s research on British 
expatriates employed in international financial centres in Singapore has concluded that they 
tend to maintain contacts with other expatriates of all nationalities while avoiding contact with 
local (in this case) Singaporeans (2002:532-534). Beaverstock points out that the boundaries 
between work and the private sphere are blurred, as expatriates use membership of formalised 
business associations, various sport clubs, sport venues, and events as “key sites” to build 
their networks for business purposes (2002:534-536; see also Fechter 2007b:69). 
Interestingly, the research conducted by the same scholar on British inter-company transferees 
in New York has shown that (with the exception of young single newcomers)71 it was only at 
the beginning of their stay abroad that they were encapsulated in “work-related ‘expatriate 
cliques’” (Beaverstock 2005:261). With time, networking activities focused on the 
surrounding environment of their place of residence and also embraced British nationals from 
outside their work (Beaverstock 2005:266).  
 Melissa Butcher (2009), studying Australians in Asia, has shown that the social 
networks of mobile professionals (again, especially at the beginning of their stay abroad) 
mostly tend to include other work colleagues, although not necessarily of the same nationality 
(2009:1361). In fact, belonging to the same cultural group and ease of communication were 
found to be more integrative factors than nationality (Butcher 2009:1360, 1361).  
 Several authors have traced certain common characteristics of social network formation 
outside of the sphere strictly designated for work (e.g., Beaverstock 2002, 2005, 2011; 
Fechter 2007a, 2007b; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). In the case of those expats who had 
moved abroad together with their families, social networks were often established through 
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70 The workplace plays an important role when it regards establishing social contacts with the members of a 
local population (Butcher 2009:1359).  
71 Beaverstock observed that “singles” living outside of the expatriate enclaves found it “difficult to forge 
friendships beyond the workplace”, mainly because of long working hours (2005:263). 
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children72 (e.g., via school related activities) or spouses (Beaverstock 2002:535; 2005:262; 
see also Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014:100-105), and were often restricted to their own 
national group (Beaverstock 2005:262; Fechter 2007b:105). Likewise, in the context of UN 
professionals researched by Magdalena Nowicka and Ramin Kaweh, international schools 
were perceived as places where new acquaintances could be made (2009:61).  
 Several authors also point at the important role of expatriate clubs (e.g., Coles and 
Walsh 2010:1322; Leonard 2010a:81; 2010b:1255; Beaverstock 2011:716; Cohen 1977:41) 
“in structuring the social fabric” in the expatriate context (Leonard 2010b:1255), which, 
according to Coles and Walsh, provide an opportunity for like-minded people to meet and be 
in a familiar cultural context (2010:1323).  
2.4.3. Across the boundaries: “expatriates’ spaces”  
Expatriates’ seclusion in space73 is not limited to housing in distinct expatriate 
neighbourhoods, but extends to the aforementioned social clubs, international schools for 
children, wives’ associations, bars, night-clubs, restaurants, and sport clubs (Beaverstock 
2002:534-537; 2011:712, 715-716, 719; Butcher 2009:1362; E. Cohen 1977:16, 57; Coles and 
Walsh 2010:1322-1323; Farrer 2010:1224; Fechter 2007a, 2007b; Leonard 2010a:81; 
2010b:1255). As David Ley observes, “the foreshortened time and space create a 
circumscribed lifeworld around work, bars, and sporting and expatriate clubs” (2004:157). 
James Farrer remarks that in the context of Western expatriates in Shanghai, “living in the 
expat ‘village’ could involve a social whirlwind that left little time for other activities, 
including socialising with ‘locals’” (2010:1224). Butcher suggests that for the majority of 
expatriates, the local people would rather belong to a category of “acquaintances” than close 
friends (2009:1361).  
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72 The role of children’s activities in establishing social ties with the local population was emphasized also by 
Hyvönen (2008:428). 
73 The concept of space is explained in subsection 2.5.2.!
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 The reasons for this situation are multiple: on the expatriates’ side, they relate in 
particular to their lack of cultural competence (Butcher 2009:1360; E. Cohen 1977:57; 
Kennedy 2009:26; Li et al. 1995:351) and the temporary character of their presence (E. Cohen 
1977:57; Amit 2007:9; Butcher 2009:1359; Favell 2008a:49; Gatti 2009:5; Kennedy 2009: 
26-27), and on the local side to the impermeability of their existing networks and social 
structures (Kennedy 2009:27). As Butcher suggests, the difficulty of setting up more 
meaningful relations with the host society was particularly due to the attitude of the locals, 
who perceived expatriates as transient (2009:1359), but also from “the awareness of 
difference” and a “lack of shared cultural frames of reference and meaning” (2009:1360). 
 Coles and Walsh argue that separation from the local society is actually wanted by both 
groups (2010:1323). Nowicka and Kaweh observe that poor language skills can be one of the 
reasons why the social networks of (UN) international professionals are limited to other 
internationals (2009:61; see also Coles and Walsh 2010:1330; Kennedy 2009:26; Li et al. 
1995:351). 
2.4.4. Social life of expats in Brussels  
The actual level and target of (social) integration of members of an incoming group can be 
best observed through their socialising practices. These practices are very much about 
erecting and crossing boundaries. As such, they are an essential element of building or 
accessing communities. 
 Cailliez emphasizes the importance of socialising practices between foreigners, 
especially at the initial phase of their stay abroad (2004:24) which she perceives as easier for 
linguistic reasons, but also offering the possibility of exchange on expat-life-related topics of 
common interest (such as solitude, cultural differences, and separation from families and 
friends who stayed in the home country) (Cailliez 2004:82). Favell observes that expatriate 
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networks are an important source of information as regards housing, new friends, and new 
opportunities (2008a:78). Based on his research, he adds that few EU expats74 reported 
acquaintances or participation in important social networks outside of their compatriots or 
other foreigners, except for those who intermarry (2003b:418). 
The situation of Brussels expats caught in “an expat bubble” can be seen, in certain 
regards, as corresponding to the clichés about “foreign expats in big cities” living in “quasi-
colonial national ghettos” (using the expression of Favell 2008a:122-123; on the latter see 
also E. Cohen 1977:8; Fechter 2007b:2, 27-29, 2010; Fechter and Walsh 2010). Indeed, as 
Emanuele Gatti observes, Brussels expatriates are often presented as separated from Belgians 
by “invisible barriers” and hence having limited contacts with them (2009:5). 
Favell states that foreign affluent residents hardly ever enter Belgian social networks 
in Brussels (2008a:123). Very few of them have many “local” (non-expatriate) friends outside 
the work context, while they find the international network to be strong and supportive (Favell 
2008a:123). By contrast, Cailliez argues that, with time, the boundaries of their social 
networks can be extended and progressively also come to include people from the host society 
(2004:24). Favell suggests that international networks may include especially those local 
people who had also lived abroad (2008a:123). Out of several different factors leading to the 
alienation of Brussels expatriates from Belgians, the reasons for which lay on both sides 
(Cailliez 2004), Cailliez distinguishes a few that can be ascribed specifically to expatriates. 
She argues that it is the fact that they have a lot in common, as they are all uprooted and have 
similar experiences, that brings expatriates together and generates their mutual support 
(Cailliez 2004:84). However, this tendency to seek out people in a similar situation does not 
have to be triggered by the desire to separate from Belgians (2004:82-83). Another important 
factor is separation in space, notably the existence of a specific infrastructure (e.g., 
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74 Favell (2008a) refers to “Eurostars”, a notion slightly larger than “EU expats”, covering all EU individuals 
attracted to a host country by “pull factors”, thus also e.g., students. 
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international schools, sport centres) and spaces that are reserved for expats (lieux réservés, 
e.g., associations, clubs)75 (2004: 23, 51; see also Calay and Magosse 2008:495). Indeed, 
some of the expatriates continue to live in accordance with the habits they had in their country 
of origin, actively participating in events of the expatriate community in Brussels, be they 
related to sport, theatre, or other free time activities (Cailliez 2004:51, 81-82).  
On the other hand, this separation is also due to certain “features” and the attitude of 
the host society, often based on negative stereotypes (Cailliez 2004:85-87). Besides, the local 
people (who have grown in Brussels) already have their established social networks (families 
and friends) and are not interested in establishing new contacts (Cailliez 2004:85; see also 
Abélès et al. 1993:23; Shore 2000:162; Suvarierol 2009:425). This is also partly related to the 
transient (in the case of “true” expats) character of their stay and the consequent lack of 
interest in “invest[ing] emotionally” in contacts with people who are set to leave in a short 
while (Gatti 2009:5).  
Moreover, such contacts between Belgians and expats are made even more difficult by 
the frequent unwillingness of the latter to learn any of the official local languages (i.e. French 
and Dutch), which is also due to the short perspective of their stay in Belgium76 (Gatti 
2009:4). In consequence, expats’ social relations are often restricted to other expatriates (Gatti 
2009:5).  
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75 There are expat-oriented websites with a rich list of different activities; there are clubs and associations (often 
oriented towards one national or linguistic group) that aim at the creation of social networks especially for 
newcomers (proposing e.g., language classes, or various hobby oriented courses) (Cailliez 2004:51). There are 
also monthly, international social events (Cailliez 2004:51) or other cultural or hobby related activities (e.g., 
gardening photography, dance, sport) (Cailliez 2004:52). Moreover, the expats have their national shops, pubs 
(located close to the European institutions), bookshops, diverse expat-oriented magazines and brochures (e.g., 
The Bulletin, the Newcomer, the Expat Directory, The Expat Survival Guide) (Cailliez 2004:54-55). 
76 Again, this will apply to most expats, but usually not to EU officials. 
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2.4.5. Socialising practices and spatial encapsulation of EU officials 
The socialising practices of EU officials partly follow the patterns observed with the 
expatriates in Brussels and other international cities. However, they present important 
specificities due, notably, to their attachment to the institutions which pervade their lives. !
2.4.5.1. Work-time social networks in Brussels: national or multinational? 
As has already been emphasized, one of the important differences between the EU 
institutions’ employees and other categories of expats is the permanent character of their stay 
abroad. This circumstance may influence the shape of their social life since it may serve as an 
incentive to build long-lasting non-work-related friendships (Suvarierol 2009:414). 
 The research performed by Shore demonstrates that the EU officials are totally 
immersed in the EU institutions’ universe, as they spend most of their time within the 
confines of the EU buildings, concentrate on EU matters, and mostly socialise with other EU 
officials (2000:163). Therefore, the EU institutions and work colleagues constitute an 
important point of departure in looking for new acquaintances (see e.g., Cailliez 2004:81). 
Some of them consider their co-workers “a second family” (Cailliez 2004:81). According to 
Suvarierol, the multinational character of the European Commission and its structure do not 
favour national attachments (2008:702). Bellier confirms that the nationality of the staff is 
irrelevant as regards “the formation of the working teams, which are typically multinational” 
(2002:87; see also Ban 2013:33; Suvarierol 2008:709, 714). Such a view is not, however, 
shared by all researchers. Even Shore concedes that some organizational divisions are known 
for being “strongholds for particular nationalities and regional minorities” (2000:190; see also 
Hooghe 2001:105).  
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2.4.5.2. Nationality and socialising practices of the employees of the EU institutions  
 As Shore contends, outside the work context, the social relations of EU officials tend to be 
less transnational and, in fact, the most lasting private networks are those based on national or 
linguistic grounds (Shore 2000:164; see also Abélès 2004:7-8; Abélès et al. 1993:22; 
Suvarierol 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011). Suvarierol insists on a separation between the work and 
private contacts of EU officials (2009:412), the former being truly international while their 
leisure networks77 are often formed based on nationality or language, even though they are 
rarely of a purely national character (2007:154, 157-158; see also Suvarierol 2009:427-431; 
2011:194). National networks are particularly important in the case of newcomers as they 
facilitate entry into the new environment while offering opportunities for social insertion and 
assistance in solving practical problems (Suvarierol 2007:152; 2009:421). However, access to 
such networks is not always automatic and requires active network building (Suvarierol 
2009:414). Another reason for maintaining contacts within one’s own national group is to 
provide opportunities for children to practice their mother tongue (Suvarierol 2009:428). The 
European Schools in which the children of most Eurocrats are enrolled are perceived as “the 
hub of contacts with parents from the same nationality” (Suvarierol 2009:428-429).  
Bellier explains that the stress related to the complexity of the working environment 
brings EU officials to seek comfort in national solidarities (2000a:146). Stevens and Stevens 
argue that every nationality groups around a specific establishment (church, club or cafés, 
bars, sport clubs, etc.) (2001:132-133; see also Abélès et al. 1993:22; Cailliez 2004:55). 
However, not all officials feel the need to participate in such institutionalized networking 
(Abélès et al. 1993:22). Importantly, as Stevens and Stevens emphasize, these networks 
sometimes embrace people from outside the EU institutions such as the staff of Permanent 
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77 Similarly as leisure networks, also career networks are “more susceptible to be predominantly national” 
(Suvarierol 2007:157). 
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Representations of member states to the EU, NATO, diplomats, expatriates working in private 
companies, law firms, and other organizations (Stevens and Stevens 2001:133). At the same 
time, the authors observe that these networks “are not necessarily altogether mononational” 
(Stevens and Stevens 2001:133). 
Networks can also be based on regional grounds (as in the case of the officials of new 
member states) or simply on the ground of belonging to the same age group and the same 
situation of being a newcomer (Suvarierol 2009:421-422). This is especially the case for those 
EU officials who had prior experience of living abroad or were raised in multinational 
families (Suvarierol 2009:426). Their networks tend to be mixed, including both national and 
multinational components (Suvarierol 2009:426; see also Suvarierol 2007:151).  
2.4.5.3. Free time networking vs. work time networking: separation or continuum? 
Amy Busby suggests that in Brussels,  
work and private lives blur because people come to Brussels to work and then establish many 
of their friendships through their work place, and therefore socialise with friends regularly in 
the nearby places after work and at networking events, but do so in work clothes and discuss 
work issues and relationships with colleagues, so boundaries quickly become blurred. (Busby 
2011:15)  
 
In fact, it is argued that informal meetings (at receptions, cocktail bars, and clubs) may 
also turn some colleagues into friends, and the role of such meetings goes beyond the 
exchange of professional information and is considered crucial for their “insertion into 
Europe” (Bellier 2000b:62). Liesbet Hooghe points to the important role of the Commission’s 
cafeteria, where officials, often from a national circle, discuss politics, share their frustrations, 
flirt, or exchange “culturally tinged pleasantries” (2001:168). At the same time, private 
gatherings frequently share space with work-related ones, as cafeteria also host informal work 
meetings (Hooghe 2001:168). Abélès et al. observe that “considerable socializing takes place 
at work and outside: units lay on breakfast or drinks; arrivals, departures, job changes are 
always celebrated; ... staff invite each other to dinner and the children play together” (1993:9).  
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This picture is not confirmed in the analysis of the social networks of European 
Commission officials performed by Suvarierol, who instead claims that, contrary to the 
aforementioned findings, the private and professional lives of EU officials tend to be rather 
separated (2009:412, 424). 
2.4.5.4. The EU officials and the Belgians 
Several scholars contend that the contact of EU officials with Belgians (except for those 
employed in the EU institutions) is extremely limited (Shore 2000:162; Abélès et al. 1993:21, 
23; Cailliez 2004:82-83; Suvarierol 2009:425) and mostly restricted to everyday 
administrative or commercial transactions (Cailliez 2004:82; Shore 2000:162). The EU 
officials who have any greater contact are usually those married to local people (Suvarierol 
2009:425; Cailliez 2004:83). Indeed, EU officials are mostly focused on the expatriate 
community, and even for those who were able to establish contacts with Belgians, these were 
not really close friendships (Cailliez 2004:83).  
Their immersion in the EU “reality” and detachment from the local social life may, 
according to Shore, be associated with their diplomatic privileges, higher salaries, and specific 
settlement patterns (2000:162). As Shore observes, if the EU officials are detached from the 
life conditions of the majority of Belgians, it is also as a result of their “institutional lifestyle” 
(2000:6, 162). Their long working hours in addition to weekend trips outside Brussels make it 
very difficult to encounter Belgians on a daily basis (Shore 2000:162).  
This situation is similar to what was reported as regards expatriates in Brussels. 
However, there are some additional reasons which are typical only of the employees of the 
EU institutions that may lead to their separation from the local population. Perceived as being 
“amongst the most privileged public officials in world” (Shore 2000:193; on the alleged 
privileges of EU officials - see also Bellier 2002:88), European civil servants are exempted 
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from Belgian income tax and they are thought to have not only very high salaries and 
allowances, but also other bonuses - “all of these were cited as possible explanations for local 
resentment” (Abélès et al. 1993:23; see also Cailliez 2004:87). Stereotypes about EU officials 
have real consequences, since they reinforce their feeling of alienation. !
2.4.5.5. Eurocrat enclaves in Brussels? 
As with other expats in Brussels (supra), EU officials are often perceived as trapped in a 
social and spatial “bubble” (Shore 2000). Several authors draw attention to the spatial 
enclaves of EU officials (and other categories of expatriates) in the residential 
neighbourhoods of Brussels (see e.g., Shore 2000:161-162; Calay and Magosse 2008:485; or 
Cailliez 2004:41), described by Bellier as posh, green districts of the city (2002:78). Shore 
(2002:162) and Favell (2008a:55) call these areas “euro-ghetto”,78 Suvarierol refers to them 
very briefly as “EU ghettos” (2007:151; 2009:425), while Calliez writes about “golden 
ghettos” or “European ghettos” (“des ‘ghettos dorés’” or “des ‘ghettos européens’”)79 
(2004:41).  
 While looking into the settlement patterns of British EU officials, Cailliez observes that, 
usually, newcomers would first look for temporary accommodation in the European quarter in 
hotels, “appart-hotels”, or with friends in order to have the time to look for a place to stay 
(2004:31). After the initial period, they would usually choose places in proximity to their 
offices, often in the European district (Schuman area) which gathers the international 
population of the employees of the EU institutions and offers them a variety of restaurants and 
pubs of different foreign “origins” (Cailliez 2004: 31, 34-35).! 
The proximity of certain infrastructure (e.g., shops, entertainment, night-life, and 
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78 Given that this term carries a strong association with excluded, stigmatised groups, I will use this term only 
while quoting other scholars or research participants.!
79!However, Cailliez suggests that “ghettos dorés”, “ghettos européens” do not really exist, but “they are rather 
a part of the collective imaginary” (2004:41).!
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public transport) and distance to the office and schools80 are the most important factors 
influencing their accommodation choices (Cailliez 2004:38). However, such factors as 
atmosphere, acquaintances, and other officials in the EU institutions or EU foreigners living 
in the neighbourhood also influenced accommodation choices (Cailliez 2004:39-40). By 
contrast, some others intentionally choose communes not popular amongst the EU staff in 
order to live amongst Belgians (Cailliez 2004:40).  
After some time, the importance of proximity to work diminishes (Cailliez 2004:40) 
and young officials usually move to the so-called communes de seconde urbanisation 
(Auderghem, Uccle, Watermael-Boitsfort, Woluwé-St-Lambert or Woluwé-St-Pierre) or 
peripheral areas of Brussels, which are also popular among well-off Belgians (Cailliez 
2004:32). This movement often follows changes at the family level (e.g., marriage, having 
children) (Cailliez 2004:32).  
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned “spatial enclavement” is partly due to the fact that 
the Directorate General in which one is employed is also the first place of socialization for a 
newcomer (Bellier 2002:86),81 and that the Eurocrats are totally immersed in the universe of 
the EU institutions, spending most of their time within the EU buildings (Shore 2000:163). 
Indeed, Cailliez stresses that over-representation of the EU officials in certain neighbourhoods 
is related to the strategies of looking for accommodation based on the use of social networks 
(2004:41).  
2.5. Identification and its bases 
Anita Jacobson-Widding observes that the term “identity” may refer to many different 
elements, such as for instance “ethnic stereotype, ... social commonality, personal integrity, 
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80 The proximity of school infrastructure is one of the most important factors (Cailliez 2004:41; Suvarierol 
2009:425; 2007:151): British schools have attracted Brits to Tervuren and Waterloo, a German school is credited 
for high concentration of Germans in Wezembeek-Oppem (Janssens 2008:418-419). !
81 Expatriate newcomers are often advised already at their arrival in Brussels by other, long-established 
expatriates and estate agencies to avoid areas inhabited by the low-skilled migrants (Gatti 2009:3). 
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temporal continuity, cultural heritage, and so on” (1983:13). As proposed by James A. 
Caporaso, it “can be seen as self-conception rooted in society, a sense of who we are in 
relation to others” (2005:66; see also Shore 1996:487-488; 2000:63; Shore and Black 
1994:293).  
Richard Jenkins suggests that identity is not “something that simply is” (2008b:17), 
but a “practical accomplishment, a process” (2008b:46; see also Góra and Mach 2010:9), 
“becoming”, involving reflexivity and social interactions (2008b:17; see also Bauman 
2004b:15-16; Easthope 2009:61-67; Hall 1996:4). In Stuart Hall’s approach, identity is 
conceived as something in constant construction “using the resources of history, language and 
culture” (Hall 1996:4). As Sztompka puts it, “people ‘craft themselves’, rather than receiving 
themselves ready-made”, and he claims that “identity has become multi-dimensional, multi-
layered, differentiated” (2004:493-494). Similarly, Bauman emphasizes that “‘belonging’ and 
‘identity’ are not cut in rock, ... they are not secured by a lifelong guarantee, ... they are 
eminently negotiable and revocable” (2004b:11).82  
Jenkins argues that identity requires classification of things or persons and association 
to some of these things, and not of others (2008b:17). The author claims that “the notion of 
identity involves two criteria of comparison between persons or things: similarity and 
difference” (Jenkins 2008b:17; see also 2002:117; 2008a:14; Jacobson-Widding 1983:13; 
Sztompka 2004:483-484; Pratt 1999:156). Thus, to a significant extent, identity is about the 
distinction of collectivities and individuals from others with whom they interact (Jenkins 
2008b:18).83  
 An important characteristic of identities is their “contextual character” (Jenkins 
2002:121-122; 1997:63), and thus the fact that identity is “specific to a given social and 
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82 Bauman observes that the main identity problem experienced by people today is how to “keep the options 
open” (1996:18) and which of the numerous possible identities to choose (Bauman 2004b:84).  
83 Hall claims that “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference” (1996:5). Likewise, according to 
Easthope, “people’s identities are in part constituted by their definitions of what they are not and by the creation 
of (physical and mental) borders or boundaries around their identities” (2009:68).!
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historical setting” (Shore 1993a:36). Jenkins (1997) points out that identity is an outcome of 
social interaction (see also!Góra and Mach 2010:15), and the latter is “always situated in 
context” (Jenkins 1997:63).  
Hall claims that identities are “constructed within … discourse” and “arise from the 
narrativization of the self” (1996:4). Finally, Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford suggest that 
identity is “a mode of self-understanding that is expressed by people in ongoing narratives 
and situations” (2005:52).  
2.5.1. The notion of identification 
Identification is “a social process”, the “product” of which is identity (Jenkins 2002:118). 
However, “identity” itself is not a stable, finished product, but its content is not more than a 
process itself, and thus replacing “identity” with “identification” does not make a huge 
difference, except that the latter term better fits its processual, open-ended nature (Jenkins 
2008b:14).  
 Jenkins observes that identities are produced in the “dialectic of collective 
identification, in the interplay of group identification and categorisation” (2008b:111). These 
two notions correspond, respectively, to the “internal and external moments of the process of 
collective identification” (Jenkins 2008b:157). As Jenkins explains, “a group is a self-
conscious collectivity, rooted in processes of internal definition, while a category is 
externally defined” (1997:54).   
With regard to the relation between categorisation and identification, Jenkins observes 
that identification may happen partly through the categorization of others, but equally 
categorization by others affects one’s internal definition, either directly or in reaction to such 
categorization (1997:57). Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper emphasize the distinction 
between “self-identification” and “the identification and categorization of oneself by others”, 
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with a particular focus on categorization by “powerful, authoritative institutions”, including 
the state or other bureaucracies and firms (2000:15-16). Karmela Liebkind distinguishes 
between “empathetic identification” (neutral acknowledgment of certain similarities without 
value judgement) and “idealistic identification” involving evaluation and the aspiration to be 
alike (1983:189). Liebkind explains that, in certain cases, acknowledgment of similarities 
may conflict with the negative valuation of the characteristics of the others (1983:189). 
Liebkind also suggests that “new identifications develop through identity aspirations, in 
which idealistic identification with specific people or groups of people induces the individual 
to empathize with them” (1983:189). 
Jenkins distinguishes “ascribed identification” and “achieved” (or “acquired”) 
identifications (2008b:172).84 The former is “constructed on the basis of the contingencies of 
birth”, while the latter are “assumed during the subsequent life-course”, by choice or 
otherwise (Jenkins 2008b:172). 
Jenkins’ understanding of identity and identification largely corresponds to the sense 
in which I will refer to this concept in this dissertation. In particular, I will not attach 
excessive importance to the difference between identification and identity, as the latter is 
simply a result of the former. In this thesis, however, I will try to avoid the notion of identity, 
since it may be perceived by some anthropologists as too “essentializing” and thus not 
flexible and fluid enough. 
2.5.2. Identity, space and place-making in the mobility context 
According to Tim Cresswell, “place is how we make the world meaningful and how we 
experience the world …, a space invested with meaning” (2008:12; see also Cresswell 
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84 Drawing upon Linton (1936) and Merton (1957). 
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2002:12; 2006:3; Lawrence 2009:360).85 For the author, it is “the raw material for the creative 
production of identity” (2008:39). It can refer to a country, a city, a district, a bar, a house, to 
anything, which is characterised by a “location” (“a site in space”), “locales” (thus the 
“settings” structuring the social interaction) and a “sense of place”, a particular relationship 
between the aforementioned and an individual (Agnew 2011:326-327).  
If geographers usually distinguish “raw” spaces from places understood as spaces with 
meaning attached (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2012:14), some authors refer to “social space” 
or socially produced space, with the meaning close to the aforementioned definition of place 
(Lefebvre 1991; Smith 1991 in: Cresswell 2008:10). Christopher Tilley distinguishes an 
“abstract” approach to space from a “humanised” approach where space (he prefers to speak 
about “spaces”) is socially constructed and can be understood as existing only together with 
human agency and in the context of human relations (1994:10-17). Referring to the 
phenomenological approach, among different types of spaces, the author quotes existential 
space, “constructed in the concrete experiences of individuals socialized within a group” 
(Tilley 1994:16). Existential spaces are structured notably by boundaries “in and between 
places” (1994:16). In this context, Tilley understands places as “foci for the production of 
meaning, intention and purpose of societal significance” (1994:16). As regards the relation 
between “space” and “place”, he also quotes Relph (1976) who sees this relation as 
interdependent: space would “provide a situational context for places”, yet, at the same time 
would draw its meaning from places (Tilley 1994:15). This understanding of the notion of 
“space” has influenced Fechter (2007b) when she described space making practices of 
expatriates in Jakarta. It is also in this meaning that I will refer to “spaces” and “places” in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
Jung-Sun Park remarks that “home” does not necessarily need to be “grounded on a 
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85 Agnew (2011) observes that the notions of “place” and “space” are sometimes used with a reversed meaning, 
notably by de Certeau (1984). Moreover, they are not always clearly distinguished in the literature (ibid.:318).!
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territory”, and that “its tangibility is weakened” (2004:298). Similarly, Akhil Gupta and James 
Ferguson observe that we live in a world where identities are becoming “differently 
territorialized” or even “deterritorialized” (1992:9). Nina Glick Schiller and Noel B. Salazar 
suggest that “identities and loyalties could be understood as products of social relations rather 
than of fixed relationships to territory” (2012:4; see also Gupta and Ferguson 1997:7). 
However, other authors insist that “residential practices” are still of paramount importance for 
identification (Butler and Robson 2003; Savage et al. 2005 in: Benson and Jackson 2012:795). 
According to Hazel Easthope, identification with places helps to establish one’s own “sense 
of self” in opposition to other places and other people in these places (2009:73).  
Spatial mobility necessarily entails abandoning of places and hence the need to re-
create them as imaginaries or to make new places. With this regard, the experience of Polish 
EU officials is partly the experience of any mobile European. Easthope contends that, despite 
the shift of identities towards hybridity and mobility, “attachment to place must exist in some 
form and must impact our identities so long as we exist as beings with bodies” (2009:66). 
Migrants also tend to “reconfigure” the place of origin in the new place out of their 
memories, “both figuratively and imaginatively” (Tolia-Kelly 2006, in: Hannam et al. 
2006:10). Indeed, drawing on examples from Harvey (1996), Cresswell stresses that places 
are produced, made by people, they are “continually … socially constructed” (2008:57; see 
also Ferguson and Gupta 1992:17; Harvey 1993:25). Re-creating places by migrants serves 
preservation or construction of identity, as a “locus of collective memory” (Harvey1996 as 
cited in: Cresswell 2008:61). David Harvey sees it as an attempt “to recover a viable 
homeland” by “the recovery of roots”, links with the past (1993:11). In the same time, the 
construction of place does not necessarily need to relate to memories of the past. As Doreen 
Massey suggests, a place “is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, 
meeting and weaving together at a particular locus” (1994:154).  
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If we assume that identity is a fluid and negotiable86 category (Eriksen 2010; Bauman 
1996, 2004b; Easthope 2009), migration is an opportunity for “re-defining oneself and 
moving from ascribed identities”, especially through new interpersonal relations (Easthope 
2009:69). In the case of my study, the identities of my research participants are strongly 
influenced by the changing context (e.g., their expatriation, relations with different groups, 
engrenage, etc.). 
2.5.3. Ethnicity: theoretical considerations 
Although, there are many different interpretations and approaches in anthropology towards 
ethnicity, Eriksen suggests that they all have to do with the “classification of people and 
group relationships” (2010:5, emphasis in original). If the term is often used in everyday 
language with reference to minority groups, scholars emphasize that in anthropological 
studies it is employed in a larger context (Eriksen 2010:5; 2015:330; Castles and Miller 
2003:33), referring to every individual (Castles and Miller 2003:33) and dealing with 
relationships between culturally distinctive groups (Eriksen 2010:5; 2015:330). 
Fredrik Barth remarked that the notion of ethnicity is used in relation to groups 
sharing identity, history, and cultural heritage (1998 [1969]:5). However, he emphasizes that 
ethnicity is mostly about “social organization” rather than about “cultural differences”, the 
latter being used as signs, “diacritica”, serving to draw and maintain boundaries and 
distinguish those who are alike from those who are different (Barth 1998 [1969]:6). Scholars 
are unanimous that ethnicity “requires a sense of belonging and an awareness of boundaries 
between members and nonmembers” (Enloe 1996:197; see also Eriksen 2010:96). Eriksen 
also stresses the relational character of ethnicity, which he argues should be thought of as a 
relationship “between and not within groups” (2010:69; 2015:332). The author insists that 
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86 Brubaker and Cooper argue that “stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid and multiple – leaves us 
without a rationale for talking about ‘identities’ at all” (2000:1). 
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“group identities must always be defined in relation to that which they are not” (2010:14; see 
also Amit 2002a:44). As he contends, cultural differences between such groups matter only to 
the extent that they are perceived as important and hence are at the origin of a perception of 
another group as culturally different (Eriksen 2010:16). Consequently, Eriksen stresses that 
ethnicity is “constituted through social contact” (2010:23, see also Roland Cohen 1978:386-
387). By contrast, Anthony P. Cohen contests the view that ethnicity is mainly contrastive 
and that boundaries are situational, and describes ethnicity as “a mode of action and of 
representation”, referring to a symbolic depiction or self-depiction in terms of cultural 
identity, made on the basis of symbols borrowed from everyday life (1998:23-25).  
Leman, referring to other scholars, proposes the following, inclusive approach to 
ethnicity: 
With ethnicity, we mean, (1), a “subjective, symbolic or emblematic use … of any aspect of 
culture, in order to differentiate … from other groups” (Brass 1991:19), (2), on the basis of “a 
feeling of continuity with the past, a feeling that is maintained as an essential part of one’s 
self-definition” (De Vos 1975:17), (3) providing “reservoirs for renewing humane values. 
Ethnic memory is thus future, not past, oriented” (Fischer 1986:176), and (4) whereby it is not 
“the cultural stuff that it encloses” that fundamentally decides what is involved in the we-
consciousness but “the ethnic boundary that defines the group” (Barth 1969:15). Ethnic 
frontiers are social frontiers. (2000:147)  
 
Leman proposes that we should approach ethnicity as “we-consciousness” “based on 
a supposed common past that is not shared with one’s neighbours” (2000:9). Importantly, he 
stresses the importance of making a distinction between two categories of ethnicity, notably, 
“indigenous and immigrant ethnicities” (Leman 2000:10), where the former focuses on 
boundary creation with reference to the distant past and the latter refers to “the near past (at 
most, three generations deep)” (Leman 2000:20).  
Eriksen refers to the studies of the Chicago School demonstrating a fluid, negotiable, 
and situational character of ethnic relations (2010:26). According to their insights, ethnic 
identities may be subject to deliberate manipulation (Eriksen 2010:26). Ethnic membership 
may vary according to the social context (Eriksen 2010:25). Park (1955 [1921]) suggested 
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that an “individual may have many ‘selves’ according to the groups to which he belongs and 
the extent to which each of these groups is isolated from the others” (as cited in Eriksen 
2010:25-26). Jenkins also claims that “ethnicity is always socially constructed” (2008a:49).  
On the other hand, De Vos insists on “the need for a psychological or emic approach 
to ethnic identity”, arguing that the latter “cannot be defined by behavioral criteria alone”, but 
“is determined by what one feels about oneself” (1995:25).  
 Caroline B. Brettell (2003, 2008) refers to three theoretical approaches to ethnicity 
which are encountered in anthropological studies, namely “primordialist”, “instrumentalist”, 
and “situational”,87 the latter two being particularly useful for studying situations of 
migration (Brettell 2008:132; see also 2003:106-107). In short, as Brettell states,  
the primordialist approach, which prevailed until the 1960s, argues that ethnic identity is the 
result of deep-rooted attachments to group and culture; the instrumentalist approach focuses 
on ethnicity as a political strategy that is pursued for pragmatic interests; and the situational 
approach, emerging from the theoretical work of Frederik Barth (1969), emphasizes the 
fluidity and contingency of ethnic identity, which is constructed in specific historical and 
social contexts (Banks 1996). (2003:106; 2008:131-132)  
 
Castles and Miller note that the concept of “situational” ethnicity (particularly 
relevant to the present research) implies that members “‘invoke’ ethnicity, as a criterion for 
self-identification, in a situation where such identification is necessary or useful” (2003:33-4; 
see also Jenkins 2008a:49; Eriksen 2015:334). !
Anthony D. Smith defines an “ethnic group” as a type of community distinguished by 
“a specific sense of solidarity and honour, and a set of shared symbols and values” (1981:65). 
Similarly, Eriksen observes that ethnic groups “have myths of common origin”, and adds that 
they often “have ideologies encouraging endogamy” (2010:17). According to Paul R. Brass, 
ethnic groups can be defined with reference to “objective attributes” (such as language, dress, 
custom, religion, or race), “subjective feelings”, or “behaviour” (1991:18). Ethnic groups 
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87 While also quoting three competing positions to the understanding of ethnicity, Sokolovskii and Tishkov 
(2002:190), mention the following ones: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. 
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sometimes use cultural symbols consciously, so as to establish “criteria for inclusion into and 
exclusion from the group” (Brass 1991:19; see also Castles and Miller 2003:35; De Vos 
1995:24). Eriksen concludes that, although different elements of self-identification may vary, 
what is characteristic for ethnic groups are “notions of shared culture” that they would have 
in common (2010:42).  
As Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex remark, Weber attached a particular 
importance to “memories of a common past”, preserving belonging to ethnic groups “in the 
collective consciousness of peoples” even after migration or other changes of political 
affiliation (1997:3). These people preserve their “feelings of ethnic affinity” due to, inter 
alia, community of religion, language, supposed consanguinity, or lifestyle (Weber 1997:20). 
Smith observes that, while certain immigrant ethnic groups predominantly adapt to dominant 
cultures, others (like Poles or Irish)88 tend to preserve their traditions and identities, even if 
they are able to adapt to conditions of life in the host society (1981:153). Eugeen Roosens 
suggests that the ethnic identity of immigrants is often situational and may “be assigned a 
comprehensive role in certain circumstances” (1989:16). On the other hand, as he claims, 
ethnicity is dissimulated when it appears “irrelevant or counterproductive” (Roosens 
1989:157). At the same time, based on different examples, Roosens argues that the ethnicity 
of immigrants is defined more by the origin than by boundaries (1994:90-91).  
The simplest definition of ethnic identity seems to come from Marcus Banks, who 
identified ethnic identity with “the feeling of belonging to some ethnically defined group” 
(1996:9). George A. De Vos understands the ethnic identity of a group as the “subjective, 
symbolic, or emblematic use of any aspect of a culture, or a perceived separate origin and 
continuity in order to differentiate themselves from other groups” (1995:24, emphasis in 
original). Ethnic emblems can include, for example, language, clothing, or food (De Vos 
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88 In this context, on the Irish community in Belgium see O'Dubhghaill (2015). 
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1995:24). 
Eriksen observes that ethnic identities are “creations” of “historical circumstances” or 
“political projects” (2010:110, emphasis in original). He also notes that, “culture is … 
invented” to serve ideology, while “history is not a product of the past but a response to 
requirements of the present” (Eriksen 2010:85-88). According to Eriksen, the related 
symbolism helps to maintain ethnic identity in moments of change, especially change related 
to a threat, such as (for example) migration or economic change (2010:81). The author also 
emphasizes the relational aspect of ethnic identity (Eriksen 2015:341). 
Several authors emphasize the dual origin of ethnic identity, since it is defined both 
by self-ascription and by external categorization (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1995:366; 
Eriksen 2010:66; Jenkins 2008a:3, 23).  
2.5.4. Nation and Nationalism 
The notions of nation and nationalism are indispensable for explaining how I will refer to 
national identity and what the relation of these concepts is to “ethnicity” and “ethnic 
identity”.!
2.5.4.1. The concepts of nation, ethnicity and nationalism  
Donnan and Wilson define nations with reference to their political goals (1999:6). However, 
as Walker Connor argues, nations are also “characterized by a sense … of consanguinity” 
(1996:71). Connor sees nation as “a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally 
related” (1996:71) and stresses the importance of “subconscious and emotional” bonds tying 
the members together and triggered, for example, by national symbols, music, or poetry 
(1996:73-74).  
In Benedict Anderson’s view, a nation is “an imagined political community – and 
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imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1996:6; 1997:44). Anderson further 
explains that its imagined character lies in the “image of … communion” in people’s minds, 
despite the lack of tangible contact (1996:6; 1997:44).  
 The concept of nation has a lot in common with the concept of “ethnic group”. As 
Eriksen points out, both ethnic ideologies and nationalism are based on cultural similarity but 
at the same time the boundaries which separate them from others (2010:10). Eriksen states 
that national identities constitute themselves in relation to others, much as ethnic identities do 
(2010:134). He sees the major difference between nationalism and ethnicity in the 
“relationship to the state” of each (2010:10). Indeed, Ernest Gellner perceived the specific 
link between ethnicity and the state to be the main distinctive feature of a nation (1983:1; see 
also Brass 1991:20). According to Jenkins, nationalism (as well as localism, communalism or 
regionalism, and racism) can be regarded as an “ideolog[y] of ethnic identification”, while 
“the ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ or ‘nationality’ are, respectively, varieties of ethnic 
collectivity and ethnicity” (1997:143).89  
Smith insists on the “constructed” character of nations (1990:180-181) and suggests 
that this construction was orchestrated “by state elites or intelligentsias” (1990:177).90  
2.5.4.2. The civic versus the ethnic model of nation and nationalism  
According to Smith, a “nation” can come into being in two ways: either on the basis of “a 
territorial state or political community”, or based on a “community of culture” (Smith 
1981:18; see also Arnason 1990 on Eastern and Western types of nationalism).91 Smith goes 
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89 Eric Hobsbawm is of another opinion and claims that, the concepts of “nationalism” and “ethnicity” are “non-
comparable” (1992:4). According to the scholar, “nationalism is a political programme”; whereas, ethnicity is 
“not programmatic and even less is it a political concept” (Hobsbawm 1992:4). !
90 In this regard, Vermeulen and Govers point out that although the role of intellectuals in constructing national 
identities has been much studied, also ethnic identities can be claimed to be literally constructed in the same 
manner (1996:6). 
91 Arnason (1990) refers to this distinction as between a Western and an Eastern type of nationalism. Western 
type would be “solidly grounded in social and political realities”, while the Eastern type is said to emphasize 
“cultural unity and specificity” (Arnason 1990:231).  
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on to say that the Western model of national identity is based on “common historical 
memories, myths, symbols and traditions” (1993b:11). In the second case, qualified by Smith 
as “ethnic” nationalism, a community of culture already exists and is believed to be or to 
have become a nation (1981:18; see also Smith 1993b:11). As Smith sums up: “Genealogy 
and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and 
tradition” are the characteristic features of the ethnic model of nation (1993b:12).92 
Smith explains the main difference between Western and non-Western models of the 
nation by referring to the possibility of having choice in one’s belonging which is left to the 
individual in the “Western” model, as opposed to mandatory, “organic” membership in the 
non-Western or ethnic model (1993b:11).! As Krzysztof Jaskułowski explains, “civic” 
nationalism defines a nation as an open community based on loyalty towards institutions and 
the acceptance of political rules binding the individual to a given community, whereas 
“ethnic” nationalism sees a nation as a closed and bounded organic social group based on 
such extra-political factors as origin, culture, language, and religion (2012:185, 187; see also 
Góra and Mach 2010:17). According to Johann P. Arnason, “the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ 
components are … interdependent and equally fundamental aspects of the modern nation” 
(1990:218; see also!Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003:9).  
2.5.4.3. National identity: now and tomorrow 
Tim Edensor suggests that national identity is located, experienced, and enacted at “the local 
and domestic levels” where it becomes part of the daily routine (2002:186; see also Billig 
1995). The author stresses the link between national identity, popular culture, and everyday 
life (2002:vi) where it expresses itself in routines, habits, objects, and domestic spaces 
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92 Slightly differently, Hugh Seton-Watson points at the distinction between “cultural nation” and “political 
nation” (1977:4; see also Wagner 2003:193). While the first is defined as “a community united by language or 
religion or historical mythology or other cultural bonds”, the latter is understood as “a community which in 
addition to cultural bonds also possesses a legal state structure” (Seton-Watson 1977:4). 
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(2002:186) as well as in popular culture, notably in films, television programmes, popular 
music, and fashion (Edensor 2002:141, 187). This national identity, as stressed by Clare 
McManus-Czubińska and her colleagues, should be “considered as a part of the individual’s 
imagination”, and thus a matter of choice; as such, it may vary over time and be subject to 
“contemporary as well as historical influences” (2003:125). 
As Donnan and Wilson observe, much of the debate on the future of the nation-state, 
which is allegedly threatened by the globalization of culture, society, and the economy and 
by the growing power of multinational corporations and the expansion of supranational 
entities is focused on Europe, where the integration processes are interpreted as a 
prefiguration of the future world (1999:7). However, in the years since 1999 this view has 
become questionable given the perceived crisis of European integration. By contrast, 
Sztompka draws attention to the possible co-existence of different identities (e.g., 
transnational or continental identities) with national identities (2003:494). In any case, as 
Donnan and Wilson report, the few empirical studies which exist on the relationship between 
national and European identities seem to show that European identity is unlikely to replace 
national identity as the “paramount political belonging” (1999:7-8). 
 As Delanty and Rumford suggest, such factors as “globalization, multiculturalism, 
global civil society and cosmopolitan political and cultural currents”, have provoked changes 
in national identities drifting towards plurality and fluidity (2005:53). Nations adapt to 
globalisation and national communities extend beyond national borders based on new 
imaginaries concerning “belonging, community and identity” (Delanty and Rumford 
2005:88). The authors conclude that, “the nation-state is no longer the primary reference for 
loyalties, identities and democracy” (Delanty and Rumford 2005:88; see also Eriksen 
1997:259; Tomlinson 2003:274). However, today, it might be argued that nationalism is 
again on the rise.  
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 Finally, Eriksen states that: 
Europeans all over the continent (but particularly in Western Europe) are acquiring more and 
more in common; internal boundaries are being erased, and European culture is being 
creolized or hybridized as diverse influences mingle and mix in blatant disrespect of the 
spatial dimension. (1997:261)  
 
Eriksen stresses that, in fact, “internal cultural variation in a country can in many respects be 
more significant than the variation between countries” (1997:262). As he goes on to say, “it is 
relevant to speak of a common European urban way of life” (Eriksen 1997:262).  
2.6. Polishness 
Leszek Koczanowicz observes that Polish history has been a story of the struggle to preserve 
national identity (2008:100). As argued by Eriksen, ethnic identity is strongly affirmed via 
ethnic symbols in moments of change or threat (2010:81). More recently, such intensified 
manifestation of Polishness became visible after the crash in April 201093 of the plane 
carrying Poland’s president, Lech Kaczyński, in addition to a number of other important 
figures, resulting in the deaths of all aboard. A similar reaction had already been witnessed in 
the aftermath of the death of Pope John Paul II in 2005. Although the actual importance of 
these events may be debatable, they were certainly perceived and lived as important by many 
Poles.94 In fact, Mirosława Marody and Sławomir Mandes even argue that “the death of John 
Paul II has broken the relation between national identity and religious identity of Poles lasting 
from the beginning of modern-era” (Janion 2007:331).95  
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93 Russians have been accused by a part of the Polish public opinion of obstructing the investigation, while some 
radical right wing politicians even mentioned a hypothesis of a Russian inspired bomb attack. 
94 According to Marody and Mandes (2006), the latter was seen as a moment of the most powerful manifestation 
of national unity, since the early period of the “Solidarność” movement in the years 1980-1981 (Janion 
2007:331). 
95 As they further suggest, restriction of the “national” public sphere to religious rituals was conducive to the 
development of a national idea unifying Poles around “moral rightness”, and not around publicly negotiated 
interests. However, as they also observed, now it will have to change (Janion 2007:331). 
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2.6.1. Distinctiveness and sameness 
While analyzing Polishness, it is useful to refer to the important opposition explained 
elsewhere in this thesis: between the elements of “sameness” and “distinctiveness” (Jacobson-
Widding 1983:13).  
 “Sameness” corresponds to the question “Who am I?” and “stresses the elements of 
continuity, permanence, and the feeling of ‘being the same’” (Marody 2003:148-149). 
“Distinctiveness” originates from the question, “Who am I not?” and the opposition “between 
ingroup and outgroup, between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Jacobson-Widding 1983)” (Marody 
2003:149).  
Marody refers to the contention of Zbigniew Bokszański (1999) that Polish national 
identity under foreign occupation (thus, with a short break between the two wars, until 1989) 
was characterised by the domination of the “sameness” element over the “distinctiveness” 
element, allegedly related to “the lack of organizational frames” for their own state (Marody 
2003:149). This proposition seems, however, quite controversial. Under Russian and Prussian 
domination, Polish people were in constant contact with representatives of foreign powers, 
who not only spoke different languages, but were also, respectively, Orthodox and Protestant, 
as opposed to Polish Catholics. Katherine Verdery (1996) suggests that, “before 1989, the 
dynamics of identity construction in Eastern Europe were characterized by sharp distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Galbraith 2004:54). If, indeed, the national identity of the majority 
of the Polish speaking, Catholic population could not be forged into a nation in the absence of 
the state, their ethnic identity, also relational, had an opportunity to develop in contact with 
the dominant “other”. 
Who were and are “them” for Poles? As Koczanowicz observes, two main trends in 
Polish history traditionally recognized the main enemy, respectively, as Russia and Germany 
(2008:80). Marody agrees that “them” referred to the Germans personifying the “Alien” and 
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“the main enemy of Poland”, and to Russians who, additionally, were later identified with the 
communist regime (2003:150). Ewa Pogonowska (2002) points to the binary opposition 
between Europe, identified with culture and civilisation, and Russia, allegedly representing a 
lack of culture, anti-civilisation, boorishness, wildness, and brigandage (Janion 2007:227). As 
Maria Janion explains, in this logic, “the West is logical, normal, empirical, cultural, rational, 
realistic. By contrast, the East is backward, degenerate, uncivilised, underdeveloped, 
fossilized, illogical, despotic, does not creatively take part in the World’s progress” 
(2007:224). Norman Davies observes that, despite its geographical location in the East, “in 
every other sense, its strongest links have been with the West” (2001:301). Marysia Galbraith 
points to the omnipresence of “reflections on the position of Poland between East and West” 
in Polish literature and important periodicals (e.g., Kultura), but also popularity of depicting 
conflicts with other nations in “portrayals of the Polish nation” (Galbraith 2004:58).  
 Marody claims that the lack of national institutions has significantly affected the 
formation of Polish identity, as “being a Pole” is still defined rather with reference to “moral 
and spiritual characteristics” and less with “institutional and group symbols of identity” 
(2003:149). As Jolanta Kociuba argues, Polish identity is built mainly on cultural factors and 
not on the basis of the nation-state and its institutions (2009:225; see also Batt 2001:247, 
Jaskułowski 2012). As a result of the non-existence of the Polish state, there was no 
opportunity to develop any rituals in the public sphere except for the one related to religion 
(Marody and Mandes 2005:61). Moreover, the disappearance of independent Poland in 1795 
coincided with the European processes of nation-state consciousness emerging (Janion 
2007:259; see also Galbraith 2004:57; Marody and Mandes 2005:51). As Galbraith further 
observes, in their theories of nationalism Polish sociologists such as Chałasiński (1988), 
Ossowski (1967), and Znaniecki (1990) favoured cultural factors over the political impact of 
the State (2004:57). In particular, according to Marody and Mandes (2005), specific historical 
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conditions have contributed to the development of a close link between religion and the 
formation of Polish national identity. Porter agrees that “in Poland, religious identity and 
national identity seem inextricably intertwined” (2001:289). 
Marody and Mandes claim that Polish national identity is, thus, based on language and 
religion, and not on political factors (2005:61). Does this therefore mean that Polish identity is 
not “constructed”? Such a conclusion would be hazardous.  
2.6.2. Polishness as a constructed identity 
John Hutchinson referred to nations as “communities of fate”, ethnic groups characterised by 
a particular culture, but also relying on common founding myths related to their origin and a 
specific interpretation of history which is attached to certain symbols (2003:38). According to 
Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, “historical and cultural myths of continuity and 
homogeneity” can be constructed in a literal sense by the nation-state’s elites and spread 
among their fellows by both institutional and non-institutional means (1996:6). Hutchinson 
observes that myths, memories, and culture allow national identities to survive without the 
state (Hutchinson 2003:40). Smith suggests that if some ethnic communities could survive 
without their own political structures, it is notably thanks to “ethnic memories, values, 
symbols, myths and traditions” (1996:189). Smith stresses the importance, in this regard, of a 
“myth of ethnic election”, a “belief that ‘we are a “chosen people”’” (1996:189-90). As Smith 
reminds us in this regard, in Poland, the elites invented the concept of Poland as “a ‘suffering 
Christ’ among the nations, soon to rise again” (Smith 1996:195). Likewise, Koczanowicz 
refers to the myth of the “Messiah of Nations”, according to which the necessary condition of 
the re-birth of Poland as a state would be the downfall of the states oppressing it, which would 
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then bring freedom to the whole of Europe (2008:80).96  
Therefore, even if no modern nation State could be formed, no related rituals could 
develop and, logically, no civic nationalism could flourish, it would not be correct to claim 
that Polishness has developed exclusively on the basis of language and “native” culture. On 
the contrary, the stateless elites deployed a lot of effort in mobilizing people around national 
ideals, inventing a common past, shaping the nationalistic narrative, and coining myths, such 
as the typically Polish “national messianism”. As a result, Polish national identity has been 
informed by such romantic “messianic” concepts of the Polish nation as an “innocent martyr-
carrier of spiritual values, heroically resisting oppression” (Morawska 2003:171). According 
to Ewa Morawska, humanistic education in Poland is deeply informed by “the Romantic 
codes and a strong emphasis on historical (literary) memory” (2003:179). The role of memory 
and historical symbols has not diminished since the downfall of communism.  
As Janion suggests, constantly endangered in its religious and national identity, 
Catholicism was treated above all as a consolation and an escape (2007:192-193). According 
to Spohn, “the successful role of the Solidarność movement, its sacrifice for the Polish nation 
and its contribution to the fall of communism in Poland and Eastern Europe was accompanied 
by a revival of Polish heroic-romantic nationalism and its core image of Poland’s special 
mission for Europe” (2003:137). Actually, as Koczanowicz suggests, this “Messiah of 
Nations” attitude was resurrected in the 1980s (2008:80). Following the imposition of martial 
law in 1981, Poland was seen as a heroic anti-totalitarian rebel and as a “victim of repression” 
(Koczanowicz 2008:80). As Koczanowicz adds, this perception triggered expectations of 
reward for their relentless resistance after the Fall of Communism in 1989, notably with 
substantial international aid from Western countries, and the absence of such rewards sparked 
resentment against the West (Koczanowicz 2008:80-81). As Koczanowicz states, “the history 
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96 Wadowski offers a more in-depth description of the identificatory role of Polish national myths (2009:423-
438; for a more extensive analysis on the role of Poland as a “Christ of Nations”, see also Janion 2007:275-280).  
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of Poland was depicted as a chain of sacrifices on Poland’s part and betrayals by Western 
countries” (2008:81).  
While reflecting on the myths contributing to the construction of Polish identity (or 
identities), one must also mention the period of communist rule. Most of the Polish people 
concerned by my research, the employees of the EU institutions, were born under the 
communist regime and some of them spent a significant part of their childhood or even 
adolescence in the late communist period. In fact, national identity was actively constructed 
by official means throughout the whole period. The communist state undertook an ideological 
offensive in order to take over and transform the national myths and the common memory. 
The official propaganda, including school curricula, constructed the “sameness” dimension 
notably by emphasizing the Slavic roots which Poles could be said to have in common with 
the Russians and many other nations of the Soviet Bloc, or by emphasizing the similarity 
(territorial and allegedly ethnic) between the Polish People’s Republic and the early state 
(10th century) of the first princes and kings of the Piast dynasty, fuelling anti-German 
resentments by emphasizing the historic rivalry. According to Lewandowski, the communists 
were trying to convince Poles that they had regained the primeval Piast territories in the West 
and North (2008:272). References to early state history served the purpose of confirming the 
right of Poland to these territories and reminding Poles of the everlasting danger from the 
West and in particular from the “revisionist” West Germany. The myth of the historically 
“innocent” nation was also adopted and successfully developed under the communist regime. 
In the communist-era cases of murders and massacres committed by the local Polish 
population against Jews under the German occupation were officially considered marginal 
and banned from public discussion.97 These efforts proved, at least to a certain extent, 
successful, judging from the shock experienced by Polish public opinion during the public 
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97 On this issue, see e.g., Grabowski (2011); Gross (2001, 2008); Gross and Grudzińska-Gross (2011); Potel 
(2010). 
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debate on the role of Polish peasants in the massacre of Jews in Jedwabne.98  
2.6.3. Polish identity today – conflicting discourses  
In the 1990s after the downfall of communism, the romantic myth of the martyr nation burst 
out even stronger, with – finally admitted to the public sphere – discussions of the horrible 
fate of the Polish officers murdered by the Soviet political police at Katyn and the many other 
Poles who died in the Stalinist death camps. On the other hand, Geneviève Zubrzycki 
observes that with the fall of communism, “and the construction of a legitimate, national and 
democratic state, Polish national identity and the association between Polishness and 
Catholicism have been questioned” (2001:640). The Church’s “moral and social monopoly” 
came to an end as, “with the advent of a legitimate state, the Catholic Church lost its 
traditional role as the ‘nation’s keeper’, or at least has gained a legitimate competitor in that 
sphere” (Zubrzycki 2001:640). As Zubrzycki goes on to say, “the transition from communism 
to ‘post-communism’ has ... provoked the rupture of the model of relations among the state, 
the Church, and Polish society” (2001:640). Furthermore, it is also pointed out that there is a 
need for a “broadening of national identity” and to reorient it along civic terms (Zubrzycki 
2001:640). The solemn mystic-national discourse has been seriously contested by the left-
leaning or liberal intellectuals (some of them originating in the Catholic movements, like the 
circle of “Tygodnik Powszechny”). Poland has become a battlefield: domestic conservative 
attitudes against liberal ideas of Western origin. Discussions about the presence of the cross in 
the public sphere, the right to abortion, the role of the “Christian values” in the media, and re-
privatization of former ecclesiastic property have undoubtedly shaped the attitudes of young 
future Polish EU workers.  
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98 Re-construction and ex post facto analysis of Polish national identity in the period of communism is not the 
subject of my research. However, it was important to mention it to understand to what extent it may affect 
today’s Polish EU civil servants, especially how the imprint of the communist era is often regarded as a 
distinctive feature of Eastern Europeans. 
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Polish intellectuals and elites in power have tried to promote a counter-discourse of 
the nation in opposition to the ethno-Catholic vision of Poland (Zubrzycki 2001:655). Thus, 
they have promoted  
a distinctively Polish civic narrative emphasizing the civic heritage of the nation in Poland, 
by, for example, going back to sixteenth-century religious tolerance, to the 1st Republic’s 
multi-ethnic state, to the Democracy of Nobles and the elective monarchy, to the Constitution 
of the Third of May (1791), to the Polish legions fighting ‘for our freedom and yours’ and to 
the end of the nineteenth-century Warsaw positivism. (Zubrzycki 2001:640-641, emphasis in 
original)  
 
At the same time, they have deliberately bypassed communism, thus making it the 
period “most clearly associated with the civic discourse in contemporary social 
consciousness” (Zubrzycki 2001:641).  
2.6.4. Polishness and Europe  
Galbraith reminds us that the decline of Soviet dominance in the region led some scholars to 
plead for the “reconceptualization of Europe, placing Poland, Germany, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary in ‘Central Europe’” (2004:59). As she further explains, this was 
argued for on the basis of, for instance, cultural and religious links to Western Europe and 
geographical proximity (Galbraith 2004:59). It is in this period, according to Galbraith, that 
“there emerged an opportunity for constructions of Polish identity based less on conflict. 
Some Polish intellectuals proposed ways of thinking about Poland as a part of Europe, while 
also maintaining its own distinctiveness as a nation (Bohdanowicz 1992; Fischer 1993; 
Gabryel 1994; Kot 1993)” (Galbraith 2004:60).!
Galbraith states that Polish membership of the European Union “is also seen as an 
important symbol of Poland’s standing within an imagined hierarchy of nations” (2011:22). 
As Judy Batt observes for Central and Eastern Europeans, European identity meant “national 
self-esteem as a member of the family of free, independent and above all modern European 
states” (2001:250-251, emphasis in original). In this context, McManus-Czubińska et al. draw 
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attention to “the concept of a ‘return to Europe’”, which they find symptomatic of the 
identification of Poland with European culture (2003:127). 
While drawing upon Georges Corm (2002), Janion draws a link between the Western 
European feeling of superiority and disdain towards Eastern Europeans (2007:20) and the 
inferiority complexes which have developed in the Polish mentality, the fatalistic conviction 
about marginality of Polish people and culture in Europe, and the related “messianistic” 
phantasmates (2007:20). Likewise, Sztompka writes about the Eastern-European “inferiority 
complex towards the West”, its “idealization with its political freedoms and economic 
affluence”, which is at the same time being “compensated by a superiority complex towards 
societies further East” (2004:488). 
 As regards the attitude of Polish people to Europe, McManus-Czubińska et al. suggest 
that the “‘progressive’ sectors” of Polish society – that is, the better educated (or raised in 
educated families), younger, relatively richer, and urban people – are more likely to subscribe 
to “dual identities”,99 and thus to identify themselves both with Poland and Europe (2003:128; 
see also Galbraith 2004: 67-68). 
2.7. Europe, Europeanness and related notions 
Although my study concerns a possible shift among the Polish EU officials towards European 
identity due to working in the EU institutions, it is important to briefly explain how the EU is 
perceived by its inhabitants and to what extent it corresponds to various expectations as 
regards the realisation of European unity. Therefore, it is important to introduce the subject of 
European identity by briefly referring to the pre-existing notion of Europe in its wider 
geographical and cultural sense.  
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99 As opposed to “exclusive” identities (McManus-Czubińska et al. 2003). 
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2.7.1. Europe: boundaries and “cultural stuff” inside  
Goddard, Llobera, and Shore stress after Wallace (1990) that the “boundaries”100 of Europe 
move depending on the criteria against which Europe is defined, thus “institutional structures, 
historical geography, or observed patterns of social, economic and political interaction” 
(Goddard et al. 1994:27).  
John Borneman and Nick Fowler point to the most popular dichotomies still present 
in thinking about Europe: the division between, on the one hand, the industrious, disciplined, 
(largely) Protestant North, and, on the other, the “spontaneous and fun loving”, (largely) 
Catholic South; between the “rich and developed” West and the “poor and underdeveloped” 
East (1997:495). Joseph R. Llobera perceives Europe as being constituted of a diversity and 
of oppositions between its ingredients, for example, between Latinity and Germanity 
(2003:160-161). According to Goddard et al., there are “many different Europes”, and 
ignoring this fact might contribute to fixing upon a wrong “essentialized” perception of 
Europeanness as something “bounded, homogenous and pure” (1994:30).  
 The problem with defining the borders of Europe seems to concern in particular its 
Eastern border (Delanty and Rumford 2005:32). Until 1989, this border was identified with 
the Iron Curtain, separating democracies from Soviet dictatorships (Delanty and Rumford 
2005:34). However, throughout history these borders have repeatedly changed shape and 
location (Delanty and Rumford 2005:32).  
Irène Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson remind us that “identities are never better 
perceived than in places and times of encounter with their ‘others’” (2000a:9). Goddard et al. 
observe that the concept of “non-European”, for instance, Muslim, plays an important role in 
the definition of Europe (1994:27). Likewise, Borneman and Fowler contend that “European 
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100 As Donnan and Wilson remark the notions of borders and boundaries have been sometimes used to designate 
the same thing, while on other occasions they were used to mean different things (1999:19).  
!110!
coherence has always been tied to some externality”, such as “the infidel, the Orient, or the 
East” (1997:490).  
Thomas Risse observes that the difficulties in defining Europe are also related to 
difficulties in clearly defining the “Other” (2004:258-259). Similarly, Delanty and Rumford 
remark that “if there is not a European self or subject, there cannot be an easily defined 
Other” (2005:76). Michael Bruter argues that the definition of the “Other” in the European 
context changed with the integration of the continent and with the altered meaning of internal 
and external borders of the united Europe (2004b:22).  
However, it is not only the problem with boundaries that distinguishes Europe from 
nation-states, but also the deficit of historical memory and tradition (Abélès 2000:33; see also 
Delanty and Rumford 2005:99-100; Shore 2000:18; Smith 1992:74). Llobera adds that, 
unlike nations, the only common past Europe has is one of division, and thus its point of 
reference becomes the present and the future (2003:160). 
2.7.2. Europeanness  
Bruter draws attention to a problem which affects any study of European identity, namely the 
impossibility of determining what respondents mean when they refer to “feeling European” 
(2004b:23). Glynis M. Breakwell, based on her observation of “survey studies across 
Europe”, claims that Europeans do “distinguish between the implications for their sense of 
self of being European and of being citizen of an EU state” (2004:25).  
Europeanness might be defined by adherence to some broad cultural identity such as 
Christianity (Delanty and Rumford 2005:72). However, Delanty and Rumford draw attention 
to the incorporation of Orthodox and Muslim populations and the resulting growing 
multiculturalism (2005:72). In any case, it might be argued that, even before this, Protestants 
and Catholics could hardly be qualified as sharing the same cultural identity. The authors also 
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point to the progressive secularisation of the continent (Delanty and Rumford 2005:73). In 
turn, they suggest that being European means an “orientation to the world” and 
cosmopolitanism, and so is not so much a matter of culture or politics (2005:75). They 
identify it with openness to other people, acceptance of his or her values and of diversity 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005:76), and “existing in a state of becoming rather than being” 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005:194).  
As Bellier contends:  
To be a European, it is not necessary to integrate in a single person the totality of the cultural 
characteristics found among the peoples, societies and cultures of Europe. It suffices to 
integrate a few of these, such as the knowledge of a second European language or a 
professional experience beyond the national environment. A minimum experience of contact 
with other Europeans, in situations which favour personal development, is necessary in order 
to conceive of a European identity for oneself. This is achieved within the Commission, 
where the experience of working together in a plurinational framework permits the 
development of knowledge about others’ practices and reflexes. (Bellier 2000a:149)  
 
2.7.3. European Union 
In Abélès’ view, the EU is an imperfect community, defined by its political will to achieve 
common identity, “a community in the making which defines itself as perpetually in the form 
of a project, focusing on an ideal whose realization is always postponed” (2000:39). As Shore 
(2005) remarks, this political will is not always clearly verbalized. The declared intention is 
“to create a new European order that will ‘go beyond’ the logic of nation-states and 
nationalism by creating a pan-national and supranational political architecture” (Shore 
2005:236). However, the practicalities are left nebulous, notably what will happen with the 
current framework, including “state, nationhood and democracy in Europe” (Shore 
2005:236). As he claims, the European Union is “an embryonic state without a corresponding 
nation”, and the latter still needs to be created “beyond the elite enclaves of its own 
institutions” (Shore 2005:249). Shore calls the EU an important “new imagined community” 
(2000:33) and draws a parallel with the efforts of intellectuals and elites to build nation 
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states, through soaking the masses with nationalist consciousness (2000:221-222; see also 
Risse 2004:260). On the other hand, as John Hutchinson observes, the EU can also be seen as 
“an instrument of national ambitions”, as its creation and subsequent successions derived 
from national self-interest (2003:44). 
Smith stresses that European “new cultural imperialism” implies the necessity of 
replacing the nation-state with a “positive alternative”, permitting the accommodation of 
different cultural identities (1990:172-174). As opposed to earlier, “national” imperialisms, 
the new ones, including European imperialism, are “supranational” and “cosmopolitan” 
(Smith 1990:176). In the same vain, various authors stress that the EU does not need to 
become a nation state and it will not or should not produce one nation (Bauman 2004a:135; 
Hutchinson 2003:46), but rather a “metanation” (Llobera 2003:161). !
2.7.4. Enlargement of the EU and its implications 
The Eastern enlargement had, according to numerous authors, important consequences for the 
understanding and perception of the EU project. Firstly, it posed a question about the 
boundaries of Europe (Kaelbe 2009:196; Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:7). The EU was no 
longer limited to the Western part of the continent, and thus the question of what exactly it 
embraces emerged (notably the question of the European character of Turkey and Russia) 
(Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:7). Furthermore, the spectre of the massive movement of 
people from the new member states to the West revived national (as opposed to transnational 
and European) attitudes (Castiglione 2009:37).  
 Triandafyllidou and Spohn suggest that the last enlargements brought a major 
challenge for “the political coherence and cultural convergence of the European Union” in 
terms of “differences in political institutions and cultural mentalities” (2003:7). In addition to 
economic differences, it put into question the religious and cultural homogeneity of Europe 
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(Shore and Abélès 2004:12). The new model of interaction between confessional and secular 
identities was cited among such disruptive “novelties”, notably in the context of Polish 
Catholicism and its connection with identity (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009:215, referring to 
Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). 
These claims seem much exaggerated. The accession of Poland or the Czech Republic 
by no means implied the imminence of including Russia or Turkey. Despite the social and 
cultural imprint of the communist period and resulting backwardness, the new member states 
were not so culturally distant from Western Europe, and the religious heterogeneity was not 
much greater than before the enlargement – the pre-enlargement Union was Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox, some of its inhabitants were strongly religious (notably in Ireland, 
Italy, Greece), others strongly secularized (notably in the Netherlands, eastern Germany). 
However, Western Europeans probably regarded Eastern Europeans as coming from another 
planet, and could indeed perceive the enlargement as the end of Europe as they had known 
(or imagined) it before (see Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:13-14; who also timely noted that 
“orthodox Christianity is now an official part of the EU as well” (2009:215)).  
As Holly Case observes, the 2004 EU accession was often conceptualized in Central 
and Eastern Europe as a return to Europe, split from these countries as a result of war and 
communist domination (2009:126; see also Laffan 2004:80; Risse 2004:255; Triandafyllidou 
and Spohn 2003:9). According to Brigid Laffan, this suggests that “since the 1950s, the 
European Union was institutionalised in Western Europe as the dominant framework above 
the level of the state” and the accession to this framework marked the confirmation of a 
“European” status of the acceding country (2004:80). It was also perceived as a guarantee of 
protection against the “renewed threats from the East, Russia and Asia” (Triandafyllidou and 
Spohn 2003:9-10). 
Delanty and Rumford (2005) also mention a certain disappointment and confusion 
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related to the European enlargement in both Eastern and Western parts of Europe. In the East, 
it was related to accession fatigue, due to a lengthy accession process and negative social 
phenomena which emerged at the margins of this process, such as “the rise of nationalism, 
incomplete democratization and the unsettling effects of capitalism” (Delanty and Rumford 
2005:29). As Triandafyllidou and Spohn add, the accession process has also sparked fears of 
a loss of sovereignty and of peripherization and economic domination by the West (2003:7). 
Furthermore, as Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach observe, some nationals of Central and 
Eastern European countries, attached to the idea of national sovereignty regained only after 
1989, might frown upon sharing this sovereignty with Brussels (2010:7-8, 21-22). 
In the West, the scepticism was related to a “growing democratic deficit and a deeper 
crisis in loyalties” related to European integration, as well as the fear of immigration (Delanty 
and Rumford 2005:29). As a result, the prospects of European identity have been looked at 
with reluctance (Delanty and Rumford 2005:29). 
2.7.5. Europeanization 
Robert Harmsen and Thomas M. Wilson propose a typology of eight (partially overlapping) 
meanings of Europeanization in the social sciences, including, inter alia, “modernization” 
(referring to the drifting towards the European economic core by peripheral European states), 
“joining Europe” (with reference to EU enlargement), “the reconstruction of identities”, and 
“transnationalism and cultural integration” (2000:13-18). The last two meanings are the most 
relevant ones from the perspective of the processes analysed in this thesis and thus merit fuller 
explanation. 
Europeanization understood as “the reconstruction of identities” is “the broadest 
‘usage’ of the term” and refers to modification of identities in Europe “in a manner which 
relativizes (without necessarily supplanting) national identities” (Harmsen and Wilson 
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2000:17). As Harmsen and Wilson further explain,  
Europeanization from this perspective must focus on issues of culture and identity, both in 
terms of culture as a European Union project (Shore 1998), and in terms of the ways in which 
EU policy has an impact on, and interacts with, local forms of political and cultural 
identification throughout the member states (Wilson 2000). (Harmsen and Wilson 2000:17). 
 
Europeanization in the sense of “transnationalism and cultural integration”, “refers to 
‘spheres of interaction’ in everyday life, ‘where peoples of Europe engage in face-to-face 
encounters with each other’” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000:18; in reference to Borneman and 
Fowler 1997: 497). The authors stress that Europeanization in this sense involves both the 
maintenance and crossing of cultural and political boundaries (Harmsen and Wilson 2000:18).  
 In both of these meanings, “Europeanization is about the practices involved in ‘being 
and becoming more European’” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000:24). 
Understood in this way, Europeanization can be seen as a process which is crucial for 
the very existence of the European Union as a polity or, at least, as a democratic polity which 
– as argued – would require a “demos”, the European people, enabling the emergence of a 
“European public sphere” (Kraus 2008:14, 23-25).  According to some authors, the existence 
of the “demos” would require a minimum cultural integration (Kraus 2003:665; 2008:26) or 
even a common language (Kraus 2008:23). Others argue that the European people can turn 
into a post-national “demos” based on purely political, “civic” basis (Kraus 2008:27). 
On the other hand, Peter A. Kraus refers to the fact that European states are internally 
culturally diverse. This argument weakens the claims of those who oppose cultural diversity 
of Europe to alleged cultural homogeneity of European countries (Kraus 2003:666-667). 
Indeed, if the diversity poses no problem in Spain, inhabited by numerous “traditional 
minorities” in addition to numerous groups of immigrants, why should it render the 
construction of European demos impossible?  
Gerard Delanty points out that Europeanization, given the diversity of national 
cultures and hence no real possibility of homogenization, must be based on “cultural 
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pluralisation” (2000:235). Delanty and Rumford see Europeanization as a process of the 
construction of a society “beyond national societies” (2005:1). They argue that there is an 
emerging European public sphere in both social and cultural terms, “a growing consciousness 
of Europeanness” (Delanty and Rumford 2005:4).  
2.7.6. European integration 
European integration is often regarded as an elitist endeavour which is insufficiently rooted in 
the desires of the wider European population. The process of European integration has been 
furthered by elites: experts and officials, and only to a much lesser extent by popular 
movements (Citrin and Sides 2004:163). Richard Münch offers a rationalization of this 
phenomenon: as the path of the European Union goes, at least partly, through the atrophy of 
nation-states, this project may only enjoy support from elites, which represent the “strong” 
faction of the society (2003:75). Meanwhile “the weak” cherish national or sub-national 
solidarities (Münch 2003:75). Indeed, the nation state may be perceived by some as a shelter 
against globalization. On the other hand, European integration, while reducing the importance 
of this shelter, may be perceived itself as offering protection against the threats of 
globalization coming from outside (e.g., Castells 2010 [1998]:352).  
European integration has mostly been understood and presented as integration through 
“states and markets, but also through law and technologies” leading to cultural cohesion 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005:10; see also Shore 2000:18). However, Eriksen suggests that, 
even if cultural homogenization, similarity, and creolization are indeed taking place, this is 
more due to “globalization, or transnational processes” than to European integration 
(1997:263-264).  
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2.8. Towards European identity 
The concept of European identity is central to my research. Explanation is therefore needed as 
to the sense in which I will use the term and the possible variants of European identity which 
exist, as described by different authors.!
2.8.1. Defining European identity 
Delanty and Rumford stress the importance of a distinction between “personal European 
identities” (consciousness of being European), which are proliferating due to Europeanization 
of social relations, and “European collective identity”, which is still lacking (2005:54). As 
they explain, “for such an identity to exist there must be a means of expressing an explicit 
collective self-understanding” (Delanty and Rumford 2005:54).  
Delanty and Rumford consider the main two lacking elements to be cultural and 
political identity (2005:74-75). As Manuel Castells claims, given the faltering religiosity of 
Europeans and the lay character of the State, European identity cannot be built around 
Christianity (2010 [1998]:368). As democracy is not a unique characteristic of Europe (and is 
in crisis), it also cannot be built around democracy (2010 [1998]:368-369). Likewise, the 
ethnic component is losing importance with the growing ethnic diversity of the continent 
(Castells 2010 [1998]:369).  
 Kraus emphasizes the necessity of “a minimum cultural consensus” for the 
construction of “foundations of a common public space” that he considers as a pre-condition 
for a functioning of a “legitimate and efficient European polity” (2003:677; see also 2008:9, 
140).  
Bernhard Giesen makes a comparison between national and European identities and 
observes that, if the former were built on the myth of an original cultural unity and common 
language, the latter can, despite its linguistic and cultural diversity, refer to a common cultural 
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heritage transmitted by its elites throughout the centuries, and consisting, inter alia, of the 
tendencies to European unity (2003:26). However, as he admits, “this cultural construction of 
Europe was always a matter of relatively small intellectual elites” (Giesen 2003:26).!  
Delanty and Rumford suggest that European identity could be conceived of as “a 
cosmopolitan identity embodied in the cultural models of a societal or civilizational identity” 
(2005:56). Such an identity would include but not be limited to the attachment to Europe 
(Delanty and Rumford 2005:57). Moreover, the term can be used with reference to the 
multitude of national, regional, or political identities which are European in the sense that 
they “are defined by an orientation to a broad cultural conception of Europe” (Delanty and 
Rumford 2005:55). Likewise, Dario Castiglione refers to the concept of “plural” European 
identity (2009:29), but he sees the common point of these different identities in “political 
allegiance to the EU” clearly deriving from elites’ attempts to ensure popular support for a 
political system or project (2009:32).  
Kraus (2003) notices that the “Westphalian” (relating identity to the nation state) order 
is, in any case, corroded by the multitude of regional or diasporal identities in contemporary 
European States. Although he subscribes to the idea that a purely “cosmopolitan” view, 
assuming a possibility to built an identity on a purely “civic” component, is irrealistic, he 
claims that the “pluralist” concepts or re-interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity might 
constitute appropriate models for how to deal with the question of identity in the future 
European polity (Kraus 2003:677-678).   
2.8.2. The making of European identity  
Castells argues that, although European identity does not currently exist, it can be constructed 
as a complement of other, already existing identities (2010 [1998]:369). In this regard, Shore 
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points to certain similarities between a nation-state and the EU, claiming that the EU elites101 
are trying to build and develop a European consciousness, much like the national elites 
recruited from the educated middle classes did with nationalist consciousness in nation-states 
(Shore 1996:488; 2000:32; see also Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:9-10; Delanty and 
Rumford 2005:55; Neveu 2000:132; Shore and Black 1994:280).  
Some of the constructed myths, symbols, and cultural patterns “transcend national 
cultural boundaries” and “form a culture area of overlapping components” (Smith 1990:187). 
Among these elements, Smith mentions democracy and its institutions, civil rights and laws, 
Judeo-Christian ethics, humanism, and individualism (1990:187). However, as Eriksen 
observes, for the Europeans’ feeling of Europeanness, “a shared mythical past is sorely 
needed” (1997:257; see also Giesen 2003:24).  
 Cris Shore and Annabel Black notice the germs of European identity in the 
institutions: 
If the public at large remain unaware of their “European identity” the same cannot be said of 
the Commission bureaucrats. Indeed, something of an embryonic European culture does 
appear to be emerging within the Community institutions, as for all that the different 
institutions may often disagree over goals, their staff share a similar set of experiences and 
life-styles, certain distinctive patterns of behaviour, and a common (bureaucratic) language. 
(1992:11)  
 
However, the authors stress the distance between the EU officials and the “lay 
people”, due to, among other things, the complexity and impenetrability of the world of the 
EU institutions (Shore and Black 1994:295) and the fact that the institutions have “little 
appeal” to “Europe’s general public” (Shore 1993b:785). In this regard, Kraus reminds the 
Eurostat survey showing that, despite the progressive transfer of competences to the European 
level, the percentage of EU citizens giving priority to their European identity over the national 
one does not increase (2008:53-54). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101! Shore claims that the European institutions, while recruiting the personnel, prefer people with academic 
background – “in economics, law and European studies”, so that they can play a role of “architects of European 
construction” (2000:28).!
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Still, Bellier points out that, according to polls, elites tend to be more favourable to 
Europe and suggests this will be the case for all those who benefit from European freedoms 
(2000a:150). Also Herrmann and Brewer suggest that educated elites benefit from EU 
integration more than the general public and thus tend to identify with Europe, while the rest 
of the European population “may move in a direction opposite to that of the elite” (Herrmann 
and Brewer 2004:15; see also Laffan 2004:76). 
 2.8.3. What kind of European identity is possible?  
Bruter (2004a, 2004b) distinguishes between “cultural” and “civic” components of political 
identities. The former refers to the perceived individual belonging to a certain group, usually 
based on “culture, social similarities, ethics or even ethnicity”, while the latter refers to “the 
identification with a political structure” (Bruter 2004b:26). In Europe, people would have a 
sense of belonging to a certain civilizational circle (cultural aspect) and might identify with 
the European Union (civic aspect) (Bruter 2004a:188; 2004b:26). Interestingly, Bruter 
observed that when asked “nonspecific questions about their European identity”, people 
generally point to the civic elements of identity (2004a:201). Jack Citrin and John Sides refer 
to Habermas (1994), J. H. H. Weiler (1997), and Shaw (1997) who also argue that a possible 
future constructed European identity is likely to be “civic” (2004:183). This concept 
resembles a “constitutional patriotism” centred on such values as democracy, tolerance for 
minorities, humanitarianism, devotion to the welfare state, and such political orientations as 
“a spirit of transnational cooperation” and “support for multilateral institutions” (Citrin and 
Sides 2004:183). The authors refer to “a Europe-wide acceptance of a rights-based conception 
of citizenship founded on EU law rather than national tradition” (Citrin and Sides 2004:183). 
Likewise, Llobera claims that European identity would rather be based on “constitutional 
patriotism” than on “primordial allegiances” (2003:167).  
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On the other hand, Delanty and Rumford also emphasize the development of 
transnational cultural codes and identifications in Europe, as well as the common pattern of 
life (2005:85), while Eriksen draws attention to the importance of “ideology production”, 
especially regarding the “creation of a shared history” (2010:91).  
2.8.4. National and European levels of identification 
If Smith does not think that a European identity might replace existing national identities, he 
predicts the possibility of the emergence of “different levels of identification ... exist[ing] one 
within the other” (1993a:134). Similarly, Eriksen emphasizes that one can have several 
identities which refer to different levels (family, ethnic groups, etc.) (2010:92). 
As Risse observes, “it has become conventional wisdom among scholars that 
individuals hold multiple social identities” (e.g., European, regional, related to membership in 
a political party) (2004:253). Richard Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer add that, while 
being members of various communities simultaneously, people attach more or less 
importance to a given identity depending on circumstances (e.g., Europeans would feel more 
European in America, while their professional or religious belonging may appear temporarily 
less important) (2004:4). Seen from this perspective, European identity does not need to 
replace national identity, as both can exist and prosper in parallel (Risse 2004:271). As Risse 
puts it, “European and national identities are not zero-sum propositions” (2004:260; see also 
Delanty and Rumford 2005:54).  
Three main approaches to analysing the relationship between national and European 
identities can be found in the literature (Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:8). Firstly, 
“Europeanness” can be seen as an additional, secondary, and subdued layer of national 
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identity (Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003:8).102 Secondly, national identities are sometimes 
seen as progressively declining, as European identity is gaining ground (Triandafyllidou and 
Spohn 2003:8). European identity would therefore be a threat to national identity (Wilson 
2000:139).  
A third approach, the most relevant to the purpose of my dissertation, is represented, 
inter alia, by Krystyna Romaniszyn who sees the relation between European and national 
identities as “an ever-developing hybrid” (2003:115). Notably, Romaniszyn103 considers 
Europeanness as  
just a new item in the “kit” [of identities], coexisting alongside other identities, not a dominant 
identity that embeds or constitutes a frame of reference for other identities (class, national, 
etc.). In turn, Europeanisation viewed from this perspective appears as a process that enhances 
the enlargement, without causing a thorough reconfiguration of national identity. … 
Europeanisation works towards the diversification of national identity, enriching the existing 
identity with a new component - the European identity. The process coincides with the merits 
of the two current transnational processes: European integration and international migration 
that restore the structural and cultural pluralism of European civilization” (2003:115, emphasis 
in original).  
 
 Risse, while subscribing to the theory of multiple identities, nevertheless observes 
that, national and European identities may clash in certain cases, like in the case of EU 
officials who are subject to conflicting imperatives deriving from, respectively, their 
obligation to “work toward a common European goal” and from their national affiliations 
(2004:249). According to Risse, there are “three ways in which we can think of multiple 
identities”: (1) “identities can be nested, conceived of as concentric circles104 or Russian 
Matruska dolls, one inside the next”; (2) “identities can be cross-cutting. In this configuration, 
some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group”; 
(3) “identities can be separate”, thus, there is “no overlap in group memberships” (Risse 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102!This approach is shared notably by Stephen Wood who believes that “nations remain Europe’s primary 
repositories and boundary markers of political identity, interest formation and legitimacy” (1998:397).!
103 Romaniszyn suggests that identity should be considered as “a ‘kit’ of identities, any of which may be used for 
different purposes and at different, suitable situations” (2003:115). 
104 Likewise, Eriksen writes about “concentric circles of social identities”, with “the following levels: Europe – 
the country – the region – the hometown or village” (1997:266). As the scholar observes, “at each level, the 
individual will experience identity conflicts as well as a sense of loyalty” (Eriksen 1997:266). 
! 123!
2004:250, emphasis in original; see also Herrmann and Brewer 2004:8; Rother and Nebe 
2009:122-123). In addition to these three models, Risse proposes another, “a ‘marble cake’ 
model”, where the identity components “cannot be neatly separated on different levels”, but 
assumes that they “influence each other, mesh and blend into each other” (2004:251-252).  
 Rother and Nebe (2009) elaborate on the abovementioned distinction, placing it in the 
European context. In the model of “nested” identities, “European citizens could hold a 
European identity on top of their existing territorial identities” (2009:122). If the relations 
between European and other identities followed the model of “cross-cutting” identities, “some 
but not all people in Europe might subscribe to a European identity; Europeanness could then 
overlap with being Protestant, Catholic or Muslim, male, female, gay, lesbian or straight and 
so on” (Rother and Nebe 2009:123). Finally, with regard to “separate identities”, Rother and 
Nebe clarify that the separation would operate at the level of the individual and not of the 
group. The latter could hold several identities, but “there is no group that shares both of these 
exact two identities. … If Europeanness took this form, it would not overlap with national 
identities” (2009:123, emphasis in original). 
 With regard to the “Russian doll model”, Ulrike Hanna Meinhof (2004) observes that 
it assumes that different identifications are complementary. However, she insists that different 
identifications could actually be incompatible or even conflictual and could be better 
visualized as a “volcano or an earthquake”, where different formations (layers) would be 
threatened from above (e.g., national identity by the European identity) or from beneath (e.g., 
by regional or local identity) (Meinhof 2004:218).  
 As regards EU Commission officials, Laffan claims that their identities are “cross 
cutting rather than nested” (2004:90). As she goes on to say, “among Commission officials 
there will be variation in terms of the identities that are assumed, with room for role conflict 
and role switching” (Laffan 2004:90).  
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2.8.5. European identity and the Other 
Castiglione observes that, independently of the culturally rooted or “imagined” (Anderson 
1991) nature of a European identity, in addition to a positive identification, it requires a sense 
of distinctiveness (2009:36).  
Some authors suggest that the traditional point of reference could be the United States 
(Citrin and Sides 2004:162; Sztompka 2004:487). According to Sztompka, this “most recent 
boundary” has been raised after the collapse of communism (2004:487). This choice might 
appear paradoxical, given that, arguably, it might be difficult to find many polities closer to 
Europe both on cultural and values ground than the U.S. 
Similarly, Castiglione refers to possible sources of such negative identification, 
quoting “anti-Americanism” and “anti-Islamism” (2009:36). The major difficulty for this to 
happen would be the post-enlargement divisions within Europe, with new members taking a 
different stance vis-à-vis the United States and towards religion (Castiglione 2009:36). This 
view seems somewhat simplistic, as even before the recent enlargement there were different 
approaches to these issues in Europe, to quote a more positive attitude to the US in Northern 
Europe (Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK) and clearly divergent attitudes to the role 
of religion in public life (e.g., between Italy and Greece on the one hand and France on the 
other).  
Similarly, Eriksen “offers” a range of options: “a shared European identity” that, for 
example, “would have to define itself in contrast to Muslim, Middle Eastern or Arab identity, 
possibly also in relation to African, East Asian and North American identities-depending on 
the social situation” (2010:74).  
Shore points to the problematic nature of such “othering”, implying the absolutism in 
this approach to identity (2000:63). Indeed, if identity is “fluid and contextual”, necessarily 
based on “heterogeneous, ‘impure’ and constantly changing” (Shore 2000:63) cultures, the 
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aforementioned approach would presuppose its fixed, essentialist nature. However, both 
Shore (2000) and Romaniszyn (2003) seem to believe that European xenophobia, especially 
against Muslims, is on the rise (Shore 2000:82) and is somehow connected with “the 
discovering of European identity vis-à-vis non-European immigrants, and perhaps migrants 
from the other parts of Europe seen as inferior to ‘the West’ or ‘Europe’” (Romaniszyn 
2003:114). Romaniszyn actually suggests that international migration could stimulate the 
emergence of European or at least Western European identity (2003:114). On the other hand, 
if Europe is a community of values, xenophobic rejection of migrants from Muslim countries 
might actually negatively affect the “sameness” element of European identity. Moreover, 
someone might argue that today Europe embraces also Muslim or African components, and 
building European identity in contraposition to migrants from these backgrounds could 
therefore only concern a part of Europeans.  
2.8.6. European identity as a product of the EU 
As Shore reminds us, all communities are culturally constructed as collective identities: 
“‘imagined’ and ‘invented’” (1993b:781). To this end, the EU institutions are promoting “the 
values and virtues of [the] ‘common cultural heritage’” aiming at “develop[ing] a sense of 
Europeanness that is proud, patriotic and distinctive, but avoids exclusiveness and jingoism” 
(Shore and Black 1994:294). While analyzing the concepts projected by the European 
Commission, Shore concludes that its notion of a “European identity” is “static, bounded and 
exclusivist” (1993b:781).  
Several scholars emphasize the role of the EU institutions in European identity 
building (e.g., Bellier and Wilson 2000a; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Herrmann and 
Brewer 2004; Laffan 2004; Shore 1993b, 2000; Shore and Black 1994). Herrmann and 
Brewer claim that the institutions play a role as “active agents of change” (2004:15; see also 
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Laffan 2004:84), seeing such an identity as useful for the European project and as a potential 
source of legitimization, loyalty, and mobilisation of collective effort (2004:15). 
Abélès observes that “virtual Europe is self-generating from the top”, trying to create 
European identity without anything existing to build on, such as tradition or narratives of the 
past (Shore and Abélès 2004:12; see also Abélès 2000:33). Originally, the European 
integration was mostly mostly understood by the EU elites as integration of the markets 
(McDonald 2012:544) and hence a functionalist vision of identity building pre-dominated – a 
European was mostly anticipated as a European consumer (or – later- a European worker or 
serviceman). It is in this role that the Treaty of Maastricht proclaimed the birth of a European 
citizen. However, his rights were only those he could otherwise enjoy under the the existing 
economic freedoms and the related acquis. Thus, the early European citizen was homo 
oeconomicus. According to Shore, since the 1980s, in addition to integration of the markets 
by removing barriers and promoting the free movement of capital, goods, services, and 
labour, attention has also increasingly been paid to culture (2000:42-44, 1996:477; see also 
McDonald 1996:54; 2012:545). The Commission has notably stressed the importance of 
building closer ties between peoples (Shore 1993b:785) and promoted “a sense of belonging” 
and “feelings of ‘Europeanness’ among the citizens” (Shore and Black 1992:10), in order to 
create a European demos, a “European public” (Shore 2005:239-240). The author notably 
draws attention to efforts to replace national symbols with European ones (Shore 1996:481). 
Hartmut Kaelbe refers to many European symbols such as a European flag, rituals, a 
European anthem, a European day, and so forth (2009:206). However, only a few of them 
have been successful, notably “the European flag, the Erasmus program, and the EU 
currency” (Kaelbe 2009:206). 
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2.8.7. European lifestyles and values and identification with Europe 
Favell stresses the importance of “the emergence of genuinely Europeanized behavior, 
beyond the national customs, identities, practices that European nationals have inherited from 
their nation-states of origin” (2001a:19). This is not yet the case on a larger scale, except for 
certain sectors, such as sport, tourism, and cuisine (Favell 2001a:19-20). However, Borneman 
and Fowler emphasize the achievements in this field, such as “European television stations 
(the English SKY, the French-German Arte) and universities; a European Champions League 
for soccer, film festival, parliament, court, and law; and a ‘Eurovision’ song festival” 
(1997:487-488). According to Kaelbe, in parallel with the “politicization” of the EU, 
Europeans have increasingly identified with European lifestyles and values, “with a way of 
life rather than a self-consciously adopted political program” (2009:203). As Kaelbe 
emphasizes, this phenomenon has perfectly co-existed with a continued identification with 
national lifestyles and values (2009:204).  
 The identification with certain common consumption patterns has become easier since 
people increasingly started to travel, study, marry, and work abroad, all this leading to the 
internationalisation of lifestyles (Kaelbe 2009:204-205). On the other hand, identification 
with Europe has not been steadily increasing during the last three decades and only around a 
half of Europeans (and less than half in certain countries) “identify with Europe and regard 
themselves as Europeans” (Kaelbe 2009:205).  
 2.8.8. Mobility and its impact on Europe and feeling European 
As Favell observes, although free movement of persons has been one of the foundations of the 
EU and as a result Western societies have enjoyed the possibility of intra-European mobility 
for decades (2009:171), only around two percent of Europeans live outside the country where 
they were born (2009:168). The author stresses that the most visibly active movers in Europe 
!128!
have become Central and Eastern Europeans (Favell 2009:171).  
Still, freedom of movement is perceived by Europeans as the most valuable advantage 
of EU integration (in Favell and Recchi 2009:2).105 Favell and Recchi remark that the impact 
of mobility extends not only to movers, but also to “those who encounter movers” (2009:3). 
As Góra and Mach suggest, “the returning migrants become a source of influence and 
change” (2010:23). Travelling and speaking foreign languages usually coincide, as Bruter 
remarks, with feeling European and support for European integration (2004a:207). 
Favell and Recchi suggest that “EU movers are the prototypical ‘Highly Europeanized 
Citizens’”, showing how to “shift one’s identity or horizon to a post-national or cosmopolitan 
level” (2009:3). According to the The European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS), the 
intensity of pro-Europe attitudes is believed to increase with the period of time spent in 
another EU member state (Recchi 2008:216).  
2.8.9. EU officials and their identity  
The identity of EU officials can be seen as a complex mix of their professional identity, their 
national and ethnic identities, and some elements of genuine supranational, European identity. 
The process of “engrenage”, as referred to by Shore (2000, 1996, 2005, 2007), seems to play 
a crucial role in the formation of the latter. !
2.8.9.1. The process of “engrenage” and its role 
Suvarierol observes that international experience (which EU officials often have prior to 
joining the institutions, notably thanks to studies, internships, and work abroad) make people 
culturally atypical, so that they “do not fit into the expectations of the primary national 
socialization scheme” (2011:195). Abélès et al. even suggest that some EU officials (although 
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105 According to the study performed by Bruter, the most conspicuous consequences of the European integration 
from the perspective of his respondents and their families were related to travel and life within the EU 
(2004b:31).!
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this is not so common) “are born ‘Europeans’”, as they have mixed origins or grow up in a 
“European” environment (1993:16).  
According to Bellier and Wilson, “the European Commission is an institution whose 
performance, ideology, and modes of integration are such that it can be considered as the 
‘avant garde’ of a new society in the making” (2000a:11), a kind of “laboratory” (2000a:17; 
see also McDonald 2012:542). It can be assumed that the same also goes for other institutions, 
as they are staffed according to the same principles by the same corpse of officials, selected 
through the Commission procedures and sometimes switching between the institutions. In 
fact, as Shore suggests, these “powerful agents of socialisation” produce “a transnational 
technocratic elite with its own norms, ethos and identity” as well as “cultural practices, 
lifestyles and class interests” (2002:7-8). Bellier and Wilson claim that the culture created by 
the EU has a paramount impact on “shaping of identities throughout Europe, and the identities 
of Europe outside its boundaries” (2000a:8). !
European officials represent “the overall European interest”, which “is supposed to 
take precedence over the interest of their own countries” (Bellier 2000b:63,65; see also 
McDonald 1996:52; 2012:542). It is stated in the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities in Article 11 that, “An official shall carry out his duties and conduct 
himself solely with the interests of the Union in mind. He shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside his institution” 
(2016:19).106 In this regard, Bellier draws attention to a “high level of pressures” experienced 
by European officials, in relation to their duty to represent a common European interest and 
the expectation that this interest should have precedence over that of their home countries 
(2000b:65). Bellier also remarks that EU officials cope with a tension between a supranational 
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106  Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of 
Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (OJ 45, 14.6.1962, p. 1385) with amendements. 
The uniform text retrieved from  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20160101&from=FR  
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and a national identity, observing that they neither completely adhere to nor are able to 
liberate themselves from the latter (1993:50). 
Shore (2000, 1996, 2005, 2007) refers to the process of engrenage (or “enmeshing”), 
understood as “a mechanism of institutional and ideological incorporation” (Shore 
2000:148).107 Engrenage, as understood by Shore, is not only the process of socialization in 
the universe of the institutions, but also the process of “redirecting loyalties” of newcomers 
towards the institutions and their ideals and coining the identity of European elites 
(2007:194). Shore points to the compatibility of engrenage with Jean Monnet’s concept of 
integration through “functional spillover”, as officials become involved with the functioning 
of the institution and this process triggers the sense of belonging and shifts loyalties (Shore 
2007:195-196; see also Abélès 2004:4).  
 Hooghe points out that the cohesion of profiles and views originates not only in the 
selection process (“selective recruitment”), during which “the organization screens recruits for 
their views”, but also from the fact that candidates to work in the institutions are more likely 
to represent the expected profile, as they tend to be already supportive of the organization 
(“self-selection”) (2005:869; see also Ban 2009) (in this case, they may already identify with 
the institutions ideals, norms, and objectives prior to employment).108 As Hooghe concludes, 
“self-selection and selective recruitment precede socialization” (2005:869).109 
 Suvarierol stresses the importance of “pre-socialisation” in terms of European-
oriented education (College of Europe) or a stage in the institutions (2011:190). Moreover, 
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107 As Shore observes, “It is unclear whether the term engrenage entered the lexicon of EU officials via 
Monnet’s writings or those of EU academics, but …, it has also been used to describe processes of socialization 
among officials in other EU institutions” (2007:195).  
108 She also adds that “self-interest [may] induce employees to share the organization’s norms (utility 
maximization)” (Hooghe 2005:869).!
109 Ban emphasizes the role of socialization of entry-level staff, by means of a compulsory “newcomers’ training 
program … provided by the European Administrative School” (2013:114). As Ban concludes: “since most of 
those recruited are at entry level, they are seen as fairly malleable, and, through both formal and informal 
socialization processes, most learn quickly how the organization works, including the unspoken norms” 
(2013:123). 
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“the Commission offers an organizational context in which the significance of nationality is 
gradually transformed” (Suvarierol 2011:190).  
 Bellier writes about a “conversion in which ‘strangers’ become colleagues (Bellier 
1997), when after some time the perception of the newcomer as a national being in the office 
is overcome, when they start sharing the same conceptual space” (Bellier and Wilson 
2000a:18). Abélès, on the other hand, argues that the fact that EU officials are constantly in 
contact with other nationalities might be counterproductive from the point of view of forging 
a common identity as it may result in the strengthening of national barriers (2004:11).  
2.8.9.2. The multiple identities of EU officials 
According to Bellier, the EU civil servants in Brussels have “multiple identities”, namely a 
European one, an expatriate identity, and a collective identity “based on a professional 
identification to the institution” (2002:91). EU civil servants neither belong completely to 
their country of origin, nor “identify themselves to a single referential frame” (Bellier 
2002:79). Consequently, they have developed a kind of new model of identity, namely 
“European identity” (Bellier 2002:79-80).  
 According to Bellier, professional identification with the service helps EU officials to 
“overcome the ambivalence of not belonging to any single national identity and environment” 
(2002:86) and serves as a remedy to the problems deriving from cultural and linguistic 
multiplicity (2002:90). The officials attach more importance to “their common destiny” than 
to their various origins (2002:90). Moreover, she claims that European identity can “be 
understood only in contrast to external national identities” (Bellier 2002:91; see also 
2000b:61). Bellier emphasizes the two main instances of the conversion of “national being” 
into a “European being”: when faced with “the image of the foreigner, of the non-European 
competitor to the EU’s economic identity” and with the image of “Europeans which preceded 
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the Union, such as the European ‘family’, or those of nationalism or regionalism” 
(2000a:150). As Bellier adds, the same phenomenon occurs among other pro-European elites. 
As she suggests, “this may be extended in the future to all those individuals who are able to 
benefit from the free movement of persons, ideas, and services” (Bellier 2000a:150). 
  This induction of European consciousness and identity to other Europeans is, 
according to Shore and Black, a major challenge for the future (1994:288).  
Bellier suggests that European and national identities in the institutions are in 
permanent conflict (1993:50; 2000a:135; 2002:86). As Abélès and his colleagues observe,  
Officials find themselves in situations in which they represent the Commission in opposition 
to their own country of origin: by virtue of their status and function, they embody a different 
entity from the one to which they might be deemed to be “naturally” attached. This puts them 
in an ambiguous position, and it is their lot in relation to the outside world, in the state of 
permanent negotiation in which the Commission and the Member States are locked. (1993:6) 
 
Furthermore, Bellier points to “the antagonism between cultural and political identities 
in the European context”, drawing attention to the self-perceived alienation of EU officials in 
their role as independent policymakers (2000b:66).  
2.8.9.3. Being a foreigner and EU official: the creation of a sense of belonging 
As Shore observes,  
the factors that shape everyday experience of being an EU civil servant in Brussels - 
dépaysement, quasi-diplomatic identity, multilingual work environment, residential 
segregation, separate schooling for their children, the relative affluence, job security and high 
status of their position, the continuous exposure to institutional norms and practices – certainly 
help to foster a strong esprit de corps among staff. (2000:166)  
 
As he argues, the same factors favour the emergence of “European identity” (Shore 
2000:166). However, on the more negative side, Shore remarks that these factors also 
estrange EU civil servants from the host society and other, “non-Europeanizing” citizens of 
member states by increasing “the social and psychological distance” (2000:166). 
 As a result, of being simultaneously fonctionnaires and foreigners, the EU employees 
are more oriented towards “cliquishness and the creation of a strong difference between ‘we’ 
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fonctionnaires (or ‘people of the House’) and ‘they’ ‘Belgians’” (Shore 2000:164). Abélès 
remarks that EU officials share with other non-Belgians the experience of residing in a 
foreign country while at the same time feeling that they are subject to criticism as Eurocrats 
(2000:40; Abélès et al. 1993:21). This further contributes to the process of engrenage and to 
the emergence of European identity. Abélès et al. observe that “the Commission has no 
territorial roots and its staff, in their own perception, are cut off from theirs” (1993:29).  
! The aforementioned engrenage (Shore 2000) favours “professional identification to 
the workplace” (Bellier 2002:86; see also Abélès and Bellier 1996:435; Shore 2000:140).  
Certainly, one could argue that this kind of “professional identity” is likely to appear 
in any workplace: most urban professionals wear suits and badges, spend time together after 
work, or develop some kind of professional slang. However, in the case of EU officials, this 
“corporate identity” is associated not only with a specifically European, institution-related 
mentality and loyalty, but is also exposed to the feeling of alienation from the host society 
surrounding them (and probably also from other European societies including the one of their 
origin). In addition to the specific lifestyle of EU civil servants, Eurocrats experience physical 
and social isolation which, coupled with general adherence to integrationist ideas, may lead to 
emotional and ideological identification with the European institutions and consequently 
contribute to building a new, supranational identity and to the process of constructing the 
separate community of EU officials. 
The Eurocrats share “the sense of being ‘different’ from other Europeans” (Shore 
2000:140; see also Abélès et al. 1993:21). Drawing upon Bramwell (1987:75), Shore suggests 
that a potent unifying factor is a “‘defensive solidarity against the outside world’ combined 
with ‘an internal paranoia’” (Shore 2007:196). Shore draws attention to the popularity of 
‘house’ metaphors with reference to the Commission (2000:131; 2007:164, 187, 192-193; see 
also Abélès et al. 1993:8; Bellier 2002:86).  
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Such professional identification will naturally add to other identifications (national, 
regional, religious, etc.) without necessarily taking precedence over them. However, the 
multinational pattern of EU officials, the specificity of their mission (serving interests 
explicitly distinct from national interests) and the particularities of their lifestyle and 
ideological beliefs strengthen the meaning of these distinctive features and may strongly 
influence their social contacts. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology  
!
Before passing to the actual presentation of the research results, I will explain my 
epistemological approach, the research methods I used, the way I analysed the data and my 
positionality. I also explain the important aspects of my research and the difficulties I 
encountered, in particular due to the “elite” features of my informants. Finally, I reflect on the 
ethnographic character of the research. If the methodology discussion comes so late, it is 
because it is inseparably linked to the actual research, presented in the following chapter, 
while it seemed to me preferable to start with the explanation of the notions that continuously 
come back in the interviews of my researched population. 
3.1. Epistemological underpinnings of the research 
H. Russell Bernard and Clarence C. Gravlee make distinction between those researchers for 
whom “reality is constructed uniquely by each person” and those who assume that “external 
reality awaits our discovery” (2015:5).  
While conducting my research, I was certainly influenced by the constructivist 
approach, which assumes that knowledge is necessarily subjective and constructed (Grbich 
2007:8). Such an approach assumes the existence of “multiple realities”, differently 
experienced by different people, while “reality is viewed as socially and societally embedded 
and existing within the mind” (Grbich 2007:8). Informants are considered as co-authors 
(Clifford 2010 [1986]:17). Indeed, almost all information about the Polish EU officials used 
in this dissertation comes from themselves, I relied on their vision of themselves, of the local 
reality, their perception of the relations with other groups of population, and so forth. 
Actually, as I purposefully abstained from triangulation throughout the research (I have not 
sought to confront the views expressed by the informants with information from other 
sources, e.g., with views of other EU officials, Belgians, or other Poles), the subject of this 
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thesis is limited to the vision of reality of the Polish EU officials.  
The research participants, while being (together with me) actively involved in this 
process of knowledge construction (see Aull Davies!2008:114), may manipulate what they 
reveal (Charmaz and Mitchell 2010:164). As Clifford Geertz insists, “what we call our data 
are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their 
compatriots are up to” (1973:9). In qualitative inquiry, the construction of knowledge would 
consist in selection of relevant phenomena out of their “raw flux” (Lofland and Lofland 
1995:68). 
Although, as a researcher, I am necessarily prone to interpreting the meaning of what 
I see and hear in a very subjective manner, and to solicit responses to the questions that I 
found important and relevant, it is still worth making an effort to identify and reflect upon the 
possible bias. Following advice of Melford E. Spiro, I had to take into account not only the 
subjectivity of my informants but also my own (2014 [1996]:430). 
3.2. The personal context of the research  
The traditional focus of anthropologists was on “small, remote groups of people” (Bernard 
and Gravlee 2015:4), or as James Clifford puts it, on “clearly defined others, defined as 
primitive, or tribal, or non-Western, or pre-literate, or nonhistorical” (2010 [1986]:23). 
Nonetheless, as Eriksen observes, with time, there was a shift in anthropological research that 
is no longer focused exclusively on “‘the tribal’ or o[n] the ‘non-industrial world’” (2015:39-
40). Mariza G.S. Peirano uses the term of “anthropology at home” with reference to studies 
of “one’s own society, where ‘others’ are both ourselves and those relatively different from 
us, whom we see as part of the same collectivity” (1998:122-123). This is also my case. 
Alluding to the term “insider anthropologist” introduced by Kirin Narayan (1993), I would 
qualify myself as a “quasi-insider” to the group in focus, thus the Polish EU officials in 
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Brussels.  Similarly as the research participants, I was a “foreigner”, a Pole living abroad. In 
line with Maren Borkert and Carla De Tona, this “reciprocal foreignness and otherness” 
could bring me closer to my research participants and created a kind of connection with the 
group in study (2006:par.24). However, not being EU official myself and remaining 
somehow at the margins of this community, I was not always considered as an insider by my 
respondents.110   
How exactly might my specific position affect my research? What is the impact of the 
researcher’s positionality (or “framing”) on the research process? As Michael Schnegg 
observes, the analysis must embrace the reciprocal relationship between the researcher and 
the researched group (2015:42). The consequences of the fact that the research was 
performed from a quasi-insider’s perspective cannot be limited to the ease or trouble in 
approaching the respondents. More importantly, it stretches also to the data obtained during 
the research, not only to the questions I asked and responses I obtained, but also to my 
interpretation of these responses. Initially, I assumed that being partly immersed in the life of 
the community of Polish EU officials in Brussels would not only ease access, but also make 
the way of thinking of my respondents easier to understand (see e.g., Lofland and Lofland 
1995:23).  
On the other hand, being a “quasi-insider” may pose certain challenges during the 
writing process. Notably, the relations of such a researcher with the research participants may 
have to be taken into account and hence influence the final product. In this context, Stella 
Mascarenhas-Keyes notes that, in case of native anthropologists (and unlike in case of 
outsiders), post-fieldwork contact with researched individuals may be extensive (1987:189). 
With this regard, it is important to recall that I needed to take into account, as it was 
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110 As Nancy Naples (1997:89) notes, “insiderness and outsiderness are not fixed or static positions, rather they 
are ever-shifting and permeable social locations that are differentially experienced and expressed by community 
members” (as cited in Borkert and De Tona 2006: par. 24).  
!
!138!
mentioned before, my own and my husband’s relations with the researched community.  
My husband, since the beginning of the process, was a valuable source of information 
contributing to my initial understanding of the overall context. This kind of information is 
available to the outside world, but collecting it on my own would have taken a lot of time. On 
the other hand, his reactions and personal views served me as a hint (but only as a hint, as I 
have always sought to confirm it with my research participants) to understand how certain 
issues may look like from the insiders’ perspective. On the other hand, I needed to be careful 
not to rely excessively on his opinions and interpretations, as it might bias the information 
obtained from questionnaires and interviews. However, it was clear since the beginning that 
my husband should not follow my research – firstly for confidentiality reasons, secondly, in 
order not to influence the interpretation of the gathered data.  
Since “the postmodern turn”, paying attention to “the self of the anthropologist” 
started to play an important role in academic writing (Collins and Gallinat 2010:3). The 
impact of the researcher’s personality on how the fieldwork experience is analysed and 
interpreted, turns anthropological accounts into a record of researchers’ reactions to the 
situations experienced during the research (Rapport and Overing 2005:26). As John Lofland 
and Lyn H. Lofland observe, “what we ‘see’ is inevitably shaped by the fact that we are 
languaged; by our spatial, temporal, and social locations (by culture, history, status); by our 
occupational or other idiosyncratic concerns; and, especially relevant here, by the scholarly 
discipline within which our ‘looking’ takes place” (1995:68; see also Hastrup 2004:457; 
LeCompte and Schensul 1999:102; 2013:79; Schnegg 2015:33). Certain scholars referred to 
“filters”, such as the theoretical or analytic frameworks adopted, social and cultural 
backgrounds, researcher’s individual features (Angrosino 2007:38; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 
2010: 358). 
While making reference to Erving Goffman’s (1974) frame analysis, Carol Grbich 
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argues that “framing” a researcher by his life experiences goes beyond his interpretations and 
affects the choice of the subject, his approach 111 (2007:17-18). Moreover, such features of an 
anthropologist as age and sex as well as personality traits, but also class, gender, religion, 
ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, may provoke “different responses from different people” 
(Larsen 2010:75; see also Šikić-Mićanović 2010:46-48; Bernard 1995:156; Eriksen 2015:34; 
Grbich 2007:18). For instance, important dissimilarity between a researcher and those studied 
may render the data acquisition less fruitful (Lofland and Lofland 1995:23). Without denying 
possible bias or specific approach of my interviewees related to my gender, I believe that this 
element probably did not play such an important role as in case of studies in radically 
different cultures (see e.g., Narayan 1993:674).112 Also the social position seems to make a 
difference. Stefanie Lotter points out that accessibility of the elite members to be studied 
depends on the researcher’s status (2004:4), while Charlotte Aull Davies remarks that “the 
social positions of interviewer and interviewee may distort or undermine the egalitarian ethos 
of the research interview” (2008:111). As I mentioned elsewhere in this work, my informants 
mostly rejected the supposition that they are elites and I have no reason to believe that they 
considered my social position as significantly inferior to theirs. Also the fact that I was a 
woman is not likely to significantly deform the results, given the topics studied and the nature 
of the research group. Most of my research participants were broadly of similar age as I, I did 
not observe or learn about any fundamental social background differences that could 
significantly affect my work. On the other hand, I do not work in the EU institutions and this, 
obviously, prevents my informants from considering me as one of them.!
 However, the fact of being a “quasi-” or genuine insider, if accompanied by 
appropriate alertness to one’s own biases and subjectivity, does not necessarily result in 
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111 D’Andrea, Ciolfi and Gray specify that the researchers’ work is notably influenced by “their own social 
locations and politics as well as by the views of involved constituencies in relation to roles, aims and 
motivations” (2011:155). David M. Fetterman adds that the ethnographer has also certain “biases and 
preconceived notions about how people behave and what they think” (1989:11). !
112 On this issue, see e.g., Bernard (1995:154-5); Jorgensen (1989:45); Lofland and Lofland (1995:41). 
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unreliable interpretations (Glesne and Peshkin 1992:147). Researchers also need to put their 
subjectivity into evidence, make the process of construction of data and meanings transparent 
and traceable, and diminish the impact of subjectivity, that is, through “a series of additional 
quality controls such as triangulation, contextualization, and a nonjudgmental orientation” 
(Fetterman 1989:11-12).  
Moreover, in line with Jean Bazin, I find it imperative to ask the respondents about 
their own explanations of their acts (2003:419). Ching Lin Pang suggests that, in a research 
context, speaking for others who are able to speak for themselves might be criticised as 
unethical (2000:58). On the other hand, there are many stereotypes and prejudices on 
Eurocrats, especially that mass media often present a very distorted image of them, enhancing 
negative attitudes. I was surprised that a motivation of certain EU officials to talk to me was 
precisely a hope that the public opinion could receive a more balanced picture of their living 
conditions, often based on strikingly incorrect or grossly outdated data and negative 
stereotypes.113 The EU officials have very little opportunity to correct this image as they are 
an easy target and a perfect scapegoat for certain media, press and politicians.  
3.3. Gaining access from a perspective of “quasi-insider” 
As it was already noted in the introductory part of this dissertation, the current research builds 
on my former study on the Polish EU institutions community in Brussels.  
Being a Polish expat in Brussels, and a wife of a Polish EU institutions civil servant, I 
could (as I initially thought) perform this research from a somewhat privileged position as 
regards access and being familiar with the context. As David Silverman points out, “it is not 
uncommon for qualitative researchers to use their existing relationships and contacts for their 
research” (2010:204), as it facilitates access. Also Fetterman emphasizes the possible benefits 
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113 I discuss this issue in the subsection on stereotypes. These misconceptions and errors are often factual and 
concern the actual existence of certain privileges (e.g., taxes) or the amount of remuneration perceived. 
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of an introduction by a member of a group, suggesting it may “open doors otherwise locked 
to outsiders” (1989:43). Initially, I was introduced to some of the participants through 
personal contacts (my partner or acquaintances). This usually helped me to remove suspicion 
or distrust (see Sabot 1999 on difficulties of gaining trust while researching elites by a 
researcher of the same national provenance).114 
Danny L. Jorgensen suggests that one of the opportunities for a researcher to gain 
cooperation of the studied individuals comes from the latter hoping that that research is useful 
(1989:74; see also Sabot 1999:330). As I mentioned before, EU officials could see academic 
study as an opportunity to rectify a very unfavourable popular perception of themselves.  
More specifically with reference to participant observation, Jorgensen distinguishes 
two basic strategies of gaining access to human settings, notably: “overt” (where observation 
is preceded by a request for permission) and “covert” (where people in the setting “are not 
informed of the research”) (1989:45-47). According to Jorgensen, participant observation 
typically has a hybrid character,115 as the information about the intentions and objectives of 
the researcher is communicated selectively. This was also the case of my research. I could not 
seriously consider remaining undercover. Not only it posed ethical problems, but it would 
also be very hazardous for personal reasons: the studied group included also colleagues of my 
husband, any behaviour that could be perceived as dishonest could affect my husband’s 
professional and social relations. Finally, adopting a covert strategy would also be inefficient: 
I needed to have questionnaires administered and conduct interviews in parallel with 
participant observation, while a lot of my informants participated in the social events at stake. 
On the other hand, the awareness of the purpose of my presence could have an important 
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114 However, during the research, I often struggled with questions of ethical nature, like for instance, the blurred 
boundaries between my private and researcher’s life. This problem was also mentioned by Busby pointing 
notably at “distorting personal relationships” (2011:14). 
115!Gobo refers to “semi-covert” or “semi-overt” observation (2009:109). 
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impact on the setting and people’s behaviour.116 In an extreme scenario (which did not 
materialize), my observation could turn into a series of “meet an anthropologist” events 
where people would try to feed me with pre-cooked information and pre-arranged 
impressions.  
It is important to stress that studying elites (especially in their work context) makes it 
highly difficult to use participant observation (Shore 2002:10; 2007:188-189). Consequently, 
my observation involved various less formal occasions - during different cultural and social 
events. It was not my intention to follow the research participants constantly during the 
everyday activities and especially in the working time. I was linked to the “community”, I 
lived with a Polish EU institutions employee, I socialized with EU officials of Polish and 
other nationalities even prior to starting my study, but necessarily my contact with them was 
limited to their spare time.  
While attending the monthly meetings of Polish EU officials, I did not inform 
everyone in a pub that I had come for research purposes. This would have been perceived as 
slightly peculiar as many of them had seen me already before (prior to my first research) and 
had known me as a partner of one of the EU officials. That might have certainly frozen the 
atmosphere, spoilt the party and – most importantly – created an unnatural situation. 
However, in the direct contacts with the members of the observed group, I always revealed 
the purpose of my presence and gave information on the research context. This came always 
very naturally, as a part of my self-presentation or (in case of acquaintances), standard “news 
exchange”.  
During such social events (and especially during the monthly meetings of the Polish 
EU officials in Wild Geese),117 those who did not know me typically asked, as the very first 
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116 Rhodes et al. argue that disclosed presence of researchers affects the behavior and responses of the 
informants, which, even unconsciously, are trying to produce a specific impression (2007a:9).   
117 Irish pub situated in the European quarter in Brussels. For a certain time monthly meeting of Polish EU 
officials took place in Wild Geese.  
! 143!
question, in which DG (Directorate General) I worked. They tended to assume I was EU 
employee, otherwise, what would be the point of my presence there? In some other cases, 
they would assume I was stagiaire. I always clarified that I was accompanying my husband 
who, just like them, worked in the EU Commission, while I was a PhD student in Belgium. 
Typically, I explained that I was doing a research on the community of Polish EU officials in 
Brussels. Some of them were truly interested in my study and would ask many additional 
questions, while others would simply turn to other interlocutors. In fact, the reasons why they 
participated in these monthly meetings were not only related to the need of social networking 
for work related purposes, but they were also interested in exchanging anecdotes or opinions 
from their working life to which I could not contribute. Actually, it happened quite frequently 
that the initial interest evaporated, once my interlocutors learned I was from the “outside”. 
Even worse, some of them happened to grow distrustful when they learned I was 
anthropologist. Fortunately, others were interested and eager to continue the conversation.  
What facilitated collection of research data was the fact that the meetings in Wild 
Geese unravelled according to a formula favouring interaction between participants, 
especially newcomers. Every participant heard several stories every evening, and my story 
was just one of them – slightly atypical, but not shockingly: especially in the later phase, 
meetings were also attended by a number of non-EU-institutions-employees. With time, I 
have managed to build some trust, which made it easier to subsequently send out 
questionnaires to some of the new acquaintances. Undoubtedly, the fact that I was considered 
as someone who was not complete outsider to the community, helped me to gain cooperation 
of some new participants.  
During the research process, the impact of my specific positionality (being a Polish, 
expat, a spouse of EU official) was certainly considerable, yet diverse. While sometimes, it 
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would open certain doors,118 it undoubtedly shut some others. The fact the community was 
quite undersized and its members often knew each other, did not help me. Indeed, during the 
interviewing phase I had to constantly reassure the respondents that their identity would not 
be revealed, that the gathered data were confidential, and that recordings would be kept in a 
safe place. In addition, it happened to me once that when I finally managed to meet the 
informant, he was afraid of meeting his work colleagues or friends while talking to me. 
On the other hand, I may only presume that without having a family link with the 
researched group, I could fall prey of suspicion and rejection. There was an instance during 
one of the monthly meetings of Polish EU officials, when a woman sitting next to me, and 
with whom I was having a conversation, was advised (although in a joking manner) not to 
reveal too much as “I was anthropologist and might have had a voice recorder in my 
handbag”. 
Already Bronisław Malinowski (1939) admitted that “an anthropology of one’s own 
people is the most arduous, but also the most valuable achievement of a fieldworker” (as 
cited in Peirano 1998:106). In fact, the more similar the researcher is to the informants, the 
less they will be willing to share with him (Sabot 1999). Moreover, they may assume that the 
researcher shares their perspective and already knows things hence may abstain from 
describing them (Aull Davies 2008:119-120; Angrosino 2007:32; see also Sabot 1999). 
Indeed, those who remembered me from the Polish monthly meetings did not feel they had to 
develop more on these social events. Furthermore, Emmanuèle Cunningham Sabot observes 
that elites are more likely to share important and even sensitive information with foreign 
researchers who also more easily gain their trust (1999:334). On the other hand, as the latter 
may not fully understand the local context, they may be less able to effectively use the 
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118 “I have to tell you that I never answer to similar questionnaires, as I know that information collected there 
might be used not only for “educational” purposes. But, since you are a Polish EU official’s wife, plus I have 
met you amongst my acquaintances …, I have decided to help you” (personal communication, October 12, 
2011, my translation). 
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collected data (Sabot 1999:334).   
3.4. Research sites 
The geographical focus of the study was Brussels119 where most of the Polish EU officials 
were settled and worked.  
Participant observation, during various cultural and social events, took place mostly, 
as I will call it, in a “semi-private” realm120 or a “parochial realm” (Lofland 1998, 1989)121 
(although, I also penetrated to the “private realm” of some of my interviewees). The 
observation mostly took place on the monthly meetings of Polish EU officials in one of the 
Irish pubs located in Schuman area (Wild Geese) and later in another venue in the 
neighbourhood (Aloft hotel). Besides, I participated in different cultural events of the Polish 
community,122 went out to restaurants or home parties that gathered many expats (EU 
officials included). Similarly, formal interviews were in most cases conducted in the 
“parochial realm” (Lofland 1998, 1989), in close proximity of EU officials’ offices in the 
Schuman and Luxembourg Square areas (e.g., the EU institutions’ canteens or cafeterias, the 
Commission’s headquarters Berlaymont’s café; but also outside of the EU institutions’ 
infrastructure - in different cafés, pubs, winery, or even in a bookshop).  
Besides, I was “lurking” in open virtual space, notably, the Internet forum of Gazeta 
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119 I did not include in my research the Polish EU institutions “community” in Luxembourg or other cities 
hosting EU institutions or agencies. 
120 I use this term as concerns semi-public realms with access restricted to a specific category, notably Polish 
EU officials, such as parts of Wild Geese or Aloft during monthly meetings. 
121 Lofland (1973, 1989, 1998) distinguishes two main categories of realms in the city, namely: “private”, and 
“public”. After Hunter (1985), she also adds a “parochial” realm. As the author elaborates, a “private realm” 
embraces close family and friends and is characterized by intimate relations a “parochial realm” is confined by 
“communal relations” with neighbors, colleagues and acquaintance networks (Lofland 1998:10, 14; see also: 
Lofland 1989:455), while a “public realm” can be characterized as “the world of strangers and the ‘street’” 
(Lofland 1998:10). 
122 These included events organised by the Polish Embassy (lectures, conferences, introduction of new Polish 
books in the presence of the authors, etc.), yearly charity events (e.g., Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity), 
film festivals (e.g., Eurocine 27), Polish theatre (or opera) when staged in Belgium, but also amateur theatre of 
the Polish EU officials, concerts, art exhibitions, receptions, but also several home parties. I was quite often 
taking my lunch in one of the canteens (access enabled via a person employed) in the EU institutions or 
attended several events (e.g., movie screenings) in the European Parliament and receptions afterwards. I also 
attended different events that were not restricted to Polish EU employees, like, for instance, after-work-drinks in 
pubs located in the Luxembourg Square area.  
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Wyborcza – Europracownicy (Euroemployees), but also virtual group - Polacy w Brukseli 
(Poles in Brussels) and Facebook groups such as Polscy Europracownicy (Polish Euro-
employees) or “Brussels Expats” (and similar). 
3.5. Research participants  
In the initial phase of my research respondents were selected on the basis of “non-
probability” “purposive sampling” (otherwise known as as “judgment sampling”) (Bernard 
2011:144).  
The eligibility criteria for inclusion to my study group were the following: statutory 
officials, temporary officials and contractual agents (excluding notably stagiaires, 
interimaires or assistants of Members of European Parliament (MEPs)). This choice was 
motivated by the fact that the employment contracts of representatives of the first two groups 
are too short or too precarious to enable development of close links with the institutions or 
with the community of Polish EU officials, while the MEPs assistants are not really 
employed by the EU institutions and were selected for political reasons and hence, they do 
not have the same experience and interests as the EU officials. 
The second important criterion of selection was the length of stay in Belgium. I 
assumed that this has an important impact on EU civil servants’ experience and the 
perception of issues, which are of interest for this study and thus, it restricted the group to 
those who have been living in Belgium at least for one year.  
The selection of the research participants for completing the questionnaires (the new 
group) was, additionally, based on the criterion of “snowball sampling” (“chain-referral”),123 
which is considered especially useful in studies of elite groups (Bernard 1995:97). 
At the next step, I identified “information-rich cases” (Guest 2015:235) useful for 
follow-up interviews amongst those officials who had completed my questionnaires, based on 
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123 Thus, I used participants’ “social networks to identify other participants” (Guest 2015:236). 
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the data collected from questionnaires, participant observation and observation of the 
activities on the open Internet forum. As my participant observation advanced, I realized that 
some of the Polish EU officials played a particularly important role in animating the social 
life of the group. They were popular and had an important number of friends in the Polish EU 
circle.  
I preferred to focus on a smaller number of informants, aimed at “the maximum 
variation” in the sample (Guest 2015:235-236; Flick 2007:27), including both “typical” and 
“extraordinary”/ “extreme” cases124 (in line with the suggestions made by Angrosino 
2007:37, 48; see also Flick 2007; Goodson and Sikes 2001:24-5; Guest 2015:235).  
The research sample consisted of 50 Polish EU officials. Twenty of them originated 
from the original number of 30 research participants who were involved in my previous 
research.125 Anthropologically speaking, what I hoped to learn while approaching the same 
people for a second time was to understand if they had changed practices and opinions on a 
timespan of two or three years or if they remained anchored in their previous positions. In 
most cases, their positions had not changed so much over time. In addition to the 50 
“official” research participants, I was in permanent contact with other EU institutions 
employees (both Polish and of other nationalities) or persons connected to the EU 
institutions, who constituted a supplementary source of information.  
Because of the confidential character of the study, I refrained from indicating the real 
names of the participants, Directorates General (DGs) of their employment or hierarchical 
grades.  
The total research group included: 27 women and 23 men employed in the European 
Union institutions in Brussels. At the moment of completing the questionnaires, the age range 
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124 Atypical respondents were, for instance, those living in Belgium for a long time, those featuring very 
intensive social activity or those avoiding contacts with other EU officials.!!
125!Although my initial plan was to involve all the 30 research participants from my previous research, and 
additionally contact 30 new Polish EU officials, it proved impossible, as some of them were not employed in the 
EU institutions anymore, or no longer lived in Belgium. The others failed to reply or endlessly procrastinated.!
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was from 27 to 50, with 38 persons below 35. The huge majority (38 persons) were in their 
thirties; six persons were in their late twenties and six in their forties, while only one person 
in the fifties. The grades, the unit, similarly as gender or age of the prospective participants 
were not taken as selection criteria. 
Twenty persons lived alone, 29 - with partners (out of whom 15 were of Polish 
nationality; two were Belgians and 12 were of other nationality), while one person did not 
respond. The majority of the respondents (32 persons) originated from cities above 300.000 
inhabitants. Very few originated from towns inhabited by less than 10.000 people. All 
research participants had completed university studies and all but six had experience of living 
abroad prior to employment in the EU institutions and living in Belgium. Some had been 
living in many different countries during their life, several of them for as long as ten years or 
more. 
A great majority of the research participants (39) were employed on permanent basis. 
Most of respondents (41) have been living in Belgium for at least three years, out of 
whom 22 had lived there for more than six years (including three real “oldcomers” from my 
original group - notably women who had been living here for 22, 18 and 16 years 
respectively). For three persons, their stay in Belgium was shorter than working for the EU 
institutions - two of them were employed in Luxembourg prior to moving to Belgium, while 
one person did some occasional freelance work for the EU institutions in the past. 
3.6. Methods employed     
The present study has combined different qualitative methods, such as: semistructured 
questionnaires (with both open- and close-ended questions);126 semistructured face to face 
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126 Although in several cases they were also asked to indicate an item from “a set of fixed alternatives” (Bernard 
1995:268). In several other cases scales were applied. The scale usually ranged from “very important” to “not 
important at all”; “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”; “highly positive” to “highly negative”; “very 
attached” to “not attached at all”; “very relevant” to “not relevant”.  
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interviews; informal conversations; participant observation during different social and 
cultural events; and analysis of academic literature, complemented by other documents, both 
in print and virtual sources (i.e., excerpts from an open Internet forum created by the Polish 
EU officials, discussion on Facebook groups, or comments under articles on EU related 
issues - especially those related to the public criticism targeted at EU officials).  
3.6.1. Participant observation 
In its traditional form, participant observation is regarded as “a hallmark of anthropology” 
(Aull Davies 2008:77). However, as it was already explained elsewhere in this dissertation, 
this form of participation in elites’ lives is difficult. This is the reason why, while performing 
my research, I gave more importance to interviews and questionnaires, while the participant 
observation was mostly restricted to various social events, and used only as a complementary 
method aimed at “understanding the context of the phenomenon under investigation” 
(Darlington and Scott 2002:76; see also Glesne and Peschkin 1992:39-40; Fetterman 
1989:45). Indeed, the observations that I had made prior to even starting my research, helped 
me to “accommodate” in this environment and provided with knowledge on key figures 
within the Polish EU “community” in Brussels. It also helped to understand the dynamic of 
the group, at least the part of the group that would socialize within this more or less organized 
framework. Participation in numerous events, gave me a better understanding of the 
challenges the members of the “community” were facing in daily life and especially at the 
beginning of their stay in Belgium. It also helped to formulate the questions included in the 
questionnaires.  
My role was mostly the one of the “observer as participant”, that is to say, I was 
“primarily an observer but ha[d] some interaction with study participants” (Glesne and 
Peshkin 1992:40; see also Bernard 1995:138; Jorgensen 1989:55). My research included also 
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instances of “a complete observer” role (Jorgensen 1989:55).  
It is difficult to clearly trace the beginnings of my (specifically research oriented) 
observation of the community, as indeed, already before my research began, I had been 
attending different social and cultural events of the Polish community in Belgium. It was 
rather a natural transition between my private and research related involvement in these 
events. As a result, the boundaries between my private and researcher selves have become 
blurred. I had not arrived in Brussels specifically to conduct my research. I had moved 
because of my personal life, I had been already there - looking at the developments in the 
Polish EU “community” almost from its beginning.  
Fundamental for participant observation (Wolcott 1995) are two axes: “being there” 
and “getting nosy”. In a certain sense my “being there” has partly been a continuous reality 
since I came to Belgium with my husband in 2005. I was not present at the work place, this is 
also why I chose to limit my research to the private life of the Polish EU officials. Still, I 
heard my husband telling stories happening in the working hours, assisted to meetings with 
his colleagues – that is how their work place has become less unfamiliar to me. However, 
some distance has always remained. I have also started “getting nosy” since I arrived to 
Brussels, but it is only after I formulated the research question that this could become 
sufficiently targeted.  
The question then is whether my participant observation could become more a 
Malinowskian style participant observation. I am persuaded that this was not an effective or 
even possible research method to study the EU officials. Even getting a job with the 
Commission would not have allowed me to achieve meaningful results, as it would not have 
been possible to create a “field” inside the Commission, not only because of hierarchical 
opposition or reluctance, but also because it could have affected the work of my research 
participants and hence could have provoked negative reactions by themselves. More 
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importantly, I would be in a situation of a conflict of interest and my freedom, as a 
researcher, might be put into question. 
At the same time, it is clear that I entered in the Lebenswelt, the emotional and 
rational atmosphere that is typical for the world of the researched people. Still, I found it 
important not to extrapolate my own feelings and interpretations in their mindset and in their 
reactions. Hence, the important place I gave to their own explanations and to their own 
reactions as they had formulated them themselves in the interviews and questionnaires. 
Many interviews were limited in time and I could meet some people only once or 
twice. But others could be met several times and these “several times” were situated in 
“semi-public places”, bars, restaurants. These are not really “private realms”, but very often 
they permitted a serious talk and a lot of spontaneity. In case of my research participants, 
interviewing through a questionnaire is the easiest and the most effective way to get their 
participation and to create a possibility to meet them also later. They know the technique of 
“questionnaires” and can accept this door opener. By contrast, most of them might not accept 
a researcher ringing at their home door and asking for an interview or for the permission to 
come for a cup of tea from time to time. So, for this population, a questionnaire is not only a 
source of information, but it partially may also be considered as a door opener. 
The role of the participant observation was to help me to formulate questions and to 
contextualize some answers obtained in response to questionnaires and interview questions, it 
also allowed me to delve into the Lebenswelt of the Polish EU officials.  
3.6.2. Questionnaires 
The decision to use questionnaires as one of the methods of data collection originated in the 
acknowledgement of my possible bias related to a quasi-insider position, and aimed at 
strengthening the reliability of the collected information. As H. Russell Bernard remarks, the 
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fact that all respondents receive the same questions that they answer at the moment of their 
convenience is a way to overcome the possible bias coming from the interaction with the 
researcher (2011:192). This method permitted also to reach a more important number of 
respondents as it would be difficult (given their limited availability) and very time consuming 
to interview them all (Jorgensen 1989:90), and to collect fairly uniform responses, but also, 
gather data on more complex questions (Bernard 1995:275).  
My past experiences showed that busy EU officials would never respond to too many 
questions, thus, for purposes of the follow-up research of the “old” group, I disseminated a 
three pages long questionnaire127 including 28 questions, whereas the questionnaires 
distributed in the “new” group128 were six pages long, and included 53 questions (not 
counting the closing questions concerning the backgrounds of the officials). 129  
The questionnaires were prepared and filled in English (except for one person who 
completed it in Polish). The questions were divided into several thematic clusters and 
concerned the participants’ opinions, perceptions, but also their emotions and feelings.  
I asked some key informants to indicate persons who would meet my needs and 
would not mind completing the questionnaire. Curiously, some respondents suggested that 
their colleagues could be discouraged by insufficient anonymity. The mere fact that I was 
able to identify them by name (which was obviously necessary and crucial, as I wanted to 
have a possibility to contact them for interviewing at the later stage) could make them abstain 
from participation.  
I contacted my “new” respondents by means of an internal mailing list, open 
exclusively to Polish EU officials (the “EPS” list), and counting around 1400 users. The 
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127 The questionnaire can be consulted in Appendix A. 
128 The questionnaire can be consulted in Appendix B.  
129 These questions concerned: age, gender, size of the city/town/village of origins (with no prior ranks applied), 
educational background, past experience of studying and working abroad and its length, and the length of stay in 
Belgium and service in the EU institutions. 
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questionnaire was posted in September 2010130 (together with my “cover note” explaining the 
project and my profile) on the “EPS” list131, or was delivered by emails in attachment. The 
message specified the eligibility criteria. The questionnaires addressed to the participants 
from the original group (researched upon during my previous research) were emailed in mid-
January 2012 and aimed at controlling possible changes or evolutions in the previously 
observed patterns and at collecting additional information on subjects not covered in the first 
research.  
The questionnaires played an important “opening and first contact” function with 
researched population. Once I collected data from the questionnaires, I proceded to the 
“preliminary analysis” of the questionnaires (Grbich 2007:16). As the questionnaire form was 
originally divided into several thematic sections, the data were analyzed by “thematic 
headings” (Silverman 2010:238). After this “preliminary analysis” I moved to the interviews. 
3.6.3. Interviewing 
Semistructured interviewing seems to be the most acceptable method of studying ‘elites’, 
thus “people who are accustomed to efficient use of their time” (Bernard 2011:158; see also 
Aull Davies 2008:119). They become useful once a researcher has already acquired some 
relevant information and (in case of my research, based on questionnaires, participant 
observation and the previous study), “comprehends the fundamentals of a community from 
the ‘insider’s perspective’” (Fetterman 1989:48).  
The purpose of this phase was to probe and develop on the responses given in the 
questionnaire, enhancing the richness of the data and enabling a greater understanding of the 
individual adjustment to work and life in Brussels. My semistructured interviewing was 
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130 Due to a relatively low number of responses, it was repeated at the beginning of February 2011. 
131 A person working in the European Commission and being a member of this list enabled the access.  
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based on an “interview guide”, including a set of questions132 (Bernard 2011:158; Angrosino 
2007:47). However, digressions of my interviewees were also accommodated (Angrosino 
2007:42). Sometimes, I asked “auxiliary” questions, so as to make sure that the questions 
were properly understood. The interviewees were given the chance to develop their answers 
in an open-ended manner, sometimes even going off the topic (on this subject see Aull 
Davies 2008:106). 
Robert Mikecz remarks that elite interviews often pose serious problems in terms of 
extracting response (2012:483). In case of my study, even though I had already met most of 
my interlocutors, it was even more difficult to make appointment for an interview, than to 
convince them to complete the questionnaires. Not all informants, selected out of those who 
filled the questionnaires, agreed to meet.  
The individual, face-to-face interviews were conducted within the span of three 
months, during the period between 1 July 2012 and 3 October 2012. I always informed about 
the goals of the interviewing in advance (via emails), while asking about the participation in 
the interviews.  
All (21) but seven interviews were conducted in English.133 This choice made it also 
easier to quote verbatim my participants without possible interference with the original sense 
of their responses. Moreover, most of the research participants worked in English, 
communicated in English on a daily basis and were able to express their views and feelings in 
this language. However, if my interviewees preferred to speak Polish, I always allowed them 
to speak in their mother tongue and translated the transcripts afterwards. Furthermore, the 
informal conversations have been held in Polish. The interviews were recorded (with the 
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132 The interview guide, which can be consulted in Appendix C, involved eight main sections (social networks; 
contacts with Poland; daily life; adaptation; Poles in Belgium, ideology; European identity and Polishness) each, 
depending on their significance, including from two to six open-ended questions. 
133 Seven respondents preferred to speak Polish. 
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agreement of the interviewees)134 what permitted to focus my attention on engaging with 
interviewee and following the conversation flow instead of taking notes. The responses were 
transcribed verbatim afterwards, usually on the same day. Most of my interviews took place 
either after working hours (in semi-public spaces, such as different cafés, pubs or winery in 
proximity of their work), or during lunch breaks (in the DGs’ canteens, in the cafeterias; 
sometimes in eateries outside of the EU institutions’ infrastructure). Only two persons invited 
me to their offices, thus the “frontstage” (Goffman 1987; see also Mikecz 2012). As they 
explained, they wanted to give me an opportunity to conduct the interview in “comfortable 
conditions”, rather than strictly because of time constraints.  
I often struggled with the problem of time control by my respondents. My interviews 
lasted around one hour each, although some respondents had less time available. 
According to Silverman, elite members tend to be reluctant to “open up” about 
themselves (2010:196). Some of my informants communicated even very personal 
information on different aspects of their lives. I was never sure if they revealed such private 
details because they perceived me as a Pole, an expat and an EU official’s wife, or they 
would do it to any other researcher. In fact, the boundaries between my “private I” and the 
“researcher’s I”, were sometimes getting quite blurred. Mascarenhas-Keyes calls it “a 
professionally induced schizophrenia between the ‘native self’ and ‘professional self’” 
(1987:180). 
At the end of the interviews, I always asked my interviewees whether they would like 
to obtain the copies of their interviews transcriptions and if they would like to share their 
possible comments with me. !
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134 In fact, only one person was initially against recording, but changed his mind after being assured of the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the recording.  I was asked, however, to delete the recording immediately after 
transcription.  
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Once I transcribed the audio-recorded data, I divided them again into thematic 
headings, and arranged according to the identified patterns.  
Before I could even start formulating the questionnaire queries or reflect on the 
preparation of the semistructured interviews, I needed to collect more general information 
about the EU officials and their relations in the EU institutions, in order to conceive and 
situate my research problems. I needed this information also at later stages of my research, to 
be able to steer interviews handily and interpret the responses. I acquired this general context 
mostly during my previous research, but also through various supplementary methods, such 
as scrutiny of the Internet forum devoted to issues related to employment in the EU 
institutions (popular especially in the very initial period after the enlargement), as well as, 
most importantly, informal, unstructured conversations with key informants in relaxed 
circumstances. Bernard suggests that this method is “used throughout fieldwork to build 
greater rapport and to uncover new topics of interest that might have been overlooked” 
(1995:209).  
While conducting my research, I had a couple of key informants who shared with me 
their observations and experiences related to daily life of EU officials. I often consulted them 
to acquire a larger picture of issues described in the questionnaires or during the interviews. 
Indeed, although the functioning of the EU institutions is beyond the scope of this research, 
various events and phenomena occurring at the margins of the professional life of the 
researched group are highly relevant for understanding the context. 
3.7. Data analysis and writing up data: a note on possibility of being objective 
As concerns situating my research on the axis between studies that are conducted inductively, 
“with a view to generating new theory” and those with a deductive approach, aiming to “test 
an existing theory” (Darlington and Scott 2002:143), my thesis includes elements of both 
approaches. Indeed, while formulating my research questions, I was influenced by my 
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previous research on Polish EU officials and on some existing academic literature on social 
and cultural integration, expatriates, EU officials, identity and identification. The text is 
structured with help of the concepts developed notably by Eriksen (2007), throughout the 
thesis I refer to past findings, commenting on how they can be situated vis à vis my own 
findings. However, I did not feel constrained by the existing literature and tried to develop 
new analytic categories. From this point of view, my research can be qualified as “recursive” 
(LeCompte and Schensul 2013:83).  
Although I obviously used a computer to record and keep the data, as well as to 
perform coding and filing operations, I did not use any specifically designed software (such 
as e.g., NVivo), as the amount and the nature of my data (which consisted, to a significant 
extent, of interview transcripts and questionnaires) did not clearly justify the added value of 
using automated methods.  
The collected data were first filed by methods of collection and sources, and 
subsequently re-arranged and filed into topical categories (merging responses and 
observations from different sources). Once I have completed the questionnaire stage of my 
research, I created a table for each question, to visualize the patterns of answers. In case of 
closed questions, the table simply reflected the proposed values (e.g., yes/no or more 
complex evaluation scales proposed in the questionnaire), and the number of people having 
chosen a given response. At a later stage of research, I sometimes came back to 
questionnaires e.g., to find out specific co-relations between answers and characteristics of a 
respondent.  In case of open-ended questions, tables contained typified responses, categorized 
on the basis of the preliminary analysis of the texts. Criteria for identifying such types of 
responses were either based on the original purpose of the question or on certain relevant 
patterns I discovered while reading the answers. While analyzing data I colour-coded 
(highlighted) elements belonging to the same category.  My analytic strategy consisted in 
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“looking for patterns and relationships” among and “comparing and contrasting” various 
elements (Jorgensen 1989:108-109). 
While analyzing data gathered via participant observation, I applied a similar strategy. 
My approach was to “identify themes or patterns in the data” (Darlington and Scott 
2002:143), certain repetitive or similar behaviors or statements. To this effect, I annotated the 
raw transcript, categorizing and linking relevant items which were subsequently further 
examined to establish the actual relations between them. The categorization process was 
heavily influenced by questions from the interviews and questionnaires.     
The process of writing up data involves reproduction of the discourse of the 
researched group.  
At this point, having explained the specificity of my position, I need to briefly refer to 
the question on how my situation affects the data gathered and the related question of 
objectivity. According to Bernard, human perception and interpretation is necessarily affected 
by one’s experience (1995:152). Eriksen emphasizes that: 
Far from being neutral and objective descriptions and analyses of other people’s customs and 
cultural systems, anthropological writings are shaped by each author’s biography, literary 
style and rhetoric, as well as by the historical period in which they were written (such as 
colonialism) and, of course, by the character of the fieldwork. (2015:44) 
Bernard claims that objectivity becomes even a greater challenge if the researcher and 
the!subjects of their study share the same cultural patterns, as the researcher is “likely to take 
a lot of things for granted” (1995:154; see also Eriksen 2015:40). 
Although I am not objective as a “quasi-insider”, it does not change much, because I 
cannot be objective already as an anthropologist. Instead, I can be expected to be conscious 
and honest in revealing my bias and to be transparent about how I participate in the 
“construction of data” thus “production of knowledge” (as labelled by Kloos 1996:184-187).  
In line with the typology developed by John Van Maanen (2011 [1988]), the 
presentation of the results in this thesis corresponds partly to “realist tales”, although some 
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elements of “confessional tales” are also present.135 With these “realist accounts”, using 
extensive verbatim quotations from my respondents’ answers, I sought to describe the 
routines and the perception of reality of the researched community and portray the native’s 
point of view (Van Maanen 2011[1988]:49). I tried to keep as “neutral” position as possible 
while giving the reader an opportunity to “‘hear’ the actual voices” (Angrosino 2007:79) of 
the research participants (Van Maanen 2011[1988]:46).  
On the other hand, while analysing the results, it has become important to take 
distance from their perception which, to a certain extent, was or became, mine. Therefore, I 
tried to liberate myself from the insider’s perception by confronting the data obtained from 
the research participants with the existing literature or other sources of information. 
3.8. Definition and methodological challenges of the anthropology of elites  
Studies concerning elites are still relatively scarce (see also Goodson and Sikes 2001:103; 
Harvey 2011:432), precisely due to their power, reluctance towards attempts to study them 
and “ability to protect themselves from intrusion and criticism” (Mikecz 2012:483). Already 
in the 1970s Laura Nader worried that the dominant-subordinate power relationships 
overpresent in anthropological research might affect the resulting theories (1974[1972]:289) 
and called for “a reinvented anthropology [that] should study powerful institutions and 
bureaucratic organizations” (Nader 1974 [1972]:292; see also Rhodes et al. 2007a:2). 
Tijo Salverda and Jon Abbink draw attention to methodological challenges of 
studying elites, perceived as “closed and impervious to critical researchers” (2013:3; see also 
Eriksen 2015:35; Nader 1974 [1972]:302). In addition to theoretical and methodological 
challenges, the anthropological study of elites may also pose serious, ethical problems, as 
compared with non-elite research (Shore 2002, 2007; see also Bellier and Wilson 2000a; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Van Maanen (2011[1988]) distinguishes three main conventions of writing: “realist tales”, “confessional 
tales” and “impressionist tales”. 
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Mikecz 2012; Rhodes et al. 2007a).136  
Certain typically anthropological methods are difficult to apply while “studying up” 
(Shore 2002:10).137 To take the example of my research, it would be difficult to live with 
Eurocrats (in any case, with more than one at the time) and to participate in their everyday-
life, especially for an extended period. It is usually challenging to meet elites, even for a short 
interview (Shore 2007:188-189; see also Bellier and Wilson 2000a:6; Harvey 2011:434), they 
are “almost by definition, opaque or shielded from scrutiny by outsiders” (Shore 2002:10; see 
also Nader1974[1972]:302). Therefore, access to elites requires lengthy and laborious 
negotiations and re-negotiations, as the research unfolds (Mikecz 2012: 483; Rhodes et al. 
2007b:218). As Rhodes et al. point out, it is difficult to acquire and maintain necessary trust 
of elites (Rhodes et al. 2007b:218, 229; see also Harvey 2011:433) who “purposefully erect 
barriers” (Mikecz 2012:483). However, following Lotter, I assume that “studying elites by 
affiliation” (being married to an EU official) and (at least to a certain extent) having access to 
their “social field”, reduces (although does not eliminate) “the considerable problems of 
access and trust that are so widely discussed in elite-studies” (2004:4). 
Rhodes et al. elaborated on the inversed power relations between the researcher and 
the studied elites (2007b:214; see also Jakubowska 2013:46; Marcus 1979:136). More aware 
of the context of the research and its possible consequences, they may hinder access, refuse 
interviews, manipulate information, insist on anonymity (Rhodes et al. 2007b:214; 
Jakubowska 2013:46; Mikecz 2012:483), or lecture the researcher!“on what they believe the 
researcher should be told” (Aull Davies 2008:111), they “have legal and cultural means to 
deflect researchers” (Busby 2011:11).  
In the same vein, Ivor Goodson and Pat Sikes observe that elites are often discrete 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 The question “how to study elites” has been subject to reflection also by such authors as, for example, Conti 
and O’Neil (2007); Harvey (2011); Lotter (2004); Sabot (1999); Zuckerman (1972). 
137 On reasons for the insignificant number of ethnographic studies on elites see also Salverda and Abbink 
(2013) or Schijf (2013). 
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about their views and behaviors, as they may believe that revealing them might be against 
their interest or their position (2001:103). Several scholars draw attention to the tendencies to 
influence the research and the research questions (Conti and O’Neil 2007: 67, 70-71; Harvey 
2011:439; Mikecz 2012:483-484), or to control the final product (Rhodes et al. 2007a:9; 
2007b:211, 215); they tend to have their own ideas on how to conduct the research (Shore 
2007:185) or transform questions so that they suit their intended responses (Conti and O’Neil 
2007:70-71). During my research, I also experienced tentatives to exercise control on the 
research. For instance, shortly after an interview, one of the research participants asked me to 
send him the final version of my dissertation before I submit it, so that he could control 
whether the confidentiality was respected. I obviously did so and, following his request, 
masked out certain details which could enable his identification. Another person, one day 
after the interview, sent me an email asking to erase a part that would reveal her DG and 
position, as otherwise it would be very easy to identify her. She wrote how exactly I should 
replace this part of the interview. Some others tried to steer the conversation. Given the 
aforementioned risks, I also abstained from including the interviewees’ profiles, as crossing 
the data from interviews with information from other sources might enable their 
identification.  
Mikecz points at another possible risk, involved in studying elites, related to keeping 
an appropriate “critical distance” (2012:482; see also Rhodes et al. 2007a:9). On one hand, 
there is a risk of “going native”, due to excessive empathy and overidentification, while on 
the other hand, there is a danger of strong antipathy resented towards the researched 
individuals (Rhodes et al. 2007a:9). Both feelings may obviously be fatal to the 
trustworthiness of the study.   
Performing research on elites may entail specific ethical problems. Questions of 
ethical nature may relate to such challenges as exercising control, or gaining access in a way 
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that would be in line with professional norms, just to give the most evident examples. 
One of the first ethical problems to cope with, while studying elites, is related to a 
constant risk of not being granted access (Shore 2002:11; see also S. Nugent 2002:72). This 
obstacle inspires Shore a reflection on whether anthropologists should indeed remain 
restricted to those groups which allow access, putting into question the aforementioned 
principle (2002:11). Another important issue raised by Shore is: “how far should the fact that 
they are likely to read what we write about them temper our analysis?” (2002:11). Busby 
suggests that researchers might choose to abstain from publishing information the studied 
elites would prefer to keep secret, either out of loyalty or out of calculation (keeping the 
possibility for themselves or other researchers to conduct further research in the future) 
(2011:16). As Eriksen puts it: 
It would not have occurred to Malinowski or Bateson that their books on Melanesia might 
have a direct influence on the societies in question … : they could write freely without taking 
such issues into account. This is no longer possible, at least if your work is published in a 
major language. (2015:42) 
 
Although illiteracy is not that common as it was the case long time ago in some “out-
of-the-way tribes” (MacClancy 2002:1), elites, contrary to literate members of these tribal 
societies, often live in the same country or region as the researcher and may be “powerful” 
enough for the researcher to take their possible anger into account. 
Yet another concern, mentioned by Goodson and Sikes, is confidentiality of 
information the informants reveal (2001:25; see also Harvey 2011:436; Rhodes et al. 
2007b:218; Sabot 1999). This was also the case of my interviewees. 
Undoubtedly, elites are “cautious and risk-aware” (Rhodes et al. 2007b:217), and they 
tend to exercise control over information they reveal, both consciously and unconsciously, 
while presenting an official self-image (Rhodes et al. 2007b:220; see also Goodson and Sikes 
2001:103). However, it might be questioned if it is a “feature” exclusive to elites? Are other 
groups of anthropological inquiry not cautious about possible results of their accounts? Don’t 
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they manipulate the image they present to reach their aims too?  
An additional problem, mentioned by Rhodes et al., is related to the elites’ usual 
insistence on anonymity, often an entry condition, as well as their claims to comment of 
various aspects of the study. According to Rhodes et al. “such controls can impose lengthy 
delays at a high cost, particularly to younger researchers” (2007b:215). 
In the context of all these elites-related problems and restrictions, several 
anthropologists have put serious questions about whether, while studying elites, the 
researcher does not need an “extra weapon”, namely relaxation of certain ethical norms 
(Goodson and Sikes 2001:92; Rhodes et al. 2007a:9; 2007b:217; Shore 2002:11). Rhodes et 
al. propose that covert behavior and spy-like observation may help the researcher to “get to 
the bottom of things” (2007a:9). Goodson and Sikes go as far as to suggest that studying 
powerful groups “may be difficult or impossible to conduct without some degree of 
deception” (2001:92), mentioning cases where anthropologists justified their non-transparent 
behavior by indicating that it was a sine qua non condition of the access to the informants 
(see also Rhodes et al. 2007b:216-217).  
Nader adds another important consideration: the research ethics developed to study 
“families, small groups, those aspects of communities which are more private than public” is 
not necessarily adequate to the research conducted on “institutions, organizations, 
bureaucracies that have a broad public impact” (1974 [1972]:304-5). However, it must be 
stressed one more time, that the present study does not concern the functioning of the 
European Union institutions, its object is not a bureaucracy in its public dimension, but 
members of this bureaucracy in the private life. The differences seem to be rather quantitative 
than qualitative: even if, in case of elites who are more conscious and can manipulate better, 
the aforementioned problems are more salient, the related risks and questions exist also in 
case of other – literate and socialised – categories of respondents and thus the 
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anthropologists’ approach should not be radically different. Moreover, I suspected that any 
deceptive behavior during the research might make the EU officials mistrustful and finally 
hamper my studies. 
3.9. How ethnographic is my research? 
According to the old, classical definition by Clifford Geertz, ethnography, while it consists in 
“establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping 
fields, keeping a diary, and so on” (1973:6), is essentially characterized by “thick 
description” (Geertz 1973:9-10). The elements of context, unique understanding of fact and 
things, interpretations, histories, etc. are usually discovered and noted by ethnographers 
during participant observation and subsequently recounted in an article, thesis, book or paper. 
However, these elements can also come from interviews – extensive comments not only on 
the specific subject of the question asked, but also on connected, proxy topics, characteristic 
tone or convention (e.g. solemn, correctness-mindful, yet distant and clear of any familiarity 
convention used by my interviewees while speaking of Polish economic migrants in 
Brussels), associations, metaphors employed (e.g., the frequency of “cogs in the wheel” 
expression used to describe my interviewees’ role in the construction of Europe), etc., all 
these elements, available thanks to verbatim transcription and large (although targeted and 
selective) reproduction of the research participants’ accounts provide the “thick description” 
as referred to by Geertz, permitting to “situate” the described facts, attitudes or perceptions 
and beliefs.  But is it enough to qualify my research as ethnographic? 
As John W. Creswell explains, ethnography is an appropriate method to describe 
“how a cultural group works and to explore the beliefs, language, behaviors, and issues such 
as power, resistance, and dominance” (2007:70). This range of issues is much broader than 
the subject matter of my research, but the issues that are of interest for me, such as lifestyle, 
socializing patterns, feelings and beliefs related to belonging, boundary making, 
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identifications, certainly lie within this field. Creswell quotes LeCompte, Millroy, and 
Preissle (1992) who mention “enculturation” and socialization among topics relevant for the 
“analysis of the culture-sharing group” (Creswell 2007:71). Margaret D. LeCompte and Jean 
J. Schensul add that the “content of ethnography” can deal notably with beliefs, attitudes, 
perceptions, emotions or social networks (1999:4). Undoubtedly, this is all what my study 
was actually about. From the point of view of purposes and the subject matter of my research, 
my study is ethnographic. However, Creswell expects ethnographic research to result in “a 
holistic cultural portrait of the group that incorporates the views of the participants (emic) as 
well as the views of the researcher (etic)” (2007:72). This is certainly not the ambition of this 
thesis: only certain aspects of the group’s culture are researched and made subject to analysis. 
As it has been explained above, the specific conditions of the present research, as a study of 
elites, have made it necessary to rely more on questionnaires and interviews than on 
participant observation, what necessarily limits its scope of focus. Furthermore, I am mostly 
interested in the perceptions and the emotions of my participants, and thus I limit my own 
views to the necessary (or, given the methodological limitations, to the possible).  
Also the use of methods itself might be considered by purists as not sufficiently 
ethnographic. To qualify a research as such, Giampietro Gobo expects the researcher to 
“participate in the social life of the actors observed” (2009:6) and claims that ethnography 
must be characterised by the “use of observation as the principal source of knowledge about 
social phenomena” (2009:190) 
It is true that, in the light of the above, my study has certain non-ethnographic 
features, possibly shifting it towards a case study or even phenomenology.   
Yet, other authors concede that, as the holistic description of culture of a group is 
quite a time-consuming undertaking, “contemporary ethnographies generally are focused on a 
particular aspect or dimension of culture” and are often “problem oriented, addressing 
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specific issues or problems in a community context” (LeCompte and Schensul 1999:5). Harry 
F. Wolcott further relaxes the “entry requirements” by claiming that “[y]es, you can do 
ethnography without directing any explicit attention to culture” (2008:225) and remarks that 
it is sufficient that that the research deals with culture “in its broadest sense, referring to 
sociocultural dimensions of behavior” (2008:225-241). 
Furthermore, as Shore points out, 
writing persuasive accounts of government elites requires that we go ‘beyond ethnography’. 
The challenge is to combine ‘thick description’ and personal observations with other types of 
more tangible and verifiable data so we manage to portray those elite worlds from multiple 
vantage points. (Shore 2007:186). 
 
Also Charlotte Aull Davies adopts a “broad interpretation of ethnography” that she 
understands as a “research process based on fieldwork using a variety of mainly … 
qualitative research techniques” (2008:5). Although she insists on necessary “engagement” in 
the research participants’ life, such an engagement usually has limits, unless one would plead 
for an extremely exclusive concept of ethnography. She also concedes that studying up, 
requires different fieldwork methods than studying “powerless people”, as the former “are 
less accessible to the traditional ethnographic approach of simply going to a location and 
hanging out” (Aull Davies 2008:44). 
While comparing my study against various analytical approaches, it appears more 
ethnographic than anything else. Indeed, my thesis attempts to describe and interpret the 
“shared patterns of culture of a group” (Creswell 2007:78-80), relies on interviews, but also, 
to a lesser extent, on participant observation (directly, but also indirectly, to understand and 
interpret the accounts gathered), and its outcome is a description of the functioning of the 
researched group, in terms of interactions with other groups, daily life and identification 
patterns. It also “involves intimate, face-to-face interaction with participants” and “presents 
an accurate reflection of participants’ perspectives and behaviors”, as required by LeCompte 
and Schensul (1999:9). 
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 Elements characteristic for other approaches are also, occasionally, present in the 
thesis, but to a lesser extent: I do analyze specific cases (case study) and do attach primary 
importance to experiences described in individual accounts (phenomenology), but the 
purpose and the result is not a description of cases or establishing “the essence” of 
phenomena as experienced by my research participants. Therefore, despite the elements 
drawn from other analytic approaches, my thesis has more features of the ethnographic study 
than of any other approach.  
!
!
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Chapter 4. Research findings 
!
As it was mentioned before, the results of my research feed in the analysis of the proces of 
integration of the Polish EU officials in Brussels along the lines of the theories of complexity 
and transnationalism. The term “integration”, used by Eriksen (2007) in a more generic 
sense, may designate different processes of mutual relations and influences. As I explained 
previously, I typified these processes into two broader (and imprecise) categories, as 
understood and used by my research participants themselves: adaptation and integration. The 
nature and outcome of integration in the broader sense will depend on various factors, 
notably: characteristics of the newcomer group, characteristics of the “host society”, 
attitudes, preferences and strategies of the newcomer group, and those of the “host society”. I 
adopted a predominantly “emic” perspective, thus I approached the characteristics and 
attitudes of the “host society” from the perspective of the newcomer group. The first five 
sections of this part of my thesis correspond to the aforementioned factors. The first section 
focuses on characteristics, expectations and attitudes of the researched group, while the 
second concerns Brussels, as perceived by my respondents and interviewees. These findings 
will be compared against the previous literature on the topic, as presented in the first chapter  
and the first two sections of the second chapter. The following three sections constitute the 
part of the research meant to deliver the aswer to the first question, concerning social and 
cultural intergration of Polish EU officials in Brussels. They correspond to the analysis of the 
processes of adaptation and integration as perceived by my research participants, their 
perception of the attitudes towards them and their residual connection with Poland. The sixth 
section concerns the evolution of identity of the Polish EU officials in Brussels, to see if we 
can speak, in their case, of emergence of a supranational, European identity. The discussion 
of these findings in the light of the theoretical framework of my thesis (more specifically 
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sections three to eight of the second chapter) is sketched on the spot and further developed in 
the concluding section. 
In this chapter, I often refer to the conclusions of my previous research (Rozanska 
2009), to verify whether the situation has evolved since then. In such cases, I am referring to 
the “old group”. As indicated earlier, the individuals from the old group interrogated again in 
the context of the current, doctoral research are referred to as a “follow-up group”, while 
those interrogated for the first time for my doctoral research are designated as a “new group”. 
4.1. The Polish EU officials in Brussels  
In this section I will present my research participants more in detail. In addition to their life 
histories, I will look at their motivation for settling in Brussels and working in the EU 
institutions. These features are likely to influence their attitude to integration in the new 
place.!
4.1.1. Who they are: a presentation of the principal actors in my research 
In order to better understand what the attitude of my respondents to their employment in the 
EU institutions was, I asked the interviewees to elaborate on their way to employment, and in 
case of the “follow-up” group I inquired about the important changes in their professional or 
private life that might have occurred since we met last time. 
Here are the testimonies of the interviewees:138  
Women 
Only two out of ten female interviewees (Emilia and Aleksandra) were not involved in my 
previous research.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 More on the procedures, challenges and methods in the Methodology chapter. 
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Maja  
 
I met Maja,139 who had been living in Belgium for nearly 20 years, in a bookshop near Kunst-
Wet Metro station in Brussels, close to her office. She was an alumna of the College of 
Europe in Bruges, now working as a legal officer in the European Commission.  
As she insisted (trying to convince me she did not belong to the group of my interest), 
her only link with the other Polish community in Brussels was the Polish choir in a church.  
Her social life was strongly “structured” by the extensive network of contacts of her 
Italian husband. As she mentioned during the interview, she was also living for some time in 
Italy in Ispra where she worked for the Joint Research Centre. 
When we met for an interview, she invited me for coffee. Then followed her story: 
I came to Belgium in 1993 - I guess as a student - for one year, to work as a baby-sitter [fille 
au pair]. Then I met a boy, I came back to Poland to complete my degree and then we both 
settled in Belgium, as it was supposed to be easier like that. At that moment I mastered 
French and I had my Polish degree in Law, which was not worth much in 2005. Well, I did 
not master Dutch or English. I went on and on studying, I made some kind of Master in 
International Law, then again, I went on studying, then I worked in a Call Center, not a very 
interesting job. In the meantime, I divorced, I stayed in Belgium as I had a nice job, nice 
friends .... Well, then, once Poland joined the EU in 2004, I started to sit the concours. Then, 
after two of them, I managed to the reserve list, and six months later I managed to find a 
position, meaning I started to work in the European Commission as a lawyer in April 2007, 
and I’ve been working on the same lawyer’s position. (Maja, August 8, 2012, 05:00 p.m.)!140  
 
As it seems, her personal situation at the beginning of her stay in Belgium could have 
only helped her to integrate into a Belgian society: she knew French, she came to work in a 
Belgian milieu, and lived with a Belgian family. Then she got married to a Belgian, and was 
living in a Flemish village for many years. She was motivated to learn Dutch at that time, as 
she used to live in a place where, as she said, nobody would reply in French. Nevertheless, as 
she confessed, she did not speak the language anymore, as also her personal situation has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 In order to preserve anonymity and confidentiality of the research participants, all names referred to in this 
work are pseudonyms. I assigned pseudonyms only to those participants who had participated in the 
interviewing part of the research in order not to provoke too much confusion with too many names.  
140 I remain faithful to the words of the research participants and correct language mistakes only if it is 
indispensable for understanding of their accounts. It is worth reminding that English is not the mother tongue of 
the respondents.  
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changed significantly. In fact, she dramatically changed the milieu: she was no longer with 
her Belgian partner and now she was married to an Italian. She moved from Flanders to 
Brussels, where she had been bringing up her trilingual son, who speaks Italian, Polish and 
French.  
Dominika  
 
My appointment with my next respondent – Dominika – took place at the Council. The “life 
history” of Dominika was quite similar to the one recounted by Maja. Interestingly, while 
sending back the completed questionnaire, she wrote a short note stating that her “answers 
were even less idealistic” than previously (she participated in my former research).  
Dominika was married to a Belgian brought up in South America, who did not feel 
very well in Belgium and, allegedly, was not accepted by the compatriots as “one of them”. 
As she revealed, they lived in a house where her husband’s grandfather and father had lived 
in the past, yet they were still perceived as “others”, or outsiders by the local population. For 
this reason, there was a moment, when they were even thinking about leaving Belgium to 
work in an external agency. At the moment of our conversation, her husband was just about 
to go, alone, for a long-term mission in an exotic destination, where she and their children 
could not follow him.  
She arrived in Belgium before the accession of Poland to the EU as a fille au pair to 
live with a Belgian family in Flanders, where she settled. Only after becoming a mother did 
she move to Brussels, to have better access to the facilities, while keeping a weekend house 
in the countryside. 
The main changes across these several years were mostly related to her private life. 
As she explained: 
I was single when I came to Brussels. Now I’m married, I have a family, I have two kids. 
Yeah, these are the major changes I would say. (Dominika, September 12, 2012, 10:00 a.m.) 
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When inquired about her way to Brussels and the EU institutions, she said: 
It was a kind of a plan, but I didn’t attach myself. It was not something that I’ve chosen very 
scientifically, or I did a lot of things towards it, but my background was such that in a way it 
was pretty logical to try at least. So, I’ve tried and luckily I managed to get here. 
 
After the interview, we had a short conversation on the topics around living in 
Belgium, or having Belgian friends. Dominika elaborated on the relations of the Polish EU 
officials with other Poles in Belgium. She was very incensed at the attitude of some Polish 
EU institutions’ employees towards the Polish manual workers. She stressed that “these 
people just did not have such opportunities as those who now became EU officials”. She also 
could not understand that some of the Polish EU officials did not want to send their kids to 
the Polish Embassy school141 in Brussels as there were “these other Siemiatycze142 kids as 
they called them”. She said “kids were kids” and even in Poland, they would mingle with 
different social strata in the same class. 
She also told me about different initiatives of the Polish community in Belgium, 
notably, a club of Polish women (BeKaP) and a day room organised and run by the Polish EU 
community for children of the Polish labour migrants.  
Laura  
 
My next interviewee, Laura was one of the most valuable research participants whom I met 
during my previous study. She had already lived in Belgium for over 20 years.  
When I contacted her, she enthusiastically accepted my invitation and was ready to 
meet immediately. She proposed to collect me from the main hall of Berlaymont shortly after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 The Polish School Joachim Lelewel was opened in 1971 and is run from Warsaw by the Polish Ministry of 
Education.  
142 Siemiatycze is a little town in North-Eastern Poland, in the Podlasie region. According to a common belief, a 
significant part of its population is engaged in pendular migration to Brussels, amounting to a substantial fringe 
of Polish economic migrants in the Belgian capital. For this reason, “Siemiatycze” is often used by Polish 
expatriates and EU officials as a metonymy for the Polish economic migrants’ population in Brussels, especially 
those originating in Podlasie.!
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lunch. On the way to the pressroom, Laura complained about the typical summer weather in 
Brussels.  
During my previous research she told me how her way to the EU institutions looked 
like: 
I’ve lived here a dozen of years already, since I finished my studies, I’ve always been living 
in Brussels. I knew that sooner or later I would choose to do it so I took some preliminary 
measures in advance and it wasn’t something spontaneous for me. I just knew I would sit the 
concours but on the other hand, I was not particularly preparing it. (Rozanska 2009:59) 
 
Also this time, she was eager to talk: 
Nothing has happened for the last several years, except for my antipathy towards Belgians, 
which has significantly increased. Since I bought a flat, I try not to be in particular contact 
with them, but, unfortunately, it was inevitable, sooner or later ... The co-propriety meetings 
are pure nightmare for me. Moreover, they’ve learnt (I don’t know how) that I’m from the 
Commission, so the incredible stories are going on. They’re telling such dirty things about 
me, I’ve learnt that from my neighbour, it makes me sick. I’m thinking about moving out and 
settling somewhere, where there will be no Belgians. You just can’t live near them! And such 
ugly things are going on, and this coming from people who are such losers, such lice, such 
worthless people who have never done anything in their lives and hence have not achieved 
anything, and they are telling such ugly things, so inappropriate, that this is simply 
scandalous, well, this is one of the last things that have happened ... And besides, in general, 
I’m getting tired with this country, you just can’t live with them. As I said, this atmosphere is 
definitely not for me, and because of different health-related issues, it’s affecting my 
psychical condition and, unfortunately, it is getting worse and worse. If I had a possibility to 
leave this country and pursue a career elsewhere, I think I would leave, in spite of my age, as 
I simply can’t stand them anymore. (Laura, July 23, 2012, 02:00 p.m.) 
 
When asked about work-related changes, she recounted: 
No, nothing particular has happened, I’m still working in the same place. Well, I’ll be getting 
to the fifth anniversary, so I will have to move, but apart from this ... Well, it has somewhat 
improved, as my boss has got off of my back, what saves me is that my work standard is very 
high, so they know that they should not mess with me, if I wasn’t there, there would be no 
one to do the job, so I don’t have problems anymore. 
We have a new Director, so it’s less nice, he is Dane and he is so hopeless ... I don’t know, it 
must be some curse, some bad fate that I still have to deal with these Danes [laughter], well, 
…  the atmosphere in the office is okay, I have not achieved anything in particular, nothing 
particularly bad has happened either ...  
 
After the interview we had an off record conversation. Laura shared with me her 
observations on living in Belgium and on the possibility of integration. She also gave me 
some tips on how to deal with local service providers and how to cope with different 
challenges related to living in Brussels, in general. As she explained, she had always shared 
her observations in order to save other Poles’ time on their way to adaptation in Belgium.  
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Otylia 
!
Another “old-comer”, Otylia, was also involved in my previous research. I was supposed to 
interview her in her office. She came with some documents she filled in to grant me access to 
the building. In addition, I was asked to exchange my ID card against a plastic badge. I had to 
pass through a gate while my belongings were scanned, like at the airport. Before the 
interview, she inquired about my research and plans for the future.  
 She had told me her way to the EU Commission already several years ago: 
It was absolutely spontaneous, as I had already been working by then in the Belgian 
administration for 14 years. Someone, a Belgian working in the institutions I had known, 
spontaneously asked me whether I wouldn’t be interested in the upcoming concours, and, 
frankly speaking, it was only then that I realized that the Union is indeed opening to new 
countries. As I lived in the Belgian reality, I thought there would be a terrible competition, as 
indeed the Belgians have a very difficult access, and I didn’t really feel like taking part in the 
“rats’ race”, as I call it. And it is only this person who presented the situation in its context, 
that at the moment of enlargement the situation is completely different, there is an important 
opening and it is enough to take it and pass it and indeed this concours appeared to me quite 
easy and I passed it at the first attempt, thus I consider I have no merit, really. (Rozanska 
2009:57) 
 
As to the changes in her personal life across time she said: 
There have been no greater changes for the last three years, except that there are some 
progressive changes, you get accustomed to the surrounding, take a critical look at certain 
things, my situation has not actually changed. No, for the last three years, I must admit, I have 
a kind of stability, which is normal at my age, well, I am much over 40, actually almost 50, 
so, at this moment, you are rather after some stability, and not any struggle. (Otylia, July 19, 
2012, 11:00 a.m.) 
 
Otylia associated any possible changes in her life with age while excluding other 
factors. In fact, she left Poland many years ago. She studied abroad in Germany; her (now 
almost adult) daughter was raised in Belgium. She went through the phase of adjusting to a 
new environment many years ago. 
 In contrast to Maja and Dominika, she lived in Brussels at the beginning and 
subsequently moved out. 
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Patrycja 
!
Patrycja, agreed to meet the very same day I sent her my email request. We met already the 
next morning for a coffee (before her working hours) in one of the Italian cafés in the 
Schuman neighbourhood. From the very beginning she was very open; the distance 
disappeared immediately. She asked me to tell her more about my research.  
When inquired about the way to the point she was now, she answered: 
It’s started sometime around the accession of Poland to the EU when I heard in the news there 
would be a competition for Polish community … so I started to get interested in that. Before 
that, I decided to take part in Erasmus to learn better the language. During Erasmus I met 
people who knew already about the competitions to the European Commission. I learned 
about the College of Europe in Bruges,143 that it’s a good direction, so I decided to apply … 
So it was like a cascade of decisions … My first decision was before Poland entered the 
European Union. Then I just prepared myself for these competitions and I came here for the 
College of Europe in 2007. During the studies I took part in the competition; I passed the 
competition in 2008, and I started my job in 2008. (Patrycja, July 25, 2012, 08:20 a.m.) 
 
Aleksandra  
!
My next interviewee, Aleksandra was a woman in her thirties. Due to the time limit, we went 
straight to the cafeteria in the building she worked in, which was quite noisy as a birthday 
“party” of an official was taking place. We found a more secluded place in the corner and 
immediately started the interview. 
Already at the beginning Aleksandra apologized and warned that she would not be 
able to stay as long as one hour as she had work overload at that moment. She strongly 
insisted on anonymity and confidential character of the interview.  
Initially, she had left Poland for the UK, where she studied European Politics and 
where she spent several years. She complemented her “story” as follows: 
I came here just in time before Poland’s accession, actually to do a stage – an internship in the 
EU Commission in 2003. Then, I took a concours during my stage. I was stagiaire at the 
consultancy for a year and when I passed the concours I joined the Commission and I’ve 
worked there since then. (Aleksandra, September 9, 2012, 02:30 p.m.) 
 
Now, she lives in Brussels with her non-Polish husband. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 The Bruges campus of the College of Europe. !
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Thus, Aleksandra seems to be a perfect example of a type of an EU official referred to 
by Suvarierol: with previous international background (e.g., via studies or work abroad), “not 
typical representative of [her] national culture” already at arrival, “exposed to other cultures” 
before (2011:195).  
Zofia 
!
Zofia was recently joined by her non-Polish husband, whom she met while studying in 
France, where she had spent most of her adult life. When we met, she showed me a grocery 
where she would usually buy flowers. She recommended a Thai restaurant in the 
neighbourhood and also mentioned about the Saturday market in Bockstael.  
We sat in the restaurant’s garden to profit from the nice weather. While waiting for 
our orders, she took a paper bag with bread out of her handbag. She asked me to smell it 
while saying that “Polish bread is the best one in the world, and it’s simply impossible to find 
anything comparable in taste on a Belgian market”. That is why, as she said, “she always tries 
to buy it in Polish shops”.  
During my previous research I inquired about her way to employment in the European 
Commission, whether it was something long-planned or spontaneous: 
It was not a plan that I had forever. It was something that came as an opportunity when 
Poland joined the European Union. And at the time I was studying in France ... Sociology and 
History and somehow my studies were more and more oriented towards this type of issues. 
During my studies I got more and more interested by those issues and I graduated and I did 
my fifth year here in Belgium ... It was something linked to public management in the 
European Union and that was when I started preparing myself to passing the concours, but it 
was not my only career line. I did some other things, I was working in market research before, 
I had some other areas of interest than the European Union, but it was something in what I 
was definitely interested on the top of all other things. (Rozanska 2009:58) 
 
As I interviewed Zofia for the first time shortly after her arrival in Brussels, I assumed 
her life might have changed quite considerably since then. Her testimony shows I was right: 
I think that now I feel much more settled down here because we’ve bought a house, my 
husband has started working … It was a bit of an issue at the beginning because he couldn’t 
find a job here and he had to re-do a university year of studies and now he has started to work, 
so somehow we feel a bit more comfortable here. (Zofia, July 17, 2012, 06:30 p.m.) 
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After the interview, we exchanged our experiences of living in the district, she 
inquired more on my research and my future plans once it would be finished. She proposed to 
walk together home as she wanted to show me her close neighbourhood. She was happy 
about developments in her neighbourhood (pavement being recently repaired, new trees being 
planted, etc.).  
Klara 
 
Klara was in her mid-thirties, and spent an important part of her life in Greece, where her 
mother and parents in law now live. As she revealed, only her brother stayed in Poland. Her 
husband was Greek and they had a five-year-old son who was already trilingual. At the 
beginning, she asked me about my partial results. She came together with the first “wave” of 
Poles after the enlargement to work in the EU institutions: “ [she] passed the concours – the 
first concours published for the Poles in 2003, still before the accession, and in January 2005, 
[she] got a job in the Commission.” 
Asked if her career in the EU institutions was something long planned, she replied: 
No, it was rather a spontaneous decision, although I was somewhat directed towards 
European issues, … as I had made post-graduate studies in European Integration in that time. 
It somehow coincided and that’s why I decided to take part in the concours, but I had not 
planned it. It had not been my plan for the future. (Klara, September 12, 2012, 01:00 p.m.) 
 
Inquired whether there were any important changes in her professional life across time she 
elaborated: 
Yes, two years ago I passed a concours for AD category – that is, administrator and I got a 
job recently, that is my boss decided to give me a promotion – that’s it. I was AST144 at the 
beginning and now I am AD1.  
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 The abbreviation for assistant. 
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Ula 
!
Even though Ula was still on a maternal leave, she agreed to meet for an interview.  She was 
spending most of her time at home with a newborn baby while her three-year old daughter 
was already in a crèche.  
She suggested meeting in her neighbourhood in Watermael Boitsfort, which consisted 
of several similar and not too high blocks of flats, in a very green and calm area. Her home, 
was marked by the presence of little children.  
Asked about her way to the EU institutions three years ago, she revealed: 
It was not that long planned. My husband always wanted to work here. On Erasmus in 
Amsterdam we visited our cousin who works here and then he thought maybe he would try. 
And then we decided that I would also do the exam with him and it was like that ... The 
decision was one year and then we went for the exam. More or less it took us two years. 
(Rozanska 2009:58) 
 
As to the changes in her life, she recounted: 
There were three changes: two kids [laughter] and the job change …. I changed the job, 
because I had passed the concours and I can stay, the time is now indefinite, so this is a big 
change, because I was previously [employed] on a contract [basis]. And I had to change job 
because of that, so I don’t work in the cabinet anymore, just in the DG, which is a big change 
because I work less time and it’s better. (Ula,!September 17, 2012, 10:00 a.m.) 
 
After the interview she said that her future was not really tied to Belgium and she 
wanted to go back to Poland at some point. She told me that, at the very beginning, she did 
not expect to stay in Belgium for such a long time.  
We talked about education and dilemmas with regard to sending kids to European 
schools. As Ula said, she wanted to go back to Poland so that her daughters could decide on 
their belonging. She wanted them to learn Polish and intended to introduce her daughters to 
the Polish culture and traditions. She mentioned that travelling to Poland with two little 
babies was very difficult and that made difficult the contact of kids with grandparents. 
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Ula also told me that she was seeking a French teacher who would come to give her 
lessons at home as she could not move because of the baby. Previously, she followed French 
classes at the Commission.  
Emilia 
 
I met Emilia for the first time via a common acquaintance also working in the EU 
Commission. In fact, she told me, that she completed my questionnaire, which she found on 
the “EPS list”145 precisely because she remembered me from the meeting with this 
acquaintance. Another reason was that she worked in the research field in the Commission 
herself and it was also why she was interested in my study. 
I invited her for lunch, as it was the most convenient time for her to meet. She chose 
to meet in Exki146 in the Schuman area. Here follows her story on how she got to Belgium 
and the EU Commission: 
So for me it started with my friends who passed the competition. I think it was the first 
competition in 2003 …. They passed it, and they found jobs in the EU institutions and they 
learned about the new competitions coming, and they ... encouraged me to take part in it. And 
I started to consider it together with my husband. So, we decided that okay, I will try and it 
was more like an adventure … and it worked. So, this was … like from a recommendation of 
some friends, but also from a general interest in working in this kind of international 
environment on some broader issues. (Emilia, September 13, 2012, 02:30 p.m.) 
 
She was married to a Pole and had children in the school age. She was very glad that both of 
them were pupils at the European School. As Emilia said, the school had created great 
opportunities not only for children, but also to the parents, as they could easily find very close 
friends amongst other children’s parents. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 EPS comes from the accronym EPSO (European Personnel Selection Office) - a department (Directorate 
General, DG) of the European Commission responsible for the organization of the entry competition exams to 
the institutions. The first group of Polish EU officials started to socialise at the time of the first concours in 
which they could participate, officially called EPSO competition. Subsequently, those who passed the concours 
started to refer to themselves as “epsy” (or “eps” in singular) and their emailing list was called “eps-list” or 
“EPS list”. 
146 A quality fast-food restaurant. 
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Men 
Only five out of 11 men were involved in my previous research. However, the contacts with 
some of the “new” informants were established already before starting the research, mainly 
during the Polish monthly meetings in Wild Geese: 
Maksymilian 
 
My first male interviewee, Maksymilian could only meet for the interview in the evening at 
his home due to a quite significant work overload. Actually, he was one of the key 
informants, involved in my previous research. His way to the EU institutions seems to be 
well-conceived, far from being spontaneous.  
I’m thinking because I’m trying to recall at what moment precisely I had this idea to try to 
pass the concours and to become an EU official. I think I started to take it seriously into 
account during my studies in France. After I’d finished my studies in Poland, I studied in 
France for three years, and these were mostly European Studies, and during these studies, in 
Strasbourg, well, I still thought that maybe I would be just a lawyer specialized in EU law. 
But I also started to seriously take into account a possibility of future employment in the EU 
institutions, but I knew that it was quite difficult to pass the concours. So, I mean, it was just 
one of the options, but not the only one. Then, I came back to Poland and I worked for two 
years in the Polish administration and still, becoming an EU official was not the only idea I 
had. I thought that maybe I would gain some experience, while working in the Polish 
administration and maybe afterwards, I would work in a law firm, or as a so-called in-house 
lawyer. But of course I knew that there would be a concours for Polish citizens after Poland’s 
accession to the European Union and I knew that I would try to pass it. And then I tried, I 
succeeded, and then I came to Brussels, I started to work in the EU Commission … Just to 
sum up, this was an idea, which I had in mind for quite a long time. I wanted to be an EU 
official, but this was not of course the only option and there were other possibilities that I 
seriously took into account. (Maksymilian, July 1, 2012, 09:00 p.m.) 
 
I asked Maksymilian if there were any changes in his private life: 
Well, during the last three years maybe yes, maybe I have more acquaintances now. I 
wouldn’t say that I have more friends, but I have at least more acquaintances, mostly Belgian 
or expat people that I met at the gym …, but I don’t see these people outside the gym … . It 
has certainly modified a little bit my universe here and probably it made my life better … But 
apart from this, I don’t think anything else has changed. 
 
Similarly, there were no important changes in his professional life:  
My professional life hasn’t changed. … I don’t know whether this is an experience which is 
common to many EU officials or is it just my experience, but I have this impression that for 
the last five years actually, nothing really changed in my life and I’m doing more or less the 
same thing. The rhythm of my life is the same. I don’t have any mid-term objectives that I’m 
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trying to achieve, like during the time I joined … the EU Commission, so sometimes I have 
difficulty to situate certain events in the past. I mean it could happen a year ago or four years 
ago, but I cannot precisely recall when actually something happened, because every day, 
every week, every month, every year is similar.  
 
Beniamin 
!
I met Beniamin, my second interviewee, after work at Schuman Roundabout. He arrived on 
city bike.  
His way to the European Commission looked quite different from those of other 
interviewees: 
I don’t think it will be an exaggeration if I say that I always wanted to work in the 
Commission, in the European institutions. My story is a bit different than the stories of other 
people, because I was working for the national authority and I had the chance to come a few 
times to Brussels to assist different meetings organized by the Commission. And I’ve always 
liked the Commission as an institution, but I also liked very much the Commission buildings 
with narrow, long corridors and offices, which looked the same. I always considered the 
Commission and people working in the Commission as very intelligent and the best experts in 
their area, frankly. And I have always wanted to be one of them. But I never considered 
myself to be intelligent enough to pass the competition. That is why I didn’t even try to pass 
the first competitions that were organized for the Polish citizens. … But somehow, I’ve 
managed to come here because, my director sent me as a national expert, so I was seconded 
by my Ministry to the Commission for two years. And I liked being here so much that, when I 
was in the second year, I decided to pass the competition. I passed the competition and I 
stayed in the Commission, so I’ve always wanted to work in the Commission and somehow I 
was lucky enough to achieve this goal. (Beniamin, July 9, 2012, 07:00 p.m.) 
 
After the interview, my respondent gave me some suggestions. He said I should have 
asked if someone was buying an apartment or a house in Belgium as according to him it 
would be a visible sign that someone considers staying for good in Belgium. In fact, he said 
he was a good example as he was thinking about purchasing a flat soon. As he admitted, he 
was looking for something in the neighbourhood of his office, where his favourite bars and 
restaurants were situated and where his friends also lived. He revealed that it was related to 
the fact he was single and he felt lonely in Belgium. He said he also had to have everything 
close to his place. Then we switched to daily routines. He mentioned he was enrolled for the 
Russian classes at the Commission, but due to his working hours he was able to attend only 
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the first lesson and as a result he was scratched out from the list. Even though he planned to 
stay in Brussels for long, he did not plan to learn Dutch.  
Sebastian 
 
My next interviewee Sebastian was involved in my previous research. We had an 
appointment in front of the Paul bakery close to the Shuman area.  
At the beginning, Sebastian wanted to make sure that being himself a sociologist did 
not exclude him from my research. Then he started recounting his story: 
The way [to Brussels] was kind of natural … At the beginning of the transformation in Poland 
… I got involved in an EU support program - financial assistance of the European Union 
(then European Community) to support Poland … and I actually evolved together with the 
evolution of this program, and so educated myself toward European Integration without any 
particular intention of coming to Brussels, but it somehow appeared natural. In the meantime, 
I got also the second dimension of my professional interest, … it was public procurement - 
into which I started getting involved. First, incidentally, and then I realized, that it actually, 
it’s fun. … And so I was more and more involved in public procurement and, … when 
incidentally I passed the concours, yeah, it was kind of natural to adapt where I am now. 
(Sebastian, September 27, 2012, 6:00 p.m.) 
 
Sebastian could not recall any important changes in his career or life since his arrival 
in Brussels: “I’ve been here for five years, so I’m completely stuck to one desk”. 
After the interview he said he was not very typical as he lived somewhere in-between 
Poland and Belgium. As he said, usually, the question concerning the place he was coming 
from was difficult to answer. In fact, he was back in Poland every two weeks or even more 
often.  
Stanislaw 
Although Stanislaw was not taking part in my previous research, I have met him many times 
before, as he was an important member of the Polish-EU institutions’ community. Initially, 
he proposed to meet in a Polish bar in close proximity of the European Parliament (Fleur 
d’Europe, known in the Polish circle also as “U Pani Basi”). As the bar was closed during 
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the summer holidays, we went to a neighbouring Exki. Stanislaw was quite busy and he had 
another appointment right after the interview.  
He proposed to record a kind of an introduction and also to share his opinions on the 
EU and Poland’s role in the EU: 
Today is July 26, 2012, Stanislaw Kowalski, an employee of the European Parliament, 
Foreign Affairs Commission. In Brussels since November 2004, formerly in the Commission 
and assistant in the European Parliament. 
I believe that the year 2004 was a very important year for the modern Poland. Of course, it is 
about the accession of Poland to the European Union, but, in the background of this event, the 
very important fact was that the borders were opened, in the figurative and in the literal sense.  
And still in the year 2003, if I’m not mistaken, the unemployment in Poland neighboured 18 
percent. We were, if I can say, threatened by the Arab Spring, but this safety valve which the 
opening of the borders proved to be, opened and gave a chance to many people who would 
not be able to secure any decent vital minimum in Poland, it gave them the possibility of 
earning decent money in this kind of social Europe. But let us leave these, somehow, lowest 
variants. Those who profited most were young persons with University education who were 
able to spread their wings in the West what proved to be a successful ordeal for the Polish 
education system. It turned out that their education [quality] does not disqualify them in 
comparison with their colleagues who graduated in the Western Europe’s universities.  
So … this was a huge opportunity and this is what [a Polish MEP] my employer and my 
mentor…  [believed in], that for him, the year 2004 stood for a great opportunity. It was about 
offering this opportunity to the Poles. He believed very much in young Poles. He knew, he 
anticipated that we would find our place here in a positive way. 
It was about creating this opportunity, creating conditions, that’s what this Europe was about. 
He was confident we were going to manage it here. It was only about opening these borders.  
 
After his introduction I asked Stanislaw about his way to the EU institutions:  
 
I was born in 1977, this means that when I was finishing … my studies ... in 2001, … it was 
already after these ten crazy years of the first years of an independence, when, as we now hear 
stories, … it was enough to have a higher education in order to be the CEO of some company 
in Warsaw.  
Unfortunately, when I was entering the market, it was already too late, but you know what? I 
had this glimpse of some smartness during my studies that I was very focused on the 
internships. Each year, I was doing at least three internships and trust me, at that time it was 
still not that popular. It was still not popular, but this equipped me with a good, real oriented 
background and experience, which was then needed … by the employers.  
Anyway, in 2001, I decided to improve my skills and use the opportunities of an open Europe. 
I went … to study (for one year) economics in Germany. There, I met one businessman. I 
went back to Poland, I started our company for one year, and then after one year I got a 
scholarship and I went … for graduate studies at the one of the best school in the EU in field 
of international relations. So, I studied there between 2003-2004.  
2004 was the year of accession. I decided to send an application to four out of the [MEPs] I 
admired most. … I applied for an internship; I got the job. So, this is my story… . I was the 
head of a Polish MEP’s office in Brussels, where I was responsible for various committees 
following the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Constitutional Committee and also for 
the smooth work of the office. … between 2008-2012, I used to work for the European 
Commission, DG Regional Policy, and Polish Unit. And now I just started in July the work in 
the European Parliament, as administrator in department of Foreign Policy in AFETH 
(Affaires Etrangères) secretariat, this is the unit which is preparing and organizing the work 
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of the Foreign Committee AFETH in European Parliament and thanks to Lisbon Treaty, the 
Parliament has been empowered in this sphere so I treat it as a challenge. (Stanislaw,!July 26, 
2012, 05:30 p.m.) 
 
After the interview, he said he had recently moved from Etterbeek to Forest and he 
really tried to adapt there. He was very much involved in the local community’s life. He 
stressed he was not a complaining expat who did not want to adapt and created his own self-
sufficient reality. He added that he and his partner spent even the New Year’s Eve with 
people from a club in Brussels of which they were members, and they felt well integrated in 
Belgium. He showed me a sticker Polska on his car (printed next to the Belgian plates) and 
declared he had it also on his other cars. He was continuously emphasising his Polishness.  
Filip 
 
Filip was yet another interviewee involved in my previous research and was very much 
engaged in life of the Polish EU institutions community. Actually, he was the organizer of the 
monthly meetings of Polish EU officials – both in Belgium and Warsaw.  
I met him just after his working hours, in front of the EU Parliament. Already at the 
beginning, he stressed he would prefer not to go to Fleur d’Europe. As Filip had another 
appointment already 30 minutes later, he decided to go to Exki.  
During the previous research, I asked him, whether working in the EU institutions 
was long planned by him. At that time he said: 
It was a spontaneous decision that was made ten years before employment, when I was 
making my decision with regard to what I would study at the university. Because I knew that 
I would like to work for the EU institutions ... I decided to enrol in the European Studies … 
Then I decided to study in France as I knew I would need the French language for my future 
career, so I decided to choose the subject of my thesis about France in order to be admitted for 
studies in France. I can say it was completely planned: my studies, career and subject of my 
dissertation, boring. (Rozanska 2009:59) 
 
This time I inquired about the changes across time:  
I came five and a half years ago. I worked in the Commission. I wanted to work in the 
Parliament, and after having worked for four years in the Commission, I sought a job in the 
Parliament. I found one and I moved to the Parliament and I am very happy about it. (Filip, 
July 16, 2012, 05:30 p.m.) 
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I also asked Filip about his “Erasmus” past. He specified he was on the Erasmus 
exchange in France. When I asked him whether the idea of working in the EU institutions 
was born during the student exchange, he clarified:  
No, I decided at the beginning of the studies what I wanted to do. I’ve completed my studies 
and made a diploma so as to make it easier [laughter]. But, after all, I found it interesting, so it 
wasn’t a problem … And I was aware that I wanted to work on the project “Europe”, a nice 
word, on things related to the European integration. It was not necessary to do it in the 
institutions, although the institutions gave a certain, good opportunity, and still in Poland I 
have worked in the field related to the European Union and the Regions, which is my point of 
interest. 
 
He said I should have inquired about the perception and the image of the Eurocrats in 
the press articles and in the media. As he stressed, the media were really spreading a very 
negative, false and unjust image of the Eurocrats.  
Kamil 
 
Kamil was one of the interviewees not involved in my former research. We met at the 
reception desk of the Directorate General he was employed in and went for lunch in the 
cafeteria in the same building. When he arrived, he introduced himself by the first name only. 
He was very open and jovial.  
He lived in Brussels together with his three-year-old son and his wife, who was 
studying Development at the Université Libre de Bruxelles in French. 
At the beginning of his career in Brussels, he was employed in the EU Parliament and 
as he recalled, the atmosphere there was much more relaxed than in the European 
Commission. Interestingly, he observed that Poles working in the EU Parliament made a 
much more coherent group. They were meeting also outside the office hours, while in the EU 
Commission everything was, according to him, more formal. He also said he attended some 
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of the Polish meetings at the beginning of his stay in Brussels. However, he had not been yet 
to a new place - Aloft -147  where the Polish monthly meetings had moved.  
When asked about his way to EU institutions, he replied:  
I passed the AST148 competition while still studying in Poland. Therefore, the only 
opportunity for me was the AST category, which does not require any studies. But when I did 
it, I didn’t really hope for some career in the EU institutions as any kind of office work 
seemed not very attractive for me. When I was studying, I was thinking more about some 
civil society, NGOs kind of activities, but ... when I passed this competition and when I got 
the offer, (it was six months after I had finished my studies), I didn’t actually hesitate too 
much taking into account the prospects in Poland, at the Polish labour market in 2004. Yeah, I 
worked … An interesting job in fact, but the pay was so low, nothing great, and so, I started 
[working here ] in May 2005 as an assistant in the European Parliament in the Secretariat of 
one of the Parliamentary Committees. I must say that after my studies, I think, it was easy to 
get in here, I mean, in this period. I was studying International Relations with European 
specialization, so, I mean, the AST competition was not very hard. (Kamil, July 26, 2012, 
01:00 p.m.) 
 
As to the changes across his stay in Brussels, Kamil stressed that with birth of his first 
child, everything had changed, that nowadays his life was more children oriented and that he 
and his wife were mostly meeting other friends with children in their free time. After the 
interview, he added that all his Belgian friends originated either from her University or from 
Oxfam. 
We also talked about children. I asked him about the languages his three - year - old 
son was learning. He said that at home they spoke Polish, while French was the language 
used in the crèche. Then, I inquired about his future plans as regards schooling of his child. 
He said he would most probably enrol the boy in the European School - as there was a Polish 
section, plus the quality of education was high. At the end, he mentioned about the possibility 
of going back to Poland for the reason of his son’s education (similarly as Ula) and own 
career opportunities (possibly also a political career). 
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147 Aloft Brussels Schuman Hotel- a modern style hotel bar (W XYZ bar) in the European quarter in Brussels. 
The monthly meeting of Polish EU officials moved to Aloft after Wild Geese was closed for renovation. 
148 Assistant. 
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Ksawery 
 
Ksawery was another respondent involved in my previous study. After several days from 
sending him my email asking for participation in the interview part, he kindly proposed to 
meet during his working hours. We stayed for the interview in his office, as both the cafeteria 
and the meeting room were full. He shared with me his story: 
As probably you know, I was a typical official from the new member states. First of all, 
passing a competitive examination and then recruited in 2005. Then I served as a Head of 
Unit for almost two years and then was transferred to another independent position. Then I 
was transferred to one of the operational units as a desk officer. So it’s a quite typical career 
for a new member state official. (Ksawery, July 18, 2012, 11:00 a.m.) 
 
During my previous research, when inquired about his way to the EU institutions, 
whether it was something spontaneous, or a long planned decision, he answered: 
I do not think it was something spontaneous. I had consciousness that drove me to some 
broader perspective, broader than national, so I used to think of my career as an international 
career that was not necessarily EU institutions, but it happened that the EU institutions 
recruited Poles and it happened that I found my way to Brussels, so it was not spontaneous at 
all. It was planned. Not necessarily EU institutions, but either international or cross border 
activities. (Rozanska 2009:59) 
 
Adrian 
!
My next interviewee, Adrian was a “new” research participant, but he was a very active 
person in the Polish community of EU officials. Actually, he was the founder of the 
Facebook group Europracownicy (Euroemployees). 
It was fairly difficult to make an appointment with Adrian as he was very busy during 
his first days after holidays; he agreed to meet only three weeks after I had sent him a written 
request. We met after work, in Aloft, which he knew well as the Polish meetings were 
organized there. He was the only person who asked me to send him my questions before the 
interview. 
Here comes his short story: 
Well, I studied International Relations at the University of Warsaw. Initially, my decision to 
study it was due to the fact that, in the past, I wanted to work in diplomacy. However, while 
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the accession was approaching, I became more interested in the European issues. I became an 
activist of a kind of pre-accession movement – I co-operated with the Schuman’s Foundation, 
but also my Students’ Association participated in a certain Polish Forum of Pro-European 
Youth Organisations, which contributed to the accession of Poland to the European Union. 
So, I was quite familiar with these issues during the last years of my studies. And, at the 
moment when we already accessed the EU, the idea came up to work for the EU, for the 
European Commission. (Adrian, July 19, 2012, 5:45 p.m.) 
 
After the interview, he asked me about my own perception of the EU officials.  
Darek 
!
Although my next interviewee, Darek was a “new” research participant, he was a quite active 
“member” in the community of Polish EU officials. He participated very often in monthly 
meetings in the Wild Geese, and other cultural events of the Polish EU community.  
We had an appointment in front of Old Oak - the place where Polish meetings of the 
EU officials were organised at the very beginning. Unfortunately, already at the door, my 
respondent saw a Polish colleague, then, inside, a few more. He felt inconvenient and asked 
to move to another café situated in the Schuman area. I also had to convince him that he was 
a valuable source of information for my research.  
Here comes the story of my respondent: 
I am a lawyer in the European Commission. I’ve obviously passed a concours for a lawyer’s 
position. Before, I had studied Law in Paris. At the last year of the studies, I studied European 
Law. When I learnt about the concours, it was a natural thing to me to take this challenge and 
that’s how I came to Brussels, end of 2004. (Darek, July 10, 2012, 07:00 p.m.) 
 
When asked why he decided to study European Law, he explained:  
I believe that the EU is a guarantee of peace in Europe. I studied EU Law with an assumption 
that one day Poland would join the EU and there will be a demand for people who know both 
Poland and the reality of the pre-existing EU. I’ve always had this idea in mind that Poland 
should be helped to find its place in Europe and this was the reason why I studied EU law and 
then took the concours. 
 
At the end of the interview, he offered me a photocopy of some excerpts of “Diaries” 
by Witold Gombrowicz closely related to the issues of the Polish identity on emigration. He 
also told me about his intention to organise the “Street’s Day”. This project would involve 
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closing the street for one day and organising a kind of street party for the people from the 
neighbourhood, in order to establish or tighten social contacts. 
Bernard 
 
I met my next interviewee, Bernard in front of the European Council in the middle of the 
week just after his work. He invited me to his favourite winery in the Schuman area, which 
turned out to be a trendy place, and full of people coming for the after-work drink.  
Bernard was one of these interviewees, for whom the career in the EU institutions was 
long planned: “It had to be long planned because it took so long. It was something very well 
thought” (July 18, 2012, 06:00 p.m.). 
When asked how his life had changed since our last interview (for my former 
research), he answered he was “very comfortable with [his] life; everything has changed; [He 
was] just more comfortable, more settled”. 
Jeremi 
 
The last interviewee, Jeremi, although not involved in my previous study, was another 
important “member” of the Polish EU community in Brussels, and particularly of its virtual 
context. Indeed, Jeremi was a very active user of the Internet forum of the Polish EU officials 
on the web page of Gazeta Wyborcza.  
It was quite difficult to have an appointment with him. Actually, he responded only a 
couple of weeks after my email request, due to an important work overload. Even though, the 
interviewing part of my research had been already finished, I accepted his late reply.  
As soon as Jeremi joined me in the hall of the building he worked in, he proposed we 
called ourselves by first names only. I asked him about his way to employment in the EU 
institutions in Brussels - whether it was something long planned or a spontaneous decision. 
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Yes, it was rather spontaneous. Some background information. I’m a technical person, I’m an 
IT specialist and in my former job, I was IT specialist in a regional bank in Poland. During 
internal movements, for half a year, I was assigned to a department that was dealing with 
internal and external risks and this job was not really related to IT. It was about reading 
regulations, reading a law, etc., and I was not happy with that job. The internal atmosphere in 
the department was not good as well, so I told to myself- “Maybe I should think about finding 
a new job”, so I started to read the newspapers about different job proposals and I found an 
advertisement from the European Commission that a new competition for IT specialists will 
start soon, so I thought – “okay, maybe I will try, I will see … how it looks like”. That was 
my first concern- how it looks, what are the questions, what is the required knowledge. So, I 
sent my documents, I enrolled for this competition, and totally unexpectedly, I passed it. So, I 
was put on the reserve list. After few months, I received some invitations for a job interview. 
First was in the Council of the European Union. Next month, I received another couple of 
requests here from the European Commission. The last one was from OLAF149 and two days 
after this job interview, I received a call that they offered me a post, so I decided to take it. 
(Jeremi, October 3, 2012, 02:00 p.m.) 
 
 At the end of our conversation, he said I should definitely join the group on FB so that 
I could always be well informed on Polish events. 
4.1.2. Why they are here  
With the following set of questions, I tried to find out not only to what extent coming and 
working in Brussels was due to ideological motivation, but also whether my research 
participants have developed any genuine interest in staying in Brussels, independently of the 
employment in the EU institutions.  
4.1.2.1. Motivation to come and intention to stay in Brussels 
My former research (Rozanska 2009) has shown that, in the light of the “push-pull theories” 
(Castles 2003), the mobility of the Polish EU officials was typically triggered by “pull 
factors” such as higher income, professional development and job security. The 
aforementioned “pull factors” were related to the EU institutions and not to the host country 
as such. In this sense, the situation of EU staff is, in many respects, similar to the situation of 
other privileged European movers. This similarity starts with limited mobility choice – in 
both cases, although the decision to come was triggered by “pull” factors and thus was not 
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149 European Anti-Fraud Office. 
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subject to various economic or security related concerns, the choice of destination was not 
deliberate, as it was determined by other professional considerations. EU officials, thus also 
the Polish EU officials, are a (particular) kind of expatriates - usually white collar elites 
moving to another country in order to take up a specific job with the immediate prospect of 
settlement. On the other hand, they differ from conventional expatriates in Brussels as their 
expatriation is usually not temporary - they are often granted life-long employment.  
 In some cases, their coming to Belgium was triggered by “idealistic” motivation to 
work for the common good (European integration). Changing lifestyle or staying in an 
international environment were the most often quoted non-professional reasons. Another 
frequent reason to migrate - almost exclusively among women - was joining a (non-Polish) 
partner.  
 For many of the participants, working for the EU institutions was long-planned and 
this objective had steered their education path and early career. 
As the previous research has shown, despite being granted life-long employment, only 
a minority of the respondents was convinced to stay permanently in Belgium. Moreover, 
many of those who had no intention of leaving, had lived in Belgium prior to employment in 
the EU institutions and their preference to stay was related rather to their private than 
professional life.  
Similarly as it was the case with my original group, when asked about the motivation 
to migrate to Belgium, not surprisingly, 17 persons out of 30 respondents indicated job 
related reasons. Some of them answered succinctly that the reason was a successful 
participation in the EPSO competition, some others referred directly to their attitude to 
working in the EU institutions (“I always linked my career with the EU”; “I got a very 
interesting and well paid job at the European Commission”), yet others referred to 
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professional experience or career opportunities. One of the male respondents pointed also at 
the “prestigious” character of employment in the EU institutions:  
I was offered an attractive post in the EC (initially for a two-year temporary contract) in 2004. 
I considered it not only very attractive financially but also very prestigious. I also welcomed 
the prospect of experiencing life in another country.  
 
 Another young male respondent pointed also at something which might actually be 
considered as a “push factor”, namely a high unemployment level in Poland at the time he 
decided to take part in the competition:  
I passed the competition for EU civil servant and found it a better option than staying in 
Poland; in 2005 unemployment among young people was high and job prospects were not 
very optimistic. 
 
For five persons, the main reason to migrate was willingness to live abroad. One of 
the ladies explained:  
I wanted to live abroad for some period of time and gather work and life experience. I also 
wanted my children to have such a life experience, to be more open to other people and have 
more “European self-confidence”, and also to learn languages. I was also strongly interested 
in a possibility to work for the EU.  
 
The studies paths of four persons were oriented directly towards the future 
employment in the EU institutions (e.g., “My Master’s Degree was in European Politics, so I 
decided to come to Brussels to apply myself”; “I did my studies in the International field, 
therefore working in Brussels was a ‘natural continuation’”). One person out of this group 
admitted that the main reason for coming to Brussels was the possibility to work in her 
favourite domain, competition law. Three women followed their partners, while four persons 
had already lived abroad before.  
4.1.2.2. Reasons for taking part in the competition and working in the EU 
institutions  
Interrogated about the reasons for taking part in the EPSO competition and working in the 
EU institutions, more than a half of my respondents from the new group referred to the 
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working conditions offered by the employer. Among the most attractive conditions the 
respondents referred to salary, but also security of employment. Very often, they quoted both 
of these components (“a good salary and social security”; “Best job opportunity while living 
in Brussels (money and social security wise)”; “secure work and good salary”). Sometimes, 
they quoted also flexible or “reasonable” working time, or “mobility and promotion 
possibilities”. Some respondents made a direct comparison to other available work options 
(“I knew that I would not be able to find back in Poland a better job”; “attractive job 
conditions at the time of high youth unemployment in Poland”). 
The ideological reasons were quoted by one-third of the respondents (interestingly, 
only in three cases this motivation coincided with the financial one). These motivations were 
differently worded, but usually referred to the possibility of having an impact on reality (“I 
thought that in the COM150 the results of my work will have more impact”; “I wanted to have 
a mission in my job, to do something for others, for the Europeans”), or to beliefs, 
convictions and political engagement (“I do believe in the European idea”; “I am European 
federalist”; “I like to work for Europe, I really do believe in it ”; “Interests and strong beliefs 
in the European Integration”). 
The third most often quoted reason to seek employment in the European Commission 
was the academic background related to the EU matters, which, in view of my respondents, 
pre-determined their career. However, this answer is more “technical”, as it does not provide 
information on the reasons for choosing this kind of studies (“[I have] graduated from 
International relations”; “It was a natural consequence of my university career”; “I did studies 
in the field of EU”). One of the respondents, building on his studies, was even actively 
involved in the promotion of Poland accession to the EU:  
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150 The abbreviation for the EU Commission. 
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I was interested in European integration since the middle of my studies. I completed a 
Master’s programme in European integration, and I actively participated in the promotion of 
the Poland accession to the EU. 
 
In certain cases, however, the reply was complemented with the motivation for the 
choice (“I have a degree in European Politics, and so have been interested in the EU since my 
student days”).  
Finally, several persons indicated they decided to sit the EPSO exams tempted by a 
multicultural, international environment or “international atmosphere” they expected to find 
in the institutions. Some other perceived the EU institutions as “the centre of excellence” or 
as a place propitious for professional development. 
In addition to the abovementioned most popular motivations, several persons quoted 
more personal reasons, such as “a need for change”, the opportunity to stay in Belgium, 
curiosity or coincidence. 
These results must be approached with circumspection. One immediate conclusion 
one might be tempted to draw is that only a minority joined the institutions out of the 
ideological motivation. However, it should be kept in mind that, at the moment of the 
accession of the Eastern- and Central European member states, the EU was not the same 
organisation as in the 1950s, 1960s or 1970s.  In that time, the Common Market was not yet 
complete, borders were still real and the memories of the war atrocities were vivid. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, the European Union was already something very real and 
tangible, especially for people who had interest in the matter. Borders had been long 
forgotten, new ambitious projects lied on the table. Despite the rejection of the European 
Constitution, the organisation seemed successful and expansionist. Following the decade of 
accession preparations associated with strongly pro-European discourse in the Polish press 
and media, the EU appeared as something almost perfect, the accession was almost 
considered as “the end of history”. In the eyes of the populations of the accessing countries, 
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and especially those of their elites, the European integration could appear as something as 
obvious as trivial. Therefore, strong emotional engagement in favour of European integration 
was probably more difficult than in the era referred to by Bellier (2002), in the same way that 
the choice of the career in the national civil service in, say, Italy, is probably rarely motivated 
by the enthusiasm for the unity of Italy, democracy or the constitutional order. On the other 
hand, as it was already mentioned, attachment to the institutions of the EU and its objectives 
may develop after the recruitment, as a result of the “engrenage”. This is even more likely 
given the growing criticism towards the institutions (and their employees) of which my 
research participants are aware (see section 4.2).  
As to those, whose answers pointed at the ideological motivation, such statements 
also need to be approached with caution. The question referred to the motivation for 
something that happened in the past - the answers may be based on inaccurate memories, they 
may even be projections of the current state of mind of my respondents. Finally, they may 
also be affected by their intention to manipulate their image.  
4.1.2.3. Motivation to stay or leave Belgium and the EU institutions  
The question was asked to both the “new group” and the “follow-up group”. The pattern of 
responses was broadly similar. 
In the new group (30 persons), only seven persons were convinced to stay in Belgium, 
16 persons did not know what they would do in the future; while seven were convinced to 
leave. In the follow-up group, only three persons (out of 20) planned to leave Belgium, while 
11 did not know it yet and six were convinced they would stay in Belgium.  
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When asked about the intention of leaving the EU institutions one day, all answers 
from the new group but four were compatible with intentions of leaving the country.151 A 
woman who said she was not going to “leave” the EU institutions explained: “But I am 
planning to use my unpaid leave and from time to time leave for up to a couple of years, go 
back and forth between Brussels and other places plus I want to do things aside from EU 
work when in Brussels (academic career?)”. One of the ladies who were unsure if they leave 
the institutions added: “If I leave, it will most likely be for a sabbatical”. 
While asking my respondents from the follow up group (only) if they would consider 
staying in Belgium after leaving the EU institutions. Six of them confirmed, eight would not 
do it and six “did not know it yet”. 
Although an important part of the respondents was not sure to stay in Belgium and in 
the EU institutions, it should be noted that very few declared their intention to leave. The 
strategies of persons who admit the possibility to stay (even without being sure) – thus having 
no plans for further mobility, considering Belgium as their possible final destination - must 
be very different from the attitudes of those who are convinced they will leave – which is the 
case of the majority of mobile professionals (expatriates).      
4.1.3. Their spaces  
To understand the overall mode of functioning of the Polish EU officials in Brussels, and 
more specifically, to see with whom and at what occasion they may actually be in contact, it 
is important to examine the spaces they have created and occupy in the new environment. 
Only then it will be possible to understand what it actually means for them to “live in 
Brussels”.!
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151 Two persons who did not plan to leave Belgium, answered they did not know if they would leave the 
institutions one day; a person who did not know yet if she would leave the country, answered she would leave 
the institutions, while another one, who was also hesitating, answered she would never leave the institutions.  
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4.1.3.1. Insignificant role of the Polish Church   
According to Leman (1997, 2000), attending the Polish mass constituted an important aspect 
of life of the previous wave of Polish (undocumented, labour) migrants in Belgium. As the 
scholar explains,!“what these migrants seek in their church is the ‘atmosphere of home’ or 
‘the native region’” (Leman 1997:37). The “Polish” church played a role as an important 
driver of integration of the Polish community (see e.g., Leman 1997, 2000; Siewiera 1995; 
Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005). Not only could the Poles in Brussels attend Sunday mass 
in their maternal language, but they could also obtain assistance, legal advise and moral 
support (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005:686; Siewiera 1995:100). The church was also the first 
destination for the newcomers, where they could find important information including 
possibilities of employment opportunities in Belgium (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:32; 
2005:686; Leman 1997:36). It supported the Polish ethnic identity, propagated Polish culture, 
customs and language (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b; 2005:686), but also facilitated social 
life. The Polish Catholic Mission provided Polish children with schooling, had its own library 
and video rental (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005:686). Moreover, it offered them free French 
courses, organized both religious and clearly entertaining events but also meetings for the 
group of support for Anonymous Alcoholics (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b:32; 2005:686). 
During my previous research (Rozanska 2009), 12 out of 30 persons admitted 
attending Catholic mass (four out of the remaining 18 who did not go to church, were 
Catholics). Eight persons attended exclusively Polish sermons, while four research 
participants indicated both Polish and Belgian masses.  
 As concerns the new research group, eleven persons admitted attending Polish masses 
(out of this group, one person declared attending also Belgian mass). Another male 
respondent explained he was not Catholic; yet another man said he was not attending the 
mass, because they are frequented by whole families and he found it strange to go there 
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alone. One woman said she was “not religious”, while another explained she was atheist.  
Overall, it seems that the “Polish church” does not play an important role for the 
Polish EU officials. This can be partly explained with a general decrease of importance of 
religion for young urban people in the EU.  
It seems that (especially) in the time I conducted my previous study, some of the roles 
of the “Polish Church” in facilitating adjustment to the new environment, (e.g., source of 
information and moral support) have been replaced by modern forms of virtual social 
networking, including the forum of Gazeta Wyborcza and the internal “EPS” mailing list 
(Rozanska 2009, 2011). These networks, established in the virtual space, were further 
extended to real social meetings (e.g., the monthly gatherings of the Polish EU officials in 
Irish pub - Wild Geese), and allowed the Polish officials to keep strong relations among 
themselves. The Polish EU officials created a kind of situational community - they were all at 
the beginning of their stay abroad, sharing a similar professional situation and suffering the 
same social limitations due to the negative attitude of other Poles and Belgians. Such factor 
as for example, being “lost” in the new “world” of EU institutions and the new place of living 
at the same time have undoubtedly tightened the ties between them. 
However, there were also some of them, who did not feel the need of “being together” 
with their compatriots, as they simply felt at ease among other Europeans just as among 
Poles.  
4.1.3.2. Meeting places of the Polish EU institutions community   
As Suvarierol remarks, the newcomers often find opportunities for social insertion thanks to 
national clubs and networks (2009:421). These clubs and networks naturally facilitate 
exchange between the more experienced officials and the newcomers, also thanks to shared 
language and culture (Suvarierol 2009:412). The regular (and ritual) meetings at the Irish Pub 
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Wild Geese were described in my previous study, as one of the central institutions of the 
Polish EU officials’ life in Brussels (Rozanska 2009; see also Rozanska 2011). 
The Polish EU civil servants seem to attend completely different social spaces in their 
free time than other categories of Polish migrants in Brussels. During the interview and while 
talking about typically Polish spaces in Brussels, Jeremi mentioned a recently opened Polish 
restaurant Pokusa (Temptation). He pointed at a huge mental gap between the two categories 
of Poles in Brussels resulting in these two groups having rather separated spaces they 
frequent in their free time. As he explained, the labour migrants have a pub called Żubr 
(Bison) and some other bars, and a discotheque in Anderlecht (Amnesia), whereas the Polish 
EU community has their own meetings in Aloft, after the Wild Geese was permanently 
closed. According to Jeremi, Aloft was a completely different type of place: it was a hotel bar 
with an open space (with no separated rooms as it was the case in Wild Geese) and that, 
according to him, could apparently facilitate contacts. Another important change was that 
nowadays these meetings were organized on Thursdays instead of Fridays, and therefore, 
they also ended earlier than before.  
My next interviewee, Beniamin, mentioned that the access to Polish shops or Polish 
restaurants was not important to him. He was aware there was a Polish bar serving dumplings 
in Anderlecht (although he would not go there just to purchase Polish dumplings). He also 
knew about the Polish bar in front of EU Parliament (Fleur d’Europe, called also “U Pani 
Basi”) and a new restaurant (Pokusa) in the Merode neighbourhood. However, he had never 
been there.  
As to the original monthly meetings of the Polish EU officials (of which he was not 
really a fan) Beniamin observed that, especially at their final stage, they were gathering 
“people of another type”, and that almost everybody was admitted. In Aloft people were 
dressed more formally and he found the ambience of the place more attractive. However, he 
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simply did not like work oriented social meetings as he did not want to meet his colleagues 
outside the working hours. He also said that although most of his friends worked in the EU 
institutions, they were not employed in the same Directorate General.  
As the profile of these meetings, so important for newcomers, has changed recently, I 
decided to discuss it with the former organizer in order to have “first hand” information. In 
fact, there was a recent “appointment” of a new organizer, a woman not employed in the EU 
institutions.  
Adrian pointed at a different character of the meetings in Aloft: 
it cannot be compared with Wild Geese, not at all. And I think that also the persons who were 
attending these meeting at the beginning, I mean the persons who were coming to Old Oak I 
could see, at least some of them, still in Wild Geese. They do not attend these meetings 
anymore. I have never seen those from Old Oak in Aloft, not a single time, while I could see 
them from time to time in Wild Geese. (Adrian) 
 
He explained the sinking popularity of these meetings in a following way: 
I just think that people got simply bored with this formula. Once they got to know people, if 
they want to meet with them, they can simply do it somewhere else. I think it was a question 
of time. … They have their circles of friends, they are integrated, and do not feel the need to 
come and get to know new people. They just do keep an occasional contact with some of 
these people, but I think that it is for those who came here as this most important wave, 
around 2005-2007 or 2008, we can say, this wave has felt so “at home” in Brussels that they 
do not feel this need for meeting any more. (Adrian) 
 
I also asked Filip, if he thought there was any source of support for the current day 
newcomers similar to the forum of Gazeta Wyborcza for the first wave of Polish EU officials 
in Brussels. I remembered he had mentioned in the past that prior to coming to Belgium some 
people already knew each other from the list. I wanted to know whether these newcomers 
were now left without a similar support. He did not answer this question explicitly, but 
suggested that this kind of support is no longer necessary: 
You know, I have the impression that everyone coming to Brussels already knows someone. I 
do not know to what extent it is true that because there are so many Poles, everybody knows 
someone. That is why there are not so many completely new people here; and when someone 
like that happens, I get to know that person because he or she would have already known 
someone from University or from a previous job in Poland, and while coming here, such a 
person always has someone who would introduce him to the environment of Polish EU 
officials. (Filip) 
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During several years of my participant observation in the Polish EU officials’ 
gatherings in Brussels, I realised that, in addition to the monthly meetings (in Wild Geese or 
Aloft), there were also other “Polish” events usually attracting the representatives of the 
researched group. This is notably the case of Polish ambulant theatre of the famous director 
Krzysztof Warlikowski – the performances in Liège regularly host a significant number of 
Polish spectators, including many EU officials, but also diplomatic staff and other highly 
skilled Polish professionals – but also of occasional spectacles of Polish amateur theatre in 
Brussels involving many eurocratic actors. Performances of the first type are rather expensive 
and require a certain awareness of the cultural agenda of Belgium or Poland, as the tickets are 
often difficult to buy. The latter, advertised in the local Polish newspapers, attracted also a 
certain number of economic migrants from Podlasie. However, despite opportunities for 
networking during the entracts, I saw rather few interaction between the two groups. Even 
more popular are screenings of Polish films – I met plenty of my research participants, as 
well as other Polish EU officials e.g., at the screening of Andrzej Wajda’s “Katyń”, as well as 
at the festival of the Visegrad cinema (embracing Polish, but also other Eastern European 
cinema). 
4.1.3.3. The Virtual Community of Polish EU officials in Brussels 
In my former study I abundantly described the first EU institution-employment-related forum 
on the Gazeta Wyborcza152 website, as well as the “EPS” list – the emailing list of Polish EU 
officials (Rozanska 2009). I was curious to know if these important institutions of the Polish 
officials’ life in Brussels were still crucial in their social life.  
Interrogated on the forum of Gazeta Wyborcza, Adrian explained that he had not 
participated in that forum for several years as it was simply easier to send an email to 
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someone than to go to Wyborcza web page. Knowing that the forum of Gazeta Wyborcza 
constituted a source of advice and support for the first wave of Polish EU officials in 
Brussels, I asked if there was something similar for current newcomers. Adrian answered:  
For sure there is no similar thing; however, I think that many questions, or a contact group has 
appeared on Facebook. By contrast, in the moment when the list has appeared, meaning the 
forum of Gazeta Wyborcza, Facebook was already there in the U.S., but it hasn’t been yet in 
Poland. ... So, I have the impression that Facebook or other social portals have overtaken an 
important part of it. I know that there was another similar group on Grono.153 However, there 
are nowadays less people who come, at least (much less) among the Eurocrats. It is true that 
they do not have similar initial support as the first wave did. (Adrian) 
 
Regarding the intrusion of other categories of Polish migrants in Brussels on the 
Forum of Gazeta Wyborcza, Adrian added: 
You know there were several such individuals; some of them I even knew personally, and 
what is even more funny, one of those attacking (I cannot reveal his identity though, as he 
would probably shoot me, literally) - for instance, his wife works for the institutions, while he 
is very active in attacking us, at least he was several years ago. I think, the word “parasites” 
was one of the nicest words, which he would apply with reference to us. I do not know why 
this guy has such a need to express himself. (Adrian) 
 
Then I asked Adrian to elaborate more on a recent group Polscy Europracownicy 
(Polish Euro-employees) that was created on Facebook on January 16, 2008: 
Actually, I have founded this [Polish] “Euro-employees” group on Facebook and I allow 
everybody to join it. I do not care if the person works for the EU or not. I have just 
ascertained that if someone feels the need to be in this group, I do not have anything against154 
… Likewise, I was in favor of opening the “EPS” list, (which was created for the EU 
institutions employees), to the outside to make it accessible for everyone who was interested. 
Since we talk about different issues there, like for instance:“I am selling a washing machine”, 
or “I am going to Poland and I can carry something for you”,  … just to give some examples. 
I do not see any reason why it could not be opened for people from other groups, from other 
works. The question was even submitted to voting, and it seems that three-fourth or two-third 
were against of expanding this “network” while one-third voted for extension. It is really a 
pity, but at least I am happy that it was a democratic choice of the entire group. The 
arguments against were quite ridiculous as for instance “I do not want extension for the 
teachers of European Schools, as I can gossip on them”. This is completely ridiculous given 
that we have around 1250 persons on that group and I am pretty sure that if someone sees a 
surname of a given person, he will further pass this information to that person. So, it is a kind 
of fictitious protection. Many people pass also emails and so on ... (Adrian) 
 
During my previous research I realized that one of the crucial tools for development 
of ties between the members of the Polish Community was the “EPS” Google list (Rozanska 
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153 Grono.net was a Polish virtual social network pre-existing Facebook. 
154 Previously, there was another group on Facebook that included only EU officials, but it was suspended. 
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2009). More than 1400 EU officials received, every day, loads of messages related to 
practicalities of life in Brussels, but also other topics, very often political or related to “faits 
divers”. The Polish EU officials’ virtual community is formed by people in broadly similar 
life situation which, given their busy life (as it will be mentioned later, most of them either 
worked overtime or had small children), cannot afford more time consuming forms of 
maintaining ties. Furthermore, it is not particularly specialized, as it relies on the exchange of 
information and opinions on very diverse subject and performs multiple roles. Indeed, the 
latter are not limited to support and advice, as the list actually organized the “community life” 
of the Polish EU officials in Brussels. 
Seven years after its creation, the “EPS” Google list seemed still very popular among 
the Polish EU institutions’ employees. Only two persons out of 21 interviewees expressed 
less enthusiastic views. Another person indicated he did not use it often and personally got no 
useful reply, but still admitted it may be useful. One woman was no longer a member, 
although she considered the list an important source of information. Many respondents 
expressed sheer enthusiasm.  
During the interviews I questioned several persons, who were more involved in the 
virtual networking of the Polish EU community. Therefore, I asked Adrian to develop more 
on the response he had given in the questionnaire about the main source of information as 
regards daily practicalities (e.g., looking for a doctor or a plumber). At that time he pointed at 
the Polish community, which as he further explained included: “Polish list, but also these 
contacts, I mean, that I know that someone [who] sometimes has done something at home 
and I would contact him directly”. When asked, if he meant the Polish “EPS” list, he 
confirmed it was certainly a very important source of information. 
During the interview, Beniamin mentioned that he actually found the community of 
Polish EU officials to be very well integrated and stronger than the community of the 
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previous categories of Polish migrants thanks to the “EPS” list. He considered it as a very 
important tool of integration of the Polish community. He said the conversations were still 
very vivid there. On the other hand, some respondents, as for instance Ula, admitted they still 
used the “EPS” list but considered it rather as an important source of information than of 
support:  
Yes. As source of information yes and I use it. Not very often, but sometimes of course, but 
not as support ... This is what they complain about, that we use it now as source of 
information and not as group itself, but for me - as group - I have friends. For information - 
this is what I need them for. (Ula) 
 
4.1.4. Conclusions on “Who they are”, “Why they are here” and “their spaces” 
Looking at the profiles and life histories of my interviewees, it seems obvious that their way 
to the institutions cannot be reduced to a simple model mentioned by several scholars 
consisting in pre-socialisation in the College of Europe, or a similar institution, or during a 
traineeship in an EU institution (Abélès et al. 1993; Ban 2009; Hooghe 2005; Shore 2000; 
Suvarierol 2011). Although many of them, indeed, admitted having planned their EU career 
and prepared for the concours in advance, for many of them it was merely an option. Others 
approached it as an opportunity they tried to seize when it appeared, without being long-
planned or considered as a career path to follow. Certain women had already been in Brussels 
for other reasons, some of them followed their partners. Many (but not all) had had prior 
international experience, either at university or in a professional career.  
The trajectories of their mobility, in many cases, illustrate the contemporary trend by 
their complexity: some left Poland for studies in France or the UK before arriving in 
Brussels, sometimes returning to Poland or working abroad before their current assignment. 
Some spent time in Brussels before leaving and subsequently returning. Although we may 
assume, following the experience of other EU officials, that their arrival in Brussels marks 
the end of their movement and can be qualified, after Van Amersfoort (1998), as a 
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“permanent” migration, it must be noted that some of my interviewees do not exclude leaving 
Brussels someday. Indeed, coming to Belgium is not always perceived as a one-off 
movement, and uncertainty as to the actual length of their stay may influence their attitude to 
a new country and their determination to integrate. Only very few envisaged staying in 
Belgium despite leaving the institutions, which seems to indicate a rather low level of 
attachment to Belgium itself. The biggest group was not yet sure how long they were going to 
stay and envisaged the possibility of leaving the job one day. Certainly, this is still in contrast 
with the state of mind of typical expatriates coming for a short or middle-term contract. Some 
authors have explained their findings concerning expatriates’ unwillingness or difficulty in 
integrating by the short term perspective of their stay (see e.g., Amit 2007; Butcher 2009; E. 
Cohen 1977; Favell 2008a; Gatti 2009; Kennedy 2009). In the case of my research 
participants, independently of what they will actually do in the future, this factor cannot be 
present, as they mostly admit a possibility of staying for an important part of their life. Most 
probably (although this could not be verified in my research), this is also their perception by 
the Brussels’ population.  
Their declared motivations are often idealistic, but even more often they are financial 
or professional. These motivations are not mutually exclusive. With all necessary caveats 
(see above), one may cautiously assume that the pattern broadly corresponds to the findings 
of Abélès et al. (1993), Ban (2013) and Bellier (2002). Some of my respondents were not 
able to clearly specify the reason for their career choice. 
Similar to other groups of Poles in Belgium, the Eurocrats have their own spaces in 
which they interact with each other. Unlike in the case of previous groups, however, this 
space is not organised around the church (for this, see Leman 1997, 2000; Siewiera 1995; 
Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005), but takes the form of organised regular meetings and 
virtual communities. Professional identification seems to play an important role in the 
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creation of these spaces, as they are normally reserved for Poles working in the institutions 
(although outsiders are tolerated). The most complete of these virtual “communities”, the 
“EPS”-google-list, performs broadly the same functions as the church for previous groups of 
Polish migrants. 
These ritualised meetings (both monthly and occasional) and participation in Internet-
based exchanges coin common experience, common histories and establish common places 
and points of reference. All these elements, considered by Amit (2002b:18) as necessary for 
the formation of a community, are there. Moreover, as I realised during the participant 
observation, there seems to be a sense of common interest (Overing and Rapport 2005) and 
emotional links, sense of belonging among the Polish EU officials. I could observe it, for 
instance, during the meeting in the “Wild Geese” organised between the Polish EU officials 
and a popular Polish writer who had written a novel depicting (in quite negative tones) their 
life in Brussels. They were truly shocked and angry because of what they understood as a 
calumnious pamphlet and asked the author for explanations.    
If the gathering around the “Polish” church by the previously studied groups of Polish 
“economic” migrants, frequenting “Polish” discos and bars (such as “Amnesia” or already 
mentioned “Pokusa”) and buying in Polish shops could be interpreted as an attempt to re-
create “Polish” spaces in Brussels, based on the memories of “home” in Poland, it seems that 
the way the Polish EU officials create and use their spaces has more to do with their current 
situation and status. Looking at the successive locations of the monthly meetings, it appears 
that their character evolved reflecting the strategies adopted by the group. It started as a 
purely Polish gathering of a strongly integrated and not very numerous group of EU officials 
in a Belgian bar (“Chez Bernard”). As the group grew, meetings were progressively 
becoming more anonymous, but still kept the character of integrative meetings, with people 
sitting around tables in dedicated areas of Irish pubs (“Old Oak” and then “Wild Geese”). At 
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a certain point, the EU officials opted for a more “expat place”, “Aloft”, much more 
expensive (and thus exclusive in terms of frequentation), with a lot of open space 
encouraging interaction with other expats.  The choice and character of places selected for 
construction of social spaces corresponded with the types of boundaries that structured these 
spaces: Irish pubs did not have a local character, they were not really much more Irish than 
Belgian and thus they constituted a “neutral”, “cosmopolitan” space, slightly like Brussels, 
well suited to be filled with new meanings for a construction of Polish-eurocratic social 
space. Belgium was left behind the door. However, Polish people not working in the EU also 
came to these pubs, as well as Belgians and other migrants. Their possible interference was 
remedied by moving to “Aloft”. In the same time, this new location enabled opening to other 
highly skilled mobile professionals and other (non-Polish) EU officials.  
The virtual spaces of Polish EU officials were subject to similar evolution. The initial 
open forum hosted on the website of a popular daily newspaper. However, in order to prevent 
access of Polish speaking persons not working in the EU institutions, the Polish EU officials 
switched to professional email based google-group (“EPS-list”). This virtual space is 
dedicated to life in Brussels and related practical advice, but also enables discussions on 
general issues and various forms of interaction. In no way can it be considered as a refuge for 
homesick people trying to feel like in the “old country”.   
4.2. The perception of the host environment: Poles in Brussels, local society and space  
One of my respondents, inquired about integration in Brussels, answered with a question: 
what actually is there to integrate with? This question – approached from the perspective of 
my research participants - is a good point of departure for my reflection on the integration of 
the Polish EU officials in Brussels. What is their perception of the local context (the city), the 
local society and its different segments?  
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As my research concerned exclusively the Polish EU officials and I have not made 
independent studies on different communities inhabiting Brussels I will focus on the way my 
respondents understand “local” while referring to the “local culture”, the “local society”, etc. 
Although the perceptions of my interviewees and respondents slightly vary (as it can be read 
between the lines of the accounts below), the most common understanding of “the local” 
seems to refer to the “core” of the Belgian society, thus French and Dutch speaking 
Europeans.  
However, the host environment is not limited to the locals (in the sense: Belgians). 
Special attention must be paid to Poles inhabiting Brussels and to other expatriates or EU 
officials, to see if, as Eriksen (2007) mentioned it, my research participant can be tempted to 
integrate to the “Gemeinschaft” rather than to the “Gesellschaft”, for instance a Polish ethnic 
community. 
4.2.1. Brussels 
For the analysis of the adaptation, integration or identifications of Polish EU officials in 
Brussels, it appears necessary to also take into account the specific character of the city (its 
international, expat oriented character; difficulty to define the meaning of “the local”; 
complex linguistic issues with English as expatriates’ language) as yet another factor 
enabling creation and maintenance of boundaries between the local population and 
international strata of the city. 
4.2.1.1. Perception of Brussels: before and after arrival  
In the collective consciousness of Europeans, Brussels stands above all for the capital of 
Europe, more than a capital of Belgium (Shore 2000:154; Bellier 2002:78; Favell 2008a:46). 
This perception is likely to be even more natural if one settles in the city in order to work in 
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the EU institutions. The attitude to Brussels certainly affects adaptation and integration of 
expatriates and EU officials settling in the city. I assumed that the trajectory of these attitudes 
might also be relevant: whether it is the way from great expectations to disappointment, 
distaste and ultimate rejection or, on the contrary, from a negative stereotype to discovery of 
unexpected strengths and opportunities (or any shade of grey inbetween).  
During my former research (Rozanska 2009), I inquired my respondents about their 
perception of Brussels, before and after the settlement in order to examine to what extent 
their preconceptions have changed. The previous study revealed that the majority of the 
respondents initially had some views about Brussels. Out of those who declared having no 
opinion at the outset, four oficials have developed a positive attitude to Brussels, while two 
persons have evolved into a negative attitude out of a neutral or inexistent one. The officials 
having a prior view on the city counted both those (six persons) who declared having 
originally a positive image of Brussels, which had subsequently turned into a negative one 
and those (four persons) who evolved into a positive attitude out of an originally negative 
one. Four further respondents out of this group maintained their initially positive perception. 
If the respondents who had only a very general opinion on the city before their settlement 
often used positive imaginaries to describe it, such as “the capital of Europe”, “the heart of 
Europe”, “international city”, “a cosmopolitan city” or “a big metropolis”, those who had 
already visited Brussels expected, at the arrival, an “awful, small, dirty”, “boring”, “strange, 
ugly and unpleasant city”, where “people didn’t want to speak English”. The positive image 
at the arrival gave place to the impressions of a city which is “colourless and boring” 
“stinking, dirty, humid and depressing, where everyday life is difficult and has no charm”, 
“overpopulated by people living out of social security, dirty, badly organized in terms of 
parking facilities, bad customer service”, “overregulated, inefficient on each level of 
administration, managed in incoherent manner by crowd of officials”, “way behind other 
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European capitals (countries) in terms of cleanness, living conditions, quality of services, etc. 
(quality of life in general)”. By contrast, officials whose opinion was initially negative or 
neutral often happened to change their mind and see Brussels as “nice to live”, very 
comfortable to live, with lots of calm and green areas but still with many opportunities, “nice 
city, with lots of interesting places and nice, smiling people”, “my hometown”. Some 
respondents, were surprised with its size and the atmosphere of a small town.  
Three years later, I asked the same questions to the new research group. Seven out of 
30 respondents admitted that their perception of Brussels had evolved towards a more 
negative one. In certain cases, the criticism expressed was pretty strong. In case of one 
respondent, it focused on the functioning of public authorities: “I am disappointed with the 
Belgian administration and the way things are dealt with (high taxes,155 high unemployment, 
lack of safety in Brussels)”. Two other respondents pointed at the poor security of the capital 
city: “I thought it was an interesting place to live in. I was disappointed by the lack of 
security and the level of crime in the city”. In case of some others, it did not refer to any 
particular aspect of Belgian reality, but referred to a contrast with higher expectations they 
had come with: “Then, THE heart of Europe (in every aspect). Now, changed a lot; nothing 
special”. Someone complained, that he had expected a “bigger and more developed town”. 
Another respondent stated that he thought “Brussels, and Belgium more in general, is much 
better organised as regards different services”, while “the reality proved somewhat different”. 
He added he “also didn’t expect that there are so many tensions between the Flemish and the 
Wallonians”.  
Needless to add that these opinions should not be considered as a source of 
information about Brussels as such, and do not even necessarily need to reflect the actual 
experience of my respondents. However, they correspond to their perception of the place they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Although the EU officials do not pay the Belgian income tax on their salaries (instead, they pay a tax directly 
to the EU budget), they do pay other Belgian taxes, like VAT (including on real property), vehicle tax, 
household tax, etc. 
!212!
inhabit. This perception may be based on the difference between the expectations and their 
actual impression of the reality, on comparisons with what they remember as the situation in 
places where they lived or visited before (and that they consider as a relevant point of 
reference), on accounts of other people (e.g., colleagues from their institutions) or on press 
and media reports (and the Polish EU officials, as my research has shown, do follow the 
events in Belgium, at least to a certain extent). Those who have never had intensive 
interaction with Belgian people, could forge their opinion on e.g., the relations between the 
linguistic “communities” in Brussels on the basis of the lengthy and mediatic conflict around 
the proposed split of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral circuit generating loads of harsh 
reciprocal criticim between the politicians of the two linguistic groups.  
Poor organisation, low level of services and the lack of safety constitute a recurring 
reason for criticism, although they are sometimes outweighed with the easygoing nature of 
the inhabitants and the international character of the city. One respondent wrote: “I thought it 
is a multilingual and multicultural environment and this has been confirmed. I expected 
Bxl156 to be safer than it is. I am also surprised on how low is the level of services (in 
general) offered to consumers (banks, restaurants, public transport, telephony, etc.)”. Another 
one, in the same vein, confessed: “I expected Brussels to be better organized, cleaner (used to 
live in Germany before). I didn’t consider the bad weather aspect which seems to be quite 
crucial for me right now. I knew it would be international”. It should be mentioned that the 
negative perception of the quality of services in Brussels was shared by the huge majority of 
the participants. Most of them, as it was mentioned before, had international experience 
before coming to Belgium. Some of my research participants previously lived in the UK, 
Germany, France or Italy. However, also for participants coming to Belgium directly from 
Poland the difference in quality of services was striking. Many lived, at least for some time, 
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in Warsaw, which is a bigger city than Brussels and which has, over the last years, 
substantially developed or refurbished its infrastructure and curbed criminality.  
One woman was surprised both in a positive and in a negative manner:  
I thought it was a nice city and this perception has not changed. I was only surprised to see 
that Belgians are quite relaxed, open to other people and they like to enjoy/taste their life. 
And this is reflected in Brussels. I only expected that the city, in particular services, would be 
better organized.  
 
However, one respondent seemed to have serious doubts even as concerns the 
multicultural aspect: “I didn’t have a clear idea, besides being multicultural city. It’s more 
segregated than I thought (different groups – EU, Belgians, immigrants from Maghreb and 
Congo – not mingling too much) and less safe”. 
Another research participant who admitted having mixed feelings referred to tolerance 
on one side and the lack of safety on the other: 
Before coming to Brussels, I just saw the city centre on postcards. After coming here, I 
discovered the city in depth, and I find it very diverse architecturally and culturally. On one 
side it’s a very tolerant and well developing, and on the other rather filthy and might give the 
impression of being dangerous. 
 
A number of respondents (12) simply said that they had no previous knowledge about 
Brussels at the moment of arrival. Seven of them did not share any information concerning 
their first and subsequent impressions. Those who did (two), told “positive” stories, although 
with a bit of criticism: “I did not think much of Brussels before coming here. Since coming 
here, I have realised that BXL is a nice place to live, although it would be a very provincial 
EU capital if it wasn’t for the EU and NATO being headquartered here”. One of the female 
participants confessed:  
I did not know huge amounts about Brussels before coming – I knew it was fairly small and 
very international in terms of people who lived and worked here. Once I settled here, I 
realised that it was a very comfortable place to be (possibility to walk to work; very good 
standard of living as compared to other big capitals – affordable great food and beautiful 
flats). What surprised me, in comparison to living in the UK, that foreigners often live here as 
if in an “international bubble” and do not assimilate and become “part” of the country (in 
terms of closely following the politics and other developments, knowing a lot of local people) 
as it usually is the case in other countries.  
 
Interestingly, one woman from this sub-group stated that even though she “knew the place 
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more”, she “still often feel[s] [she]’s living on ‘Europlanet’ rather than Brussels”.  
Finally, several respondents (four) had had clearly negative pre-conceptions about 
Brussels which have subsequently evolved into a positive view. One of the men put it in a 
following manner: “before: boring western city, far, far away. Now: a melting pot, a lot of 
opportunities to meet new people, city which “never sleeps”, every day there is something 
new to see”. Another respondent had even been ready to face difficulties which luckily failed 
to materialise: “I was expecting some problems everyone warned me against, but personally 
everything went well, so if my perception has changed it was from neutral to very positive”. 
More importantly, certain respondents (3) had visited Brussels before their 
appointment and got a very negative impression of Brussels at their first contact with the city. 
This impression subsequently was replaced by a more positive assessment. One of the 
respondents said:  
My first impressions of Brussels were from a 6-week traineeship in 1999. I remembered 
Brussels as somewhat grey and dirty, slightly depressing. But my perception has changed 
completely since we settled here (first for a brief period of one year 2004-2005, interrupted by 
a 3-year stay in Luxembourg, and back to Brussels in 2008). I consider Brussels to be a very 
pleasant city to live in. 
 
Similarly, one of the male participants recalled:  
I knew Brussels a bit before (I had a stage here in 2004). First impressions were not too 
positive (dirty, a lot of construction works going on, weather…) but after some [time] I think 
everybody can discover one’s own place. In fact every district has its ambience, and there is a 
lot of difference among them, so there is something for everybody.  
 
One female respondent with no preconceived ideas about Brussels prior to arrival, referred to 
her first impression and the subsequent evolution: “I knew nothing about it; I was a bit 
shocked after getting out at the Central Station but now I really like it”.  
Altogether, the number of respondents having negative pre-conceptions subsequently 
changed after arrival is roughly similar to the number of those who felt disappointed after 
settling in Brussels. Most of the respondents expected the city to be international, 
multicultural and cosmopolitan: (“I thought it is a multilingual and multicultural environment 
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and this has been confirmed”; “I knew it will be international”), and only a few were 
subsequently disappointed on this particular point. On the other hand, many expected the city 
to be better organized and offering better quality of services. Those who had negative 
preconceptions usually perceived Brussels to be “boring”, “dirty” and “gloomy”.  
4.2.1.2. Book of complaints and compliments about Belgium 
Once in Belgium, my respondents have developed differing attitudes to the country, enjoying 
certain aspects and suffering from others. I was interested in these attitudes, as factors 
potentially contributing to their relationship with the city and hence – their adaptation.  
I asked the same question during my previous research (Rozanska 2009), three years 
earlier. The feature considered as the major advantage of Brussels by the highest number of 
respondents was its central location followed by “multicultural environment” or 
“international environment” or a similar concept. Many persons referred also to work in the 
EU institutions and higher salaries, as well as the quality of life, (notably the “relax way of 
living”, availability of quality food and green areas), higher standard of living and “friendly” 
and “open-minded” people. However, one might wonder whether these last observations 
referred to all inhabitants of Brussels or only to the international strata of the city, given that, 
as evidenced elsewhere, the contact of EU officials with Belgians was rather limited.  
As to the disadvantages, respondents usually referred to poor quality of services, 
“shops’ opening hours”, “generally poor living conditions” or weather. Many persons 
mentioned homesickness and distance from friends and family.  
During the current research, I asked the new respondents about the three most positive 
and the three most negative aspects of the city. As to the advantages, as much as 20 out of 30 
persons referred to the geographical location of Belgium. Explanations were very brief and 
focused on the central location in Europe, easy access to other European destinations and 
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good transport connections. Although this advantage does not relate specifically to 
opportunities offered by Brussels, but rather to easy access to opportunities offered by other 
countries, one of the respondents referred also to the fact that Belgium is a “small country – 
you can get to the seaside/mountains in less than 2 hrs.” It is interesting that most of the 
positive opinions focused on the aspects which are typically important to expatriates.157 The 
strategic location of Brussels is an important advantage if one reasons in one- or two-years 
perspective, but it would nevertheless be unusual for most of the people looking for the place 
to settle permanently to consider the opportunities for weekend travelling as an important 
criterion. This may be explained by the fact that most of my respondents had lived in 
Belgium only for a couple of years. Also my husband and I, as well as many of our friends 
employed in the institutions, travelled frenetically during the first couple of years, visiting 
probably every cathedral in the perimeter of 300 kilometers. But since then, the urge to 
“profit” from the travelling opportunities offered by the new location has faded away. 
Twelve respondents referred to the multicultural character of the city, although they 
worded it in various manners: sometimes referring to it directly (“multiculturalism of 
Brussels”; “multicultural environment with lots of things going on”), other referred to its 
“international” aspect (“very international (mostly thanks to institutions)”; “international 
atmosphere”) or to the presence of expats and foreigners (“large expat community”; “it’s easy 
to be a foreigner in Brussels”, more indirectly: “easy access to ‘exotic’ things – like music, 
culture, food”). As Adrian elaborated on this topic during the interview:  
[the advantage of living in Brussels is related] probably to multiculturalism, and above all to 
the presence of expats. Or also this, for instance, that I can go to Ethiopian restaurant or that I 
live close to a pizzeria run by Sicilians, or that I have easy access to Japanese sushi. It offers 
me a greater opportunity to choose, so it also gives me a wider access to culture of different 
countries, it is for sure also very interesting. (Adrian) 
 
Again, the importance attached to the international, “cosmopolitan” character of Brussels 
may suggest the attitude of my respondents to integration: they are definitely more interested 
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in the adaptation to the city with its multi-cultural inhabitants than in any kind of deeper 
integration with Belgians. Again, the formulations they used while describing the advantages 
of Brussels read as if they were describing some kind of Disneyland, focusing on leisure 
activities and the possibility of living among affluent foreigners – which is a perfectly 
legitimate perspective but, again, rather characteristic for expatriates.  
However, the foreigners-friendly climate was also sometimes attributed to the 
character of Belgians. According to one of the women, Brussels is “easy to settle, given a 
number of other international employees in Brussels, and given great language skills of 
Belgians and their apparent patience with all the incoming foreigners”. Another female 
respondent referred to “tolerant and open people”, one of the men to “liberal society”, while 
yet another one praised a “tolerant, open society, at least in Brussels”. Perceived strengths of 
the Belgian nature were not limited to their tolerance and the attitude towards foreigners: one 
person considered that “Belgians are relaxed and easy going”, while the woman who praised 
the city for its “tolerant and open people” also added that “most people are helpful and 
friendly”.  
In line with the findings of Favell (2008a:126-129; 2001a:39-49), a significant 
number of respondents (eight) quoted the “quality of life” as one of the most important 
strengths of living in Brussels.158 Such references included “relatively high standard and 
comfort of living”, or “high quality of life, at least for me and people I know”. Some Polish 
EU officials elaborated slightly more, explaining what they meant: “comfort of life - bigger 
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158 Favell uses this term with regard to the relation between the cost of living on one hand and the services, 
opportunities and other benefits the place of living offers on the other (2008a:120). In fact, as the research 
performed by the scholar shows, the respondents considered the city as very affordable (in comparison to other 
European cities) and, in the same time, boasting good facilities, with quality cultural life, well developed public 
transport, easy access to work and outside the city and “village-like, yet wholly urbane, cosmopolitan city 
lifestyle” (Favell 2008a:120). Moreover, “the location of the city [was perceived] as a huge factor in their 
happiness with the city” (Favell 2008a:52). However, as he further suggests, in case of EU fonctionnaires, it is 
not really the quality of life which attracts them to Brussels, but rather the lucrative and secure terms of their 
employment and their “commitment to working for the EU” (Favell 2001a:35). This is what might result in a 
weaker engagement of EU officials with the city, as compared to other “free movers” (Favell 2001a:35).  
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apartments, less blocks of flats, smaller city, easier to get around (compared to Warsaw)”; 
“very good standard of living (affordable great food and beautiful apartments) – cheaper than 
some other big capitals”. Some people, although they did not explicitly refer to “quality” or 
“standard of living”, mentioned elements normally perceived as their components, such as 
“spectacular homes at affordable prices”; “relatively cheap accommodation costs (renting) in 
comparison to other European capitals (London, Paris, Madrid, even Warsaw)” and, more 
generally, indicating that “prices are relatively low (comparing to many other European 
capitals)”. In the same vein, some respondents (four) appreciated the variety of cultural 
opportunities offered by the city (“lots of cultural events (cinema, concerts, etc.)”), despite a 
relatively non-metropolitan character (“all the life and culture of a capital yet pleasant to live 
as if in a much smaller city”; “Brussels - a big capital with a very local feel. Closeness of 
shops, cultural venues. One has everything needed, however, without the stress of a very big 
city”). Only three persons referred to the international importance of Brussels, calling it a 
“centre of Europe” or a “governing centre of Europe” or stressing that the “EU institutions 
are here”. One of the male respondents pointed at the presence of a “strong Polish 
community” – again, it is quite characteristic that only one person referred to this factor 
which is often decisive in choosing destination by ordinary migrants. 
On the other hand, the majority of the respondents (17 out of 30) complained about 
the quality of services in Belgium (“poor commercial services”; “low quality of many 
services, including customer service”; “poor level of services while they are pretty 
expensive”; “very expensive services for zero quality!”). As one of the women developed: 
“fairly low service provision culture – applying to the administration too. E.g., needing to 
take a day off work in order to wait for an electrician or phone, gas company employee or a 
postman with a recommended parcel, etc.” Interestingly, more than a half of the respondents 
who praised the quality of life in Belgium also criticised the quality of services – apparently 
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this aspect of Belgian reality did not, in their view, significantly affect the quality of life. 
Slightly less (15 persons) complained about the weather in Brussels (qualified with 
such adjectives as “unpredictable”, “bad” or “depressive”). Another “objective” feature of 
Belgium which was often (7) quoted among its disadvantages was its distance from Poland 
(“it’s 1.400 km from my home town and my family”; “far from home”; “distance to relatives 
in Poland”). Some respondents also mentioned “cultural distance”. The others (although a 
clear minority) referred to the character of Belgian people as a significant nuisance. One of 
them mentioned “mentality of Belgians”, someone else complained about “egoistic people”. 
More specifically, two respondents criticised the Belgian sense of order (“visible differences 
to German Ordnung”; “poor organizational skills of Belgians”). Reference was also made to 
the ugliness of the capital city (“Brussels is dirty and ugly”; “Brussels is ugly + the Belgian 
countryside is spoilt”), political situation (“uncertain future status / resolved 
linguistic/cultural conflicts”; “completely incomprehensible political system. Governmental 
instability - possibility of Belgium divided in half”), perceived economic decline (“economic 
and political stagnation”; “limited professional perspectives”), and incompetent 
administration (“difficult relations with local administration and businesses”; “bad public 
administration – dangerous, not well organized (compared to Germany where I lived 
before)”, “lengthy public administration”; “complex/non-user friendly administration – e.g., 
when needing to register, or pay taxes, or deal with the commune about anything else”). 
4.2.1.3. Criticism regarding the local “reality”   
During my previous research (Rozanska 2009), I investigated the respondents’ assessment of 
the local reality by the Polish EU officials. Most of them (27 out of 30) believed that the 
Polish EU community was critical towards the local reality. The explanations advanced were 
either dismissive of this critisism (“because Polish community is critical about anything”), or 
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full of understanding (“cause they are not stupid”).  
Some of my respondents suggested at that time that this critical attitude is due to “the 
inferiority complex”, or that it is “a way of compensating complexes”, other explained it by 
the lack of understanding of the local reality, as a result of the separation from the Belgian 
society and the encapsulation in the own Polish EU institutions’ bubble. Finally, some 
respondents formulated a similar idea, suggesting that the critical attitude was related to the 
“difficulties to adapt to a new environment”.  
According to my respondents, the Polish EU civil servants complained about such 
phenomena as dirty streets, bad services, closing hours, food, weather and the state of public 
infrastructure. Their perception certainly corresponded with the opinions expressed directly 
by my respondents themselves. One of the respondents suggested that the criticism might be 
due to a “different historical background of the local society” while “free market and 
unrestrained civil freedoms are perhaps much more cherished in PL, as reintroducing them 
has been a historic effort”.  
Not all of the officials noticed this criticism. Some respondents expressed opposite 
views, stressing the difference between “opinions” and “criticism”; or claiming that “the 
cultural activities are appreciated ... : concerts, street festivals etc”.  
When I asked the same question during the present research to the new group, the 
results proved broadly concurrent. Out of 30 persons interrogated about whether their Polish 
fellows were critical towards the local reality, roughly two-thirds of all respondents 
considered that this was the case. Three groups can be distinguished among those who 
confirmed: those who shared this allegedly negative perception of Belgium and Belgians, 
those who criticised the negative attitude and those who simply reported the existence of the 
phenomenon, without giving their personal opinion. Some of the opinions belonging to the 
first group were indeed formulated as very sharp criticism (“this country doesn’t function 
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properly, going to the doctor, dealing with administration, landlords is really complicated - 
people see it and hence the criticism”), some others disclosed the reason of the critical 
attitude of the other in a manner translating sympathy for these views (“because they had 
memories of the good, quality services, life and people from Poland and partially from US 
and UK”; “they are not happy with services in BE,159 shops closing 10 minutes before they 
should, lack of flexibility of Belgian services providers, etc.”). More respondents, however, 
reported the critical attitude of other Poles with some distaste and more or less explicit 
rejection of such an attitude: “Belgium bashing is a very popular activity among the 
foreigners, including Poles. Often it’s exaggerated to absurd levels”; “I think we, Poles, 
generally like to complain and be critical. Even if objectively we don’t have a good reason to 
do so”. As one of the participants observed, “a lot of them ... complain a lot about Belgium 
and Belgians. Usually, however, they don’t have closer relations with them besides the 
commercial or administrative ones.” Someone else remarked: “I often hear that it is better in 
Poland, shops, cleanliness, etc., while I can clearly see it is just the opposite.” Another 
respondent explained:  
They are often very quick to criticize everything from the start (comparing it unfavourably to 
what you can buy or what service quality you can get in Poland) without trying to understand 
the local reality at least partly. Also they tend to focus on some (critical/negative) aspects 
only while failing to notice areas where Poland is clearly lagging behind (e.g., the access to 
and the quality of health care). They are often objectively right, but it annoys me when people 
are in a very negative mindset from the moment of arriving in a country which they know 
very little about.  
 
 The quality of services was a recurring theme, almost all criticism-sympathetic and 
neutral respondents referred to the quality of services. In fact, this is the part of Belgium 
many of them know best, as this is, in some cases, the only moment where they interact with 
the locals. On the other hand, many criticism-critical persons suggested, implicitly, that the 
critical attitude might originate from complexes: “they are quite often acting as if they would 
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159 Belgium. 
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be from NY160 or other big city with the best weather and not e.g., from Radom or another 
village”.  
 As to those who simply reported on the phenomenon without assessing it, the 
following opinions could be found: “many Polish people working for the EU do not like 
Brussels in general. They think it is filthy, the people are not sympathetic, the metro is dirty, 
that it is dangerous, that there are not enough places to go out, not enough cultural venues 
etc.”; “people tend to complain all the time about the EC,161 the weather, the country lacking 
a government, Belgians etc.”. Another female respondent clearly pointed at the “security 
situation, [and again at the] level of services in Belgium”.  
Finally, the minority of respondents denied that the Poles are critical towards the local 
reality: “sometimes we exchange the similar stories about having had to wait for a gas 
company employee for a whole day or the inefficiency of the local commune, but I would not 
call it being critical”. 
4.2.2. Polish communities in Brussels: one or more?  
The community of Polish EU officials in Brussels had its actual origins in the virtual space, 
notably, in an open access forum of Gazeta Wyborcza (this was shortly after passing the 
competition, when there were still not that many Poles in the EU institutions) and then, on a 
“closed” Google “EPS” list with access enabled only to Polish EU institutions employees 
(Rozanska 2009,  2011). The first of these networks, had made it possible to use pseudonyms 
(nick names). By contrast, in order to have access to the “EPS” list, Polish EU institutions’ 
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160 New York. 
161 European Commission. 
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employees, had to use their official, work email addresses. In that way, random “invaders” 
were excluded.162 
As suggested by Blackshaw and Fielding-Lloyd, “the Internet does not provide a 
separate reality or necessarily detract from our social contact with others, but typically serves 
to supplement existing relationships” (2010:109). In case of the Polish EU community in 
Brussels, it also served as a starter, a catalyst. Different forms of socializing in virtual space 
were swiftly transposed in the real life, notably in the form of monthly meetings in one of the 
Irish pubs in the Schuman area, but also through some other forms of cultural and social 
activities, including those in smaller circles (see Rozanska 2009:163-169; 2011:293). !
It must be noted that certain authors consider that there is one single Polish 
community163 in Belgium (Paspalanova 2006; Kuźma 2010). The opposite view is 
represented, for example, by Lambrecht (2007). My initial assumption was that a single, 
integrated, homogenous community of Poles in Brussels did not exist. This conclusion was 
based on the existing literature on the Polish economic migrants (see e.g., Grzymała-
Kazłowska 2005)164 and on my previous research on the Polish EU officials (Rozanska 
2009).  
However, I wanted to confirm it and verify if this situation had not evolved over the 
years separating the two studies on the Polish EU institutions’ community (or perhaps only 
the Polish EU officials, should the situation have changed).  
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162 This was particularly important in the light of the previous experiences of the group with the open mailing 
list that was “invaded” by often verbally aggressive compatriots, mainly the economic migrants from the 
Podlasie region) (see Rozanska 2009:147-155; 2011:290).!
163 I develop on the notion of community in section 2.1. 
164 As Grzymała-Kazłowska observes, still before Poland’s accession to the EU, “the ‘official’ Polish 
community, predominantly made up of educated individuals performing prestigious jobs, distance[d] itself from 
newcomers undertaking illegal employment and performing unskilled labour” (2005:677). As she further 
argues, “documented Polish residents and Belgians of Polish origin are well integrated into Belgian society, 
although they sometimes maintain their Polish identity and form their own ethnic associations which are 
virtually closed to undocumented migrants” (ibid). She is even pointing at “the public hostility of the ‘official’ 
Polonia towards undocumented Polish workers” (ibid).   Moreover, as Grzymała-Kazłowska suggests, there are 
strong divisions even amongst the Polish workers as regards their region of origins – in this case, amongst the 
Poles from Podlasie and Lubelszczyzna (2001b:54).  !
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Indeed, it appears that there are still two or even more separate circles, which 
according to Jeremi are “totally different worlds”. The first one – largely organised around 
the Polish church in Brussels - consists of labour workers (see e.g., Leman 1997, 2000; 
Siewiera 1995; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005). This “world” is very much present in the 
testimonies of my respondents, perceived as something completely different and strange, the 
otherness of which inspires the feeling of distinctiveness of the community of EU officials. 
As, indeed, my respondents usually saw themselves as a community apart.  
Only one respondent, Zofia, believed that there was one Polish community in 
Belgium:  
I think there is a Polish community in Belgium. There is a Polish church. A lot of people go to 
the Polish church and across all kinds of categories and classes ... We have now two 
newspapers: Gazetka and Nowinki, I think it’s the other one that is a bit more new and those 
also Polish people read … across categories. I was in April this year, … or in May at this 
“The Pole of the year” event. [This event has been organised] for six or seven years … There 
are five categories: social, business, art, young talent and I don’t know what’s the fifth 
one165… . So, it’s a big event, indeed, at the Theatre St. Michel and it gathered plenty of 
Polish but also Belgian people. It was transmitted via TV Polonia and so I was there. And I 
think, there is really this kind of feeling of belonging, because there were also Polish people 
from outside of Brussels, like this very old emigration that came to work in the carbon mines 
… There was one man that even got this prize or a very young girl of 16 years old, who lives 
somewhere in Antwerp and she sings in Polish, Flemish, French, English. She sings in all the 
languages and she got the Young Talent Prize. So I think also with this kind of events it 
creates some kind of feeling that there is a Polish community; and I think it’s a very strong 
community and ... very visible here; and now even in the local elections, we have Polish 
candidates. And I think it’s a community that has quite a good image amongst Belgians, I 
think so. Comparing to, I don’t know, Maghrebians or Africans, sometimes I think they still 
see us as really Europeans like the Italian community, or the Portuguese, Spanish that is very 
old here. The Polish one is also starting to be like that. (Zofia) 
 
Others, with regret, observed that although there are a lot of Poles in Belgium, or 
specifically in Brussels, there is no organised and self-conscious community (e.g., Otylia, 
Beniamin). This, according to Otylia, contrasts with the situation of other nationalities that 
have strongly distinctive communities in Belgium. Also Ksawery pointed out:  
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165 The competition is organised by the Council of the Polish Community in Brussels with the collaboration of 
the Section Consulaire de l’Ambassade de la République de Pologne au Royaume de Belgique and the following 
organisations: Polish Emigration and Polish Expat Network (PEN). The prizes are awarded in the following 
categories: Culture; Business; Social Engagement; Le Prix de la Polonia; Le Prix des Internautes. 
http://www.polakroku.be/a-propos-du-concours/ , accessed November 12, 2015. 
! 225!
There is a problem of lacking of cultural identification and this is also valid for the 
community of EU officials from Poland, but it’s also a problem for the rest of the Polish 
migrants who came and work here in Belgium. (Ksawery) 
 
As he added:  
And I think that the problem existed and exists, but probably with time and with different 
waves of migration and backgrounds of people who come and with more channels of 
communication and interaction with those groups, we perceive the Polish minority as a whole 
and as kind of homogenous community. (Ksawery) 
 
He found it important to  
first of all recognize its existence and value, … [to] recognize that this community can bring a 
lot to Belgium and to Europe, and also that this community needs certain rights that should be 
respected by others and that kind of understanding is growing and this kind of interaction and 
different group of migrants help each other in recognizing this kind of need and necessity. 
(Ksawery) 
 
Most of my respondents pointed at differences between different groups of Polish 
people in Brussels, suggesting the existence of two or more communities.  
This distinction was referred to for instance by Dominika: 
I think there are two [communities] in fact. I think there is one and that’s the people working 
in the EU institutions … and I think that the officials do not mix that easily with Poles who 
don’t work in the EU institutions, so it’s like two circles, I mean, all the Poles who are here 
for a very long period, I mean longer than those who came here with accession and onwards. 
It’s a completely different milieu than the Poles who came here with the enlargement. 
(Dominika) 
 
Some made a distinction between the inside and the outside of the Commission, and 
point to a strong inside Polish community with its own support system (mailing list). Some 
others, like Maksymilian, observed that there was a kind of a “mainstream community”, 
although “not everybody is meant to be in it”: 
I think there is a community of Polish EU officials and “expats” and maybe there are also 
other communities, I don’t know. And definitely now all Polish EU officials or Polish 
“expats” belong to this community. But I have the impression there is a kind of a central 
[community], I mean, it is not that there are many small communities, which have nothing to 
do with each other, but there is some kind of mainstream community, but not everybody is 
meant to be in it - I’m not for example. (Maksymilian) 
 
Patrycja, and Ula seemed to subscribe to the idea outlined by Maksymilian and 
claimed that, rather than speaking of larger communities, one can observe the existence of 
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small integrated communities inside the rather atomised group of Polish people living in 
Brussels: 
I wouldn’t really call it a community, the third community is less strong, it’s just the link of 
people working in the Commission and in the institutions, we’re just connected with each 
other via a mailbox discussion group, but it’s not that [strong]. At least I’m not that much 
involved, so I don’t know these people personally, you just write on the group and you get the 
answer. But I think there is a group of people who meet quite regularly. There are some 
meetings, but I’ve never participated in that, so maybe that is another community that is 
stronger than I thought. (Patrycja) 
 
Inside the Commission we have this Polish group that keeps us informed. We ask questions 
and so on and we can always have an advice. Outside, [the EU Commission] I don’t know 
how it looks like. I think they mostly live in families, together. (Ula) 
 
However, some other interviewees referred to larger “communities”, stressing the 
internal integration of these groups. For instance, some of them (like Zofia cited above) 
emphasized the advanced level of organisation of the Polish economic migrants’ community, 
quoting the role of Polish newspapers (Gazetka166 and Nowinki167) or cultural events such as 
for instance the “Pole of the year”,168 (or even Polish shops) as important tools of maintaining 
the Polish community.  
I think this is because there are some magazines or some events that I saw that they exist, I 
see them and okay, when I see such a magazine, I take it just to have a look what’s happening 
or … what issues bother Polish people living here or what advise they can have to each other 
… yes, so I think there is [the Polish community]. I don’t feel very strongly involved in it and 
I’m not following it very closely. (Emilia)  
 
I would say there are two Polish communities. Well, let’s be frank. Both are well organised. 
Finally, Gazetka, etc., Polish shops – this is alive. The contest for “the Pole of the year”. 
There is the Polish Community and there is also the community of “expats” from the 
institutions, sometimes strongly linked with the Permanent Representation which organises 
the events. (Filip) 
 
Others emphasized the role of the Polish Embassy (this was especially important in 
the context of the old Polish immigration who had arrived long before the labour migrants 
wave) or of the Club of Polish Women in Brussels (Brukselski Klub Polek - BeKaP). Yet 
others pointed at the crucial role of the “EPS” mailing list and monthly meetings, but this in 
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166 http://gazetka.be !
167 http://nowinki.be !
168 !http://www.polakroku.be/a-propos-du-concours/. 
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the context of the community of Polish EU officials. The second group (EU officials together 
with other Polish “expats”) were sometimes seen as “strongly linked with the Permanent 
Representation” (Filip).  
Finally, it seems that a certain genuine feeling of distinctiveness, almost hostility 
towards members of other groups, was also an element contributing to the emergence of the 
communities: 
No [there is no homogenous Polish community in Brussels]. It depends on a person. Some 
maintain contacts only with the persons who are here on diplomatic positions, a kind of high-
life, but I rather do not classify people this way. For me, a doctor is important, but the man 
who makes windows, for example, is equally important, if it is a person who is valuable as a 
human being. But there are persons who maintain [contact] only within their own group and 
these people do not necessarily interrelate, as this is the same problem that I had at the very 
beginning, that these people were simply from another planet and we had nothing in common 
with each other. And there were constant conflicts, as they appreciated me only if they could 
use my knowledge of French … [to] arrange something. And I helped them, for instance, to 
obtain a paper, to arrange for schools, etc. But once I was not useful anymore, [their] 
comments were so scandalous, you know ... That is why I say that these people were scum. 
And such people are still here and you can’t do anything about it. So, there is no such a thing 
as one community. Even if there are some big, common events, the people who come do not 
maintain daily contact with each other. (Laura) 
 
Concerning the typology of such different communities, Kamil distinguished four 
different categories of Poles, including, next to the two most common ones, the old Polonia 
and a separate category of students and “expats” who, according to him “tend to mix rather 
with EU officials than others.” As Kamil recounts: 
No. I think there are three distinct communities or even four, and they do not have necessarily 
a lot in common and at least, and for sure they do not share the common institutions and 
common objectives and ideas. So there is the first one which is maybe now not very large, but 
it used to be important – the old Polonia let’s say, with their own … long established 
institutions. Then you have the fresh wave of the nineties and this decade workers to work in 
the cheap labour market here and they don’t have any institutions basically, besides shops and 
bars and the church. And then you have the officials - in the Commission and the Parliament 
and staff like that. They have their own kind of institutional ways of socializing including a 
mailing list and those meetings, plus of course, they share the same institutions and then you 
have other people: “expats” and students for example, which do not belong to neither of these 
categories and they are kind of apart, but I think that “expats” and students tend to mix rather 
with EU officials than others. (Kamil) 
 
Darek attempted some typology of the Poles in Brussels, adding short characteristics: 
I think that the Poles are well divided … You have all this crowd of Poles from Siemiatycze – 
this is a very big group – then, I don’t know, how it is ... Certainly it is sub-divided in the way 
that you have, let’s assume, ordinary workers and the entrepreneurs who live somewhere in 
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Kraainem and they have villas – not that all Eurocrats envy these workers, that despite one is 
a worker, he has a villa which is three times bigger than your small flat and some huge car, 
while you cannot afford a small flat out of your work. Then, there is this crowd working in 
the construction sector, and then, there are the Eurocrats. Here, there are two major groups: 
people working in the European Parliament and their assistants. They all keep together and 
this is the first integrated group, which is also subdivided somehow, but rather not along the 
party lines. There are a few political groups, each integrated inside, but they still have 
contacts. Then, there are ordinary Euro-officials, and this is quite a big group, where there are 
coteries. A big group consisting of coteries, in average 10-15 persons having closer contacts 
with each other. Then, there are people employed at the Council and I do not know much 
about them. They are on the side, somehow. They never show up. I have the impression that 
these are older persons with families and they do not have time for such social gatherings. 
Then, there are the Poles from the Representation, from the Embassy - this is yet another 
group. And there are the people from the Representations, from the regions, as well as those 
working in private firms who are not necessarily from Siemiatycze, but from the whole 
Poland. (Darek) 
 
Bernard emphasized that belonging to one or another community did not really 
depend on specific features of Polish persons in Brussels, but mostly on one’s choice (this 
latter idea was supported also by Otylia and, in a way also, by Laura): 
I think it’s impossible to say that there is one [community] and everybody is included. I think 
that Eurocrats, old Eurocrats [first wave] do hang out together. Some of them at least. And 
you can call it a community, I think. And I don’t think that anybody is excluded. It just 
depends on you whether you want to join or not. I think it’s a decision. (Bernard) 
 
No, there are a lot of Polish people, but there is no Polish community, in my opinion. If there 
is, these are very small groups which I have never tried to reach, as I have never had such a 
need. But this is not a strongly integrated community. Other nationalities have strongly 
distinctive communities, and the Poles do not have it really. (Otylia) 
 
As my respondents presented it, the different communities were, nevertheless in 
contact. Provision of services is regarded as a space where the two main Polish communities 
meet. Polish EU officials are often clients of Polish servicemen and Polish shops belonging to 
the group of economic migrants: 
A uniform Polish community? No, I would say there isn’t, as, unfortunately, despite the 
effort, there are a lot of various institutions in Brussels by now, which promote the Polish 
people here in Belgium. There is the Club of Polish women [BeKaP], there are many, many 
institutions. However, I think this is still a group which is divided into the groups of the 
Eurocrats and the remaining emigrants. These two worlds, except where they meet at the 
occasion of the provision of services, are two separate worlds. (Klara) 
 
Based on these accounts, it is quite obvious that, in the perception of the Polish EU 
officials, there is no such thing as “the Polish community in Brussels”. My interlocutors seem 
to understand the notion of “community” as referring to the interactions within the group, but 
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also the feeling of belonging. While looking at definitions of Rapport and Overing (2005:61), 
emphasizing such factor as “common interests” or “a common social system or structure”, it 
seems that, indeed, the authors would agree with my interviewees. There is certainly no 
awareness of “common interests” between the EU officials and economic migrants from 
Podlasie, their contacts are too superficial and unstructured to perceive them as any 
functioning entity (Rapport and Overing 2005:61).  
Independently of the actual attitude of my interviewees towards economic migrants 
and service providers from Podlasie, except for isolated cases, Polish EU officials do not 
maintain intensive contacts with other Poles in the city. Certainly, they sometimes buy their 
services (not all of them, not always and not every type of services, as my research further 
shows), but they socialise among themselves or with other highly skilled movers, sometimes 
including students. They do not seem to form one group with the “old immigration” of Poles 
either. Such a community seems to be limited to the Polish EU officials, kept together 
notably thanks to the “EPS” list, even if the ties are not equally tight throughout the group: 
the EU officials interviewed mentioned different sub-groups, coteries, or the core group of 
“old” Polish officials, not covering all members of the Community. Each of the segments of 
Polish population in Brussels present a certain level of organisation, with the aforementioned 
“EPS” list for the Eurocrats and the Polish dailies for the Podlasie community.  
If today, there is no single Polish community in Brussels, is it likely to change? Is 
there any reason to believe that the Polish officials are likely to choose the path of 
“segmented integration” (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006) within the overall Polish 
population in Brussels? In order to further investigate the mutual relations of the distinct 
communities the existence of which was confirmed by the answers to the previous questions, 
I asked my respondents about the attitudes of the EU officials towards other Polish 
communities. 
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 Some of the interviewees described, as requested in the question, the attitudes of 
other EU officials towards other Poles in Brussels, while others focused on their own 
perception. In both cases, they were expressing personal opinions on the “other Poles”, 
although the sincerity of these affirmations is uncertain. Only a few persons insisted on 
negative features of this community or declared that they kept distance from them. Most of 
the group either directly or indirectly (through criticism of the opposite stand) declared their 
positive attitude. 
According to one of my interviewees, the EU officials hardly know any working class 
Poles in Brussels. However, asked about their contacts with lawyers employed in Brussels 
law firms or other highly skilled Polish professionals, he confirmed:  
Oh, the “halo”? No, those, they know ... I mean, at this level, where people have, let’s say, 
professions requiring higher education and high educational qualifications (but I’m not saying 
that the workers do not need to have high qualifications), these professions, [with them] the 
contacts are good. And with people working in the construction sector, in care services, there 
are nearly no contacts. This has not changed, in my opinion, for the last five years. Five years 
ago, similarly, you knew people from the regions, from lobbying, or else and those who did 
physical work or au pair – less. (Filip) 
 
Some respondents stigmatised the allegedly patronising and elitist attitude of their fellow EU 
officials. Maja, for instance, said cautiously:  
A few times, I happened to notice some kind of mépris … Like the lack of respect for such 
more modest persons, not educated perhaps, who work in cleaning, they said that these people 
should not be paid as much as ten Euro, because they will get used to it and they will ask for 
so much. But this concerned perhaps two persons only, but besides, I don’t know, I can’t say. 
(Maja)  
 
Stanislaw confronted the negative attitude of many Polish EU officials with his own, 
positive one: 
Well, I think that it’s a natural coexistence. You know, I can say for myself and I can say for 
some people. But of course there are a lot of “expats” who are from the same villages and 
they feel much better than the compatriots who are cleaning houses or repairing roof. It’s not 
my style. I’m patriotic in this sense, that I have all my servicemen Polish. Cleaning lady, 
dentist, mechanic, doctor, hairdresser, security, insurance guy, everything.  
How I see my role? I’m earning quite good money. I want to improve Polish economy by 
spending my money in Poland. Spending my money in Poland means to buy goods in Poland 
and giving this money to these “Siemiatycze guys” (and they will bring it to Poland). 
(Stanislaw) 
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Kamil made similar observations:  
About students, I don’t think there are any particular emotions, but regarding those people 
who came here before and who come normally from a kind of a very targeted region in 
Poland, so distinct at least in the language, let’s say, if you consider this like that, then I think 
I’ve observed some kind of “feeling of superiority” or even arrogance of some people towards 
them and this is reflected also in the social divisions, as these groups do not normally mix up. 
Besides, maybe some big events like WOŚP [The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity]169 or 
whatever. But I must say, … I know personally in my kind of close circle of friends, or 
acquaintances … at least two couples which are mixed - I mean EU officials and this 
construction worker for example, so personally, I don’t have any problems with that, but I’ve 
heard sometimes people saying that. (Kamil) 
 
None of these testimonies contained ascription of the feeling of superiority to all EU 
officials, my interlocutors usually made clear that these are only their impressions, based on 
limited experience. 
Laura went even further in expressing her solidarity and chastising some disdainful 
attitude of young Polish EU officials:  
Frankly, we don’t speak about it much, but I don’t think that the Poles, at least those with 
whom I am in contact (as I do not know what is the attitude of these young, conceited persons 
…), they have a very positive attitude towards these people, they think of them similarly to 
how I do. Well, these are persons like us, who probably have not made studies, perhaps are 
not so ambitious, but probably it is much harder for them than for us, as the kids here are 
“snug like a bug in a rug”, and these people deserve respect, as it is much harder for them in 
the Belgian environment, for instance. I often draw people’s attention to the fact that they are 
having everything handed on a plate while those who are on the local labour market are 
terribly discriminated and it is much harder for them and I am very much in favour of the 
Polish private initiative, people founding undertakings and doing pretty well, which is very 
difficult, even for Belgians, while for the foreigners this is terribly difficult. And yet they are 
managing with it, they build houses and their children do well at school. I think that at least 
the people with whom I am in contact have very good attitude to them, for instance this week 
I discovered a new shop with chocolate where a Polish woman works, and immediately after 
the Poles [officials] come back from holidays, I’ll put it on the [mailing] list, we also simply 
promote a bit Polish initiatives outside the institutions, Polish shops, some Polish cultural 
institutions no matter how they are, some Polish contacts, we are not some kind of sick 
patriots, but we try to strengthen the Polish diaspora, to the extent that we even advertise 
local elections and I, for instance, dispatch information concerning people who are candidates 
in local elections, where I don’t live, for example, I don’t live in Etterbeek, so can’t be 
candidate, but I dispatch to my friends who are not on the list, so that they know. It is worth 
asking someone who really wants to do something interesting, thanks to which also the Polish 
diaspora will have a completely different image in their eyes and they will take us seriously, 
perhaps people will be less discriminated because of this, etc., so I think that we have a 
positive attitude to these people. (Laura) 
 
The opinion of Dominika was quite similar: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (GOCC) Foundation is Polish non-governmental, non profit 
organization (for more information: http://www.wosp.org.pl ). 
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I’m not very proud to say that, but I think that officials feel much more valuable and well 
better in short, than most of other Poles living here. Especially of course the construction 
workers and cleaning ladies. I deeply believe it’s not a different category of people, they are  
same Poles, they come from different regions as well, and they just had maybe less chance or 
they made different choices in their lives. (Dominika) 
 
Another group of respondents focused on the fact that the relations between the two 
communities are mainly based on and modelled by commercial exchange. Their opinions 
were free from a somewhat moralising tone of the previously quoted accounts. This is how 
Aleksandra described it: 
I don’t know. Here I can, I suppose, speak on the basis of my personal experience. I think the 
contacts are very often service providers contacts. And I have used services of Polish building 
team or cleaning ladies and I suppose the nationality plays a role, the quality of the work 
played a role. So, I don’t know if it’s evolved, but for me the ones that I have known of – they 
are very positive and I’ve been recommending those people further to other friends. 
(Aleksandra) 
 
The testimony of Klara is somewhat similar:  
[The attitude of the Polish EU civil servants towards the other categories of Polish migrants in 
Brussels is] [v]ery diverse ... I mean the truth is that the contact that the Polish Eurocrats have 
with other Polish migrants is a contact through services provided by cleaning ladies or various 
specialists ... well, construction men, let’s call them like that. So I think these are service 
relations, the Eurocrats are receivers and the other emigrants provide them, and this is 
actually the only existing contact, I think so, although I had friendly relations with my 
cleaning lady who has now left for Poland, but we have children in a similar age and we 
simply met for coffee every Saturday, it was very nice. So, I think this is an individual 
question, whether to transgress the borders of simply providing and receiving services. 
(Klara) 
 
Interestingly, the relations between the Polish Eurocrats and the Polish non-EU 
population is pictured in terms which could very well be applied to relations between the 
“Polish workers” with the non-Polish “expats”, as well as with the autochthones. 
In the same time, both interviewees quoted above also signalled their positive and 
open attitude to the fellow non-EU employed community. This is also the case of Emilia, 
who explained how nationality influenced these commercial relations:  
It’s hard for me to say whether it has changed or not. I think the attitude is … that it’s good to 
have this possibility to work with some of them, like to employ them for some work, mainly 
domestic work. Yeah, I think that the positive thing is that you feel that you give work to a 
Polish person, and also you can communicate easily, or you share sometimes some 
similarities, so I think the attitude is positive. I can’t say, I don’t have any experience that it 
could be the other way. (Emilia) 
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Zofia responded in a similar manner, although she emphasized that her response 
concerned the “economic migrants” only, and not the other groups, such as earlier waves of 
immigration:  
Well, I don’t know, there are many of those who arrived after the war, who have lived here 
for a long time or in the 1980s because of Solidarność, and I think that a lot of people have a 
Polish cleaning lady, would they be the Polish officials or other officials, that’s very typical. 
And sometimes you would even say you’re from Poland, and they immediately say, “oh, I 
have a Polish cleaning lady”, … or, I have got a Polish, you know, construction works 
company for the renovation of the house. So, that are two typical situations.  
I would say I have contacts with them. When we did some works at home, I took a Polish 
company and I was very satisfied with [their work]. I don’t have a cleaning lady at all, but 
maybe I will take a Polish one, I don’t know, I don’t care too much. I sometimes go to a 
Polish shop, where I meet, you know, some people from a bit everywhere, and it’s just 
normal. I think most of the contacts we have are for services ... It’s like an exchange of 
services. Some people go to a Polish hairdresser or even when they are looking for a tailor, 
they would look for a Polish lady, you know, because they are the best, or whatever, I don’t 
know. So I think it’s mainly [around the] services ... And then we have this one exception that 
is this lady who has a library - that through the services, she became a friend I must say so, 
and her whole family here. (Zofia) 
 
References to “provider - customer” relations could be found also in other opinions, 
going beyond this relationship though. Sebastian presented a rather positive picture of 
relations between the two communities, referring even to cases of “mixed” friendships:  
There are two groups of Poles living in Belgium, right? One group is the employees of EU 
institutions and another group: there are simple workers, so there are not that many Poles who 
are somewhere in the middle. There are some, right? In the bank next to the Schuman, there is 
a Polish lady … but, the majority of Poles are simple workers. I don’t have really any 
observations. I don’t think that they are really that patronized that one could be afraid of. I did 
not really observe any such a horrible patronizing instinct or behaviours. I have at least one 
friend ..., an acquaintance who is on this other side - a girl dancing tango whom I meet quite 
regularly - a Polish girl who is not employed by the EU institutions, which means that she is 
just a cleaning lady. Obviously, she has a problem with this. (Sebastian) 
 
Also Beniamin presumed that the relations between the two communities are good, 
although he admitted that he was not really aware of the attitude of the Polish EU officials to 
their compatriots in Brussels:  
Frankly speaking, I have no idea. I mean, I don’t really know what’s the attitude of other 
Polish people or other Polish Eurocrats towards people working in the construction or in 
another work. I think it’s okay. I mean I haven’t heard or noticed anything strange in these 
relations and I think that Polish workers are generally respected in Belgium because of the 
quality of their work, so I think the attitude, if there is any attitude, it’s rather positive than 
negative, but it is difficult for me to say. (Beniamin) 
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Yet it should be observed that not only those interviewees who presented their attitude 
to fellow Poles in the cleaning and construction sector as positive, but sometimes also those 
who, like Sebastian, explicitly claimed that this attitude is generalised among the Polish 
Eurocrats, referred to “patronising” or “a sense of superiority” as attitudes which could be 
expected in this situation. 
Finally, some EU officials indeed expressed rather negative views on their 
compatriots from the cleaning and construction sector living in Brussels. For instance, 
Patrycja said:   
The only thing that I know from people that I speak to is that many of us are ashamed about 
the Polish community here, Polish working class I would call them: dames de titres services 
and the others, because honestly, they are the only people we see on the streets that are drunk. 
I’ve never seen anybody else who was rude and aggressive and drunk, who was not Polish, so 
somehow this makes me feel ashamed. But on the other hand, I think we feel proud about 
positive opinions, because we also know from other foreigners with whom we work that they 
have the best femme de ménage, and she is Polish, or the best nanny and she is Polish, or the 
best plumber or electrician who fix their house … On the other hand, we have a good opinion 
as hardworking people, but there is a very big part of Polish people who are destroying this 
good opinion because of alcohol. (Patrycja) 
 
Maksymilian distanced himself from other EU officials as a community, while his 
opinion on other Poles living in Brussels was mixed: he appreciated contacts with the more 
educated part of the community, while he admitted he avoided any contact with the 
cleaning/construction sector people, referred to as “migrants from Podlasie”:  
To be honest, I have no clue, because … I am not making an effort, let’s say, to participate in 
the life of the Polish community in Brussels, so I don’t know whether they, as a community, 
[whether] they like or dislike the economic migrants from Podlasie. Personally, I don’t have 
anything against my fellow Polish EU officials, but I’m not seeking to spend time with them. 
By contrast, when I see someone from the group of the economic migrants from Podlasie, 
normally I try to avoid contacts with them because I think that they have a very different 
background … I mean, they are very different from me. I mean, probably they are more 
different from me than an average “expat” and I think it would be quite unpleasant to have to 
talk to them and spend time with them. So, personally I have nothing against these people, as 
long as they are far away from me. There are also other groups of Poles in Belgium and I 
think this is my favourite category of Poles in Brussels, because they are educated people, 
“expats”, who on one hand are not EU officials, so we don’t talk about the Commission life, 
and, they have different experiences. They are different and that’s what is appealing. And at 
the same time, they are people like me, they are culturally, and mentally more or less close to 
me. And I also think that other EU officials tend to have the same attitude towards them, 
because, well sometimes I go to these gatherings of the Polish community (although I didn’t 
like it but I went there a couple of times) and there are always plenty of other Poles from 
! 235!
regional representations, lawyers, people working in NGOs or private firms, this kind of 
things, this kind of people. (Maksymilian) 
 
Interrogated on whether he would use services provided by these other Poles as a customer, 
he replied:  
Well, I think I might use services of the construction people or mechanics in certain situations 
if they were really cheaper, but not because they are Poles. It’s just that if they are cheaper, 
and if I was convinced that they are sufficiently professional, I would probably have nothing 
against using their services. Baby-sitting, I don’t think so, because, I would be afraid to leave 
my cat with one of these people so I don’t think that, once I have a baby (today I don’t have 
children), … that I would leave my child with the kind of Polish people, who usually are 
baby-sitters. That would have to be someone I really know, or someone recommended, but 
really someone who is intelligent enough and educated enough to have sufficient imagination 
not to kill or seriously damage health of my child. (Maksymilian) 
 
If Patrycja raised the problem of alcohol abuse, Darek focused on the security issue:  
Well, these persons, one can be afraid of them, as they are of poor upbringing, they are very 
loud, often in a vulgar manner ... I often have the impression that I am seeing some lads, 
criminals, half-criminals, they walk loudly, often with a bottle or with a can of beer in hand, 
also girls. They usually stroll in couples or groups and they behave like Muslims, Arabs, they 
stroll in gangs, you don’t even know what it is about, they behave loudly and they are vulgar. 
I think this is not because they don’t know that I am Polish and I can hear what they are 
saying, because they would swear the same if they knew that it’s a Pole passing by, I mean, 
these are the persons that you see on the street and that when you see them on the street, 
effectively discourage you from trying to meet other, “good” persons who certainly are in this 
group. (Darek) 
 
 Like Maksymilian, Darek also appreciated a part of Polish community in Brussels, although 
this group seems much more exclusive:  
Concerning the persons occupying high positions in private companies or in the 
administration, I do not know a lot of such persons. I mean, I know, I knew a few persons, as 
some of them left, a few persons working in banks. I’m trying to avoid contacts with persons 
from the Permanent Representation, although I do not know whether that’s who you’re asking 
about, because these are not EU officials, but these are like the same persons, but from the 
other side. We are dealing with the same matter, but they are on the other side and I often 
need to attack them on the professional ground, thus I think it is not desirable that I have any 
social relations with them. (Darek) 
 
Some respondents also shared their impressions on the evolution of the relations 
between the communities over time. For instance, Adrian considered that a sometimes-
disapproving attitude of the Polish EU officials to these less privileged Polish migrants has 
remained constant:  
On one hand, it is indifferent, sometimes very positive, but it happens to be, unfortunately, 
contemptuous. It depends on the person, especially that there is this large group from 
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Siemiatycze which is perceived, by some people, stereotypically and with a grain of salt. 
Perhaps this is not hostility, but sometimes there are such strange smiles and I do not think 
that it has changed over years. These are, more or less, constant ... Perhaps it is not much 
debated, but these were lasting, durable ... either indifference, or, unfortunately, prejudice. 
(Adrian) 
 
Similarly, Jeremi did not notice any difference (“it’s still the same as it was three or four or 
five years before”) although his view of the mutual relations between these groups had a 
rather negative character. As he elaborated: 
I think that Polish officials in the European institutions, they live in a kind of, I would say, ah, 
“a ghetto”. It is not a good word, but they live in their own world and … they don’t need to 
look outside …, to have contacts with the outside world. Of course it depends on the person, 
because sometimes, well from my personal observations, my colleagues, they know that of 
course there is a lot of our compatriots living in Brussels and working outside the institutions, 
but they don’t need to have contacts with them, they don’t want to, but of course they know 
that there are Polish nannies, Polish [street/domestic workers], etc., but I know that some 
people, they think that’s okay, I work for the European institution, so I’m someone better than 
my compatriots who clean houses. I think that that was the case a few years ago and it’s still 
the case nowadays. (Jeremi) 
 
When  asked about the attitude towards some other highly skilled Polish people, he replied, 
“they are still divided”. 
 Ksawery was one of the few officials who saw an improvement in the mutual 
relations of both Polish communities in Brussels: 
There were waves of migration. First of all, there was an old wave of migration already from 
the 19th Century and those families live not only in Brussels but also in other cities; and then 
there was another couple of waves of migration in the 1970s and 1980s and 1990s. First of all, 
I don’t think that this is an issue for the Poles who work for the European institutions. There 
is, I think, a very good cooperation between those groups and we learnt a lot probably over 
those years, here in Brussels how we can strengthen our powers and position by strictly 
collaborating on what we are doing best. And I think that, that is also my personal feeling and 
experience, that knowing each other better, we really understand better what are our 
expectations and what are our values, and then we can possibly also valuate those minority 
groups in the eyes of other nationals and other citizens of Belgium or other nationalities who 
live in Brussels. So, I think that this kind of interaction is improving and getting better and 
benefiting both sides more and more. (Ksawery) 
 
The picture of relations between the Polish EU officials and other Polish groups in 
Brussels is quite mixed. On one hand, a number of persons appreciated the Polish expat 
community. The principle of homophily (McPherson et al. 2001) seems to apply fully in their 
case, as the same interviewees seemed reluctant towards the idea of maintaining close 
relations with the economic migrants from Siemiatycze. On the other hand, most of my 
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interviewees focus on the relations with this latter category. Some interviewees apparently 
approach them with caution and seemed to be repulsed by their presumed difference, lack of 
education, inclination to heavy drinking or even violence. Some other speak about them 
positively and do not see any negative attitude from the side of other EU officials. They 
describe their relations in neutral terms, often focusing on the provision of goods and services 
as the main axis of contacts. Finally, some of my respondents denounce the presumed 
contempt and patronising from the side of the Eurocrats’ community. However, they typically 
remained silent on their own relations with the Siemiatycze people (except for Zofia, Klara 
and Kamil). Thus, it is difficult to say, on the basis of responses to this question, if their 
openness and respect materialise in the form of friendships or acquaintances in this milieu. 
However, if we combine their answers with the responses to the question on the existence of 
a single Polish community in Brussels, it can be presumed that such contacts are rare.   
In order to obtain a broader picture and be able to compare between the attitudes of 
the Polish EU officials towards different communities, I asked my respondents (30) during 
my previous research (Rozanska 2009), whether they considered the Polish EU community as 
open towards various other communities living in Brussels, notably the Belgians, the 
community of Polish people not employed in the EU institutions, the ethnic minorities (such 
as the Moroccan, Turkish or Congolese people) and towards the other “expats”. The same 
question was posed to the respondents from the new group. Responses were broadly similar 
in both groups: most of my respondents considered that Polish EU community was open for 
other foreigners (“expats”) living in Belgium (27 affirmative indications out of 30 in the 
“old” group, 24 out of 26 in the “new group), respectively, 18 persons out of 30 and 14 out of 
26 found them open to Belgians while only the half of the group or less (in the “new group”) 
believed that the Polish community of EU officials was open to Poles not working in the 
institutions. The number of persons believing that the Polish EU officials are open to other 
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minorities in Brussels was particularly low (14 out of 30 in the “old group”; only 8 out of 26 
in the “new group”).   
4.2.3. Conclusions on “the host environment” 
This part of my research explores the perceptions of Brussels and its inhabitants by my 
research participants. In addition to the contribution to the analysis based on the complexity 
approach to integration (Eriksen 2007), this part of the study provides an opportunity to 
verify previous findings concerning Brussels. Moreover, it allows me to conclude whether 
Polish EU officials should be analysed as a part of a larger Polish “community”. The relations 
with compatriots living in Brussels also shed some light on the role of ethnic bonds in the 
positioning of Polish EU officials towards the local population. Finally, their declared attitude 
to the local space and the people reveals interesting boundary-making patterns which can be 
compared with and interpreted in light of the previous research on boundaries in the 
expatriate world (see e.g., Fechter 2007a, 2007b). 
 The research results show that the perception of Brussels by the participants before 
the arrival was varied and often reflected the stereotyped imaginaries referred to by Calay and 
Magosse (2008). An important number of Polish EU officials changed their perception of 
Brussels after they settled in the city. Those who did not know the city and associated it 
mostly with its role as the capital of Europe sometimes expected to find more splendour. This 
recalls the opinions according to which Brussels was a “metonymy for the European Union” 
(Bellier 2002) or was even identified with Europe (Favell 2008a). Moreover, Brussels could 
be perceived through the prism of imaginaries of the wealthy and ordered West – still popular 
in Poland after the period of the communist dictatorship and deprivation and after the 
subsequent decade of notorious backwardness. This idealistic perception could not survive 
the confrontation with the ordinary, everyday hassle of living in the city. On the other hand, 
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those who had previously lived in other European countries compared Brussels with their 
previous place of living and this comparison was often unfavourable for Brussels, at least in 
certain aspects.  
Meanwhile, some of those who had previously lived in Brussels for a short period of 
time and had experienced the negative side of living in the city but had no time to get used to 
these aspects could improve their initially negative perception after their permanent 
settlement. 
Some research participants expressed positive views about the local population, the 
quality of life and, – very often – the available leisure opportunities, often related to the city’s 
geographical situation. The “cosmopolitan” character of the city was often referred to, usually 
with a positive connotation. The negative comments concerning Brussels very often referred 
to the low quality of services and sometimes also to the poor functioning of the 
administration. Criticism was often very harsh. 
This phenomenon could also be observed during my participant observation in the 
“Wild Geese” meetings, as well as at other informal gatherings I attended. Discussions about 
Belgium and Brussels, often taking the form of “Belgium-bashing” is one of the most 
common subjects of conversation among Polish EU officials (but also other expats) – it is a 
variation of “weather talk”, together with recommending restaurants or exchanges on 
holidays plans and experiences, and institutions related news (and gossips). Here comes a 
typical sample of such conversations, originating from my field notes (June 2011): 
In the metro I told him [about a problem with my leg due to a medical error] … He 
immediately took up the subject and started complaining about medical services here. He said 
that [during a kneel surgery] Belgian doctors reduced 80% of his meniscus, while doctors in 
Poland said it was unnecessary, as only 20% should have been “cut off”.  He said he had 
heard many other similar stories. Then he switched to complaining about the life in Belgium 
in general. He compared Belgium to the Third World, he said there was no progress here and 
everything was just on its way to collapse. He pointed at the dirt in the metro and in the City 2 
shopping mall to which he was just going … [At the shop] he started a long monologue 
[concerning a slow shop assistant], he said we had been waiting long enough and that he knew 
that in this country everybody had a lot of time … He added that after six years in Belgium he 
hadn’t got used to it. 
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The most striking element in these opinions is a mismatch between the actual reason 
for complaints (as it was presented) and their intensity. Some of my respondents stressed that 
their fellow Polish EU officials do not actually come from a place where the situation would 
be radically better to what they encountered in Belgium. If this is indeed the case, the 
question is why the criticism was so vehemently expressed. The inferiority complex 
suggested by some of my respondents is one possible explanation: as mentioned elsewhere, 
Poles employed in the institutions may indeed suffer from well-rooted stereotypes about 
Poland and Eastern Europeans. According to these stereotypes, Poland is a poor backward 
country with low living standards and the Polish EU officials might feel frustrated that the 
changes which have occurred in their home country during the last 20 years have not been 
sufficiently noticed and recognised. This is super-imposed on Poland’s long-standing 
“inferiority complex towards the West”, referred to in particular by Sztompka (2004) and 
Janion (2007). This perceived lack of appreciation might trigger strong, sometimes excessive, 
criticism of the Belgian living standards in an attempt to rebut the anticipated contempt which 
Belgians would have towards their Polish or Eastern-European background. However, there 
might also be another explanation. Favell et al. argue that wealthy expatriates are often 
subject to discrimination by the host society (2007:21). This is undoubtedly true in the case of 
Polish EU officials in Brussels, who may suffer both as Eurocrats and as Eastern Europeans. 
In this situation, a natural reaction is to consolidate one’s own community and strengthen ties 
with other groups of privileged migrants. According to Fechter, expatriates often create 
boundaries separating them from local populations (2007b:26; on boundaries manipulation in 
the context of minorities see also Leman 1998) in order to preserve their privileged status 
(Cohen 1977:24). Indeed, ritual rejection of the local reality through violent criticism of the 
local ways might play a role in cementing the community by strengthening the boundary 
separating it from the host society and confirming its belonging to the cast of EU officials or, 
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more generally, even the international elites inhabiting the city. If, in the case of less 
developed, post-colonial countries, such rejection is more natural and implicit (justified by 
the discrepancy between Western and local standards of living and important cultural 
differences), in the case of Belgium it might even appear counter-intuitive and hence needs to 
be constantly and explicitly verbalised. In this model, harsh, almost obsessive criticism of 
Belgian services, Belgian administration, and even Belgian weather assumes the role of being 
a verbal boundary marker (see Nash 1989:12) or, more generally, of being “signals and 
emblems of differences” (Barth 1998 [1969]:14).  
In addition to Belgians and other (usually marginal in my research participants’ 
accounts) population groups, Brussels is inhabited by a significant number of Polish 
migrants. Generally, the picture of relations with this population drawn by my respondents is 
rather complex. The Polish EU officials perceive themselves as distinct from other groups of 
Polish people in Brussels and certainly do not have the impression of belonging to a “Polish 
Community in Brussels”. Some of them believe that there is such a thing as the community of 
Polish EU officials or – sometimes – “expats” in Brussels, but this feeling is not general. 
Some of the research participants believed instead that there are several communities of 
Polish EU officials, created on a voluntary basis.  
The declared attitude of my respondents to other Poles was usually positive, but many 
of them considered that other Polish EU officials treat their compatriots with contempt. 
Interestingly, although the question did not explicitly refer to the economic migrants from 
Podlasie, this seemed to be the intuitive understanding of my research participants. One 
might wonder whether their assertions on their sympathy and respect were not somewhat 
hypocricious, given that other questions revealed that my research participants had only rare 
and superficial contact with their compatriots from the abovementioned category. Those who, 
indeed, expressed negative views, emphasized either drinking habits or security issues or 
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simply objective differences which made them estranged from the economic migrants from 
Podlasie. Less than half of my respondents considered their community open to other Poles, 
which is less than to other “expats” or even to Belgians not belonging to a minority. 
At the margins, it is worth mentioning that, although the relations between the Polish 
EU officials and other high skilled migrants from Poland are visibly very different from those 
described above, I have also come across Polish non-EU institutions expats who complained 
about the seclusiveness and impenetrability of the Polish “Eurocrats”. The experience of 
these people often resembled my own: some of our interlocutors lost interest tended to 
terminate the conversation once it was revealed that we did not work in the institutions. The 
exchange of information on DGs and units where new acquaintances worked is usually one of 
the first stages of any initial conversation, as if it was designed on purpose (although it was 
probably not) to identify people “from outside”, aliens.   
Already at this stage it seems possible to understand whether we may, at all, refer to 
“the Polish Community in Brussels”. Such a creation clearly does not exist, no matter which 
of the definitions of a community referred to in Chapter 1 one adopts. There seems to be no 
common interest between different groups of Poles in Brussels (Overing and Rapport 2005) 
and no sense of belonging (Banks 1996; A.P. Cohen 1985; Jenkins 2002). There are no 
boundaries that my interviewees would be keen on establishing which would include the 
economic migrants from Podlasie (Barth 1998; Amit 2002a). Also, if one looks at a 
community in more dynamic terms (Warner 1941) as a functioning whole, it should be 
stressed that the actual relations between my interviewees and the Polish economic migrants 
appear to be sporadic. 
One might refer to the situational approach to ethnicity (see e.g., Brettell 2003, 2008; 
Castles and Miller 2003; Jenkins 2008a; Eriksen 2015) and observe that, in the case of Polish 
EU officials, ethnicity (although important in absolute terms) is not the most important 
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element defining their position in Brussels. It is difficult to perceive any strong “we 
consciousness” (Leman 2000) based on ethnic criteria. They draw more power and privilege 
from their class and professional belonging to the “people of the House” (as referred to by 
Shore (2000:164)) than from the fact of being Polish. Even if their Polishness is an important 
element for their feeling of Europeanness (infra), their professional identity is sufficient to 
confirm their Europeanness, hence they have no interest in emphasizing their Polish 
distinctiveness, especially in light of the stereotypes about Eastern Europeans which still exist 
in Belgium. Therefore, it is logical that ethnicity is not used to construct boundaries by my 
researched group and hence there is no consciousness of belonging to the same community as 
other Poles in Brussels.  
Here it might be useful to recall my previous research (Rozanska 2009) where I 
described the intensive socialising of Polish EU officials during the first years after their 
arrival in Brussels. In that context, invoking their Polishness was useful, as it allowed them to 
quickly create ties with other Polish officials in the same situation. The remnants of this 
phenomenon survive in the form of the mailing list of the Polish EU officials. Reference to 
their common origin with Polish economic migrants in Brussels is not beneficial and thus, if 
it is not dissimulated, is not particularly relied upon. This seems to confirm the situational 
approach to ethnicity (Bretell 2008) and, in particular, the opinion of Roosens (1989) on the 
situational character of the ethnicity of migrants.  
4.3. Integration from the EU officials’ perspective 
In this section I will focus on the perception of integration by the research participants 
themselves. This includes important precision on their understanding of such terms as 
“adaptation” and “integration”, but most importantly, the description by the Polish EU 
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officials of their relations with the host society, other communities inhabiting Brussels, the 
space they live in and their attitude to it. 
4.3.1. Adaptation and integration in Brussels 
The purpose of this part of the research was to find out how the Polish EU officials function 
in Brussels, what their strategies, preferences and attitudes are with regard to the process of 
integration into the host country.  
General patterns of adaptation in a new society characteristic to ordinary migrants are 
different than in case of privileged migrants, such as the EU officials in Brussels. As Favell 
observes (2003b; 2008a) the privileged migrants do not aspire to assimilate into the local 
society, they rather “integrate” to the international community so visible in the city of 
Brussels. Favell observes that, although it is commonly admitted, in the European nation-
state context, that integration implies naturalisation and thus immigrants are subject to 
pressures to this effect, this cannot apply to EU movers in Brussels, as the latter did not come 
to “go native”, but to find “a denationalized freedom, a life beyond such norms” (Favell 
2008a:136-7). Indeed, they are less often subject to the pressure by the host society to 
integrate. They receive support from their fellow EU officials and thus are less prone to join 
“ethnic” communities of their fellow nationals.170  
A number of questions concerned the level to which they interact with the local 
society and other expats (including other Poles) and the nature of this interaction. These 
objectives are partly inspired by the theories of social and cultural integration, defined by 
Jeannette J. Schoorl and referring to, respectively, “the degree of interaction between 
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170 In case of the first wave of the Polish EU officials, directly after the enlargement, their situation was quite 
atypical, as they tended to perceive the EU institutions (and their employees) as a distant fortress that they had 
been storming for so long, looking somewhat suspiciously at the newcomers from the other side of the Iron 
Curtain. On the other hand, the existing Polish community could not fulfill its supporting function, given the 
difference of class, economic status situation and even culture between the EU officials and the transmigrant 
community of Poles from Podlasie. However, this situation was exceptional and characterized only the very first 
years after the enlargement. 
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immigrant and native population groups” and “the degree to which various population groups 
share the same norms, values and preferences” (2005:2).  
The questions, formulated in an open manner, concerned, inter alia, adaptation, 
integration and the understanding of these terms by my research participants. They are 
conceived to help me understand the focuses, the ways of thinking and categorising that my 
respondents propose themselves. For this reason, I abstained from excessive framing of the 
way they were supposed to answer the questions. More specifically, their purpose was to 
trigger testimonies translating the perception and also some categories of mind of my 
interviewees related to the functioning in a foreign country. Indeed, as the responses showed, 
the very idea of integration understood as “becoming part of the social-cultural and 
institutional fabric” (Schoorl 2005:1-2) of the Belgian society was so distant to some of my 
respondents, that they understood the question as referring to integration within the EU 
institutions or the expat community. 
4.3.1.1. Being adapted as understood by Polish EU officials 
 Although, there is an important variety of approaches toward “adaptation” in academic 
literature, I wanted to understand the meaning the Polish EU institutions’ employees assign to 
this term. This understanding must be influenced by their experience and would refer, putting 
it in most simple terms, to what they consider as relevant and conceivable in their social 
situation. 
Some of the interviewees restricted their answer to the definition of the notion of 
“adaptation”, while other complemented it with considerations concerning their adaptation in 
Brussels.  
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Among the definitions given, most of the Polish EU officials referred to the capacity 
to function in the host society, without necessarily participating in its life or sharing the 
interests of the locals. Patrycja proposed:  
I think … adaptation is the situation in which a person feels at ease in a foreign country … I 
mean comfortable with everyday life, so whenever he or she has to make decisions about job, 
school, shopping, administrative issues, he or she knows where to find information or already 
knows where to go. (Patrycja) 
 
Klara gave a somewhat similar definition, while heavily insisting on the preservation 
of distinction:  
Absence of the feeling of alienation. … I mean, what comes within this notion is that, while 
keeping the sense of distinction, or difference, we feel at ease, thus we consider the new 
environment as ours. This does not mean that we do not feel different or distinct, but it does 
not produce the lack of comfort ... , we accept our new environment, we consider it as ours, 
even if we know we are different, or distinct. (Klara) 
 
For Jeremi,  
adaptation means to get knowledge [about] how to live, how to deal with the country: with the 
federal government, with the local government, with the police, with the shops, with daily 
life, to know how this country is organized. (Jeremi) 
 
He also believed that adaptation required  
to know the national character of the people. To understand why they are like they are, … to 
understand the city, the country and the people. (Jeremi) 
 
Maksymilian believed that “adaptation is basically the development of the ability to function 
smoothly in a certain society, … in a group”. He also made an explicit reservation: “but it 
does not mean of course that I’m becoming a part of a local society, far from that”. Also 
Otylia insisted on a more limited meaning of the notion of “adaptation”, as opposed to 
“integration”:  
Adaptation is something which is not complete integration. So, out of respect for the hosts, I 
take out my shoes and walk barefoot, as they wish so, although I will not require it at my 
place or even feel completely fine with it, as this is exclusively the question of respect and not 
standing out of the group, and not necessarily of acceptance. (Otylia) 
 
Adrian discussed the problems that he found challenging in the context of adaptation (in the 
same “limited” meaning): 
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As to adaptation, certainly there are things you need to get used to in Belgium. The weather 
set aside, e.g., the quality of services with which there are serious problems, many Poles 
complain about it and not only Poles. I tried to reconcile myself with it, I know this country is 
a bit different from Poland and I try to live so as to feel at ease here and obviously I have to 
adapt to certain things. But the term “adaptation”? It is difficult for me to elaborate upon, coin 
a definition, for example. [It means] tuning in to something, right? (Adrian) 
 
Zofia seemed to subscribe to the same basic understanding of the notion of “adaptation”, but 
she took a more personal approach and described her own experience:  
The first stage when you arrive somewhere is, more or less, … discovery of the country and 
sometimes a bit of a shock regarding some aspects, or, you know, you really need to make an 
effort to adjust. And then, the second stage is either that you adapt yourself and you accept 
your environment or that you don’t like it at all and you just keep complaining and you feel 
you’ll never adapt and you just want to leave the place … Now, I’m in this second stage of 
adaptation that, okay, I know the country more or less, how the administration works, the 
politics. I cannot say I understand everything, but I feel quite comfortable with what I 
understand at this stage. And we managed to go through these whole house purchase 
procedures without any problems, we know this social security system for my husband and 
how it works with the work system, you know, the education system, because he is working in 
education [sector], so that was a big step forward also to understand and to adapt ourselves. 
(Zofia) 
 
This understanding recalls the theory of four stages or “psychological states” of acculturation 
experienced by migrants according to Alaminos and Santacreu (2009:99).171  
Similarly as Zofia, also other interviewees referred to the respect of the local 
traditions and laws. Maja understood adaptation as “learning some rules of co-existence”, 
“adaptation in the environment, so the rules of co-existence or some social rules of the group” 
and “submission to certain requirements, where it is feasible”. She concluded that “this is 
submission rather than imposing”. Dominika elaborated on the differences of habits which 
one needs to take into account in order to adapt:  
There are certain things that are very different from Poland. People don’t visit each other 
without having, like you know, an appointment before. And if you organize a big party, then 
you have to invite people in writing most of the time, so, it’s different and you have to adapt 
to that, because if not, you will pass for someone who is not very gentle. (Dominika) 
 
Finally, Stanislaw placed his understanding of adaptation in the context of his perception of 
multicultural society which must – in his view – be based on respect for the law:!
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171 These are: a short state of euphoria, the stage of culture shock, the third stage where migrants “slowly begin 
to function in the new context” (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009: 99). At the fourth stage, migrants “adopt a stable 
psychological disposition”, possibly different from the one they had in their home country (Alaminos and 
Santacreu 2009: 99).  
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Respect the law of the country where you are coming. This is adaptation. I’m sorry, I keep in 
mind too many bad examples of people who were overusing the “multi-kulti” policy in 
Germany. … I’m coming to Belgium not as a refugee, but as somebody who is coming here to 
work, but for me it’s obvious that you have to respect the law of the country where you are 
staying ... I’m adapting in this sense to the local regulations. (Stanislaw)  
  
Interestingly, his criticism of the multicultural society seemed to go even further, as he gave 
an example related not that much to the respect for the law, but rather to the eagerness to 
accept a deeper level of adaptation, going beyond mere respectful co-existence: 
I’m glad that chancellor Merkel criticized this year or last year the “multi-kulti” policy in 
Germany as too liberal. The best example is that she said openly that the Turkish guys, who 
are born in Turkey, they have to go to German schools as a primary and only in their free time 
they can go to the Turkish [school]. This is again my approach. (Stanislaw) 
 
However, while interrogated about his plans concerning the choice of school for his children 
(European or Belgian), he did not seem to apply the same reasoning to himself:172  
It will be much more practical issue [based on] which school is closer. I don’t see it much as a 
decisive fact, okay? We will make the decision according to the location probably. 
(Stanislaw) 
 
Some of the interviewees also referred to what one of them described as “integration” or 
“adaptation in the stronger meaning”: 
Adaptation in the stronger meaning also would mean understanding of the local policies and 
local people, but I think, this is … I would even say, more like integration. So, adaptation 
with integration, then it would be … when you know exactly what’s going on here and you’re 
interested in it. (Patrycja) 
 
Filip defined adaptation as “ability to live and draw from public life and social-cultural 
environment”. Also Kamil’s definition of adaptation went beyond a mere ability to deal with 
the everyday life:  
You understand what’s going on and you show certain amount of some kind of interest at 
what’s going on. I don’t say you must be engaged, because a lot of people even in Poland are 
not engaged. You don’t have problems with orientation in, you know, in the institutional 
framework if you have to buy something, if you have to fix something, plus you know 
somebody who is local as well. Yeah, you try to follow maybe media from time to time as 
well. (Kamil) 
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172 More recently, I discussed this issue again with Stanislaw who, in the meantime, had become father. He 
confirmed that he would still choose between Belgian or European school (French section). 
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The opinion of Bernard recalled association with the words of Laura Gherardi, who 
considered “the ability to change one’s point of view and way of thinking” as crucial for 
adaptation (2011:110): 
Adapting to the city involves changing the way one thinks, also, one has to change their 
attitude, also their expectations. (Bernard) 
 
On the other hand, there were some interviewees, like for instance Darek, who 
thought that the EU officials are not really expected to adapt and that the communication was 
the main important requirement:  
I think that, as regards us, the Europeans, we do not need to integrate, adapt to anything, as we 
are at home here. As long as you are able to communicate with the inhabitants of this city, 
you should feel well here, but I see no need for changing myself, any adaptation ... We are not 
the same as the local people, we are slightly different, we have similar values, but this is 
something different, we are bringing it here and enrich the mix. I think we should not resign 
on something, or change, so as to live well here. The only requirement is to be able to 
communicate. (Darek) 
 
Again, this opinion seems to go in the same direction as the proposition of Favell, 
who argues that the elite migrants do not need to assimilate into the host society, without 
compromising on their ability to function smoothly in the new environment (2003b:413). 
Most importantly in this context, Favell believed that:  
Within a regional context, such as the European Union, one would expect then that the 
Europeanisation of elite cultures will enable European free movers to succeed in any part of 
Europe, without needing to undergo the kind of socialization to national integration norms 
that would have hitherto been demanded of all newcomers as a condition of social mobility. 
(Favell 2003b:413-414) 
 
Curiously, among the persons who backed their answers with comments regarding 
their own adaptation in Belgium, the issue of communication was mentioned by one of the 
interviewees in terms of inability to speak easily any of the national Belgian languages. 
Sebastian remarked:  
That’s a very simple indicator. If we were really integrated into the daily life of this country, 
we would have had this conversation at least in French. … That’s one of the indicators of my 
distance from this country. I can imagine that I speak perfect French; it’s not that easy, but 
okay, given the fact that I don’t speak it after five years, but I cannot imagine that I speak 
perfect Flemish. (Sebastian) 
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My interviewee referred to the lack of linguistic competence as to a symptom of 
insufficient adaptation and not as a cause thereof. 
 4.3.1.2. How does it work in practice?  
Two groups of Polish EU officials have been asked a similar, and yet different question. The 
“old” group, the respondents from my previous research, have been asked a “follow-up” 
question on whether they felt “integrated” in Belgium. On the other hand, the “new” group, 
composed to a significant extent of persons who had stayed much shorter in Belgium, have 
been asked whether it was difficult to adapt to the local culture. The same question was asked 
to the first group during the previous study,173 as the difference originates from the 
assumption that the members of the first group, having stayed in Brussels already for some 
time, are more likely to develop further going interactions with the local society (and thus 
they could experience “adaptation in the stronger sense” that they qualify as “integration”). 
The responses of the first group were mostly, if not all, negative. Only four persons 
out of 20 firmly stated that they were integrated in Belgium, but their explanations seemed to 
suggest that they were rather adapted (thus, what the majority of my respondents considered 
as integration in a weaker sense, covering what Favell (2001a) referred to as “integration in 
the city”) or integrated with the expatriate community. One of them developed:  
Yes, I do feel quite well integrated; I know more or less how things work here in terms of 
services, administration, cultural events etc. On the other hand, I am not much involved in 
associative life, my commune’s life etc., maybe because I do not have children yet (I’ve seen 
that usually families with children, especially if the children go to the local school and not the 
European school, tend to be better integrated here in Belgium). 
 
A few further respondents stated explicitly they were integrated in the city or that they felt 
well in the place they lived, but they did not feel a part of the Belgian society. Indeed, many 
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173 At that time 20 out of 30 persons did not find it difficult to adapt to the local culture. However, it must be 
stressed that some of them regarded the “local culture” not as Belgian, but rather as “international mix”, and this 
could explain the easiness of adaptation. Only one third of the participants found adaptation difficult, while 
many of them were not even able to delineate the “local culture” in the Belgian context (Rozanska 2009). 
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of the Polish EU officials who are granted life-long employment seem to attach to the place 
where they come to live. For example, one of the men confessed:  
Yes and no. I feel at home in Brussels, especially in Jette. I’ve met some nice people, both 
Belgian and international. I like my quarter. I’ve developed a routine which makes me feel 
familiar. On the other hand, I do not feel a part of the Belgian or Brussels society, I am not 
concerned with their problems and do not share their interests. I think they will always 
perceive me as a stranger and will never accept me 100 per cent but I’m fine with it.  
 
 Similarly, one of the female participants nuanced:  
It depends what you mean by this question… I am not integrated in Belgium in the sense of 
the Belgian society as I do not need it. I feel very good in Polish and international community 
living here. On the other hand, I am well integrated in Belgium as a place to live, as I found 
my favourite places and people here, I enjoy living here and I am not homesick anymore.  
 
Again, it should be observed that this distinction (integration in space as opposed to 
integration in a community) was already described by Favell who wrote about expatriates in 
Brussels that their networks and cultural activities may not intersect with those of Belgians, 
but are evidence of a strong integration into the city which enabled these activities (see also 
Favell 2001a:47; 2008a:54). In Favell’s approach, “a person can be perfectly well ‘integrated’ 
into Brussels life, while knowing no Belgians at all” (2001a:47). However, the notion of 
integration refers to a cultural or social process and must always translate into a specific 
relation with a population. Thus, Favell’s (2001a) “integration into a city” can be understood 
either as deeper integration with the international strata of the city or as simply adaptation to, 
without integration with the local society (here: Belgians). 
Finally, numerous respondents wrote they were well integrated in the expat society 
and that they did not feel the need to integrate with Belgians. One respondent wrote:  
[I feel integrated] only in the expat community, not in Belgium as such, [I] don’t have any 
Belgian friends or colleagues and I’m not really interested in the BE[lgian] politics etc. 
 
Another one stated: 
Not really. I am still integrated rather with the expat community and I have few contacts with 
Belgians that are not either colleagues or Polish colleagues’ spouses.  
 
Yet another person admitted that she evolved mostly within the Polish circle:  
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Not really, we kept with the Polish society. My newborn is in crèche now where the only 
spoken language is French, so I have a motivation to learn it better. At work I use mainly 
English. 
 
Some respondents complained about the impermeability of the Belgian society and in 
certain cases, their attachment to common stereotypes on Eurocrats that excludes any deeper 
interaction:  
No, I do not feel welcome. “True Belgians” show little desire to interact with international 
officials, whom they hold responsible for the hike in property prices etc. 
 
One person developed:  
I do not feel integrated with Belgium. Given the number of expats living in the country the 
public administration is not prepared well to serve the purpose. Only good knowledge of the 
official languages can open the gates to normal treatment. Having won the battle over 
building own house I decided to learn the language of my new commune. Also the Belgians 
are very introvert and are not open to new friendships. The Belgian Police do not serve its 
purpose and in general I do not feel safe in here.  
 
Finally, a few persons indicated that they did not feel the need to integrate with the host 
society, for example, 
No and I don’t want to. The country seems to be falling apart so the idea of being “integrated” 
in it seems rather frightening. 
 
By contrast, the members of the new group, asked whether they thought it was 
difficult to adapt, mostly claimed that adaptation in Belgium is easy or even unnecessary. As 
it clearly results from responses to interview questions, if “integration” was understood as 
becoming a part of the local society, adaptation was seen rather as the ability to smoothly 
function in this society, without necessarily establishing any stronger links with it. 
The only person who firmly confirmed that adaptation is difficult clearly had different 
understanding of adaptation from the one mentioned above:  
Yes, Belgians seem to be a closed community.  
 
Some other persons emphasized their isolation from the host society, putting in question the 
sense of any considerations pertaining to adaptation. One person responded:  
I have few interactions with the local culture and I see a limited need to adapt. The part of 
society I belong to is the international expat community related to the European institutions. 
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The only Belgian I know well is my former colleague from the company I worked at in Berlin 
a few years ago. In Brussels, I have not really met that many Belgians.  
 
Another person remarked:  
I do not think that being an EU citizen you really need to adapt to living in another EU 
country unless for your own curiosity. I think that EU citizens should feel at home in all other 
EU MS [member states] without much effort or any “planned” action of adaptation – for me 
this is not really a priority here although I would like to somehow extend my knowledge 
about current affair in Belgian politics etc.  
 
One female respondent expressed even a more radical opinion:  
No, Brussels is an international place, there is no need to adapt to the local, Belgian culture, 
one can stay within the international environment which is at least for me, very easy to adapt 
to.  
 
She did not even envisage a possibility of having any closer contact with local population, as 
it was not necessary to leave the international circle. The same idea could be identified in 
numerous responses: “No. Due to the high number of expats the contact with the local culture 
is minimal”; “I find I adapted to the Brussels expat culture, I have only limited contact with 
the authentic ‘local’ culture”; “I do not find it difficult; I am mostly surrounded by a 
‘European’ culture (not Belgian) of which I am a member, and therefore it is rather a natural 
environment for me”. One of the female respondents developed a bit more on this issue, 
referring to the concept of “international bubble”: 
I feel that I live as if in an international bubble rather and in parallel to rather than fully 
assimilating into the local culture. When I was in the UK, I remember fully following politics 
etc. in the UK and being surrounded by British friends. In Belgium it is a bit different – most 
friends are from other EU countries but only a few are Belgian and it feels like living in a 
“neutral” country rather than assimilating. In terms of culture, I go to certain events, drink 
Belgian beer etc. – but I might not be aware of many of local habits/cultures. In this context, 
there was actually not that much adapting.  
 
Another group of respondents apparently had some contact with the local population, 
although – as it can be concluded from their responses – rather a superficial one. One person 
explained that the language is the key to the local culture: “No, if you are willing and you try 
to speak one of the languages, you are welcome”. Kamil confirmed this impression: “No, but 
the language is the biggest barrier”. These statements are not surprising, they validate this 
intuitive view, confirmed by researches (see e.g., Kennedy 2009:26; Nowicka and Kaweh 
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2009:61). Another respondent, apparently in the same situation as his “alienated” colleagues, 
found nevertheless contacts with Belgians quite easy and showed quite a proactive approach 
with this regard:  
As an expat I do not have much contact with the local community. Most of my friends are 
expats, too. But I have no difficulties to find my way when among local people. I also 
participate in many events organised by Belgian cultural organisations.  
 
One of the men found adaptation easy mostly due to the lack of dominant local culture:  
No, not at all. In my opinion Brussels, due to the internal divisions is very easy to adapt – it is 
not such a strong and unified community as French in Paris.  
 
Another research participant apparently alluded to the same phenomenon, when he asked 
jokingly: “Not at all. Is there any local culture here?” 
The respondents quoted above found adaptation to be a non-issue but, as they 
admitted, had a very limited contact with the host society and some of them did not even 
speak any of the local languages. In fact, these circumstances may, paradoxically, explain 
their lack of need to adapt. Alaminos and Santacreu suggested that, although even within the 
Western European cultural circle the perception of being discriminated against also happens, 
the occurrence of social interactions coupled with the ability to perceive the nuances of the 
social reality (often related to the ability of understanding the language) are necessary 
conditions for this perception to take place (2009:112).  
However, some other respondents seemed to have detected some local culture. One 
woman said: “No, I don’t [find it difficult to adapt]. I live my ‘own culture’ and the culture of 
the local place”. Another person, a man, elaborated:  
Not particularly. We actively try to learn about aspect of local culture (especially in the micro-
scale, e.g., the local developments and traditions in Schaerbeek). Our main point of contact 
with Belgians is our daughters’ school – we actively try to participate in all the events 
involving parents to try to build some contacts with Belgians and to learn about daily local 
habits.  
 
Some other respondents gave brief answers (“no”), while one person was explicitly 
enthusiastic about the ability of the host society to make it easy for expats:  
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No, I did not have that problem. The Belgians are rather open-minded, very used to live with 
the international community, therefore with some effort and self-confidence adaptation is not 
difficult. 
 
4.3.1.3. Eagerness and ability to speak the local languages: evolution 
As it was already described by some authors (notably Shore 2000; Bellier 2002), the EU 
institutions’ employees are not only multilingual (Abélès et al. 1993:31; Suvarierol 
2011:187), constantly switching between different languages (usually English, French and 
their mother tongue) (Shore 2000:188), but have also coined their own jargon 
(“Franglais”/Frenglish (Bellier 2002:82) or “Eurospeak” (Bellier 2005:14)) (see e.g., Bellier 
2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2005; Shore 2000; Abélès 2000; Abélès et al. 1993; McDonald 2002). 
As language can be, one of the “surface pointers” (“markers of difference”) (Nash 1989:10-
12), this linguistic specificity certainly is relevant for the relation between the EU officials 
and the city and its different communities. Language may affect identification and constitute 
an important factor influencing adaptation in a new cultural context. This is even more so in 
case of expatriates living in an environment where the language spoken is one of the main 
boundaries dividing different autochthonous communities.  
 On the other hand, it is argued that despite the multicultural environment in which 
they evolve, many of the EU officials, seeking the opportunity to speak their mother tongue 
(Suvarierol 2011:191; 2007:150; Bellier 2002; Hooghe 2001:105; Abélès 2004:7-8), join 
“national networks and places of socialization where they feel more comfortable” (Bellier 
2002: 84). Not knowing the local language is seen as a factor contributing to seclusion and 
separation from the host society (Nowicka and Kaweh 2009; Kennedy 2009; Coles and 
Walsh 2010).  
As the results gathered during my previous research (Rozanska 2009) revealed, 
surprisingly, almost a half of the respondents knew, at that time, none of the official 
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languages in Brussels at arrival. A lot of persons mastered French, while no one spoke Dutch. 
Slightly more than a half of the respondents did not find it important to learn both of the 
official languages in Brussels, including especially those living in the French speaking area 
and mastering the local language. By contrast, those living in a francophone area usually 
recognized the importance of learning French “because the Walloons174 do not always speak 
English”, while in the Flemish area some people considered that the lack of knowledge of 
Dutch was not affecting them significantly as: “Dutch speaking people are very much willing 
to speak English”. 
Half of the research participants said that French was the language they spoke most 
often outside the office. Other most spoken languages in the extra-professional environment 
were English (most often), Polish and Italian (the latter probably partly due to the fact that 
several female EU officials studied were married to Italians). These results could be 
interpreted as showing a high level of independence from the Polish linguistic circle. 
The same question was asked to the new group. When questioned about the local 
languages they spoke at the arrival, 20 (out of 30) persons pointed at French, while two 
persons spoke Dutch (including a woman who spoke both French (“fluently”) and Dutch (“at 
the communicative level”), and a man who spoke only Dutch. As many as nine respondents 
did not speak any of the local languages at the arrival. 
Only five persons found it important to learn both languages. One person gave her 
personal opinion: “I guess you can easily get by speaking none of the two – only English, but 
then I think it’s nice to speak at least one of the languages of the country you live in. And [it 
is] helpful too”.  
Nonetheless, a great majority (24 persons) did not find it important to learn both 
French and Dutch. As one of them explained: “while coming to Belgium I thought it was 
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174 It is common among the Polish EU officials to refer to all French speaking population as “Walloons”. 
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important to learn both of the languages, but after several years, I have understood that 
French is absolutely enough”. Another person said it was not important, “although helpful”. 
A female respondent explained: “it is embarrassing to say … but I have not tried to learn 
Flemish and probably will not – just because it is so easy to communicate in French and 
English (especially with Flemish speaking great English!)”. Overall, the results confirm the 
conclusions that could be drawn on the basis of the previous research. 
When asked about the language most often used by them outside the office (with 
more than one indication possible), 15 persons wrote it was Polish, 21 persons - English, six - 
French. Nobody indicated Dutch, while four persons mentioned other languages, such as: 
German, Russian or Spanish. As compared to the previous research, the number of persons 
speaking mainly English in their private relations was much higher, what can be interpreted 
as owing to more intensive contacts with EU officials of other nationalities and other 
expatriates.  
After a few years separating my first and current researches, the majority of the 
respondents have learnt at least one of the local languages. It is also striking that, contrary to 
common beliefs, many of the EU officials interrogated have learnt some Dutch. 
As many as 12 (out of 20) respondents from the old group observed the improvement 
of their language skills. Three persons amongst those who spoke French upon the arrival 
were learning or planning to learn also Dutch. As Filip elaborated during the interview:  
No, I am not learning Dutch [at the moment]. I learnt it in the past. I’m also planning to 
continue. This is also the reason why I’m enrolled to a Flemish music school - I thought I 
could learn a bit of the language there. However, they are simply too friendly with me and 
I’m not able to learn Dutch as they speak English with me. It is not possible to learn the 
language here as people too rarely speak Dutch and they are too gentle, too lenient with those 
who do not learn the language. 
 
For eight persons the linguistic skills stayed at the same level during the last three 
years.  
It was particularly interesting to compare the actual improvement of linguistic skills 
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with attitudes declared during the original research. The two oldcomer women who did not 
find it important to learn both official languages of Brussels now were either speaking both or 
were even working in both of them. In fact, one of them had already spoken fluent French 
upon arrival (16 years ago), whereas the other did not master any of the local languages 22 
years ago - when she moved to Belgium. 
Four persons who found it important to learn both languages implemented their 
opinions in real life and they are learning them or already speaking both; whereas five 
persons who found it important to learn them both in the past still did not speak (even if tried 
to learn) or not even made any effort to learn them.  
The opinions of nine persons who did not find it important to learn both local 
languages in the past remained stable. One of the women explained: “I master only French. I 
do not like Dutch and I do not think I will ever need it.” Likewise, another female respondent 
did not see any importance of learning Dutch, but her explanation was quite different: “[I 
speak] perfect French. [I] do not consider learning Flemish because of the very strong racism 
of the Flemish people.” Another woman elaborated on the language issues: “I master the 
French but not the Flemish and I am not learning Flemish as I don’t have the time and this 
language is not necessary either to my work or to my personal life.” Yet another woman was 
not learning Dutch herself, however, as she mentioned, “her husband was [doing it] for job 
searching purposes”.  
The patterns described above indicate that the attitude of my respondents to the 
official languages in Brussels was mostly very pragmatic, driven by the need to communicate 
in everyday life situations or, probably, at work (French is one of the Commission working 
languages and its command, at least rudimentary, is strongly encouraged by the institution). 
That is why Polish EU officials learn French and find important to do it. By contrast, only 
very few persons found it important to, or actually did learn Dutch, as this language is not 
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perceived as necessary for successful adaptation. The intention to learn Dutch can be 
interpreted as a sign of the ambition to integrate more in the Belgian society, but also as 
seizing the opportunity to improve one’s linguistic skills for future professional purposes. 
4.3.1.4. Spatial arrangements: leaving an EU bubble?  
Certain features of the separation in space described by authors performing research on 
Western expatriates in culturally and economically different context are clearly related to the 
characteristics of life in the situation of poor security, insufficient hygiene and sanity, or 
strongly differing culture of the host society (see e.g., Fechter 2007a, 2007b; E. Cohen 1977) 
or  “in countries where armed conflicts, terror attacks or high criminality are common”, 
where expatriates “reside in Western compounds, which offer them security and a certain 
living standard” (Nowicka and Kaweh 2009:61). Therefore, the relevance of such features for 
the present work is limited. Indeed, whatever the perception of Brussels may be by 
expatriates, their spatial separation certainly does not result from fear of violence, poison, 
health-threatening dirt or extreme weather conditions.  
However, the phenomenon of spatial seclusion of expatriates is not unknown also in 
cases where the cultural difference is not so important, like in the Western world. Erik Cohen 
even suggests that expatriates “tend to barricade themselves behind the walls of their 
“environmental bubbles” and to develop a very low propensity for adjustment” (1977:57; see 
also: Gatti 2009; Favell 2001a, 2003a, 2008a).  
Several authors (e.g., Shore 2000; Bellier 2002; Cailliez 2004; Favell 2008a) 
elaborated on how boundaries, conceived in terms of the “segregation” of space, are traced in 
Brussels. Indeed, they found that most of affluent, highly skilled professionals lived in 
several, mostly southern and eastern districts in nearly complete spatial isolation from the 
host society. This enclavement (Shore 2000:161) is believed to be common among the EU 
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staff, as they tend to settle in certain middle - or upper middle class districts of Brussels, such 
as Woluwe St. Pierre, Woluwe St. Lambert, Auderghem or Watermael-Boisfort (Bellier 
2002; Cailliez 2004; Shore 2000; Suvarierol 2007, 2009). The phenomenon would be 
triggered by the fact that newcomers evolve predominantly within the environment of the EU 
officials since they come to Brussels, they follow their advice and seek to settle in their 
neighbourhood (Bellier 2002; Cailliez 2004). Suvarierol also observes that “EU ghettos” are 
characteristic for the neigbourhoods of the European School (2009, 2007; see also Cailliez 
2004; Janssens 2008).  
One of the objectives of this research was to examine whether the same patterns 
applied to Polish EU officials. 
4.3.1.4.1. The current spatial arrangement of the Polish EU officials 
My previous research (Rozanska 2009) has shown that this phenomenon of spatial seclusion 
in expat enclaves in Brussels did not take place in case of the Polish EU officials. Some of 
my respondents chose to live in trendy, youthful municipalities such as Bruxelles-Louise, 
Ixelles175 or Saint-Gilles. Another group lived outside Brussels, often in French-speaking 
municipalities, preferred for linguistic reasons. One third of the respondents lived in one of 
the central municipalities (Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Bruxelles 1000 or Etterbeek). The most 
obvious explanation for these choices was a relatively smaller purchasing power of the 
newcomers, coupled with ever growing prices of flats in the “posh” areas.176 At that time, one 
could observe the beginning of gradual migration to “better” municipalities.  
Amongst the most important factors influencing settlement choices of the EU 
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175 According to Favell, situated in proximity to the European quarter, Ixelles is “the best example of a 
cosmopolitan Europeanized neighbourhood”, as it is inhabited mostly by young European expatriate newcomers, 
attracted by their friends’ networks or leisure options (2008a:128). Indeed, the progressive gentrification of such 
municipalities as Ixelles, Saint-Gilles, or Schaerbeek, initially abandoned by Belgian middle class inhabitants, is 
predominantly thanks to European expats (Favell 2003b:420).  
176 Affordable price of real estates was notably quoted as the reason of settling in such districts as Schaerbeek or 
Jette (Rozanska 2009:69).  
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officials, Cailliez quoted such factors as proximity of certain infrastructure (e.g., shops, 
entertainment, public transport), proximity of work office and schools (2004:38). Besides, her 
respondents mentioned such factors as: tranquility, spaciousness, greenness of the 
neighbourhood, but also its atmosphere as important factors (Cailliez 2004:39). Some of her 
informants were opting for areas inhabited by their acquaintances (Cailliez 2004:39). 
However, as Janssens observed, the possibility of communication in a mastered language was 
yet another factor influencing settlement choices (2008:432).  
Out of the persons inquired in the “new group”, no one lived in the aforementioned 
traditionally “expat districts” in the Eastern part of the city, except for a more mixed 
Auderghem (two persons).  
Not all respondents from the new group answered this question. Eight persons (out of 
30) declared living in Etterbeek, seven in Schaerbeek, five in Ixelles, four persons lived in 
Brussels 1000, while two in Auderghem. One person from the new group lives in Jette and 
one in Woluwe St. Stevens.  
The respondents of the new group also revealed their motivations for choosing the 
place to live. Several participants chose Etterbeek because of its proximity to work. One of 
them added: “yet far enough for you not to have the feeling you live at work”, another one 
specified that it was also close to “metro, park, shops, ring”. One respondent seemed to 
appreciate the character of this municipality: “this seems to be the most tolerant and 
international part of the city with a lot going on around. In my view, this is the best choice for 
a person without family obligations. Restaurants, bars and friends living near by.” Another 
male respondent, explained he had chosen to live in Etterbeek as it is “close to work, to 
squares (Pl. Jourdan, Flagey) with their markets, cafés etc., parks around, good 
transportation; I don’t like to use car and this localisation does not force me to do so.” People 
who had chosen to live in Ixelles praised this location for being “relatively safe and quiet but 
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close to downtown and work”, “close to work, lively”.  
The inhabitants of Schaerbeek valued “proximity to work (walking distance) and 
lower prices of apartments”, the fact that the district was “fairly central, walking distance to 
work, safe” and had “good public transport connections”. Some other respondents said that it 
was “aesthetically pleasing and … safe”, “nice, close to a beautiful park, quiet, walking 
distance to the office” or praised its “great architecture, close to the center and affordable”. 
One person elaborated on the reasons for choosing this district:  
We were looking for an affordable neighbourhood in the city centre (within minutes from 
Schuman on foot or by bike) where we could afford a large family house. Also very important 
was the architectural quality of the immediate surroundings and the house itself. We also 
wanted to avoid Eurocrat enclaves. We picked a neighbourhood which we think is 
architecturally beautiful, yet it is affordable hence it is highly mixed in socio-economic and 
ethnic terms.  
 
Brussels 1000 was prized for such qualities as: “close to work, on the metro line”; 
“close to European quarter”. As one of the male respondents revealed “I did not know the 
city when I was looking for a place to live, so I chose the apartment I liked most”. 
Those two respondents who lived in Auderghem cherished its proximity to work (“I 
chose it because it is a compromise between my place of work, my husband’s place of work 
and the European School in Uccle. I wanted to be able to get home from work quickly”), but 
also its suburban charm (“I was attracted by its relaxed suburban atmosphere and good public 
transport”). 
Finally, a person who lived in Jette seemed to consider it as “quiet, not a typical expat 
neighbourhood”, but featuring “good infrastructure”, while Woluwe St. Steven was chosen 
“due to good road access to the area [of work], combined with relatively low houses price in 
a nice, high quality residential area”.  
Overall, the new group typically settled in one of the municipalities surrounding the 
European quarter, such as Etterbeek, Ixelles, “better” Schaerbeek, 1000 Brussels and 
Auderghem. Their motivation was mainly proximity to work, good transport connection and 
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safety, but there were also motivations typical for each of these places: international, 
expatriate character of Etterbeek, “liveliness” of Ixelles, or small-town charm of Auderghem. 
The few who lived in Jette appreciated its safety and good infrastructure, but also considered 
it to be more “truly Belgium”, with lower concentration of expats. 
Therefore, it seems that the new group mimicked the settlement patterns of the “old 
group” several years ago. They looked for ambiance, “truly Belgian” experience, proximity 
to work and lower prices – and thus were not interested in living in districts traditionally 
inhabited by EU officials. Nevertheless, the “old group”, after a few years, mostly followed 
the example of their colleagues and moved to Eurocratic districts. However, the reasons for 
this seem to be related to the evolution of their lifestyle and preferences rather than to 
intensive socialisation within their DG, as suggested by Bellier (2002:86). Indeed, Etterbeek 
and Ixelles are very urban and lively quarters, probably too noisy and boisterous for families 
with children, but perfect for younger, socially active people. Woluwe or Wezembeek-
Oppem are typical family districts, “boring”, but green, safe and good looking, by contrast 
quite expensive. 
Altogether, while taking into account the answers from both groups, among those 
living in the city of Brussels, only six persons lived in 1000 Brussels (perhaps even less, as in 
two cases it was impossible to understand whether the respondents referred to a district or to 
the whole city), while as much as 11 persons declared living in Etterbeek, eight in Ixelles, 
seven in Schaerbeek (only persons from the new group), three in Auderghem and three in 
Jette. Two persons chose Woluwe St. Lambert, one person Woluwe St. Pierre and one 
Watermael Boitsfort. The participants from the follow up group living outside of Brussels 
mentioned such “posh” municipalities as Wezembeek Oppem, Kraainem or Genval, but also 
Braine- l’Alleud. Additionally, one person from the new group lives in Woluwe St. Stevens.  
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4.3.1.4.2. Evolution in spatial arrangements of the follow up group 
Based on her research on British EU officials, Cailliez observed that young officials would, 
after several years of living in Brussels, move from their original locations (usually close to 
work, often in European district) to residential, South-East parts of Brussels (Auderghem, 
Uccle, Watermael-Boitsfort, Woluwé-St-Lambert or Woluwé-St-Pierre) or peripheral areas of 
Brussels. She explained this movement with personal changes at the family level (marriages 
or having children) (Cailliez 2004:32). As she found out, although proximity of work was 
still cherished by many, the importance of this factor diminishes with time (ibid.:40-41).  
As my previous research reflected the beginning of the phenomenon of belated 
“migration” to more “Eurocratic” areas, I wanted to verify whether, several years later, the 
Polish EU officials adhered to the pattern common for other EU officials. 
Out of 20 persons from the follow-up group, only eight did not move during the last 
three years (since the previous research). Five persons moved to one of the typical enclaves 
inhabited by expats, such as Woluwe St. Pierre, Woluwe St. Lambert (two persons), 
Wezembeek-Oppem or Kraainem. Moving to one of these areas was usually explained by a 
purchase of a house in the district. In one case it was motivated by a “more green and calm” 
character of the district. One person, on the contrary, has left Woluwe St. Lambert, in order to 
buy a bigger flat in Brussels. Buying a house (or a flat) was also a motivation for people 
moving to other areas, such as Jette (two respondents). One person explained moving to 
Genval by changes in her personal life. Two persons moved to Brussels or Watermael-
Boisfort in order to live closer to their work, one person simply did not like the previous flat. 
By contrast, one of the male respondents explained: “I moved twice, mostly due to starting 
part-time work. I just didn’t need an apartment all of the time in the first place. I also couldn’t 
afford the old apartment on part-time wages.” One of the women moved with her Flemish 
husband from Flanders to Brussels [although she and her husband kept the house in the 
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countryside to spend there weekends]. As she explained, “The motivation [was] - two small 
children, so we did not want to spend too much time commuting.” Although, while 
completing the questionnaires, the respondents did not explicitly pointed at marriages and 
children as reasons for moving out from previous locations (which was pointed out by 
Cailliez 2004:32), many of them mentioned it during the interviews or occasional 
conversations. During the interview, Adrian reflected on a specific trend within the Polish EU 
institutions circle:  
Before, I used to live in the European district in Brussels, but now I live in Etterbeek. 
However, it is still the same … circle – notably these are always the surroundings of 
Schuman, Merode – for the last eight years. An important number of my friends live there. 
However, the friends who are now in couples, who got married, or have children, more and 
more often leave. And I think that with time it will be similarly as it was the case with other 
groups. And not necessarily these European districts. I have many acquaintances who live 
outside of Brussels and I think that there is such a process, that will not stop, and which will 
be natural with time- that people will keep on escaping from the center of Brussels in the 
direction of suburbs, or completely out of Brussels once they have children or once they will 
have such a need of stabilisation. But at the beginning, for sure … Well, it’s been already 
seven years I’m here, it’s difficult to call it ‘the beginning”, but I like it here, in this district. 
(Adrian) 
 
It can be concluded that the majority of my respondents “originating” from my former 
research changed their place of living, often moving to wealthier and quiet neighbourhoods, 
where they often acquired houses. Such neighbourhoods included the two Woluwes, 
Auderghem or “posh” municipalities outside Brussels (such as Wezembeek Oppem, 
Kraainem or Genval). 
Subsequently, I asked the interviewees questions aiming at verifying their 
involvement in public activity: whether they were interested in issues concerning their 
immediate surrounding. 
4.3.1.5. Interest in local matters 
EU officials, contrary to expats, often settle in Brussels for life. Moreover, it is with this 
assumption, or at least admitting such possibility, that they already come to Brussels. Even if 
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they do not sometimes exclude leaving the institutions in the future, their assignment is 
theoretically unlimited (except for contract or temporary staff) and this should, in principle, 
strongly affect their behaviour, but also their attitude to the local population and, more 
generally, to the place where they live. Based on Favell’s study it would seem that not only 
EU officials, but also other foreigners were able to establish “connections ... with local life” 
(Favell 2008a:54). The author stresses that such “functional integration” into the city, the 
multinational (or denationalized) space, does not require integration into national culture 
(2008a:136). On the other hand, several authors claim that European foreigners in Brussels 
usually do not participate in the city’s life (see e.g., Calay and Magosse 2008:494-495; Favell 
2001a; Shore 2000; Cailliez 2004). 
At this point, I wanted to verify whether my interviewees felt sufficient ownership of 
the place they inhabited so as to get involved in the life of their quarter. This could be 
political or cultural activity, but also mere interest in the issues concerning their immediate 
surrounding. Only very few of my interviewees (4 out of 21) admitted they were not 
following at all the information concerning their quarter. Surprisingly, one of them was a 
person living in Belgium already before the Poland’s accession to the European Union. As 
this interviewee explained, there was “not so much life” in the little municipality in Wallonia 
where she lived. Beniamin did not explain his attitude, succinctly stating that he did not have 
any interest at all. Bernard, on the other hand, was one of not so many interviewees who had 
registered as a voter. However, according to his own statement, “that was it”: “Other than 
this? Do I do anything special? No, not really”.  
The only person out of this category who gave a more elaborate explanation was 
Sebastian:  
Absolutely not [laughter]. Very limited, very limited. I live in Ixelles and so there is now a 
campaign for the local elections to which I obviously will not vote because of the obvious 
reason - because it’s obligatory, so I don’t want to impose on myself the obligation which I 
absolutely do not need. And when I receive those materials connected with the local election 
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campaign, I really cannot find any interest in those things and being honest, there is no reason 
why I should be interested …Oh, I don’t own the apartment, I rent it, right? So I can move to 
different districts ... Second, I don’t have kids, so I’m not interested in the school issue. I 
don’t use public transport. I’m not ill, so I don’t go to hospital. Why should I be interested in 
my district? And the street is clean, so everything is fine. (Sebastian) 
 
This last explanation seems to go in the same direction that the findings of Favell, 
who remarked that the quality of life and degree of satisfaction of Brussels expatriates is high 
enough that they “feel no great pressure to get involved for social change”(2001a:43). 
However, as it was mentioned before, EU officials’ stay in Brussels is usually meant to be 
permanent.  
Indeed, the majority of my interviewees showed some degree of interest in the local 
affairs. Many of them limited their interest to certain information, selected either based on the 
accessibility criterion or on the thematic criterion. The first category was formed of the 
interviewees who admitted to profit from the information that was directly given to them, and 
not actively searching for it. Patrycja said:  
Not that I’m actively looking for this information, but whenever I get the local bulletin, they 
are sending this newspaper every, I think, two weeks or once per month, then I’m always 
reading it, so I know if there are some construction works, … But it’s not that I’m [actively 
looking for it] … I’m just curious of what is going on or also if there are some streets where 
there are, how to call it… brocante, so this I know. But, if I’ve never got this newspaper, I 
would never look for it, so it’s just because it comes there and I just read it. (Patrycja) 
 
Similarly, Emilia admitted she was reading the information “given to her”, without taking the 
initiative to search for details: 
[l’m interested in the local matters] to a limited extent I would say. So, the infrastructure, 
okay, to some extent, when the information ready is given to me, so I’m not searching for it. 
It comes to me, okay, I absorb it, I’m interested, but I’m not deliberately looking for details or 
I’m not following political life in my district, no, this is not the case. Okay, I’m interested in 
what’s happening in the neighborhood, but it’s also not very intensive I would say [chuckle]. 
(Emilia) 
 
Also Klara acknowledged: “I am interested in the information we receive from the 
municipality and I am trying to follow everything, which concerns the municipality’s life”.  
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As to the second group, a couple of interviewees stated they looked mostly for 
information that concerned them personally, and that had impact on them. Maksymilian 
expressed this attitude in the most explicit manner:  
Well, certainly I am interested in things which concern me directly. So, I’m definitely 
interested in the issue of the [new tramway line] because, well, of course, when I bought the 
flat I thought that tramway would be there in a couple of years, but then some people 
protested against it. The construction was blocked for a couple of years and, well, this kind of 
things definitely interest me because it concerns the quality of my life, but, well of course, I 
try, let’s say, to know when there is any festival in my district or some kind of Sunday fair or 
this kind of things, but I cannot say that I am extremely involved in the political, or social or 
cultural life of my district, no. (Maksymilian) 
 
 Aleksandra presented roughly the same attitude, although she put it in a more succinct 
manner: “Very selfishly unfortunately, what’s of specific interest, like infrastructural projects 
and if they would impact me, then I follow them, but I’m not so involved in local politics or 
voting”.  
On the other hand, some of the interviewees declared the lack of interest for certain 
spheres of activity, mostly politics. As Filip put it: “Cultural life, yes, political life: a little. 
Too little. There are elections and I do not know whom I should vote for, right? [chuckle]”. 
Filip at least registered as a voter (in the local elections), while most of the respondents had 
not done it. However, there seems to be little correlation between registering for the election 
and the intensity of the declared involvement in political life. 
 Those of my interviewees who declared any deeper involvement in local affairs 
explained it usually either by referring to their civic responsibility or by genuine interest in 
local cultural and political activities. For Maja, the turning point seems to be the purchase of 
a house in Belgium (curiously, the fact of being only a tenant was referred to by Sebastian as 
justification for the absence of civic involvement): “Yes, yes. Because two years ago we 
bought a house and thus we are kind of citizens already, so yes, to the extent possible”.  
This feeling of citizenship seemed to be a particularly important motivation for 
Stanislaw:  
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Just behind the corner there is a sport centre. I’m going to this sport centre. I feel responsible 
for my street. Whenever I see some trashes on the street, I put them to the dustbin, they know 
that I’m waving my small Polish flag, but [they] treat me all like a neighbour, and I’m also 
interested in seeing all my neighbours. I’m for assimilation, for being an active member as a 
Polish, for being an active member of a community in Forest and respecting their law all the 
time. (Stanislaw) 
 
Laura actually has Belgian nationality, so for her, a minimum involvement was a 
question of legal obligation. However, her interest seemed to go far beyond the compulsory 
voting:  
Well, perforce, as well, as I have the obligation to vote. I have the nationality, so, I have to be 
interested. Besides, there are so many things here, that sometimes, you have to push it 
forward, as the Belgians are very passive and if someone does not put one’s foot down, also 
while the elections approach, different things can be pushed through, as then, they finally start 
working [laughter]. (Laura) 
 
The sphere that seemed to be neglected was definitely the political life. As they said, 
it was “too difficult to follow”. Some of the interviewees admitted that their interest in the 
political sphere was far too little. However, overall eight interviewees enrolled to vote in the 
local elections. Darek showed enormous interest also in the political life, motivated not that 
much by abstract “citizenship” or “civicity”, but by the need to protect Polish inhabitants’ 
interests:  
Yes, of course. I even decided to enrol for the local elections which are going to take place on 
October 14, I mean [for] Brussels 1000. I am definitely interested, as I see the increasing 
influence of the foreigners (not from Europe) on the policy of the city of Brussels and I would 
like to make a difference by voting, if possible, even for the Poles, although there are no Poles 
in this electoral region, but I think we are so numerous that we should have some 
representatives. This is impossible that only the Moroccans, out of the foreigners, have their 
representatives, and not the Poles, while we are a dozen of thousands here, in Brussels and no 
one is able to speak to us, right? I enrolled for the elections for this reason, this time it is 
impossible to vote for Polish people, so I will find someone from a purely Belgian party and 
not the foreigners who are Muslim and have completely different views and would like to 
impose their fancies to all inhabitants. (Darek) 
 
Ksawery also showed genuine interest in local issues, although he was not so much focused 
on political life and his motivation also seemed not to be of political order:  
Yes, [I am interested in the issues of my neighbourhood], very much so. I live in a small city 
of Braine-l’Alleud in the North Brabant Wallonie, which you know,177 and that city is quite 
active in social life and there are many events of cultural and societal nature in which I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 I visited the interviewee at home during my previous research. 
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participate. Especially I pick up the family activities, outdoor activities that happen there and 
that are often related to the local life and I’m also very much interested in the infrastructural 
projects that go on there, there are many such initiatives, there is also a quite active political 
life. In Belgium we will have also local elections, so I observe those processes and I 
participate in them. (Ksawery) 
 
A number of interviewees had an attitude similar to Ksawery’s, namely a genuine interest 
motivated by the will to participate in cultural, political and social activities. This was, for 
instance, the case of Ula:  
Yeah, I mean, since we’ve moved here, there are lots of events organized by the commune. 
We try to go and see and this is very interesting and I like this organization here that in your 
little world, which is the commune, lots of things happen and they keep you informed and you 
really feel like a part of these people. (Ula) 
 
Overall, most of the EU officials interviewed showed some interest in local issues, 
although the majority of them limited their attention to certain categories of information. A 
clear minority was more interested in political or cultural life. One can conclude that this 
pattern indicates a comparable or somewhat stronger level of involvement than this is 
normally the case of “expats” (see Favell 2001a, 2010).  
As the next step, I asked my interviewees whether they were active in associative life. 
4.3.1.6. Social activities and associative life 
Associative life can play a major role in the integration of migrants or expatriates, both 
positive or, if it is limited to exclusive, foreign circles, negative. For instance, Fechter 
described the importance of wives’ associations on building the expatriate community 
(Fechter 2007a:44, 48). Leonard stressed the importance of clubs in “structuring the social 
fabric” (2010b:1255). On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the associative tradition 
is not very strong in the Polish society. From this perspective, participation in associations 
might even be considered as a sign of successful acculturation. For this reason, in addition to 
the interest in the local issues I tried to assess the intensity of the associative life of the Polish 
EU officials, as well as their involvement in other forms of organised social activities.  
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The majority of my interviewees did not participate in any structured, organized 
activity of associative type. Only seven of them (thus one-third of the interviewees) were 
permanent members of any associations. Although many of them practiced sport, sometimes 
using club facilities, only Zofia and Sebastian were actually members of any clubs organising 
sport-oriented social activities. Zofia was a member of the Yoga Association of the European 
institutions, organizing also weekend yoga activities. She has also been involved in gardening 
activities since she bought a house with a garden. This permitted her to socialise with some 
retired people. Likewise, Sebastian was involved in sport activities and he took it quite 
seriously. He was a member of a Runners Club and a Canoe Club. He also participated in 
activities with a circle of tango lovers. Maja participated in the cultural life of the Polish 
diaspora in Brussels, as she sang in a Polish choir in a church (although she was not religious) 
and she “liked that it’s Polish”. She also belonged to some sport clubs and she envisaged to 
get involved in organised social activities with a Parents’ Committee in the maternity school 
of her two children. Also Filip belonged to a school ensemble, whereas Stanislaw was a 
member of as much as three different clubs:  
I’m a member of [international club with a section in Brussels]. … I’m officially a member of 
the Russian club here, but I’m going on various lectures just to improve my knowledge and 
according to my interests. I’m interested in Balkans for example. ... And the Alumni Club of 
my studies, which is active here in Brussels. We have regular meetings for people who used 
to study there. (Stanislaw) 
 
Kamil was the only one involved in true charity activity:  
Yes, I’m in this Oxfam NGO, I’m in the Commission chess club … I’m a member of 
Couchsurfers’ organization, but this is not really formal. You don’t have to sign any 
declaration or whatever, but okay, I’m on Couchsurfing. Plus, the Green Party, but this is now 
just formality, because I’m not actively engaged besides paying some monthly … fees, so 
that’s about the organizations. (Kamil) 
 
Finally, Darek was involved in both political and cultural activity:  
Half-professionally, half privately, I am member and vice-president of a trade union at my 
job, which allows for contacts with Poles and, obviously, administration on issues concerning 
our employment. More privately, I am the founder and animator of a chess-club and we 
organise meetings once per month. Besides, I practice no sports. (Darek) 
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Out of the majority of the interviewees who did not belong to any association, some 
nevertheless emphasized their involvement in social activities. For instance, Adrian said:  
I mean, in such a formalised organisation, no, I am not member of any. We were trying to 
launch a Polish club in Brussels, which unfortunately didn’t work too much. I was organising, 
for a while, Polish speaking meetings – kind of “Polish tables” for non-Poles speaking Polish, 
for them to have contacts with Poles.  I organised probably five [such meetings]. Later, I must 
admit, I’ve had no time to deal with it. I participated in the organisation of WOŚP and i.a. I 
co-organised a concert this year. That’s where I helped with various different activities, so 
this is also an element of the “Polish” activism, for sure ... All this, it was not really 
formalised, but it had some ... effects. (Adrian) 
 
Laura expressed her a priori reluctance towards organizations and associations, but declared 
eagerness to “help”:  
No, no organised structures [for me], as I am still of the old system. I am very allergic to 
everything what is organised structures, like parties, no way I could join any party. I can help, 
for instance, the Women’s Party, I would gladly go there and listen what they have to say, but 
I will certainly not be activist, as, to me, it has a very bad co-notation. (Laura) 
 
Some other interviewees referred to sport, socializing or cultural activities. This was the case 
of Aleksandra and Emilia. The latter said:  
No, not really [laughter]. Okay, I have a kind of subscription … to use some sport equipment 
in the sport center, but it’s not like a club, so it’s just private use, with friends, but without any 
kind of organized guidance or anything like that, so no I don’t think I’m involved in any clubs 
or associations, no. … I don’t know, what can be understood as social activities? Can it be 
going out or going to cinema, to some concerts from time to time, yes, so these are the things, 
of course some activities for kids that is also something we try to follow. (Emilia) 
 
Beniamin simply described his social activities, referring to eating out or visits of friends:  
Yes. So I try to meet my friends and colleagues after work. This involves going to different 
clubs, restaurants, meeting in the park, going out for Saturday – Sunday to Ardens … I’m not 
a member of any club or an organization, but I do go to a gym where I also have a few Polish 
colleagues. We go to discos sometimes, usual things, you know lunches, I visit them at home, 
we eat together. (Beniamin) 
 
Other interviewees bluntly denied being involved in any organised activity (e.g., Patrycja, 
Otylia). Yet some others justified their lack of engagement with the fact that they had small 
children: “No. I work full time plus I have two very small kids at home, so I’m very busy 
with that” (Dominika); “No, not for the moment [laughter and pointing at a baby]. For the 
moment this is my biggest social event, so no, nothing like that” (Ula).  
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In general, the Polish EU officials I interviewed do not seem to be particularly 
involved in the associative life. Only a few of them are members of any club or association 
and those are often sport clubs or other hobby-based associations, often linked to the EU 
institutions. Only a minority is involved in charity or political activity. 
4.3.1.7. Attachment to Brussels: what if the EU institutions moved to another city? 
After the discussion on their establishment and functioning in the city, I tried to find out 
whether the Polish EU officials have developed a strong emotional link with the city, or if 
they were merely attached to the EU institutions community in which they spent most of their 
time.  
One of the interview questions assumed that the institutions, together with all their 
employees and the expats dealing with EU matters would move to another place, such as 
Paris, Prague or Canary Islands.  
Several persons admitted that in case the EU institutions moved to another city, they 
would miss Brussels or they would be otherwise unhappy about this fact. This concerned 
both some persons who had come to Brussels for a job related reasons and some of those who 
had already lived in Brussels before they started to work in the EU institutions. The latter is 
notably the case of Otylia, who said:  
Certainly, but it would be different this time, as if you are dislocated once, then it is easier to 
go through it again, however, now, my life is already fully arranged here and it would be a 
problem. (Otylia) 
 
Emilia admitted she would miss Belgium, as she appreciated certain aspects of life in this 
city. However, she would be ready to move out, especially that there were also many things 
she  did not like in Belgium. 
 On the other hand, for Maksymilian, staying in Brussels would rather be a question of 
convenience: 
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Well, I don’t know how it would be like in this new place, but as I said I would definitely be 
very unhappy about the fact that I have to change my life again and do the job, let’s say, not 
really adaptation, but let’s say, again try to make friends and come to know places and 
develop … the habits which I need to feel safe. So, from this point of view, I would be 
definitely quite upset about it, but it’s not because I’m emotionally very strongly attached to 
Brussels. (Maksymilian) 
 
Numerous interviewees, on the contrary, showed unconditional enthusiasm to the 
idea. Again, in this group there were persons who had lived in Brussels for quite a long time. 
Laura’s testimony bares resentment towards the city and its inhabitants. She vividly 
exclaimed with laughter: “I dream about it!” Further interrogated on whether she would not 
miss Brussels, she said:  
Absolutely not! Absolutely not! I am even telling this to the Belgian people that I am 
dreaming about it, [about] being transferred elsewhere, because they do not deserve us, I am 
being so nasty with them and really ... if only they warn me about it in advance, so as to sell 
the flat before the price goes down [laughter]. 
Now I laugh, you know, I talk a lot with my colleagues who did not understand me at the 
beginning, they used to say that I am a bit nuts, as I told them such things, I guess this is 
shocking when you hear such things right after the arrival, as everybody is so innocent, I was 
also innocent when I arrived here, I regret this time very much and they, after years, they 
admit: “at the beginning we thought you were a bit crazy, and that, in general, something’s 
wrong with you, but everything happened as you said”. I respond: “Fortune teller, fortune 
teller [I am]” [laughter]. And you know, these people, after five or seven years, not only 
confirmed I was right, but even started to adopt attitudes very similar to mine, as I spoke with 
colleagues who were very prone to compromise, tried not to stand out and to do things 
through compromises, now said: “if you do not stand up against, you have nothing”. I said: 
“didn’t I tell you?” Well, you know, there is satisfaction somewhere, not that it is so, as I wish 
it was not, but that you know and you arrived to a right conclusion, so it is not that bad with 
me and I still have social skills [laughter]. (Laura) 
 
Another long-term inhabitant of Brussels, Maja, said she would not mind leaving Brussels, 
although she had happened to miss Belgium in the past: 
I have already missed Belgium, when I was detached to work in Italy. Even though I liked it 
very much, but it is there where I realised that some of my roots stayed in Brussels. But after I 
had come back from Italy, I wanted to go back there [laughter], and as I did not manage, at 
least did I find a husband [laughter]. So, no, I do not think it would bother me, as I am so open 
and it does not bother me when I have to adapt. On the contrary: this is a challenge and an 
experience. (Maja) 
 
Also those who had settled in Brussels relatively recently expressed their dissatisfaction with 
their life in Brussels. Klara said:  
No, no [I wouldn’t miss Belgium], not at all, not at all ... [laughter], for me, the Canary 
Islands, yes please. No, I would not miss Belgium. In Belgium, we adapted to the 
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environment, but we are not so delighted with our life here so as to make it sad for us to leave. 
(Klara) 
 
Also Beniamin’s reaction suggested that living in Brussels must have been challenging for 
him: “God, yes, please! … I could live in another country”. 
Some respondents claiming that they would not mind the Commission moving to 
another city made it clear that the attractiveness of Brussels lied precisely in its international, 
pluricultural character that would disappear together with the institutions:  
If the weather is nicer [laughter], I must say, that could be a good idea. … I think I would 
miss the international atmosphere, but then, if the whole Commission and all the institutions 
move there, then the international atmosphere will also move, so I don’t know, but I think … 
there are a lot of things in the city that I like, but still the weather and some stuff are still quite 
annoying, so if we could move to some place, like … maybe Spain or Prague, yeah, a very 
nice city, I wouldn’t mind [laughter]. (Zofia) 
 
Because, to a large extent Brussels … revolves around the Commission expats, international 
community. If that all is gone, there is very little left, let’s be honest. Those buildings will be 
vacant and there will be no one in this bar, so staying here would miss the point. (Bernard)!
 
Because I assume that all this environment, as well, not only buildings. The institutions are 
mostly people, officials, employees, and they would all move together with the institutions. 
Buildings and the city are actually without importance if the circle of your friends is among 
the EU officials. If we all move, your acquaintances, friends, all move. (Darek)!
 
The opinions quoted above tell much about the attitude of certain Polish EU officials to 
Brussels. Indeed, for them, Brussels stands for the institutions and their expatriate friends. If 
the instiutions moved, everything would move, so the situation would remain almost the 
same. If, indeed, the Polish EU officials community exists, as certain responses to previous 
questions would suggest, this community is deterritorialised, it could be transplanted 
elsewhere without losing its character. 
Some respondents referred also to the idea of a new challenge which moving to 
another city would bring about. Adrian confirmed his readiness to leave, in the following 
words: 
It would be an interesting challenge; I could certainly cope with it. If there was such a 
decision ... I think this is not very realistic, but if it was, for sure ... I have not come here, to 
Belgium, to be in Belgium, right? I’ve come here, as the EU institutions are here. If it was 
another country, I would probably go, although, by now I have also started to identify myself 
with Belgium in some way, for sure. But for sure, it would not be a problem to move. … 
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Probably, I would [miss Brussels]. I can tell, as when I come back here from somewhere, I 
don’t feel estranged. And also on the basis of the [experience of] friends who had left 
Belgium and are very nostalgic and miss the city. (Adrian) 
 
Darek had a similar point of view:  
I think I would be even glad: a new, different city, different local people, different things to 
see and different connections with other cities. Something would change. I think I would even 
want such a change. (Darek) 
 
4.3.1.8. Brussels: the city of expats?  
Thus, although the previous questions made me think that at least some of my interviewees 
are integrated within the city, as Favell (2001a, 2008a) wanted it, this kind of integration does 
not necessarily imply attachment. But, if the Polish EU officials care only about the EU 
institutions world and the “satellite” expat crowd, perhaps they would prefer to eliminate 
completely the “genuine”, national character of the place they live? The following question 
confronted my interviewees with the eventuality of living in an “expat city”, without 
genuinely local population. 
Not surprisingly, all of my interviewees responded with horror to the suggestion that 
they might want to live in a city inhabited by expats only. The question was supposed to 
make them reveal, in the context of the response to the question, their attitude to the mixity, 
to their colleagues and the local people, as well as their perception of Brussels and their way 
of integration into the city. 
A large number of interviewees observed that their life in Brussels already resembles 
a lot life in a city of Eurocrats. Bernard remarked that “this is the case here already”, Adrian 
admitted: “but I feel here a bit as if Brussels was a city like that”. Klara said:  
Actually, Brussels is a place like that in certain districts … but luckily ... it is still governed by 
the Belgian State … and I wouldn’t like to live in a place governed by the Eurocrats. (Klara)
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I asked the interviewees to give reasons for their answers. Those presented certain common 
features. Some of them pointed, paradoxically, at the lack of diversity, as such, as a serious 
impediment. Emilia believed that: 
It’s a great value to have a proper mixture of people and people with completely different 
perspectives and experience and just to have a chance to see things from the other angle. 
(Emilia) 
 
Maksymilian further developed a similar statement: 
You need a certain variety, I mean, I rather tend to avoid colleagues in my private life. I mean, 
I think we spent sufficient time together at work and I think it would be quite impoverishing 
to limit my social contacts to people who … are in the same situation as I am. I mean, I think 
it’s quite enriching to meet people from different cultures and different professions and with 
different experiences and with different life stories and … I mean, living in the city with only 
Eurocrats would be like, living, spending the whole day in my Commission building. 
(Maksymilian) 
 
Ksawery added:  
I also appreciate very much some kind of mixture of origins and nationalities that coexist in 
Brussels and create this unique atmosphere and environment. (Ksawery) 
 
Many interviewees thought that living in such a city would be impoverishing. Dominika said:  
There is local culture everywhere you go and it’s a pity not knowing it. And it’s so rich to try 
different food, different music, different books and different ideas. (Dominika)  
 
For Klara, “this would be a place sterilised of everything”, Filip feared that “that would be 
the narrowing down of [one’s] cultural life”. As he continued: “The city with only expats has 
no roots and usually becomes degenerate, like Nowa Huta”.178 Darek compared such an expat 
place to a “ghetto”. 
Therefore, the city inhabited exclusively by the EU officials of 28 different 
nationalities, as well as by other expats would lack diversity, because their professional 
situation and the perception of the world would be the same. It is striking that my 
interviewees perceived EU officials of different nationalities as belonging to the same “tribe”. 
For them, they were colleagues, fellow Eurocrats, rather than Spaniards, Frenchmen or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 A socialist “perfect city” built near Cracow in the Stalinist period, it was conceived as home for workers of 
the newly constructed giant steelworks; its population, consisting of uprooted, usually uneducated migrants 
from different parts of the country, quickly degenerated and fell prey of alcoholism and different “social evils”. 
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Slovaks, they were perceived as having more in common with each other than with any other 
category of Europeans. 
Some others emphasized the importance of the presence of a dominant culture.  
Bernard put it explicitly:  
It would be without any predominate culture, and maybe that would be interesting, that there 
would be nothing to discover. Apart of it, an interesting aspect is just to get to know a 
different culture, but there has to be one. (Bernard) 
 
He also stated that it is too early for the emergence of “a genuine European culture”. 
Similarly, Adrian said: “it would be very artificial. There must be a group who feels some 
attachment”. Aleksandra and Ula admitted that they felt better surrounded by a dominant host 
community having “an element of a national life around” or seeing “something else, like real 
Belgium”. Ula added: 
People complain they never know real Belgians, which is true … So, it’s better that we still 
live in normal … environment not only with expats and with other Commission workers (Ula) 
 
 Other interviewees described a situation of a “city of expats” as artificial.  
My respondents often used the question as an opportunity to elaborate on their life in 
Brussels and their adaptation strategies. Maja explained:  
Because, as I said, my experience with expats …, except for those persons that I know 
through private contacts, through my husband, are very lukewarm, if I can say. And if this is 
transmitted to neighbour relations in a block of flats, so if you have neighbours who are like 
that, so lukewarm … (Maja) 
 
Darek admitted, that to the extent possible, he was “trying to meet people from outside this 
environment”. He added:  
While buying a flat, I chose a place with no EU officials. My neighbour, for instance, is an 
old Belgian attorney, with a long family tradition, on the street there are also foreigners from 
Morocco and, on the other side, there is a house full of Africans. (Darek) 
 
Zofia said:  
I like to have some friends from work in my life also that I really appreciate and enjoy 
spending time with them, but I didn’t even want to live in Woluwe, you know, or Uccle, 
because ... the percentage of expats and EU officials was too high for me, ad here in Jette I 
feel quite well, you know, more in a normal life of local people. (Zofia) 
! 279!
4.3.1.9. Place of “belonging” 
Having learnt that the Polish EU officials I interviewed felt fairly adapted in their 
environment and even “integrated in the city” (Favell 2001a), although not very much 
attached to it, I asked them where they felt they belonged: in other terms, with which place (if 
any) they felt, after several years in Brussels, the strongest link. 
Five out of 21 interviewees said they belonged here, in Brussels, although many of 
them referred also to places where they had been brought up or studied. Maja succinctly 
replied: “Brussels certainly, and also Lublin, my home town. And Poland as well”. Laura 
originally answered “nowhere”. However, she corrected herself:  
I mean, actually Brussels, as I’ve lived here my whole life, as, you know, I have a 
complicated biography in Poland, I didn’t live anywhere, I can’t tell where I am from when 
someone asks, I am from nowhere in Poland. (Laura) 
 
Adrian referred to the parallel processes of adaptation in Brussels and progressive alienation 
of his own town (Warsaw):  
I think I started to identify myself with Brussels. I started my eighth year in Brussels. Okay, 
Warsaw is my city, I was born there, I studied there, it will always be my city. However, as I 
do not have regular contact [with Warsaw], I walk in the street and I go to my favourite place 
which does not exist anymore – there is a bank there – and I do not know these streets and it is 
somehow difficult to explore Warsaw. Brussels is smaller, so it is easier to get a grip on and 
as I spend more time here, I think I identify myself with Brussels. (Adrian) 
 
Also Darek explained in detail his choice:  
Whenever I come back from a trip, a longer stay outside Brussels, when I come back, I’d say 
that I’m coming home, that I am at home and at present, I identify myself mostly with 
Brussels. (Darek) 
 
Only two persons quoted their hometown as the place they felt they belonged to. Dominika 
had no doubts about it:  
Of course a region. I’m coming from Poznań, so it’s [the region of] Greater Poland that is 
most important place to me. (Dominika) 
 
Also Sebastian simply answered: “Warsaw”. Some other interviewees, although they did not 
designate their hometown as the primary place of belonging, attached nevertheless much 
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importance to the place they originated in, or to their native region. This was the case of 
Stanislaw, who said:  
I was born in [a city in the Mazovian region ]. Even right now, on my car I have an emblem of 
my city. I’m reading the local newspaper, okay, it’s also due to the fact that I was once 
running there in elections, but I like my region. I would like to serve to my region in the 
future, maybe as an MP … . I was studying in Mazowsze. … So, I feel Polish, definitely. 
European, Polish, born in a Mazovian city, raised in Warsaw culture, with a great influence of 
United States – I’ve been [there] three times for three months - Chicago area. (Stanislaw) 
 
A few persons indicated that they did not really have the feeling they belonged to any place. 
Beniamin said jokingly: “frankly, I don’t think I belong anywhere. I just exist in one of the 
many out of millions universes”. Maksymilian elaborated a bit more on his attitude to places 
where he lived, suggesting that he did not really “belong” to any places, although he could be 
nostalgic for settings and situations:  
I’m getting used to places, and certain settings very easily, but having said that, I mean, it is 
more a question of convenience than strong emotional ties … If I have to, tomorrow, go to 
New York, or Warsaw, or any other place, I would probably find it quite inconvenient, I mean 
to adapt to a new reality and … to recreate my little universe around me, but I will not, like, 
cry the whole night, so I mean, this is just to say that, whether I belong here, or whether I 
belong there, … I wouldn’t formulate it like that, but now I feel at home here, that’s for sure. I 
definitely do not think that my home is in Poland and here I’m only on a temporary basis and 
wherever I am, my home is in Warsaw, the Jelonki district, where I’ve grown up, … I’m 
definitely nostalgic for my childhood as, I suppose, many people are, but I’m not nostalgic for 
this type of places, like Poland, or anywhere else. (Maksymilain) 
 
Some other respondents who gave broadly similar answers, were rather vague while 
determining their place of attachment. It is characteristic that these persons referred to the 
concept of Europeanness to explain the reasons for hesitation: 
I think I’m in the middle of adaptation, so, it’s easier and easier for me in everyday life. But 
there are still many issues that I still don’t know, because I was not yet at the stage of looking 
for school for children or childcare - about these I have no idea. While in Poland I would 
know it immediately, because we just know so many local people who use it, so you just 
know it, and here it’s not like that, it’s just that I would have to look for that information. … I 
would absolutely not identify myself as connected with Belgium. I treat this place as a place 
where I work, so I would say that I’m more European living in Belgium. European - Polish 
living in Belgium. (Patrycja) 
 
That is a good question because we are more Europeans than nationals, but I think I’m both. 
I’m first of all national because I feel national and I speak the language and I associate myself 
with a certain culture, which is Poland, but on the other hand I’m very much fond of European 
Integration in the large sense, and that makes me a bit European also, so I think it’s both, that 
I’m European and national in the same time. (Ksawery) 
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I don’t know at all. I cannot say I’m, you know, from Brussels, Bruxelloise, I don’t think so at 
all [laughter]. I’m not Belgian at all … I think I have this European identity, you know, that 
okay, I’m from Poland, but I lived in France most of my adult life I must say and now I’ve 
lived here for a few years and maybe tomorrow I could live somewhere else. (Zofia) 
 
Most of the interviewees said the place where they belonged was still Poland. Sometimes, 
they also had secondary places of attachment, like Aleksandra, who spent some time in the 
United Kingdom:  
I think it still depends on the period of my life, I mean in general and by origins I identify 
with Poland and the town that I come from and that doesn’t change. I feel some closeness and 
familiarity with the UK because I’ve spent quite a number of years there. But I don’t quite 
associate myself with Belgium so much. (Aleksandra) 
 
 Similar reflection was shared by Otylia who has lived in Belgium for quite a long time and 
had a daughter issued from a nationally mixed marriage: 
I am a Pole. I am definitely a Pole, although I am impregnated with Belgitude and now also 
with multiculturalism, so actually, I feel European. And certainly, I’ve brought up a European 
– my daughter. (Otylia) 
 
 These multiple attachments were also shared by Klara and Kamil: 
Ooff, I guess [I belong] in Poland [laughter], definitely. No, I mean, I feel now at home in 
Poland, in Greece and in Belgium. To a different degree. But I belong in Poland, definitely. 
(Klara)  
 
In the first I think it’s Poland, Polish then. Then, I think European, because I work in the EU 
institutions. Then, my region, so - lubuskie . Then, Brussels. (Kamil) 
 
4.3.2. Daily life  
Having heard about the impressions, attitudes and convictions that the research partcipants 
had with regard to Brussels and their possible adaptation or integration, it might be 
interesting to see if there are any “objective” indicators of these attitudes or processes in their 
daily life. 
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4.3.2.1. Change of lifestyle after arrival in Brussels? 
Berry defines acculturation as “a dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes 
place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual 
members” (2005:698). As the scholar elaborates, in addition to changes in social structures, 
cultural practices and institutions of a group, acculturation involves changes in an 
individual’s behaviours (Berry 2005:698-699). These changes may concern the way people 
speak, dressing and eating habits or one’s cultural identity (Berry et al. 2002:352). With this 
in mind, I asked the research participants whether their lifestyle had changed significantly 
since they came to Belgium, hoping to obtain a hint on whether and to what extent their daily 
routine has been impacted by the new place of living and the surrounding other cultures. 
Twelve out of 28 respondents (from the new research group) who gave an answer to 
this question found that their life had not changed significantly since they had come to 
Brussels. Some of them referred to changes in their lifestyle that they did not, nevertheless, 
found important or significant. One of them mentioned “new job, new flat, distance from the 
family, new friends”, but qualified these changes as superficial. Another male respondent 
said: “Not really… maybe except that I can afford more than when I lived in Poland”. One of 
the women referred to the fact that she “eats out more often and became more interested in 
good food”, but also considered that her lifestyle had not changed “significantly”. On the 
other hand, other research participants considered that their life has changed to a certain 
extent, precisely because of: “a much higher salary than in Poland”; or as yet another one put 
it: 
because moving to Belgium largely coincided with a significant upward change in my income 
and job stability. Compared with my life in Poland (a university lecturer making ends meet by 
doing a lot of freelance work in evenings), I have much more free time for quality activities 
with the family, and a significantly higher income (which means e.g., being able to afford 
quality food, restaurant outings, a larger home, etc.). The fact of having two young children 
since moving to Belgium has also affected my lifestyle significantly – there is less time for 
more traditionally young leisure activities (especially social nights out) and more time is 
devoted to children at home. 
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For some respondents the arrival to Brussels coincided with events which are not 
specifically related to the city or to the European institutions, such as birth of children or the 
beginning of their professional life: “It did change, but mainly due to the fact that my two 
children were born”; “A lot – I have a baby now and it is impossible to spend all weekends in 
the mountains or bike as much as in e.g., Germany”; “Basically I stopped being a student, and 
started a professional life”; “It is very difficult to say because before coming to Belgium I 
was a student and here I did a stage and started my professional life – and this was the 
biggest change in my lifestyle. I think it would have happened in a similar way had I been in 
another place too”. 
For some other Polish EU officials, the arrival to Brussels stood for a slower pace of 
life: “It got more lazy, the job is not so difficult, not stressful I have time for hanging around 
with friends, I go out a lot, speak with people, drink more alcohol than before. I don’t worry 
about the money, future, “Eurocrat” life is very comfortable”; “Yes, I have much more free 
time and earn enough to live well”.  
Changes described by these respondents could not be analysed as related to 
acculturation, they might and probably would occur also if they had moved to another city in 
Poland or if they had simply changed the job or increased their monthly income. 
A few persons who gave an affirmative answer referred to aspects reflecting, to some 
extent, the local eating habits as important aspects of his lifestyle which had changed:  
To some extent yes. I eat Belgian food (moules; frites) ;-) I spend more time in restaurants; 
  
I slowed down. Before, I used to work hard and travel frequently to far-away places. Here, 
my job is less demanding and stable. I can spend more time on out-of-work activities, which 
is great. Belgium has a large Polish ‘expat’ community and good access to culture related to 
Poland which I take advantage of. This was not the case with my previous assignments (New 
York, Montreal, Berlin, Mexico, etc.). 
 
 Subsequently, I inquired about the way they spent their free time – firstly, I asked 
whether they frequented predominantly “expat” places or rather places popular among the 
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local (Belgian) population, in order to find out to what extent they stuck to the “expat 
community”. 
4.3.2.2. Spare time: “expat” spaces or Belgian spaces? 
According to various authors, the separation of skilled mobile professionals from the local 
population, partly due to their working patterns, allegedly extends to their spare time. 
Expatriates would remain “scotched” to certain circuits, including work, home and expatriate 
places (see e.g., Vertovec and Cohen 2002:7). This would make part of a conscious process 
of establishing boundaries by expatriates themselves (see Fechter 2007a:63).  
During the interviews, I asked the research participants about places where they tend 
to spend their time, to find out whether, indeed, they maintained physical and social 
boundaries separating them from the host population. The answers to this question revealed 
that the lifestyles of my interviewees varied significantly. Relatively few of them admitted 
that they frequented mainly places popular among other EU officials and “expats”. Only one 
of them - Adrian - clearly regretted not reaching outside “the bubble”: “Unfortunately – 
unfortunately, I insist – among “expats”. Rather seldom do I go to typically Belgian places. 
When I meet people, these are most often non-Belgians”. Patrycja, by contrast, admitted she 
had preference for “expat” places and “expat” life:  
Mostly “expat” oriented, because I don’t have Belgian friends, so I don’t know where 
Belgians go out, but those places that I know that they are maybe typical Belgian bars, I don’t 
like them, so I don’t even try to go there. So, these are usually events organized either by 
Polish community, like Polish Embassy or by people working in the institutions or around. 
(Patrycja) 
 
Beniamin, although he said he went also to Belgian restaurants, he was not really sure 
(and did not seem to care) whether there were actually any Belgians frequenting these places:  
I can tell you precisely where I go. So, I go to “Piola Libri”, I go to “Amigos de Aragon”, 
“Casa Miguel”, so I think these are the places which are not really Polish oriented, these are 
not Polish clubs, so these are Spanish, Italian, Belgian restaurants. But there are many Polish 
people there. (Beniamin) 
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Klara explained the fact of going mainly to “expat places” by the fact that she lived in 
a district where “expats” were overrepresented:  
I think so, [I think] ... that some of these places are popular rather among “expats” and this is 
also because of its territorial location, as ... we live in Kraainem and, in general, Kraainem, 
Woluwe-St.-Lambert, these are quarters which are very much populated by the Eurocrats, so, 
by the nature of things, when you frequent any place there, they are actually all frequented by 
the Eurocrats. (Klara) 
 
 The other interviewees who frequented mainly “expat places” explained this phenomenon by 
different lifestyles and different financial capacities of the local population. Sebastian 
referred to his sport activities where he seemingly met both Belgians and “expats”. Then he 
explained:  
This is very simple, right, this is a city of “expats” and Belgians live different lives, right, 
which you don’t know … I guess, when you are settled, you just stay where you are, where 
your place is; basically at home, especially when you have kids. “Expats” quite often are 
without kids and even if they have kids … their very kind of inner world is quite limited, so 
they have this need of going out, which Belgians do not feel because they are at home. 
(Sebastian) 
 
Bernard said:  
I go to restaurants, that’s true, but I think that they are open to everybody, but I think that 
disproportionally there is a lot of “expats” because simply they can afford … Belgians do not 
go out that much. (Bernard) 
 
Interestingly, the interviewees quoted above believed that the lack of contact with the 
Belgian population of Brussels was due to fundamentally different lifestyle of the latter, 
while Bernard and Maja (quoted below) seemed to believe in the stereotypical opinion on 
enormous gap between the earnings of EU officials and average Belgians. According to this 
logic, entertainment places like bars or restaurants are places for expats, not for the poorer 
and family-oriented local people. This somewhat surprising conviction recalls the situation of 
young, single Western expats in a Third World country, as described by Fechter (2007a, 
2007b). In case of these interviewees, their alienation from the Belgian part of the city must 
have been complete, as they did not even notice their presence.  
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 Those Polish EU officials who frequented the same places as the Belgians were far 
more numerous. Some of them simply stated the fact, without mentioning their preferences or 
integrative enthusiasm. Kamil noticed:  
I mean, the basketball I play, there are sometimes regular Belgians who attend, and other 
things, I mean, besides those meetings with Polish network in this bar, I mean, besides that, I 
think it’s quite open … But there are sometimes some activities which are for example sent 
through our mailing list and mainly attended by the Polish community or by “expats”. But I 
cannot say that I’m more, let’s say, inclined towards those events. (Kamil) 
 
For Emilia, the social activities were determined by the activities of her children, what 
placed her on the “Belgian” side:  
I think [these places are attended] also [by] Belgians. I think they’re not typically [ “expat” 
oriented] … Okay, if there is an invitation ... linked to the institutions, then okay, it might be 
different. Then it’s mainly “expats” there, but as regards some kids activities or some other 
events that are happening in Belgium, they’re open to everybody, so I consider them as also 
typical, yeah, open for Belgians as well. (Emilia) 
 
Another group of my interviewees seemed to deliberately share their activities 
between “expats” and Belgians. This is clearly the case of Ksawery:  
I try to do both, so I’m not refraining from getting together with the “expat” community in 
Brussels, but on the other hand, I always keep in mind that it’s another culture, another 
country and to understand it better I need to interact with those people and I try to do it. It’s 
not only with the Belgians, but also with the international community that is well developed 
in Brussels and in the Brussels area. (Ksawery) 
 
For Maja, the “expat world” represented the friends of her (Italian) husband, while 
she connected the “Belgian world” to friends and acquaintances she had met before she 
started to work in the institutions:  
With my friends from the old times, we often go to places where we went before, so, rather, 
to places where either the Belgians go or people who are like Belgians, who do not work in 
the institutions, while with acquaintances from, say, the Commission circles - meaning more 
international, who have more money, as this, let’s be frank, this is also a criterion, perhaps we 
go to other, trendier places, although not too much trendy. As far as I am concerned, this is 
not my style. (Maja) 
 
Finally, Otylia, who has also lived in Brussels for quite a long time, showed curiosity for 
Polish places, despite being accustomed to mainly Belgian-frequented spaces:  
[I attend] Belgian [spaces], although I do not avoid and like discovering Polish places in 
Brussels. For instance, for my birthday, my daughter invited me to a Polish restaurant in 
Brussels, knowing that it will be a pleasure for me. Besides, my intimate circle likes Poland 
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and Polishness, so thanks to this, from time to time we go to such places, but this is not a 
condition or a great need. (Otylia) 
 
Darek visited places popular both amongst the Belgians and the “expats”, while additionally 
he attended Polish meetings:  
I rather do not go to such places, want of time, and when I do go out, I usually go to such 
places as Café Belga on Place Flagey, where I was, perhaps, twice during the last three years 
and I have the impression that there is a mixed environment there, Belgian and foreign. Then, 
from time to time, I go to Polish meetings, once a month, [I go there] more and more rarely, 
but I still try to go there from time to time and the environment there is purely Polish, 
although there are less and less persons working in the EU institutions. I think this is related 
to the fact that the organizer has changed and has a broader circle of acquaintances – also 
outside the EU. (Darek) 
 
  Filip, similarly as Klara, explained his choices by the characteristics of the place he 
lived in. However, unlike Klara, he went both to “expat” and Belgian places.  
Certain Polish EU officials I interviewed were very critical of “expat places”. Laura 
explained that, as she had also lived in Brussels for a long time and the language was not a 
barrier for her, the presence or absence of “expats” was not a criterion either. However, she 
also found it impoverishing to mingle predominantly with “expats”: 
No, I do not go ... as I have no language problems, so I do not need to go where they 
necessarily speak English and I am trying not to lock myself in a certain environment, as I 
believe that this is very impoverishing, if you always speak about the same things. Besides, I 
believe that many of these “expats” are detached from the daily life, as they maintain contacts 
exclusively within the same environment. I was here before and thus, thanks to this, I have 
wider contacts. (Laura) 
 
Maksymilian seemed to have a similar opinion, although he had come to Brussels much later, 
together with other EU officials:  
I have the impression that most of the places, most of the bars I frequent are quite popular 
amongst the local population, yes. I hate typical “expats” oriented places like Place 
Luxembourg, I mean, I went there a couple of times in the very beginning of my stay in 
Brussels, and I found this place absolutely horrible, I mean, terribly boring, the kind of topics 
which are discussed there. … Well, it’s very much work related, or “expat” life related, but in 
a very superficial manner, and this is precisely the impression I had: that typical conversations 
on Place Luxembourg are extremely superficial. It makes me think of, when I was 
ERASMUS student in France, at the beginning when you meet people, I mean you practice 
this ritual small talk which is very superficial, and very boring, but you have to do it in order 
to, I mean, come to know people, I mean, develop any relationships with them afterwards, but 
I have the impression that at Place Luxembourg, … you stay at this level forever, I mean, I 
have a headache when I think of it. (Maksymilian) 
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Another person who did not like “expats”- oriented places was Zofia, although for 
her, the main factor determining her frequentations was the area in which she lived, which 
was not very popular amongst the “expats”:  
Well, sometimes I would go just here close by, like to this place or just to have a drink with 
my husband somewhere in the evening, or we’d go to a Thai restaurant that is close by, 
because we live here, so we just walk somewhere, that’s easy, or we go to visit Atomium also. 
When we’re in this area, sometimes we would go there just for a drink or to eat something 
there. So, I don’t think it is really “expats”- oriented, because it’s not an “expat” area at all. 
And sometimes when we go out to friends, it would rather be in the centre of Brussels, so, I 
think it’s for everybody. I’ve been once to an “expat” club and I didn’t like it at all. It is called 
ALOFT, or something. (Zofia) 
 
To sum up, the frequentations of the Polish EU officials interviewed do not comply 
with the findings of other scholars (see e.g., Fechter 2007a, 2007b) researching on expats, 
often in culturally and socially different settings (like e.g., Indonesia). Most of the 
interviewees claim not to be physically locked in the “expat bubble”, going to places 
frequented also by the Belgian people. Very few secluded themselves intentionally. Those 
who visited mostly “expat” places explained it rather by geographical proximity and 
settlement patterns of the areas they lived in, sometimes also by the difference of lifestyles. 
Among those who frequented the same places as Belgians, some interviewees expressed their 
lack of preference for typical “expat” places, but they were hardly ever motivated by the 
perspective of integration.  
This behaviour seems to fit the overall strategy of the Polish EU officials towards the 
local population. They do not seclude themselves intentionally and are often fond of the 
presence of Belgians or other minorities. These different cultures are a “nice” second plan. 
However, my respondents usually make no active effort to enter into any closer contact with 
them.  
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4.3.2.3. Attending EU restricted social events  
Previous research on EU officials showed that, although networking outside the working 
hours was characterised by different patterns than networking at work, the EU played an 
important role in the spare time activities. EU related events are, by their very nature, 
excellent occasions for networking and lobbying, they are the interzone between the 
professional and leisure activities. These were the conclusions of Shore and Black (1994), 
Suvarierol (2009), Bellier (2000b) and Abélès et al. (1993) – all of  them “heavy weights” of 
the EU officials research, drawn on the basis of “old member states” and mostly “pre-
Kinnock”179 officials. 
To my surprise, only five out of 29 respondents who answered the question indicated 
that they participated in events restricted for the EU officials once per month or more 
frequently.  
The remaining respondents usually answered “sometimes” (occasionally specifying 
that it stood for one-three times per year), “rarely” or “never”. One person declared taking 
part in such events once per two months. 
A few respondents developed their answers, usually giving reasons for their sporadic 
participation: “I go to these events very rarely, generally only when I have to. I think this 
‘ghettoisation’ of the EU community, and organizing events strictly restricted ‘so one might 
feel better than the others’ is completely counterproductive, and creates animosities towards 
the Belgian society”; “Not really ... too much propaganda there”; “Overall no. The only 
exception I can think is the internal Directorate-General Christmas parties once a year, which 
are limited just to the employees of a particular DG”. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 The so-called Kinnock reform was a reform of the Staff Regulation entered into force in 2004, reducing 
certain rights and privileges and re-structuring the EU civil service. All EU officials from new member states 
are, obviously, “post-Kinnock” officials. 
!290!
Overall, most of my respondents claim not to go to events restricted to the EU 
officials. Some of them avoid such events purposefully, sometimes by reluctance to a 
seclusive and ideological character of these meetings. The difference as compared to the 
patterns identified by my predecessors could be attributable to the fact that, as Bellier (2002) 
claims, old officials having started in 1970s and before, were more idealistic and convicted 
Europeans, but it could also be related to specific associations with such semi-official events 
in the post-communist Europe, related to suspiciousness towards any form of official 
entertainment, automatically associated with institutional propaganda. Finally, it could also 
be interpreted as showing limited interest in intensive socialising with other EU officials. 
4.3.2.4. Belgian public celebrations  
During my previous research, I asked my respondents about their participation in Belgian 
public celebrations, like for instance Carnival or Ommegang. What I meant with this question 
was participation in celebrations massively frequented by Belgians, rather than originating in 
Belgian culture. I assumed that repeated participation in such events would be a symptom of 
determination to discover the local culture, but also to get closer to the host population. In 
that time, however, around half of the respondents answered they had never participated in 
such celebrations, while the majority of the rest had done it only occasionally (Rozanska 
2009).  
The results of the present research, with regard to the “new group”, showed even less 
involvement in the local public life as only slightly less than one third of respondents (nine 
persons) admitted attending them (including two men who were doing it only occasionally). 
Twenty-one persons said they did not take part in any Belgian celebrations (one man said he 
was doing it rarely, the other said he was doing it only “occasionally but too rarely to say 
‘usually’”). One of the women explained: “I have not done so far much – but it was not ‘on 
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purpose’, so I might very well participate in one of the events in the future.” 
4.3.3. Social life  
Social networks “of kinship and friendship” play a crucial role both during migration and 
adaptation in a new society by “provid[ing] social capital” (Brettell 2008:125; see also Janeta 
2011; Favell 2003b; Field 2003:1). Favell notably points out that organized migrant networks 
offer social support facilitating mobility (2003b:417). As he argues, this kind of extensive 
networks of “expat or international community connections” exist in each city and their 
functioning is sustained with the help of “magazines, websites and services designed to 
facilitate these movers’ lifestyles and needs” (Favell 2003b:417; see also Cailliez 2004; Gatti 
2009; Fechter 2007b). 
4.3.3.1. Working overtime? 
I started with the question on how much they worked. Integration into any community 
requires a minimal amount of time to devote to social activities. One of the imaginaries 
concerning EU officials (but also other expatriates) refers to the vision of people working 
long hours in glass and concrete buildings in the European (or business) district, separated 
from the rest of the city by physical boundaries (see e.g., Shore 2000:162). During the 
interviews, I inquired the research participants about the time they usually spend at work. The 
purpose of this question was twofold: in addition to the already mentioned inquiry about their 
actual possibility to establish any links with the local people or participate in the local 
cultural activities, I wanted to understand the attitude of my interviewees to the job. Are they 
driven by their dedication to the European cause? Do they hope to make a career or act out of 
their personal interest or professional ethics? As the EU officials community was built around 
the work, I found these questions very relevant. To this effect, I added a comment: “As far as 
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I know there is no extra pay, and number of extra hours you can recover is limited, so why 
are you staying?”  
Almost half of my interviewees claimed that they never (or almost never) did extra 
hours. Those who worked under the “flexitime” scheme (permitting to recover the hours 
overworked), scrupulously recovered the extra working time. This is the case of Bernard, 
who said: “Oh, I don’t work beyond what I can recover, that’s for sure. I try to do my job as 
well as possible within the reasonable limits”. The working patterns varied in this group: 
some interviewees declared that they came earlier in order to leave earlier: 
So, I try not to stay too long, because then I really don’t have much time to spend with my 
kids, which I don’t like. So, I try to come to work a bit earlier and also then be able to leave a 
bit earlier. It’s not always easy because there is always a lot of things to do. … [W]hen I see 
that I have to leave even if I will have some things for tomorrow, I do it and if there is 
something urgent then I can stay ... But it’s not that I work very late. I try to leave work, I 
don’t know, at 5:40 p.m. or 5:30 p.m. and then to be at home before 6:00 p.m. (Emilia).  
 
Some others, on the contrary, come late and leave later, like Kamil:  
It happens [that I work overtime]. I like what I do, but the reason why I stay rather over time 
is basically a lot of work. A lot of work and I start quite late - 9:20 a.m. let’s say, 9:30 a.m., so 
if I’ve started at 8 a.m., then probably I would finish at 5:30 p.m., that’s it … I usually stay 
until 6:30 p.m., so a lot of work plus, as I’ve said, late start in the morning. (Kamil) 
 
Many interviewees of this group had little children, which affected their working patterns. 
For example, Klara said:  
I do not work extra hours at all, because while driving my children to school and back home, I 
simply cannot, that is why I do work standard time. If I have to stay longer, if it happens from 
time to time that I really need to do something, then I stay. (Klara) 
  
Similarly, children needed to be taken into account by Emilia quoted above, and Dominika: 
I don’t do a lot of extra working hours, to say the truth ... If it happens, … at least here I have 
the luxury of being able to put my hours aside, then if I need sometimes a day off, I can use 
those extra hours from that. ... I try to stick to normal working hours because I have small 
kids, so I have to bring them from the crèche on time. (Dominika) 
 
For Otylia, there was no conjunction between her personal interests and the job. This is how 
she explained that she never worked overtime, although she underlined that she respected the 
working time and was involved in correct discharge of her tasks:  
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First of all, I am not in a political department, so what I do, I rather do it for those who work 
for Europe, but no, I do not have such penchants ... It’s a job which ... is absolutely not in the 
field of my interest, as I am, as you may remember, biologist. However, as I always try to do 
well what I do, I am devoted to it and I respect the working time, although it is quite flexible. 
Nobody is supervising me, my job simply needs to be done and nobody will do it for me. ... 
but no, I do not do extra hours and I do not intend to. (Otylia) 
 
Some of the interviewees recalled having worked more in the past: before they had 
children or at the beginning of their career, when they simply needed to work more. Maja 
recalls: 
I mean, we do not even have this system where you can recover hours, as our boss considers 
that we are responsible, quality officials and we have to have the job done, sometimes it takes 
more, sometimes less time. When I did not have a baby, I worked, probably, slightly above 
the limit, perhaps from 9:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., for instance. Fridays even more often, as the 
evening extends to Saturday, but only sometimes, because I was overloaded with work, or, 
rather, because it was more convenient for me to work like that. But now, since I have a baby, 
I am somehow limited and, I guess, I work within the normal limit. (Maja) 
 
For Darek, the reason for longer working hours was the accumulated backlog of work related 
to the time before his appointment:  
Well, I do not count the working time, I start at 9:45 a.m., around 12:30 p.m. I have a lunch 
break, most often around two hours or somewhat less. Sometimes, it happens to be two hours 
and a half, if I need to do something in town. That’s how I work until 6:30 p.m. or even more, 
if necessary.  
I never leave before 6:30 p.m., but, as I said at the beginning, I do not count the working time, 
if something needs to be done, then I stay until 8:00 p.m. It happened to me a few times to go 
to work on Saturday, and I worked, and I did not count. And at the very beginning, of course, 
I have worked longer, as there was nobody on my place for half a year before I came and the 
whole material needed to be processed. I remember that, at the beginning, I even stayed until 
midnight or longer, as I was at the office with a colleague, who had a lot of work and I would 
have felt uneasy to leave, so we worked together. (Darek) 
 
Finally, Filip had to stay longer in the previous job in the institutions. He considered the 
change as an improvement. 
However, the other half of the interviewees, more or less regularly, stays after hours. 
In case of Aleksandra, this is still not her main working pattern, although it happens 
regularly:  
The work comes in waves, so sometimes there is much more work, sometimes there is less. If 
there is a need and there are deadlines, then of course, I work overtime. It’s just a question of 
getting the things finished, for instance if there is a meeting with member states, everything 
has to be finished and then if that means that one has to work longer, then that’s it. 
(Aleksandra) 
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Also for Ksawery, apparently “on the flexitime”, working extra hours seems to be under 
control and does not take an unreasonable dimension:  
I tend to stay a little longer than expected, but on the other hand I try to limit the extra time I 
spend in the job in order to keep my free time available for me and for my family, so there is 
in fact a number of hours that I cannot recuperate in the system, but I try to keep it under 
control. And what is also, I think, important for me is that the extra time that I spend in the 
job that cannot be recuperated and definitely limits the hours available for the private life I 
spend rather on training and personal development than on the projects that we have here in 
the office. So I also feel that even if I stay a bit longer, that is for my personal upgrade and 
development and so it’s not only the job that gains, but also myself. (Ksawery) 
 
The attitude of Ksawery is positive - he does not perceive extra work as exploitation or mere 
necessity, but he also finds personal satisfaction in it. 
Likewise, Patrycja explained her longer working time by her interest in the job: 
Well, I work minimum eight hours per day, maximum - 12 hours, and there are peaks of 
work, so there are months, usually from May to end of June when it’s very intense, so it can 
even be more than 12 hours, plus weekend. Well, why I do it? I do it because I like my job 
and I like to have things done well. I also argue with my boss about the job [laughter], so it’s 
of course not that each time I’m eager to stay extra hours, especially if I consider that it’s 
because of bad organization, then I try to negotiate, but if I see the need, I stay without 
problems and I just like doing what I do. (Patrycja) 
 
Beniamin, although he was also among those who overworked with enthusiasm, apparently 
spent significant time at work – probably more than most of the interviewees quoted before:  
I start my work, between 8:00 a.m. - 8:30 a.m. in the morning and I leave work at 7:00 p.m. 
When I have really a lot of work, then I take my work and I work at home. I have a rule that 
at least I try not to work on Saturdays and Sundays. I overwork per month only around 40 
hours, only because the system does not count more than ten hours per day. So I overwork 
more, but the system registers only 40 hours … We have a flexitime in a system, but I don’t 
apply it, so I have these hours, but I don’t do anything with them. I overwork because I have a 
lot of work and the expectations of my hierarchy are high. … I mean, I really like my work, 
I’ve always wanted to work here. I think that I’m good in what I’m doing and so, it is natural 
for me that we are paid to work for I don’t know, ten or 11 hours per day. But, if it is 
necessary for me to leave work at 5:00 p.m. because I have a meeting with someone, or have 
to go to the airport to pick up someone, then of course I go. If you ask me for an average day, 
I left [home] at 7:00 a.m., like today, and I came between 8:00-8:30 p.m. (Beniamin) 
 
Many interviewees justified staying after hours by work necessity. Although they did 
not declare doing it “for themselves”, some show strong work ethics, sometimes coupled with 
active (although conscious) self-indoctrination. This is, most typically, the case of 
Maksymilian:  
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Well, indeed I think I work quite long hours. I try to control it more now, but well actually I 
cannot really have any influence on this. It depends basically on how much work there is and 
if there is work, if there are urgent things to do, I need to stay. And the question why … Well, 
the first answer, the first level is, because it is necessary for the job to be done, and if you ask 
why it is so important to me that the job is done, well, I think it is a question of certain work 
ethics, certainly… Either, you have to believe that what you’re doing is important, or at least 
you have to try to convince yourself that it has certain importance or meaning, because 
otherwise it would be very sad to come to the conclusion that you’re spending one-third of 
your life doing unimportant things. So, if it is important, then of course, it would be stupid to 
compromise it, just because I don’t want to stay one or two hours longer and finish the 
assignment. (Maksymilan) 
 
Finally, Laura described the Commission’s working environment in quite dark 
colours. Although she emphasized her personal involvement, she harshly criticized the 
management exploiting her:  
Well, [I stay] much, much longer, as I used to work, regularly, 16 hours sometimes even more 
than 16 hours per day. And this is not that I am coming to surf on the Internet or to stroll 
around offices . … [T]he reason for this is mainly that they cut posts, while there is more and 
more work, as there was disproportionately low number of posts created after the enlargement 
… but the job has to be done and it is distributed among other persons. They always do some, 
you know, post reductions, economies … . [S]econdly, as they noticed that I do a lot and I do 
it well, they rely on me and they put everything on my back. … And that is how it works … . 
But, apart from that, I like my job, the problem is only that I noticed this is not fair and I try to 
reduce it. So, I come to the office very early, … by the nature of things, it’s holidays time so I 
do not have so much work to stay extra hours, but as I come at 7:00 a.m. or at 8:00 a.m., then, 
obviously, as I can’t leave earlier. So, now, you know, for instance, I am at the lunch break, 
but normally I try to make it short and then I can leave a bit earlier – I am going home at 4:30 
p.m. and I still have life apart ... . (Laura) 
 
Overall, the pattern proved to be mixed, without any significant trend to be noted. Many 
interviewees who did not overwork, explained it with their family situation, usually small 
children. Thus, it can be deduced that both those who leave early and those who stay longer, 
are not in the position to practice particularly abundant social and cultural life. 
Two more issues need to be noted, in this regard, to put the abovementioned accounts 
into perspective. “Overworking” is often a relative notion. One might “overwork” as 
compared to the standard working time in the institution, but still work significantly less than 
some highly skilled professionals work in certain private companies. Secondly – although 
this does not belong to the subject matter of this study – it results from certain testimonies 
that the workload is not always equally shared. The abovementioned considerations might 
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explain certain apparent contradiction between the testimonies of certain respondents (in the 
previous chapter) claiming that they had “slowed down” after entering the Commission and 
the accounts of those suggesting that EU officias work significantly more than “relaxed” 
Belgians. 
As to the motives of doing extra hours, although many interviewees justified long 
working hours by personal interest, their explanations did not involve ideological, 
“Europeanising” motives. On the other hand, common explanations included professional 
ethics, personal interest in “the job being done”. Therefore, their motivation could be, in a 
way, idealistic, especially taking into account that my research participants mostly grew up 
and entered into adult life in Poland in 1990s and early 2000, the time when open references 
to ideology were not considered appropriate, given the memories of the dominant ideology 
under the communist dictatorship. Positive values were rather soberly wrapped as resulting 
from pure rationality, common sense. Thus, my research participants might simply prefer 
talking about sober “professional ethics” rather than referring to their belief in the European 
cause. Moreover, in addition to more personal, specific motivations, one could also read 
between the lines that more or less subtle pressure of colleagues or the “hierarchy” could also 
constitute a more prosaic reason for overworking (see notably the accounts of Laura and 
Darek above). !
The next set of questions aimed at revealing the relation between the Polish EU 
officials and other groups, such as Belgians or other expats. The purpose of these questions 
was to find out, whether they stay among other Poles or other expats or if they are trying to 
establish contacts with the local society. !
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4.3.3.2. Making friends in Brussels 
Several years after their arrival to Belgium, my research participants (at least the interviewees 
with whom I had an occasion to discuss this issue) are still predominantly acquainted with 
other expats or EU officials. Contacts with the local population are more rare and include not 
only Belgians, but also ethnic minority groups (e.g., Italian, Congolese). This seems to 
confirm the observation made by Kennedy, who reports that most of foreigners had 
relationships with other foreigners with whom they shared the same everyday problems: “like 
them, they were away from home and were social outsiders” (2009:27). More specifically 
regarding the EU officials, Shore claims that they socialise mostly with other EU officials 
(2000:163), while Cailliez even states that co-workers become sometimes “a second family” 
(2004:81).!
On the basis of the conducted interviews, it appears that many Polish officials had 
friends in Brussels already at the moment when they settled in the city. These friends had 
usually been acquainted during the University studies or in the legendary College of Europe 
in Bruges and Natolin (considered by Suvarierol (2009:421) as the forgery of EU Brussels’ 
networks), but also during the socializing activities prior to employment: on the Internet 
forum of Gazeta Wyborcza and in the Zielona Gęś [Green Geese] bar in Warsaw.  
This was the case of Patrycja, who said:  
For me [making friends in Brussels] was easy because of the studies. Since I studied here in 
the College of Europe, I met a lot of international people from the whole Europe and also 
other parts of the world and many of them came here to make careers in the European fields 
so many of them stayed, and they are a kind of family, so we always meet together, so it was 
easy. (Patrycja) 
 
Jeremi met some of his Brussels friends in Poland:  
Well, before I started, I was a member of a discussion forum on Gazeta Wyborcza, called 
Europracownicy, so during discussions on this forum, I found some persons that were 
enrolled for the same competition and they had oral interview or oral exams exactly at the 
same date as mine, so I met one of these persons during oral exams and we keep in touch after 
that as well. (Jeremi) 
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Kamil reported:  
Actually, from the very beginning I bumped into Poles incidentally and not incidentally, 
because some friends from the university, they have also started to work here more or less the 
same time, the same period, so I knew them. Then, I had a neighbour in a flat that I rented 
who was Polish and it turned out that he worked in the same unit, so it was already, you 
know, narrowing down. (Kamil) 
 
 The experience of Emilia was similar, but differed by the fact that her Polish friends had 
already been in Brussels and had enouraged her to sit the EPSO exam. Also Adrian “had 
known a couple of persons already earlier ... even before [he] had an idea to work in the 
Commission”. Emilia also mentioned school-related activities: “a big part of our friends now 
are parents of pupils from the European School from the class … where our sons go. So, this 
is the source of friends”.  
Those who met their friends only at the arrival, often made their first friendships 
within the Polish community, during the intensive socializing activity of the first months. 
This seems to confirm the findings of Suvarierol (2009) who emphasizes the role of national 
networks for the newcomers’ social insertion. 
Sometimes these were the real life encounters with the persons they had already 
known from the Internet forum – the virtual Polish community, organized around the future 
employment in Brussels was materialising as a “real life” community. Darek was in the first 
group of people recruited after the publication of the “reserve lists” after the concours. He 
kept the following memories of these events:  
As far as I remember, there was an Internet list Polish [EU] Workers or something of the sort, 
on Interia or Onet,180 where persons who were passing the concours had already created a 
group and exchanged experiences; and it is already there, as far as I remember, where I met a 
few persons who subsequently came to Belgium; so these were the first contacts and when I 
started the work, the very first day, immediately after I got a computer, there was an email 
from a colleague of mine already waiting for me who had somehow come to know that I was 
going to be recruited and she immediately arranged to meet for a coffee and this was the first 
person I met. And then, the second or the third day, I met four persons from Poland, from the 
mailing list or from the group where we had already had the first contacts and we met at a 
cafeteria, here, in front, at the corner of rue Franklin and rue Archimède. These were the first 
contacts. Of course, later, at work, there were gatherings organised for people who had just 
started to work at the Commission, these were groups of thirty and some, all from the new 
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180 Interia and Onet are popular Polish Internet portals. 
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member states of course, where the Poles were the majority. And then the people who were 
first to come here from Poland started to organise monthly meetings. And during these 
meetings, I met plenty of people in the same situation as mine. And obviously, during these 
first meetings, I met the persons who had already worked in the Commission for two-three 
years as auxiliaires, kind of auxiliary staff. And this was also quite a numerous group of 
Poles. Quite quickly have I met at least 100 people. And then it was like a snowball, more and 
more. There was also one colleague who organised excursions outside Brussels, always a 
group of 12-15 persons, but these were different people each time, not always Poles. (Darek) 
 
Adrian had similar experience:  
[I have met my friends] at the moment when the first group of the employees in the 
institutions [arrived] and these meetings [were organized], first in the Old Oak and then in 
Chez Bernard, I guess ... In Poland, there was this idea of the people who were going to leave 
to organize meetings in Zielona Gęś [the Green Geese], and I was at the first meeting and also 
at the second and somehow, I stayed in contact with these people. I was on the forum 
[Europracownicy of Gazeta Wyborcza]. And, at the moment when I arrived, I had already 
known some people, [whom I met] either before, or on the forum, but I also met a lot of 
people at the Polish meetings, certainly at the Old Oak, later also at the Wild Geese, certainly 
also via the work, as the Poles started to contact each other at work, then I changed the 
Directorate, then I was in contact again and this is how I made contacts. (Adrian) 
 
Filip, who was involved, for several years, in the organisation of the social events of the 
Polish Community, concluded:  
I have the impression that everybody who comes here knows someone [here] already ... . So, 
there are very few complete newcomers. And if there is one, I usually meet him because he 
already knows someone from the University or from the previous work in Poland, so while 
coming here, he always has someone who introduces him into a new environment. (Filip) 
 
Apart from the Polish community, my respondents usually made friends at work, or 
through their partners, encountered by the latter also at work or various courses. Those who 
have stayed in Brussels slightly longer, progressively broadened their social circles through 
other non-work related activities. As Klara told me:  
Most of friendships I have made at work and actually, all of my Polish or non-Polish friends 
are connected with my work or with my child’s school or with my husband’s work … . There 
are no other places where we meet [people]. (Klara) 
 
The testimony of Dominika goes in the same direction: she met the majority of her friends 
through work, as “here it’s pretty easy to go just outside the normal working relationships”. 
She also met people at the sport club. 
Finally, a minority of my respondents did not even mention the work or work-related 
networks (the network related to the College of Europe must be qualified as such, as its main 
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function is indeed to forge the future European bureaucratic elite). One of them is 
Maksymilian:  
After a couple of years, I think we started meeting people. Well, these were partly friends of 
my wife, met at the university or at language courses, partly these were my friends which I’d 
met … mostly in the language courses, I’ve also met a couple of people at the gym but I’ve 
never managed to transfer these friendships to the “real life” … But this is true that we don’t 
have a group of constant friends if I can say, because these people leave or we’ve met 
new people, who are friends of the friends. So I think that ... it’s about ten persons altogether, 
but we don’t see them very, very often. And most of them are either of Polish origin or expats, 
but it is true that there is a couple of Belgian people as well, … of Congolese origin. 
(Maksymilian) 
 
Zofia categorized her acquaintances as follows:  
Well, I think there were three ways of meeting friends: one was through my job, because I 
was at the beginning the only one who had the job, so actually just colleagues. Some of the 
colleagues became somehow more than colleagues and then – friends. And with some of 
them, after those years, we’re still in contact. They come to our house, or we go to see them, 
or we meet during the weekends. Sometimes- somewhere in the city for festivals, concerts or 
these kinds of events, so through the work. Then, the second one was, through my husband’s 
activities I would say, because … he is learning Polish and he also did an English course 
when he arrived and there he met some people that he also somehow brought to the household 
[laughter] if I can say. And with them, with some of them we’re still in touch. And the third 
one is a bit of miscellaneous, I would say, because for instance, the Polish lady that has a 
library in Brussels has become a friend while, you know, we’ve just met her in the library, but 
because it was such a good contact that, it was just by chance that, you know, she became a 
friend. Or somebody, we would meet somewhere while travelling abroad, actually who was 
from Brussels, and then we would meet after with this person (when we were back) here, and 
then you know we’ve just become friends like that. (Zofia) 
 
A separate category among the Polish EU officials answering this question were those 
who had lived in Brussels before they started to work in the institutions. Their stories concern 
mostly their relations with Belgians. They are also quite diverse, depending on the 
successfulness of their adaptation. They also differ from the main pattern, on several respects. 
Maja got along quite well with the Belgian people, although her social circles include also 
other expats and other Poles: 
I mean, well, when I arrived as a fille au pair, it was kind of difficult, as I did not speak the 
language, I was in a little town and I did not feel quite well alone in some bar or on the street, 
while once married … then I had the family ... and a lot of acquaintances ... The 
acquaintances, which I cherished most, were those from the university, where I studied. Until 
now, I have two female friends I am in contact with, well, for 20 years ... Then, at work. But, 
of course, they were not Poles, as in that time Poles either worked in cleaning or in 
construction, so my environment was a bit Belgian, a bit international, as in Brussels, the 
Belgians ... , well, they are many but there are also a lot of foreigners. But when I started to 
work in the institutions, at this occasion I also met my present husband who is Italian and who 
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works as interpreter in the institutions and I was kind of “adopted” by his numerous friends, 
so at present, we actually evolve within the Italian diaspora here. But since I started to work in 
the Commission, I would say it is quite difficult to fraternise with colleagues at work, as there 
is a kind of cold climate, socially, I would say. People are very vigilant to separate their 
private life from their professional life. Even if you sympathise with someone, you are very 
rarely invited home, for instance, or for something else, except for, perhaps, a coffee Friday 
evening or something ... And my friends are not particularly Poles, I am not looking for Poles, 
specifically, as it’s been such a long time I am here ... well, I would even say that sometimes I 
avoid them. I mean, I do not purposefully avoid Poles, but these Poles that I have known 
accidentally, I do not necessarily prefer their company to the company of other people, only 
because they are Poles. (Maja) 
 
Also the testimony of Otylia could have very well come from a local person, if it was not for 
the fact that she mentioned some new, previously inexistent, contacts with Poles:  
Yes, I must admit that I don’t know whether it has changed over the last three years, but most 
certainly, since I am in the institutions, I entered into relations with the Poles. I did not have it 
before when I was in Brussels. And I can also tell you that I had also changed the place [of 
living] and now I live in Genval outside Brussels, where I have just made new acquaintances 
and these are, very normal relations, either neighbouring relations, or old acquaintances, 
restored from past times, or acquaintances of my partner who is, himself, relatively recent … 
So there are constantly new things coming up in the social contacts. (Otylia) 
 
Laura told quite a different story. I decided to reproduce it entirely, not only because 
the adaptation of this respondent spectacularly failed, but because it contains a 
comprehensive description of the respondent’s attitude to different communities that the 
Polish EU officials may interact with in Brussels:  
I mean, at the beginning, I was a very open person and in general, I was not prejudiced 
against anybody here. My picture of Belgians was very theory based, but positive. I had a 
good attitude towards the country and, in general, I did not intend to stay here at all: I had 
come here only for ten months. My contacts with Belgians started on the very first day, 
actually, as my friend’s daddy, who was supposed to come to collect me, could not do it and 
asked his Belgian colleague and so it stayed. So, actually, I’ve had contacts with Belgians 
since the very beginning and it was somehow natural. As I had known the language while 
coming here, I improved it while I was here, so I did not need to get to know them, it was as if 
I had been here simply and they did not suspect at the beginning that I was Polish. Only later 
was it revealed that I was Polish so they often cut off contacts with me, but I have never had 
problems in making contacts, as I do not look like a Pole, as for them a Pole is a person who 
cannot cope with his life, who does not master the language, who works in cleaning business 
etc., while I master the language very well, I am outspoken, look like an educated person, so 
they do not suspect that I might be Polish and only when I tell them, the problems start. So, 
since the very beginning I had these contacts and during the first years, I could not understand 
this mentality and I thought that I was terribly incongruous and, for a very long time, I tried to 
understand and only after many years, a German friend explained to me that it is them 
[Belgians] who have a problem – not I. 
With the Poles, I tried to maintain contacts since the very beginning, as after all, I am Polish. I 
did not select people according to their nationality, but I think that even in order to train the 
language (at that time there was no Internet, Polish TV etc., telephone calls were expensive), 
it was important to maintain contacts with the Polish milieu, but I realised very quickly that 
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these are people of a completely different kind, the persons who had come from, with all 
respect, a slightly backward part of Poland. These are the persons who are not well educated 
and they are extremely dishonest, greedy, they made dirty tricks to each other, they stole from 
each other, they were intellectually very poor and, in general, not my milieu. … When I 
gathered (more information) about this milieu, I discontinued contacts with them and I even 
started having problems to speak fluent Polish, as I did not have that much contact with the 
Poles. I never frequented various Catholic Missions, as I’ve never been interested in this kind 
of things. That’s how things are, in general.  
And now, I limit the contacts with Belgians, as I simply don’t want to experience unpleasant 
situations, I don’t want to stress, I don’t want to quarrel, I don’t want this kind of conflict 
situations, as one simply cannot live with them. I simply know it already, I don’t have 
illusions concerning them, after so many years, and if I can, I simply do not socialise with 
them. 
And when the Poles [the EU officials] came, it was a big change for me, as it was a great 
moral and psychological support, as I was finally among the people whose level of education 
corresponded to mine… as, at the beginning, most of the people coming had lived abroad 
before, so, with some openness to the world, some knowledge about emigration etc., so we 
understood each other very well at the beginning and … it was edifying for me because I 
finally felt attached somewhere, as before, it was a bit, well…, I have never been Belgian, I 
will never be and I was a bit, like, not at home, although I did not realise it for many years, 
and with Poles, I could not have any contact for obvious reasons. 
And only now, since the [other] Poles arrived, it will have been soon eight years, I have found 
some contacts which are durable and satisfactory and enriching and I have a wide range of 
friends, from 30 to 50, so these are very diverse people, from different circles, with different 
biographies with different educational backgrounds and they also enrich me with more recent 
information from Poland which I do not have any more, so this is a good thing. (Laura) 
 
Most of my respondents described making friends in Brussels as a very easy task. 
Some of them explained that this is due to the openness of the people who come to work in 
the EU institutions. However, a couple of persons expressed a contrary opinion. In addition to 
previously quoted Maksymilian (who referred rather to acquainting people from outside the 
institutions), the opinion of Ksawery deserves to be quoted, as it refers to the aspect of 
relations between the EU officials which is absent from most of other testimonies:  
It’s not easy to make friends in the institutions. The environment is completely different than 
the environment I used to operate in. It’s more competitive and there are conflicting interests 
among the officials of different nationalities and of different background and this kind of 
environment and competitiveness does not foster friendly relationships or informal 
relationships, so this is a particular challenge for me. (Ksawery) 
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4.3.3.3. The circles of friends: mixing private and professional contacts? 
After the initial question about making friends, I explored the question further, asking my 
interviewees to describe their different circles of friends, so as to have a clearer picture of 
their social interactions and networking, their frequency and intensity. 
Most of the interviewees confirmed that they had multiple circles of friends. 
Typically, at least one of them is related to work. These are not necessarily the current 
colleagues of my respondents but they work in the institution and often had been acquainted 
through work. Indeed, also according to Shore and Black (1994:289) and Abélès et al. 
(1993:9), EU officials socialise with each other both at work and outside working hours. 
Usually there is also a Polish circle and the circle of the partner’s acquaintances or the 
partner’s family. Another circle of friends mentioned sometimes are friends from university 
or from the College of Europe. Obviously, these circles overlap sometimes. Dominika 
characterised the situation in the following terms:  
I have several circles [of friends]. One is people from work, that I know from work, and we 
don’t necessarily work together anymore, or we have sometimes never worked together, 
really … These are people whom I know from here or I met through my friends from here, so 
it’s like my working circle, and then I have some friends from the university who came here 
as well. So of course, we stay in touch and we see each other pretty often as well, but we 
don’t work together, we are employed in several institutions, so there is no common working 
environment let’s say. And then, it’s my husband’s family as well and my husband’s friends, 
so, that’s the second one. (Dominika) 
 
The testimony of Patrycja is similar: 
So, mostly these are friends from the university, so from College [of Europe - Bruges] and 
then I can divide them into two groups: one group is a Polish group, because it was a natural 
thing to get along with Polish people, and the second group is Italian, and this is mostly 
because after I graduated I got along … my new partner [who] is Italian. So, it was also easier 
to keep in touch with Italian part of College, but there are also other people who go along 
with us, these are mostly Portuguese and Spanish; And beside that … I think from work I 
have just … Polish friends, with whom I work … , but other nationalities I wouldn’t call them 
friends. I just know them, and sometimes we meet, but closer relations are with them and 
Polish people at work. 
 
Another example of a respondent following this pattern is Klara, who admitted:  
I think that the majority of my Polish friends ... if not almost all of them, work in the 
institutions. I met them either at work, or via the kindergarten or possibly school of my 
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children, but these are also the persons who work in the institutions – this is one circle of 
acquaintances. But I also have another one – these are Greeks and these are acquaintances of 
my husband via his work. He does not work at the institutions, but this is also quite a peculiar 
[laughter] closed circle. (Klara) 
 
This pattern seemed to be shared independently of the actual intensity of contacts and the size 
of the network. Ula said:  
I have one [circle of friends]. The closest friend is Polish as well and I met her at my work. 
The second one is also Polish and these are the closest friends. The rest are just colleagues … 
There are also friends of my husband that we meet, they have children as well , … and most 
of them are Polish as well. (Ula) 
 
Adrian did not refer to the friends of his partner, but he had exactly the same experience as 
concerns the nationality and profession of his friends as the previously quoted speakers:  
Yes, I could assess that I have, say, two or three circles of acquaintances and they are not 
related to work in any way. I mean, okay, most of these people usually work in the 
institutions, not all of them, but a significant part, but I do not work with them, they do not 
work in my DG, for instance. With most of them, I have never worked, professionally. These 
are mainly Polish groups, but I also have contacts with non-Polish people. But the circle of 
most intimate friends is 80 percent Polish. (Adrian) 
 
Also Emilia seemed to have a similar structure of her social environment, except for a 
separate circle of her partner’s friends. However, in addition to Polish friends and colleagues, 
she also socialises a lot within the group of the parents of her children’s classmates:  
As I said the friends are other parents to some extent, so we meet quite often like on 
weekends we do some trips together or we party together or we just meet so that the kids can 
play. Or we go to cinema or to some other events with children. It’s quite around kids, but not 
only, we also happen to go out without kids, with these parents. We still keep the contacts 
with friends from Poland who moved here and it’s on the same basis I would say, we also 
visit each other for weekends, with kids, and spend time together. And yes, I have also some 
private contacts with colleagues from work. I play sports with some of them and then apart 
from sport we also happen to do some other things together, we go out together from time to 
time. So, these are not Polish friends, but friends from work. (Emilia) 
 
Darek gave an interesting insight into the social life of some EU officials:  
Well, there are a lot of these groups, that’s true. These are the cliques of people who glue to 
each other, but these cliques are sometimes unfriendly or even hate each other. I know people 
from different cliques and sometimes I can’t gather them all. For example, I can’t invite to my 
place all these people who kind of belong to different groups, otherwise there could be no 
party at all. Everybody would flee. If X sees Y is there, he’ll flee. If Y sees that Z is there, 
then Z will flee. And this is quite complicated. So, there are about three-four of these 
cliques. Myself, I don’t want to belong to one particular group, but I’m trying to hang out 
with the ones and with the others a bit. Cinema with some of them, excursion with some 
others so as not to let myself closed in a little group of five-six people, as this is unsound. 
Furthermore, these cliques are preponderantly composed of Poles. There is one of them which 
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suits me most, as there are not only Poles. There is one Belgian, one Scottish girl, one girl 
from Finland, a few persons from Poland and a well-acquainted colleague of mine from 
Cyprus. This colleague, well, I work with him, while most of the people from these cliques do 
not work with him. Not directly. Right, they all work in the institutions, but we are not in 
contact on a daily basis. (Darek) 
 
While our interview was already quite advanced and had passed to other issues, Darek could 
not resist coming back to the issue of his circles of friends: 
Back to the first question, about the acquaintances, about these coteries, well, unfortunately, I 
forgot about two female friends more. One is German-speaking Belgian, coming from the 
area near Eupen, the other one is from Hungary. These friends do not belong to any coteries 
and I know them individually, so to say, and they actually do not know my other 
acquaintances, or [they know] very few. (Darek) 
 
Those of the interviewees who had lived in Brussels before joining the institutions, 
usually rely mostly on friends they had known already at the moment where they started to 
work in the Commission or simply friends and acquaintances who are “local people”. This 
was the case of Otylia and Maja:  
Not many professional contacts are transposed to my social life, although I do have two or 
three like that. These are indeed Polish women with whom we broadened so to say, the limits 
of the acquaintance. However, this is rare, as meeting people on the professional ground 
satisfies these needs that one has and actually, one does not look for such contacts. And 
besides the work, I have contacts mostly with people living in my region ... to whom the 
access is easy and who are very open-minded. At present, I have very intensive social 
contacts, perhaps even too intensive, given my age [laughter]. (Otylia)  
 
Maja, in addition to the people acquainted during her “previous life” in Belgium and in 
addition to some friends from work, seems to socialise also in the circle of friends of her 
husband:  
So, I have a circle of friends in common with my husband who were, originally, his friends. 
Well, … we have known each other for six years, so this circle has slightly evolved. These are 
his friends. With some of them, I am befriended, with some others, we are just ... 
acquaintances, but this is quite a large group from ten to 20 persons who are acquainted with 
each other, etc. Well, I do have friends, or good acquaintances, from the old times, before my 
husband’s times [chuckle], and before the [time I joined the] institutions and some of them are 
acquainted with each other, but these are such friendships that we are friends individually, not 
in a group. Now I have some colleagues at my present work and, you can say, we form a 
mini-group of three persons – sometimes we meet after work. For instance, I have two female 
friends and one male friend whom we meet ... , who know each other but they are not friends 
with each other. I meet with them, we invite each other home, sometimes we go somewhere 
for holidays ... (Maja) 
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Some of my interviewees, like Maksymilian or Bernard, admitted that they did not 
have very close circle of friends in Brussels:  
Well, the friends we have here are not very close friends. ... These are probably more 
acquaintances, but not really close friendships and, so in this sense I cannot say that there is 
really any inner circle. These people know each other but they do not come from one specific 
environment. It’s just that usually when we go out we propose to many people in the same 
time, so they have occasion to meet … The distance is more or less the same to all of our 
friends. (Maksymilian) 
 
 If Maja claimed that she was trying to transpose her professional acquaintances into 
private contacts, others, on the contrary, stressed that they were purposefully keeping the 
professional world and the private life apart: 
No, in principle, I try to make a difference between my friends and my colleagues from work. 
I try not to have close relations with my colleagues, so people with whom I work. For 
example, there were recently two barbecues organized by my colleagues at work, including 
one this Sunday, and I didn’t go because I don’t want to have very close relations with them. I 
know a bit about them, they know a bit about me, but I don’t look for close contact with them, 
so all my friends … work for the Commission, but I do not work with them in the same unit 
or in the same Directory (Beniamin) 
 
I mean, it overlaps a bit, but not much. Because I am trying to have, like, private life which is 
really private and not connected with professional life, as I am not careerist and I am not 
using professional contacts to deepen it with some parties and to profit from it (Laura). 
 
No clear “stratification” of circles of friends baring any distinctive features (e.g., 
befriended in a specific period, being Polish or Italian, working in the institutions, etc.) could 
be observed at the level of the whole group. Those who arrived recently, usually have among 
their circles of friends those acquainted at work, or in the time preceding their entry to the 
institutions, e.g., at the College of Europe. Many of them are either Polish or expatriates. 
Polish EU officials seem to maintain dynamic but rather indiscriminately close relations with 
different categories of friends, even if certain individuals are obviously closer than others. 
But this closeness, except for a few interviewees, does not seem to be related to belonging to 
any specific category, e.g., Poles or other EU employees. 
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4.3.3.4. Evolution of social contacts  
Polish EU officials live and interact in a culturally diverse social setting consisting at least of 
five sub-systems: the Polish EU community, the non-Polish EU group, the culturally diverse 
society of Belgians, other expats (both Polish and foreign), the Polish society in Poland, but 
also, occasionally, the Polish low - skilled migrants. 
While looking at the entire “follow up” group, no clear dominant tendency concerning 
their social life could be distinguished.  
As the responses to the questionnaires revealed, only eight out of 20 respondents 
found their social life more developed than three years ago. Two persons said it was thanks to 
better language skills (“Yes. I speak better the language; I engage more”; “Yes it is. I can 
better communicate in French, know more people, including even some real Belgians, 
participate in two Belgian leisure activities circles, have more expat friends”). For one of the 
male participants it was improved thanks to sport and language related activities, but also his 
wife: “Yes, it is [more developed]. I met some friends at the gym, at my Dutch course; my 
wife befriended some people at her language courses and their friends. We’re going out quite 
often with them”. As one woman explained: “Yes, in the sense that I have more contacts via 
GezinsBond with other families with small children.” Another female respondent said her 
social life was more developed; however, her social contacts were restricted to foreigners. 
Yet another woman elaborated on the developments in her social life as follows: “I have 
more friends and have developed and deepened my friendships. Still, large part of my social 
life is outside Belgium (partly in Poland, partly in France where my husband comes from), 
and I am spending all my holidays and some of my week-ends outside Belgium.” 
Amongst the remaining twelve persons, eight said their social life was the same. As 
one of them explained, her social life was “the same intense as before. Mostly contacts with 
my Polish friends living here and international friends (Italians, French, German, etc). I 
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participate in cultural events and parties organised for international community in Brussels”. 
One of the male participants, with a rather stagnant social life, said it was because he was 
“not really interested in developing it more”, while another male respondent specified his 
social life was “heavily constrained to Polish parents who have children in the European 
School, where [his] child attends since 2011.” Two other persons explained it was related to 
family obligations. 
Four others revealed their social life was even less developed than before. As one of 
the women explained, it was related to her “bad experiences”, as she “was very often attacked 
as Pole and as Eurocrat”. Another woman specified: “I have rather a smaller group of friends 
with whom I stick. I know the places I like so I don’t feel like discovering new places or 
people”. The last, two persons related it to changes in their personal life. In case of one male 
respondent, it was related to the fact that he started working part-time “for family reasons” 
and spent much more time in Poland. Another reason for less intensive social life was the fact 
of having two little children and “not much time for social life”.  
Interestingly enough, while later interviewing members of both research groups, it 
was still difficult to distinguish common dominant tendencies in the evolution of their social 
contacts. My assumption was that, after initial intensive socializing within the national group, 
my respondents could have opened to other EU officials or other circles, not necessarily 
Polish. This assumption could match the testimonies of some of the interviewees, although 
they hardly ever put it exactly this way. Darek hesitated to confirm that some of his contacts 
died out, although he admitted:  
There are persons I am bored with, fed up with, that’s true. And I do not even go to their 
parties. I have the impression they have already forgotten me, as I decided not to go to some 
birthday parties, as I started to have the impression that it’s all repetitive and there is a kind of 
ritual each year, it’s all the same bore, and there is nothing to do. So, I quitted these things, as 
I consider it a waste of time. Well, let’s say I neglected two such coteries, I do not show up. 
Have things changed over time? In general, I have withdrawn a bit from the social life for the 
last year and a half. (Darek) 
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Also Filip, previously strongly involved in the life of the Polish community, indicated that he 
“had more friends from outside Poland now, as well as some Belgians”, the reason for this 
being his enrolment to a music school (he had friends from the school). Some other 
respondents admitted that they had changed their circle of friends, but advanced specific 
reasons for this. Dominika started, like most of the new EU officials, by socializing with the 
people she met at work, but subsequently closed herself in a family circle:  
Well, the family one became more and more important … [W]hen I arrived here, the most 
important circle was people I knew from work, and now of course I spend much more time 
with people I’m involved - family of my husband and my husband’s friends as well. Yeah, it 
evolves. (Dominika) 
 
Zofia and Aleksandra changed their social circle mostly as a result of internal professional 
mobility. Zofia considered it a pretty normal evolution:  
Well, I think I’ve lost touch a bit with some of the friends that I met initially at work because 
I’ve changed Directorate General in the meantime. So, with those who were in the first one, 
with some … I stay in touch, but with others I don’t, but I think it just means that … some 
kind of relationships … they have not really had time to evolve into friendship yet, … so I 
think that’s just a normal thing. And then, well, we’ve met also some new people here, so, 
that’s it [laughter]. (Zofia) 
 
Oh, it’s hard to say. I suppose networks of the contacts with some colleagues fade away. Once 
one changes job … some of the network with some colleagues can fade. Just because one is 
not so much in touch, so unless one has other interests and becomes friends it fades. Same for 
some of the internship contacts and also Brussels is such a place where people come and go, 
so some people have left and then the contacts have become looser. (Aleksandra)!
 
 For Bernard, the event triggering change was departure of his partner to another city:  
I would say that is quite dynamic, because as I’ve said people come and go and it happened to 
me already and also my partner lives in another city which a little bit extended my circle of 
friends, but it’s hard to say whether they are really friends or just his friends, it’s quite fluid I 
would say, but definitely I have maybe a few friends that I see on regular basis. (Bernard) 
 
Kamil re-shuffled the composition of his circles of friends as a result of his involvement in 
the public life in Belgium, outside the Commission: 
Yeah, I mean, if we take into account the networks of friends, … of course, some people they 
went back to Poland ... or there were new friends, new partners, but I mean generally the first 
circle of the closest friends and then the second broad circle with people who you meet at the 
parties, but not beside, you don’t have much contact with them. I mean you can meet them 
every second month or something, but they are not really your friends, but you just know 
them from friends of friends basically, so that’s the second or third circle of friends.  
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And besides, after like two years, it was in 2007, I think, or 2008 I engaged in the civil society 
here a bit - in one of the NGOs which were always quite interesting for me – OXFAM - 
Magasins du Monde. I became a volunteer and then started to, basically, have the permanence 
on Saturdays from time to time, … I mean every week or maybe [every] two weeks, so I got 
to know people from this circle, mainly Belgians and it included sometimes some kind of 
social events like dinners or something like that and of course I think Belgians who work or 
who are in this kind of organizations they are more open than other Belgians, because this is 
about fair trade … But recently I had to step down a bit with my commitment there, because 
of the kid and family and work obligations, but this is still … an existing circle, not a very 
close one, but existent.  
What else, I also have some weak links with some friends from the political linkages. I was a 
Member of the Green Party in Poland and I was in Brussels before I came here to work for a 
kind of a stage in 2004, so I knew some people there plus some Poles who are also in the 
Green Party and who live here, so that’s another circle of friends, let’s say in the political 
sphere, but basically the meetings of this kind of people it’s just you know, like every other, 
you drink beer and just talk about politics and in case of the Green Party in Poland, it is not 
really big politics [laughter] because this party is … just at some local level, local counsellor 
or whatever, so that’s another circle, but not a big one , because there are not so many people 
there. (Kamil) 
 
However, Kamil’s situation is somewhat atypical, as he has also a family in Belgium:  
I have family here, which includes my wife’s aunt and my aunt, but they don’t live in 
Brussels, so we meet them only ... every couple of weeks or something. They are both married 
to Belgians, Flemish and Walloon, or actually married or just after being married [laughter]. 
(Kamil) 
 
By contrast, the evolution of contacts of Patrycja took the form of strengthening the ties with 
the closer friends and losing the margins.  
To a certain extent, the situation of Ula is characterised by loss of contacts both as a 
result of a change of working environment and following the tightening of certain ties to the 
detriment of the others.  
 The experience of EU officials who had settled in Belgium many years ago is usually 
slightly different. Maja lost contact with her previous friends following more intense 
socializing within her husband’s circle of acquaintances, but most importantly as a result of 
her joining the institutions:  
They stopped. This is rather because of my husband and his abundant social life. This has not 
changed. But one thing has evolved in a negative manner, unfortunately, as lots of my 
acquaintances reacted in a way which wasn’t really that nice or positive to the fact that I 
started to work in the institutions and earn three times more than we have all earned in old 
times while doing other things – as I have never been a lawyer in a private firm and they did 
not work at the positions where they currently work, and even among the friends … with 
whom I am still in contact, although occasional, like we meet somewhere once per two-three 
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months, or we call each other, or else, even there, there is a bit of some kind of jealousy, not 
that nice, which I try to ignore. (Maja) 
 
Laura got immediately involved within the Polish circle, once she had started working for the 
EU institutions, but she has quickly become disillusioned:  
At the beginning, we were not many, when we founded this entire network, I remember that it 
started with five persons. When we were 50 in a gathering, we thought how crowded it had 
become, and these were mostly people who had come here from abroad, who were already 
somewhat older – these were not the persons right after the university and I liked these 
persons, because their biographies were very similar: “ils sont partis quelque part”, they have 
learnt by themselves what emigration is, what integration is and how it is to learn another 
language that you actually use in the everyday life, just like a mother tongue, etc. So this was 
somewhat immediate and obvious. Then, more and more new persons have been coming, 
more and more people coming right from Poland, younger and younger, and with these 
persons, I have a serious issue. These persons are very much self confident, very conceited, 
but unfortunately, they feature a very poor intellectual level and this is really terrible! The 
younger the person, the worse it is. I think that the level of education has simply lowered in 
Poland, anybody can study these days, anybody can get a degree and these individuals are 
very poorly brought up, in general. It is not only about education, but also about the 
upbringing. These individuals do not know how to behave at the table; don’t know how to 
dress up to the situation, etc. But they have such a self-esteem that it is just excruciating! 
(Laura) 
 
 Some respondents said that they had not lost the contacts they developed during their 
early years in Brussels. Adrian explained: 
I mean, no, it has not changed. Actually, these circles, they have been forming themselves for 
a couple of years. However, during the last, say, three years, there was no change. I mean, 
perhaps one circle that I counted as the third one, meaning the circle of people I have met 
relatively recently, one or two years ago. But I am maintaining [the contact] also with people I 
had known before. (Adrian) 
 
For Jeremi and Maksymilian, the contacts, especially those outside the Commission, have 
simply become less frequent, although have not faded away. Jeremi reported: 
Well, I would say, the contacts [with] … my friends from outside of the Commission, well, 
because the salsa course ended, so our contacts are not too frequent, as it was before. But 
well, we are friends on Facebook. Sometimes, we send a message, or you know, [we] 
comment on photos or events in our life, but it’s not a face-to-face contact. I have more 
frequent contacts with some of them, so we meet, I don’t know, once per month to have a beer 
or to discuss. And contacts with my friends from European Commission, well, I have a link. It 
depends on the frequency, of our monthly meetings, because a lot of my friends I’m able to 
meet only during these meetings. With some of them we meet more frequently, especially for 
occasions like birthdays or something like this. (Jeremi) 
 
 Maksymilian described the dynamics of his social contacts in the following manner:  
It’s difficult to say whether they really have faded away because these contacts are not 
extremely intensive, so, there are periods when we are in quite intensive contacts with them, 
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with some of our friends, and then we don’t hear from them for like months, and then we re-
establish these contacts again, so I don’t want to say that some of these networks ... 
completely faded away, but the intensity of our contacts with different people vary, that’s 
obvious. So basically, you can say that we see them in average every second week … I mean, 
with most of these people, but there are also people I haven’t seen for months, but maybe in 
the future these contacts will come back. (Maksymilian) 
 
For Beniamin, even the intensity remained the same. His response is interesting (although not 
perfectly matching the question), as the situation he described may be the case of many 
Polish EU officials:  
Because I don’t have family yet here, and my parents and my brother live still in Poland and I 
am somehow alone here, in the meaning I don’t have, how to say, a partner. I am somehow 
forced by the situation to have more contacts with my friends and colleagues. And, so yes, 
these people play a great role in my life, because I spend also my free time with them.  
(Beniamin) 
 
 In the same time, interrogated specifically on the developments in his social contacts during 
the last years, he vigorously denied that there were any such developments. 
What can be concluded on the basis of these interviews is that, although the 
trajectories of my interviewees’ social lives were different, the common point is the departure 
from the initial model of interactions, based on the participation in meetings of a broad Polish 
EU officials’ community (on this, see Rozanska 2009, 2011). If my interviewees claimed that 
their social life had expanded, they typically referred to developments of contacts with the 
persons from outside this community (they mentioned language courses, GezinsBond, 
improvement of their language skills). If their social contacts diminished, it could be related 
to family life or restriction of their contacts to the closest friends – often to some natural 
consequences of their permanent, “matured” settlement. In all cases, the time of intensive 
networking in the EU institutions Polish circle was over. 
 The answers of the research participants seemed to confirm my initial assumption 
that members of the Polish EU institutions community who were initially involved in 
intensive socializing within the Polish group (“Wild Geese” meetings, etc.) broadened their 
social network with years, including EU officials from other member states and people from 
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outside the EU institutions. However, although the original pattern of socializing changed, 
the question remained whether and to what extent the main relations of my respondents are 
still with the Polish people.  
With this regard, the previous research on EU officials suggested that this might be 
the case. Abélès et al. argue that in their private life, the officials often want to escape from 
the “melting pot” experienced at work and tend to socialize with people of the same language 
and culture (1993:22). Also Shore, although with less conviction, suggests that the afterwork 
relations seem less transnational than the professional ones (Shore 2000:164; see also 
Suvarierol 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011). On the other hand, Hooghe suggests that the proneness 
to national networking may vary depending on nationality (2001:105). 
For those living in Brussels before the accession, joining the institutions has actually 
permitted them to meet Polish people with whom they had not socialized that much before. 
Maja said:  
Well, before I started to work in the institutions, I basically knew no Polish people, or maybe 
incidentally, but I had no Polish friends or acquaintances. By contrast, since I started to work 
[in the EU institutions], it has indeed happened that people approached me because they knew 
I was new there and that I was Polish. It was nice. And it is true that if I need to make a 
(professional) phone call, when I am looking for someone dealing with something in another 
DG and if I don’t know whom to call, I always start by trying to find a Pole on the list [in the 
directory]. My second choice is an Italian, even someone I don’t know, as I somehow always 
think that it might be nicer. (Maja)!
 
Otylia’s testimony is partly concurrent, as regards the history of contacts with Polish people, 
but includes the element of fascination and subsequent rejection of the “Polish forum” which 
was one of the main factors of the first phase of integration, also related to the Irish Pub Wild 
Geese:  
Well, not really [has it changed] in my case, as I had actually had no contacts with Poles, so 
rather positive changes occurred, that I have a few contacts. By contrast, it is with a certain 
amount of criticism that I am watching this Polish forum that I formerly appreciated a lot. It is 
becoming annoying, as they stew in their own juice and I think the forum should change the 
profile. (Otylia) 
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Laura, despite her criticism towards the younger part of the Polish EU officials, considers the 
arrival of Polish EU officials to Brussels as an extremely positive change in her life and still 
socialises mainly within the Polish circle:  
No, this has not changed, mostly because I do not want to deal with some people, now it is 
completely official. Belgians, for instance. I have replaced them with Poles and Poles are 
important for me. Because, despite all odds, there are a lot of people among these Poles who 
provide me with spiritual food and these are not necessarily outstandingly intellectual persons. 
There are, for instance, people who are 40 years old or so, who have had some experiences 
and while talking to them, I also re-evaluate certain things, etc. And these people are 
important for me, as these are, in my opinion, wise people and they have a completely 
different perception than people from the Western Europe. Furthermore, their life stories are 
completely different and this is important for me. (Laura) 
 
This category is, however, particular, in the sense of their motivation to socialise with 
the Polish people: they are used to live in a non-Polish environment, so cultural and linguistic 
facility referred to by Abélès et al. (1993) may be secondary for them.  
Another category which is at least potentially distinct, are those EU officials who, 
although they arrived to Brussels only after the accession, have a non-Polish partner. Some of 
them responded in a manner similar to other Polish EU officials who, previously to joining 
the EU institutions, evolved mostly in a non-Polish environment. For instance, Zofia said:  
Well, I would never say that for me, the friendships with Polish people ... were the most 
important ones at the beginning. I cannot say that. Because it was mostly through work and at 
work I meet all kinds of people, of all kinds of nationalities and I didn’t really privilege just 
the nationality as the factor, you know, for really, getting to know someone closer. So, I think 
that actually now, I have more Polish friends than at the beginning [laughter]. I don’t know, 
maybe it’s just because you notice, after a while, meeting all different nationalities, that still 
you have somehow more things in common with the Polish people, so, actually, maybe for 
me, it was a bit the other way round. (Zofia) 
 
Other interviewees from this category were split between the two “communities” 
(interviewee’s compatriots and the partner’s compatriots), which necessarily affected the 
dynamics of their contacts within the Polish community. Aleksandra confirmed that Polish 
people still constitute an important part of her friends: 
Yes, although my group of friends is very mixed just because I came … with a kind of mixed 
nationalities group of friends to start off with, because my husband is of a different 
nationality, so our friends are actually mixed. But there are definitely many Poles among the 
friends. (Aleksandra) 
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Further interrogated about changes which occurred in her contacts with the Polish people, in 
particular as compared to the early “Wild Geese” meetings, she added: 
So for me there was no change across time, but again, because I came already with a group of 
friends who were of other nationalities, Polish as well, but of other nationalities as well, I 
never quite relied on the Polish network in such a way. (Aleksandra) 
 
The great majority of the remaining respondents stated that they continued to maintain 
close relations with the Polish people. In case of Maksymilian, these contacts were stable, but 
not preponderate in terms of quantity:  
Well, they do, they actually still [play an important role], but these are not really people from 
the European Commission, well, I knew a couple of Polish people from the European 
Commission and we were friends in the first period of our stay in Belgium, but I’m not in 
contact with them anymore. So, I can say that nobody from my friends here in Belgium is 
Polish EU official, but, other Poles yes. I mean, these are obviously not the economic 
migrants from Podlasie, but they are rather educated people who live and work in Belgium 
either as Polish teachers or in some kind of NGOs, yeah, and it is true that, well I’ve never 
counted it, but I think that they represent something like one third of our friend in Belgium. 
(Maksymilian) 
 
Stanislaw and Filip simply confirmed that they maintained important contacts with Poles. 
Concerning the intensity of these contacts as compared to those with people of other 
nationalities, Stanislaw said that he considered them “on equal footing”. Ksawery described 
the Polish people as a relatively large group of his “personal friendships and professional 
friendships”. He added: “I feel this group is crucial for my wellbeing in the institutions and in 
Belgium and I appreciate the most this kind of contacts”.  
Some respondents clearly indicated that Poles constituted the majority of their 
relations. This was the case of Kamil:  
Yeah, I think this didn’t change so much, I mean besides this Belgian NGO Oxfam, majority 
of people which I consider as close are still Polish. (Kamil) 
 
Also Beniamin admitted that, somehow, he kept on socializing mostly with Polish people:  
I don’t pay attention to … the nationality of my colleagues and friends, but I must admit that 
overwhelming majority of them are Polish. … I have a few non-Polish colleagues but not too 
many frankly speaking. Not because I don’t want to, but somehow it turned out that I’ve 
always ended up in the Polish environment. (Beniamin) 
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Similarly, Jeremi and Adrian confirmed that the majority of their friends are Polish. By 
contrast, Dominika and Ula stressed that their social contacts made in Brussels were not 
numerous. Dominika said:  
The most important they are people I know from Poland from the university. These are not 
really people I met only here in Brussels. (Dominika) 
 
Ula mentioned some new Polish acquaintances among colleagues, stressing: “they are not my 
friends, I just know them, they are colleagues”. 
Finally, some interviewees indeed strove towards more international community, like, 
for instance, Emilia, who, nevertheless, kept contacts with the previous Polish friends as well:  
I think it would be stable, maybe a bit more … what evolved the most is these contacts with 
colleagues from work that moved to private grounds as well. But still contacts with Polish 
people are important for us, because ... we share so much, that we want to keep it and it’s very 
important, but it’s not, as if it’s not for any organized, I don’t know events, or something like 
that. So it’s really spontaneous, private contact. (Emilia) 
 
Sebastian admitted he actually purposefully avoided Poles:  
I try to avoid the Polish circle, right? So that’s the first point, but it’s really difficult [to avoid 
them] … if you remain within the city. (Sebastian) 
 
4.3.4. Conclusions on integration 
This part of my research allows us to see to what extent the previous findings on the social 
life of expatriates and EU officials remain true in the case of Polish EU officials. It also 
provides material for reflection on the social and cultural integration of EU officials, as 
referred to by Eriksen (2007).  
There can be no question of assimilation of the EU officials into any local society. 
Not only is this society itself multicultural, but, politically speaking, such attempts would not 
be seen as legitimate. Also, the term “integration”, as defined by some authors, does not seem 
to apply to the situation of my research participants. Schoorl summarizes common definitions 
of integration as referring to the process of “becoming part of the social, cultural and 
institutional fabric of the receiving society” (2005:1-2). Under no circumstances can we say 
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that the level and intensity of interaction with the “receiving society” permits the Polish EU 
officials to become a part of it. Even if we understand (social) integration in the sense given 
to this word by Eriksen (2015), implying participation of newcomers in certain institutions of 
the host society, this term does not seem appropriate to describe the dynamics of relations 
between the Polish EU officials and the population of the city. Indeed, my research 
participants are not interested in the city’s life, most of them do not vote and do not 
participate in local celebrations, they do not engage in the associative life, some of them do 
not even care about their surroundings. The Polish EU officials do not feel integrated into 
Belgian society and do not consider themselves a part of it. Instead, they feel “integrated” 
with the international community (which also includes Poles), restricted to people of a similar 
social and educational background. Feeling familiar in the expat community, they also do not 
see any incentive to leave their international circle in order to integrate with Belgians. Using 
Eriksen’s (2015) classification, it would be more appropriate to refer to “segregation”.  
However, if we refer to the understanding of social and cultural integration proposed 
by Eriksen (2007), but also by Alaminos and Santacreu (2009), the situation is more 
complex.  
If “integration” is seen by my research participants as becoming a part of the local 
society, adaptation is rather understood as the ability to smoothly function in this society, 
without necessarily establishing any stronger links with it. As the research shows, Polish EU 
officials feel rather well-adapted to living in Belgium but not integrated into the host society. 
Indeed, they have the capacity to function in the host society, without necessarily 
participating in its life or sharing the interests of the locals. The notion of adaptation, as 
understood by my research participants, can be assimilated to the notion of cultural 
integration in the aforementioned sense. 
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These results seem to confirm the theory proposed by Favell (2003b), who claims that 
the elite migrants do not need to assimilate into the host society without compromising on 
their ability to function smoothly in the new environment. Indeed, my research participants 
are visibly getting used to the host country, they understand and respect its rules, although 
they do not necessarily apply them in their own lives. In fact, many feel comfortable in 
Brussels, although there are still some aspects they complain about (e.g., poor quality of local 
services, poor weather).  
The attitude to integration of Polish EU officials can be compared to the situation of 
Polish people who came to Belgium before the entry of Poland into the EU (some of my 
research participants arrived in Belgium many year ago, well before Poland’s accession to the 
EU). For them, maximum integration in Belgium, up to possible acquisition of Belgian 
nationality, was necessary for their success and self-esteem. The power relations were 
unfavourable to them as people coming from a poorer country and perceived as economic 
migrants and becoming Belgian was seen as the only way upwards. By contrast, those, who 
came to Brussels after the enlargement to take positions in the EU institutions saw their 
arrival as the consequence of Poland joining the European Union: they were in Brussels not 
despite the fact they were Polish, but precisely because they were Polish and hence could be 
recruited to the institutions. The power relations between the EU officials and Belgium are 
very different and they did not need to become Belgians – on the contrary, abandoning their 
Polishness would be unnecessary, as they have a very strong feeling of being European 
precisely as Polish nationals. 
Again, drawing on Eriksen (2007), it must be observed that the researched group of 
newcomers, having rejected social integration with the larger receiving society (although this 
option has never really been offered to them) and with the Polish “community” in Brussels, 
seem to consider itself part of another “Gemeinschaft” of the EU officials in Brussels. What 
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is striking is that, again, the ethnic factor does not count at all in their choices (it confirms the 
already mentioned opinion of Roosens (1989) on the situational character of ethnicity in the 
context of migration).  
As my research has shown, Polish EU civil servants perceived EU officials of 
different nationalities as belonging to the same “tribe”. They saw them as belonging to the 
same category of fellow Eurocrats, while the cultural and national identification remained 
clouded by their status as EU officials. However, in this context it is also worth reflecting on 
whether the EU officials from “old” member states would perceive them and other officials 
from the former Communist Bloc countries as belonging to the same “tribe”, or rather, as 
suggested by Triandafyllidou (2002), as “distant brethren” or “distant aliens” (Spohn and 
Triandafyllidou 2003:7). In fact, as Carolyn Ban observes, “within organizations, there is 
often a ‘we-they’ split, and it takes some time to accept new members as fully part of the 
group, especially if they differ markedly in skills or values from long-time group members” 
(2013:35). However, in order to verify it, further research is necessary, this time on non-
Polish EU officials. Special care would need to be taken to delimit possible division lines 
based on nationality criteria from those based on the moment of employment and the time 
spent in the institutions. 
Compared to the expatriates living in culturally distant locations (see e.g., Fechter 
2007a, 2007b; Beaverstock 2002, 2011; Coles and Walsh 2010; Butcher 2009; Leonard 
2010a, 2010b), whose lifestyle was completely transformed after their expatriation, the 
arrival in Brussels does not seem to have substantially altered the lifestyle of Polish EU 
officials. Certainly, the latter has somewhat changed due to a higher income, stable job, 
becoming adult, having children, and settlement in a new place. However, the influence of 
the new country as such on these changes seems negligible. Having children, earning more 
money or getting old transform one’s life independently from whether one has moved to 
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another country or stayed in the country or city where one was born. The phenomenon of an 
expatriate “bubble”, observed by many scholars (Fechter 2007a, 2007b; E. Cohen 1977; 
Farrer 2010; Butcher 2009; Leonard 2010a), is much less visible than during my previous 
research. Most of my interviewees spend their free time in the same places as Belgians. If 
they frequent typical expat spaces, they usually do not do it with the intention or even the 
conscious awareness of separating themselves from the host population. They do not go to 
clubs reserved for specific nationalities or even for the expatriate population and they clearly 
avoid events organised for EU officials. Although the ritual Polish meetings in the Wild 
Geese pub could be assimilated to the “club culture” as described e.g., by Coles and Walsh 
(2010) or Leonard (2010b), the importance and frequentation of these meetings have 
decreased after the initial period which followed the arrival of the first Polish Eurocrats. 
Furthermore, as it results from my own observations based on regular attendance to these 
meetings, the character of the gatherings has also evolved: the group of people coming to 
Aloft was more diversified, counting also non-Polish expatriate friends and even persons met 
through “Couchsurfing”.   
The absence of seclusive behaviour does not seem to result from any drive for 
integration. Most of my research participants do not have or do not even declare feeling the 
need for further integration and more intense contacts with Belgian society. They maintain 
contacts from universities, make new friends among Polish and other EU officials, as well as 
among other expats. The majority of these friends are Polish, although other expats are also 
well represented. Belgians are rarer, but such friendships also occur. Most of the Polish EU 
officials have rather occasional contact with the Polish community of economic migrants 
from Podlasie, although they show no hostility towards them. The social contacts of my 
interviewees have, in most cases (although for different reasons) evolved from the initial 
focus on the community of newcomers to a more diverse pattern. They appreciate the 
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presence of the local society “at the back stage”, but they are not strongly attached to 
Belgium. Many of them still feel they “belong” in Poland. However, some of these 
statements are less true in the case of Polish EU officials who had lived in Belgium before 
joining the institutions.  
To a certain extent, a parallel can be drawn between the evolution of the social 
contacts of Polish EU officials and the research findings of Beaverstock (2005) concerning 
British expatriates in New York. The author observed that, after the first period of intensive 
networking in the work-related environment, British expatriates started to avoid contacts with 
colleagues, instead developing relations with people from the “outside world”, often related 
to their place of residence, predominantly other British people. In the case of Polish EU 
officials, the disengagement with the initial group of friends, Polish EU officials (not 
necessarily direct colleagues) has also taken place, but seemed to have followed more diverse 
patterns: if the initial circle tended to include mainly fellow Polish EU officials (Rozanska 
2009), new circles of friends include also other EU officials, other foreigners and even 
(although to a limited extent) local people. 
The responses I obtained from my interviewees do not coincide with the findings of 
Suvarierol (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011), Abélès et al. (1993) and Shore (2000). Indeed, even if 
my interviewees maintained extensive contacts with other Poles, they were not necessarily 
preponderate as compared to other contacts. They often originated from the past: people 
interested in European integration were likely to have met before, in the College of Europe or 
in other universities, most probably in thematic seminars, et cetera. Thus, it is not possible to 
conclude, on the basis of the responses, that the Polish EU officials tend to stick with other 
Poles, including in order to stay within the Polish cultural circle or to benefit from the 
opportunity to speak the shared mother tongue, even if the number of Poles among their 
friends remains high.!
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4.4. Perception of attitudes towards Polish EU officials 
One of the important points of interest of the present study are factors which may impede 
integration and adaptation of the Polish EU officials in the new cultural setting as, for 
instance, the not always flattering perception of the Polish “economic immigration” by 
Belgians, or stereotypes on Eastern Europeans and on Eurocrats. Undoubtedly, not only the 
adaptative capacity of the Polish EU staff depends on their anticipated perception by the 
others, but also their identification. In fact, the image of “Us” is also influenced by perception 
(of us) by the “Others” (Jenkins 2008b:21). Also Shore suggests that identity “concerns both 
how a group sees itself in its collective self-definition and how it is portrayed by others: it 
therefore incorporates both image and self-image and draws simultaneously upon the 
classifications of insiders (the ‘emic’ view) and those of outsiders (the ‘etic’ view)” 
(1993a:36).  
4.4.1. “Are [we still] the land of cleaning ladies and construction workers”? 
My previous research performed on the Polish EU officials included a question on the 
stereotypes concerning Poles encountered by my respondents in Belgium (Rozanska 2009). 
As this question was not asked again, in the context of the “follow-up” research, while it was 
asked to the new group, it is worth recalling the main patterns of the previously collected 
responses.  
At that time, nine (out of 30) persons claimed not having personally encountered any 
stereotypical views on Poles while living in Belgium.  
In the new group, half of the respondents encountered no stereotypes about the Polish 
people, in general. Some of them admitted they heard jokes based on such stereotypes, but 
they could not take it seriously, given the context: “Not really, if anything just in form of a 
funny joke, like any other jokes concerning stereotypes of other nationalities”; “There are still 
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jokes about the ‘Polish plumber’ and the ‘Polish builders’, however, it was more used in a 
conversation with friends in a joke manner. I have not encountered any negative stereotypical 
views”; “Yes, as jokes or half-jokes, but nothing offending; usually in the office”; “[A 
stereotype] That Poles drink a lot. ! It’s to some extent justified, but every time that I 
encountered such view, it was expressed with humour and sympathy”; “Some – mainly told 
as jokes during social encounters. Our fondness of vodka seems to be exploited”. 
During the former research, positive opinions were most often related to the quality of 
Polish services (Rozanska 2009). This was also the case in the new group, where many 
respondents referred to acknowledgement of the Polish workers’ skills and hard work: “Yes, 
usually in reference to Polish blue-collar workers (cleaning ladies, child-minders, workmen, 
etc.). The opinions held about these people are on the whole neutral or positive, and I think 
are fully justified”; “I have been hearing very good views – in terms of Polish workers being 
hard-working, reliable and resourceful – that applying to both people working in and outside 
of the institutions”; “On the positive side: we work well, e.g., service levels provided by 
Poles are generally superior to the ones offered by the locals”; “we are recognised as hard-
working and honest people”. One of the men elaborated: 
It seems that the dominant stereotype is of Poles as builders (working on renovating Belgian 
homes, construction sites) etc. It also seems to me that the stereotype is in general fairly 
positive, in the sense that the quality of the work of this type is generally perceived as good 
and the Polish builders are perceived as flexible and reliable. It seems that a part of the 
stereotype is also that these Polish workers often work illegally or semi-legally (to avoid the 
prohibitive Belgian social security contributions and taxation, though this is also one of the 
main reasons why Belgians use their services). I find this stereotype to be largely justified, i.e. 
this probably corresponds to reality in most cases. 
 
The respondents from my previous research group referred to certain misconceptions 
related to the Polish people. As they claimed, Belgians were surprised that someone was a 
Pole, due to the disparity between their stereotyped expectations probably based on their 
perception of the earlier migrating groups from Poland (Rozanska 2009). Similar stories 
appeared in the responses of the new group: “I was asked whether I’d like to be my 
!324!
neighbours’ cleaning lady, once they learned I was Polish”; “we are the land of cleaning 
ladies and construction workers”. 
Another common stereotype, related to drinking alcohol, seems to be eternal. During 
my former study, my interviewees complained that “Polish people are perceived as heavy 
drinkers”; “Drinking vodka – something considered typically Polish” (Rozanska 2009). The 
same stereotypes were highlighted in the responses from the “new” group, together with 
another common stereotype, related to Catholicism: “People tend to think that Polish people 
drink a lot (which is very often true) and that they are really religious (true as well)”; “Poland 
is cold, overly Catholic, poor, we drink too much, we are the land of cleaning ladies and 
construction workers”. 
There were also some generally negative stereotypes reported in the “new” group, 
going beyond the abovementioned evergreens, although they were rather rare: 
On the Belgian public forums (e.g., discussion boards under online newspaper articles) one 
also occasionally finds a negative stereotype of “Eastern Europeans” in general as rather 
“uncultured” (presumably meaning their lifestyle, food preferences etc.). Though this may 
also refer to a subculture of Polish “lager louts” (young, loud and usually shaven youths 
drinking beer in public and behaving loudly) which are sometimes to be found in some 
Brussels neighbourhoods (St. Gilles etc.). From the point of view of an average college-
educated middle-class Belgian, there is probably also some justification to that stereotype, 
especially since a vast majority of the Polish population in Brussels comes from the poorest 
rural regions of Poland. However, a part of the “uncultured” stereotype may be related to the 
old but persistent image of Central and Eastern Europe as somewhat technologically and 
socially backward. I find this part of the stereotype somewhat amusing, since some aspects of 
life in modern Poland seem to be more advanced than in Belgium which is a very stagnant 
country in many areas (notably when it comes to commercial services). Yet many Belgians 
still seem to live with the notion of Western European superiority in that sense, which does 
not always correspond to reality. 
 
4.4.2. “We don’t work, have too big salaries, are arrogant and don’t want to 
integrate”: stereotypes on Eurocrats, perception of xenophobic attitudes  
Concerning the stereotypes on Eurocrats encountered by my respondents, only a minority 
(around one third of the whole research group) has never encountered such stereotypes 
personally, although some of them were aware that they exist or might exist. Those who 
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encountered negative stereotypes, referred mostly to the conviction that the EU officials are 
lazy, do not do anything substantial, yet they are extremely wealthy and enjoy numerous 
privileges: “Yes, most of my friends from the period before I’ve started working for the 
Commission think I do nothing and earn more than them. Moreover, they think we have all 
for free (crèche, meals)”; “I encountered several times stereotypes about ‘eurocrats’ in 
Belgian TV and press, on the street/shops (from random encounters) and at doctors .... The 
classical stereotype is that: we are lazy, earn too much and do not pay taxes (I even heard we 
get cars, petrol and alcohol for free!)”; “I have heard quite a few (as a joke or seriously) 
stories regarding “eurocrats” being lazy, earning lots of money and yet coming to work late, 
taking long time for lunches and leaving early”; “Sure I have! We are a bunch of do-nothings 
with enormous salaries and no connection to real life. My car has been damaged on one 
occasion”). In total, three persons complained that the Eurocrats are considered as having 
everything for free, not paying taxes was mentioned by four respondents (e.g., “we don’t pay 
local taxes, although we use local services”). Four others referred to yet another common 
stereotype – about raising prices (and especially the real estate prices): “[Eurocrats] drive up 
property prices (making them unaffordable in some neighbourhoods for ‘normal people’”; 
“the Belgians consider ‘eurocrats’ as the ones ... who made prices higher”; “they raise 
housing prices and therefore ‘evict’ the real local population from central neighbourhoods”; 
“they make the housing prices in BXL higher.” 
These stereotypes affect, in certain cases, personal relations with the freshly 
acquainted people and some respondents seem to have taken them into account also in the 
strategies of their social interaction: “Yes, people stop being nice and get distant”; “Belgians 
think that we do not pay taxes. They become reserved when they learn that you work for the 
Commission. Sometimes it is better to get to know someone better before you reveal where 
you work”.  
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Another stereotype encountered, although more rarely, referred to alleged arrogance 
and intentional seclusion of the EU officials: “we don’t work, have too big salaries, are 
arrogant and don’t want to integrate”. One of the male respondents elaborated on the issue:  
Stereotypes among the Brussels population seem to be fairly negative (though often mixed 
with jealousy). The stereotype is often that of highly (or over-)paid bureaucrats who do not 
work too hard yet enjoy incredible privileges, who drive up property prices (making them 
unaffordable in some neighbourhoods for ‘normal people’), isolate themselves from the rest 
in Eurocrat enclaves, tend to be arrogant (e.g., always complain about the quality of public 
and commercial services in Brussels without contributing to them financially, and sometimes 
are even aggressively monolingual (English only). 
 
Finally, many respondents complained about local doctors and service providers 
“ripping them off” because of their alleged wealth: “the ‘eurocrats’, can pay more”; “I have 
often been in situations where someone tried to rip me off (at the dentist’s or doctor’s for 
example, in a taxi, or while buying a house) because they knew I was a Eurocrat”; 
“sometimes they make you undertake tests just for the money, not out of necessity”;  
“[doctors] they always ask where you work, if you answer at the European institutions they 
charge you more!”. 
There are also more serious cases of negative reactions. One of the women recounted 
on her experience: “[I was a target of a xenophobic attitude] just once, with someone working 
for an asbl who treated me as an awfully rich person and did not want to handle my file 
because I am eurocrat. Not justified at all as attitude”. There were also two testimonies on 
damaged cars (although I have heard about it more often during off-the-record 
conversations): “My car has been damaged on one occasion; I’ve also seen a Belgian 
reproaching an EU official for having Belgian (rather than EUR) licence plates on his 
vehicle, as if he was hiding. The fact is though that EUR plates can get you in trouble with 
some people here”; “Heard of cars being scratched but most annoying is at the medical 
services level”. 
 The image of Eurocrats presented in the mass media (outside Brussels) also did not 
help them to fight the common stereotypes: “In Polish press the stereotypes of ‘eurocrats’ (as 
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rich lazy stupid bureaucrat) appear from time to time”; “Not in Brussels, but outside BXL 
yes, on holiday the Eurocrats are negatively received, as in the local media all negative 
developments in the countries are presented as imposed by Brussels, so then also our image is 
not positive. It’s seldom that anyone would speak about the positive aspects of the EU. It’s 
always easier to complain”. 
Most of the respondents rejected these opinions as unfair and unjustified: “‘eurocrats’ 
are not more lazy and less efficient than employees of other big corporations or maybe even 
the opposite in lot of cases”; “I think xenophobic attitude would not be justified, as we are not 
conceited or arrogant and I think we bring more benefits than nuisance to Brussels”; “These 
opinions (or rather accusations) were of course not justified”; “A general view that we earn a 
lot and do nothing at work. The “earning a lot” is justified, the ‘doing nothing’ is not”. 
One of the female research participants was of the opinion that the origins of the 
stereotypes related to allegedly not paying taxes lied in “the communication problems of 
institutions themselves but also the ‘eurocrats’.” As she further explained: 
Many Eurocrats do not know how to answer to such accusations. For example, as regards 
taxes almost nobody knows that we actually pay taxes (around 8% on our salary, property 
taxes, taxes on saving, TVA) and since we earn more than average we are able to leverage big 
proportion of our earnings into Belgian economy (buying here, going out to local restaurants, 
inviting guests from abroad). 
 
Another respondent explained that it is not true that the EU officials have everything 
for free (e.g., crèche, meals). As she explained: “it’s simply not true, we pay for all this and 
even more than Belgians (ex. crèche of the commune: 500 euro per month, the Commission 
crèche: 1000 euro)”. There was also a woman who considered that “people still don’t know 
much about how the situation for the EC employees is worsening.” Yet another respondent 
said that, together with his wife, they “try to counter these stereotypes in [their] personal 
conduct.” One of the men suggested these stereotypes “stem from ignorance and jealousy, 
simply speaking”, whereas another one emphasized the Belgians “forget often that it is the 
‘eurocrats’ who contribute enormously to the budget of Brussels and it is them who create the 
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demand for various services.” As someone else argued, “most of the stereotypes have sources 
in little or virtually no knowledge of EU institutions, perceived through the prism of 
individual officials.” 
However, certain respondents acknowledged that a part of the accusations may be 
founded, at least in certain cases: “There are quite a few [stereotypes]: rich; closed; arrogant. 
Justified? To some extent probably yes”; “As in every stereotype there is probably a grain of 
truth in this, as there is probably a group of Eurocrats who do have most or all of these 
characteristics”. One of the female participants gave a more developed answer to this 
question: 
On the basis of my own experience, these stories are not justified at all – my experience is of 
a huge majority being very hard working and working fairly long hours (although yes, getting 
good money and enjoying flexibility at work). Although I have heard that there are also 
people “around” who do not work so hard and might deserve some of this criticism. I have 
also heard comments about the size of the Brussels “bureaucratic machine”. This is not 
justified – the number of officials working in the Commission being sometimes smaller than 
an administration of a big capital in a Member State!  
 
4.4.3. New member states’ officials as “distant Others”? 
Given that Polish EU officials consider themselves as belonging to a wider community of EU 
officials, it is important to verify what is, according to my research participants, their image 
in other EU officials’ eyes, but also in Belgians’ eyes.!
4.4.3.1. Attitude of old member states’ officials to Polish EU officials and Poles in 
general 
The respondents from the old group generally avoided the extremes in their answers. Nobody 
considered that the attitude of the old member states’ EU officials to either Poles in general or 
Polish EU officials was very negative and only one person indicated a very positive one (both 
in case of the attitude to Poles and to EU officials).  
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In the entire follow-up group, around two-fifth of the respondents (8 out of 19 who 
gave a useful response) considered that the attitude of their colleagues to Poles in general was 
positive, while over one fourth (five persons) considered it negative. The attitude to the 
Polish EU officials was believed to be even better: eight out of 19 considered it positive and 
only three respondents found it negative. As one of the respondents emphasized:  
Such classification (old MS/ new MS) is no longer valid. As everybody recruited after the 
2004 reform has similar problems and issues, it is rather pre-2004 (officials from old MS with 
a lot of experience) versus post-2004 (officials from old and new MS with short experience). 
Thus the “old MS” group is not homogenous anymore in their attitudes.  
 
It is striking that, even if still in minority, a relatively high number of Polish EU officials 
anticipated the negative attitude to Poles in general. According to Filip, who did not give any 
clear answer, “there is no standard attitude. In private life, they are positive; in professional 
life it happens to be xenophobic.”  
Likewise, also the respondents from the “new” research group avoided extreme 
answers. In fact, most of them found the attitude of old member states EU officials towards 
Poles employed in the EU institutions as either highly positive (two respondents), positive 
(14 respondents) or neutral. Only one person considered it negative. Concerning the attitude 
to the Poles in general, one person found it highly positive and 14 – positive. According to 
three persons the attitude of the old member states’ officials was negative. 
 As one of the women explained:  
 
Towards Polish EU officials – overall I think positive – because most are young, well 
educated, and ambitious. However, some secretaries from “old MS” might have felt 
resentment against some young secretaries from new member states who joined the 
Commission and created competition, but also some instability as they did not want to stay in 
their posts – but looked for ways to find another job quickly.  
 
Another female respondent said, “they are positive towards Polish people but there is 
a bit of jealousy as regards affirmative action that took place between 2003-2010”. 
A person who found the attitude towards Poles in Belgium neutral, explained that this 
is the case but “except for using Polish services (cleaning ladies, plumbers, construction 
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workers)”. The same woman who tried to indicate possible reasons of resentment of the old 
member states offcials towards the Polish EU civil servants suggested that the attitude: 
“Towards Poles – [is] also overall positive – many officials from old member states know a 
Polish cleaning lady or a plumber or a builder and I have only heard good comments”. 
4.4.3.2. Attitude of Belgians toward the EU officials and Poles in general  
The attitude of the “host society” towards the newcomers is seen as one of the important 
factors that either facilitates or hinders the process of adaptation (see e.g., Berry 2002; 
Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). As Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels stresses, 
according to European policy-makers, “immigrant integration is a ‘two-way street’ ” and it 
depends both on migrant’s “own characteristics” and “the context of reception – 181 positive, 
negative or neutral – which that migrant encounters” (2014:14). 
Consequently, I decided to ask my respondents, how they would define the attitude of 
the majority of the Belgians toward EU officials, but also toward Poles in general.  
During my former research (Rozanska 2009), 15 respondents – thus a half of the total 
number - found the attitude of the majority of the Belgians toward EU officials negative, 
followed by neutral (10) and positive (4). According to two respondents this attitude is highly 
negative, while only one considered it highly positive. For this question, there were more 
indications than respondents, as some participants failed to give unequivocal answers. 
The attitude of the Belgians towards Poles in general was found neutral by 15 
persons, 11 persons found it positive, while only five persons – negative (Rozanska 2009). 
I asked the respondents from the new research group the same question. As to the 
attitude of Belgians towards Poles, almost equal number of participants declared it was either 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 She refers to “the concept of the context of reception” as understood by Portes and Böröcz (1989); Portes and 
Rumbaut (2006).  
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positive (14 persons) or neutral (13). Two respondents found it negative, while two others 
hesitated between “positive and neutral”.182  
One of the women, explained: “As [regards] their attitude to Poles, ... my experience 
shows that they have a positive attitude. But I am sure that some Belgians might think that 
Poles (especially those working outside of EU institutions) are taking their jobs from them”. 
As another female respondent added: “We seem to be appreciated for our services 
(construction, cleaning)”.  
By contrast, the attitude of the majority of Belgians towards EU officials was 
considered negative by 11 persons, while ten respondents found it neutral and one person - 
highly negative. Only five respondents considered it positive. One person did not know how 
to answer the question, one found it between neutral and negative, and one between negative 
and highly negative.  
As one of the participants developed on the issue:  
On the basis of my own experience I would think positive – but then Belgians whom I know 
well are either married to Polish or other EU citizens, or work in the EU institutions – and 
therefore are more tolerant, open and positive. Overall, I think of Belgians as a nation as fairly 
open and tolerant. But it depends on what they do – I am sure that there could be some who 
think that EU officials have pushed the prices of property up. 
 
As to the attitude of the Belgians toward the EU officials, the latter learn very quickly 
about the alleged hostility of the local population. A newcomer in an EU institution is often 
immediately informed by “older” colleagues that the Belgians do not like the Eurocrats, he is 
advised not to carry the official’s badge after leaving the EU institutions buildings or never 
put the EU car plates so as to avoid aggression.  
Similarly as it was the case during my former research (Rozanska 2009), the 
anticipated attitude of Belgians toward Poles in general was considered to be more positive 
than towards the EU civil servants.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 A few persons gave more than one indication, for example “positive” and “neutral”, “neutral” and 
“negative”, “negative “and “highly negative”. Therefore, the sum of the numbers quoted above may not match 
the total number of respondents.   
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4.4.4. Conclusions on the perception of attitudes toward Polish EU officials 
In the present thesis, I followed the assumption that stereotypes about Poles may strongly 
affect their integration into the host country and their identity. The theoretical grounding for 
this assumption can be found in the works of Daux (2006), Eriksen (2010), Nash (1989), 
Jenkins (2008b), and Shore (1993a). I was also aware of the findings of scholars concerning 
the stereotypes about EU officials (e.g., Bellier 2002; Shore 2000) and about Poles in 
Belgium (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b; Galent et al. 2009).  
Based on the interviews and questionnaires administered to both groups, the initial 
assumptions based on the literature on Polish immigrants in Belgium were not clearly 
confirmed in the perception of my research participants. It might seem that the stereotypes 
about Polish people among Belgians, as perceived by Polish EU officials, are becoming less 
widespread and less firmly held. Certainly, although they have encountered such views, they 
do not feel perceived as heavy-drinking individuals (Galent et al. 2009) and do not have the 
impression that Belgians associate them with unlawfulness or the semi-criminal demimonde 
(Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005). However, according to many testimonies, Belgians still 
tend to perceive Poles primarily as a “nation of cleaning ladies and construction workers”, 
even if their image is overall positive and gradually improving. This seems to be confirmed 
by a number of stories about the confusion allegedly experienced by Belgians faced with 
Polish EU officials who are thus Poles not belonging to any categories of Polish people they 
are familiar with. Also, a high number, although still a minority, of my respondents perceive 
their fellow Eurocrats to have a negative attitude towards Poles. This might support the 
conclusion that, although they do not want to acknowledge it, Polish EU officials still expect 
to experience certain form of stigmatisation as Poles or Eastern Europeans. According to such 
an interpretation, my respondents would more readily admit falling prey to stereotypes about 
Eurocrats – about those of a “dominant” group – enjoying a high social status and economic 
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privileges, rather than to stereotypes about “uncultured” builders and cleaning ladies. 
However, my research does not provide any conclusive evidence for such a (possible) 
interpretation.  
The negative stereotypes of the local population concerning Eurocrats are felt to be 
strong and persistent.  
As mentioned before, some of the respondents thought their fellow EU officials of 
other nationalities might also have a negative perception of Poles in general – even if this 
reluctance might not concern themselves because they too are EU officials. To a certain 
extent (and indirectly), it justifies the opinions of Ban (2013) who has argued that negative 
stereotypisation of Eastern Europeans does occur in the EU institutions. This perception 
might constitute a barrier to their identification with and adaptation to this professional group.  
It may be assumed that the perception that stereotypes still exist about Poles being 
associated with certain labour niches in Belgian society (i.e. construction workers and 
cleaning ladies), may contribute to the maintenance of internal boundaries within the EU 
officials’ community, namely between the Polish EU officials and officials of old member 
states. The same stereotypes, but also the stereotypes about Eurocrats (i.e. seeing them as lazy 
“parasites” earning incredibly high incomes and raising the price of real estate), being 
perceived to exist among the local population would strengthen the boundaries between 
Polish EU officials and Belgians. The theory of Nash (1989) concerning the use and 
“processing” of stereotyped cultural features as a boundary marker indirectly helps to 
understand the situation of the Polish EU officials in this regard. However, the mechanism 
here is quite complex: these boundaries are perceived as imposed, but, to the extent that they 
are simply a matter of perception, and therefore the projection of fears, they may in reality 
come, at least in part, from the Polish Eurocrats themselves. Finally, the fear of negative 
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categorisation through amalgamation may also push Polish EU officials to erect boundaries 
separating them from the community of other Poles in Brussels. 
4.5. Transnationalism 
Integration of incoming population can be analysed not only with reference to the “target” 
society, but in a triangle formed also by the country they left – or, often, only partially left. 
This perspective is notably illustrated by the concept of transnationalism. Linda Basch and 
her colleagues refer to transnationalism as a phenomenon of creation of spaces across 
national boundaries through various migrants’ activities of social, economic, and political 
nature (Basch et al. 1995:22). Such activities may embrace not only regular travel or money 
tranfers, but also extensive communication with friends and relatives in the home country, or 
strong mental connection, manifested e.g., by strong interest in social, cultural and political 
developments in the “old country”.  
Although, as it was mentioned earlier, in the context of highly skilled movers, this 
concept is sometimes amalgamated with cosmopolitanism, it might be relevant in case of my 
respondents even in the sense reserved by Val Colic-Peisker (2006:220) to the situation of 
working-class migrants (“an enduring connection of migrants with their place and community 
of origin”). Indeed, the EU officials differ from expatriates by their commitment to stay and 
live in Belgium, even if they do not intend to (or cannot) integrate into the Belgian society. 
They would rather – as mentioned elsewhere – tend to integrate into the international strata of 
a city or into the EU officials’ universe, which is a prefiguration of a denationalized class of 
Europeans. In this sense, do they have certain features of diaspora, developing a certain sense 
of belonging to a community in the new country, while possibly maintaining “the strongest 
sense of … belonging” in their “old” country (Vertovec 2009:78)? 
 To answer this question, I decided to inquire about the actual links that the Polish EU 
officials kept with their home country. To this effect, I formulated a number of questions that 
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would help me to find out, firstly, what is the intensity and means of communication with 
Poland (in terms of travel, communication with friends and relatives, places where they spend 
important moments, such as Christmas or Easter). I also asked them to what extent they tried 
to live as they did back in their home country, buying in Polish shops, using Polish 
servicemen and remaining in the circle of Polish culture. In the following part of the research, 
I proceeded with more focused interview questions to find out to what extent they still relied 
on Polish networks within the institutions in order to stay in the Polish environment and 
obtain basic advice. Then, I also inquired about their mental connection with Poland, 
interrogating my interviewees about the evolution of the quality of their contacts with friends 
and relatives back in Poland and inviting them to reflect on how much they still understand 
their home country they had left several years earlier. Finally, I tried to understand what is the 
strength of their emotional links with homeland, asking whether they would like to come 
back to Poland in case they had such a possibility without having to sacrifice their career and 
standard of living.  
4.5.1. Contacts with Poland: tangible connection 
In this subsection I focus on those links with Poland which directly influence their day-to-day 
functioning, such as contats with family, practicing Polish traditions and lifestyle. !
4.5.1.1. Contact with the home country 
Leman pointed at the strong emotional and physical attachment of the previous wave of 
Polish labour migrants (mainly from Podlasie) to Poland (Leman 2000:31). According to 
Leman, these people were “‘present’ in Brussels but continue[d] to ‘live’ in Poland” 
(2000:31). Polish Catholic Church, but also buses that on weekly basis linked Poland and 
Belgium were the main means facilitating regular contact with Poland (while enabling 
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circular “travels”, but also bringing visitors and sending goods both sides) (Leman 2000:31; 
Siewiera 1995:98-99; Grzymała-Kazłowska 2005:684, 2001:33).  
My former research (Rozanska 2009) revealed that all of the respondents maintained 
intensive and regular contacts with Poland - mostly via Internet (email or Skype) (22 
persons). Another popular means of communication was telephone, many persons also 
travelled regularly to Poland. In fact, all respondents travelled to Poland at least once a 
year.183 Ten out of 30 respondents visited their home country no more than two times a year. 
Only two persons travelled regularly six times per year or more. As much as nine persons 
contacted their family and friends on daily basis.!
The first question I asked to respondents from the new group (30 persons) concerned 
the frequency of their visits in Poland and their communication with friends and relatives 
remaining in the home country.  
Eight persons (more than one-fourth) declared visiting Poland more than four times 
per year. Half of the group (15) visited Poland between three and four times per year but less 
than five times. Eight persons visited their home country less frequently, but at least once per 
year. One person said she had “several home countries”.  
 Only twelve persons replied to the question on the frequency of their contacts with 
relatives and friends in Poland. It seems their contact is quite intensive. Three women do it on 
a daily basis. Several respondents spoke to their families in Poland “almost everyday” or 
several times per week. On the other hand, many respondents contacted their friends much 
more rarely than their family.  
Only one person contacted friends via traditional mail. Twenty-four EU officials 
contacted their friends and relatives via Internet (often Skype) and 23 by phone. Twenty 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Although some of the EU officials work on files related to their home country (which might result in 
professional trips), this is by no means the rule. 
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persons specified that the Internet contacts were mostly via email (which may look surprising 
given that the research took place in the time when Facebook was already very popular).  
In general, it can be concluded that the great majority of the respondents who 
answered the question visited Poland regularly and quite often, and kept very close contact 
with their family and – less frequently – with friends via Internet. 
4.5.1.2. Frequency and quality of contacts with friends in Poland, possible evolution 
Favell argues that, with time, only the contacts with family back home stay largely intact 
while those with friends are often challenged (2008a:203). On the other hand, Klekowski von 
Koppenfels suggests that both links with friends and relatives home usually subsist, despite 
their possible weakening (2014:108).  
In this regard, a very clear pattern can be observed: the majority of my interviewees 
admitted that their contacts with friends in Poland have either completely disappeared or 
faded away with time and distance. Some of the interviewees claimed not having friends in 
Poland at all. Beniamin said:  
I don’t have any friends there, no. I know a few people but I don’t really keep any contact 
with them. Maybe because of time, I simply don’t have time to care about these contacts and 
they haven’t been really my good friends or colleagues. In fact, I don’t have any close friends 
or colleagues there. (Beniamin) 
 
However, most have kept contact with one to four friends. Maja explained:  
So, … [in addition to] the family, I am in regular contact only with four persons, out of which 
two are my close friends, one is quite a good friend and one is a good acquaintance of mine 
and this is it. As after 20 years, this is what I am left with, these were the best - the group 
from the university. I am certainly soliciting these contacts more than they are, as it is me who 
had left and when I come back, I am supposed to report. But the quality of these contacts, I 
would describe it as a very ... intimate and true friendship and … even with this friend with 
whom my ... friendship is the least intimate, it is still friendship and not just acquaintance. 
(Maja) 
 
  Dominika also reported having discontinued most of her friendships in Poland:  
I think that with time it was a good check for some of my friendships in Poland … I’ve lost 
contact with some people I considered very close friends when I was there. But I left eight 
years ago also, so I think it’s normal that only the strongest links remain the same and 
unchanged. Then, I go to Poland twice a year, more or less, so it’s not that often. And of 
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course, with different Polish people we spend much more time while talking on Skype or just 
... emailing or talking on the phone, but it’s not the same as meeting face-to-face. But I’m 
very happy to see that with the closest friends, when we see each other, it’s still the same. 
That’s nice. (Dominika) 
 
These testimonies stress also the positive side, thus the friendships Maja and 
Dominika managed to keep.  
 The stories of Zofia, Patrycja and Klara were also very similar, with their circles of 
friends in Poland reduced to their best friends. 
 A couple of persons responded that the quantity of their friends and acquaintances in 
Poland had not decreased. This was the case of Ksawery:  
I think that in the today’s world, there are planes, we can see each other, I can invite them 
here and they come so it’s no more a problem. I think that distance is no more a problem and 
we, and personally I, use different tools to get closer with my old friends and to keep contact 
with them and to nurture this relationship, which is much long term, and more substantial I 
would say. (Ksawery) 
 
Sebastian reported that expatriation had actually even made him tighten the relations 
with his friends in Poland: 
Actually I would say that ... I wasn’t a very much socializing person when living in Poland. 
But people change when coming to Brussels, obviously. It concerns me as well ... , so I would 
say that I have even closer contacts with guys in Poland than I used to have in the past. Even 
though ... I have life here, … I am simply a more sociable person than I used to be. 
(Sebastian) 
 
However, for other respondents, sinking quality of their friendships in Poland was the 
problem they elaborated with much bitterness. Otylia complained that the contacts with her 
friends, although frequent and sustainable, were “somewhat superficial”. Bernard reported:  
It’s less and less frequent and every time we meet it’s unknown whether it’s going to work or 
not … It’s less and less intensive. I remember … I used to call them on a regular basis and 
they used to call me. Now, we don’t call each other at all. It’s just meeting … we just meet up 
when I’m in Warsaw. ... I would say that before every meeting I’m a little bit stressed, 
whether it’s going to work as in the past or not. (Bernard) 
 
Also Adrian, who apparently managed to stay in touch with his friends in Poland, complained 
about the quality of these contacts, explaining it by the following reasons:  
I mean, the distance ... , the absence of possibility to meet after work ... make that you send 
emails more rarely. Of course, each time that I am in Poland I try to meet them, but I do not 
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always succeed, although there are two or three friends that I always meet when I am in 
Warsaw. (Adrian) 
 
Darek complemented this explanation with additional aspects, related to disappearance of 
common interests:  
It is notably with this friend from Poland that I see, more and more, that we have no topics in 
common, we have nothing to talk about. This is certainly something that you easily notice, 
that our paths are going apart, that we are growing distant, but apart from this, there is still a 
link between us, still from the childhood. (Darek) 
 
Finally, a small number of interviewees indicated that jealousy may also play its role:  
I can observe a certain distance …. Sometimes it may be related to people who don’t have 
children .... Maybe, because those who don’t have, they would like to have, and they cannot 
have, but this is just my guess … Probably a more important reason is the fact that sometimes, 
you know, they regard their situation in Poland, in economical terms, as not very 
advantageous in comparison to our situation. Therefore, a certain distance when you talk with 
them can be seen, especially in relation to things like, you know, talking about holidays, or 
whatever. So, even if this might not be very intentional, this might be a problem, especially 
taking into account the wages you have in Poland (Kamil). 
 
Laura formulated a much more radical diagnose with this regard:  
The contacts strengthened some five years ago or something, as I had the 20th anniversary of 
the maturity exam and I went to this event and, finally, these people wanted to stay in contact 
with me, as I think they consider me as a successful person what is very funny to me, as, 
imagine, there was a distasteful situation resulting therefrom during the event, as it was 
revealed where I worked, etc. and I think it was perceived like that, a bit as if this person was 
doing an outstanding career. I was not actually talking about myself, they have invented it 
themselves ... and then the persons which had not even known me at highschool started to 
come to me and be my friends. But I am not stupid, I perfectly realise what it may be about. 
And the funniest of all, when a classmate of mine with whom I maintain contact called me 
and said, listen, at [her] workplace, a girl who had never said “hi” to me throughout the whole 
highschool time, and I’ll bet she didn’t even know what my name was, was watching the 
photos from this event at work and telling [voice modification]: “Oh, this girl was my best 
friend in highschool! Now she’s making a career in Brussels”. So, people simply tend to 
exploit a bit and I am trying to avoid it. People tend to maintain contacts also out of pure 
curiosity, as this is a different world, they want to see something different, e.g., on Facebook 
and so on, so, this is a bit troublesome for me, as I have grown suspicious in this regard. 
(Laura) 
 
On the contrary, Maksymilian seemed overall happy with the quality of these contacts, even 
though he also noticed certain negative phenomena that he considered natural:  
Well, I don’t think that this is the case [that the quality of contacts with friends in Poland have 
changed]. I mean, it is obvious that if you don’t see someone, that definitely affects your 
relationship with this person, because you don’t have that many topics in common. I would 
say they grow distant to the extent that anybody whom we don’t see more often than every six 
months must finally grow a bit distant, but I think that I still understand them very well and 
they understand, they know me, and I definitely cannot say that I have or they have evolved in 
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a direction which have made it impossible to communicate. I definitely do not appreciate 
them less today than I appreciated them before. (Maksymilian) 
 
To conclude, although the majority of the interviewees admitted that the relations 
with their friends in the home country became limited to the closest friends and, very often, 
their quality suffered from the lack of common interests and decreased intensity, only very 
few of them referred to factors specific to the employment in the EU institutions, or rather to 
the material status related to it. In the majority of cases, the distance and difference of 
professional or private life situations were at the origin of this phenomenon. One could 
presume that the same would have occurred had they moved to any other country to exercise 
any profession, or even if they had moved to another city or changed the job. In fact, the 
stories of my interviewees often point at growing alienation from their friends. On the other 
hand, in case of my research participants, these circumstances were due to the fact they had 
joined the EU institutions and have become a part of their expatriation experience. In certain 
cases, the reasons seem to be related to separation, in other to financial promotion and thus, a 
change of social class, yet in other cases, especially as regards young people, to the late effect 
of their passage to adult life.  
4.5.1.3. Celebrating important feasts 
If the actual frequency of visits and contacts may depend on the amount of spare time 
available and the intensity of relationships with friends and relatives, preference for spending 
Christmas or Easter in the home country gives additional indication of a solid link with the 
country. 
The data collected during my previous study (Rozanska 2009) showed that a great 
majority of my respondents spent traditional festivities, such as Christmas or Easter holidays, 
in Poland, while only one person stayed in Belgium.  
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While looking at the new research group, only three out of 30!persons declared that 
they did not spend the traditional feasts in Poland – all of them being somehow connected to 
another country, be it by one of the parents or by nationality. Those persons spend feasts in 
an “other country”. Only one person indicated that he spent feasts in Belgium, as well as in 
Poland and in an “other” country. This person added the following comment: “no priority 
here – it does not matter for me that much”. 
4.5.1.4. Access to Polish goods and services 
Preference for Polish goods and services, including their regular consumption may be 
considered as indicating a strong attachment to the everyday culture of the home country. 
Notwithstanding such possible advantages of Polish services as communication in Polish and 
(presumably) lower price, such preference seems to indicate that even after having settled in a 
host country, my respondents seek to live as if they lived in Poland, choosing the familiar 
over the local. The same goes for the interest in Polish clubs and (to a lesser extent) 
restaurants. 
During my previous research (Rozanska 2009), I asked my respondents about the 
importance of access to different Polish facilities or services. In that time, most of the 
respondents did not consider access to Polish clubs and restaurants as important, with a 
somewhat higher interest in case of access to Polish shops with specific products (13 
affirmative against 17 negative). The answers were even more balanced as concerns the 
importance of access to different Polish services, (14 affirmative answers against 16 
negative), especially plumbers (5), “cleaning ladies” (3), Polish doctors (3) and construction 
workers (2). 
My present research revealed that 18 respondents (out of 30) found it important to 
have access to Polish culture. Some of them specified what they meant under the 
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term “culture”: “books, journals, films, music”, “films, theatre”, “books, films”, but also 
“events related to the European institutions” or “press – mainly through the Internet”.  
Furthermore, almost as many (17 respondents) considered it vital to have access to 
Polish services. Some specified that they were mostly interested in medical care (four 
respondents), dentistry: (“it is useful to be able to talk in one’s own language although 
expertise of the doctor is more important! The fact that the Polish email list within the 
institutions is one of my sources for such information means that I often ‘end up’ with Polish 
service providers”), “cleaning services, workmen”, “plumbers, hairdressers”, “car mechanic”. 
During my participant observation in the “Wild Geese”, I even encountered people who 
turned to Polish udertakings for car or home insurance services. 
By contrast, only 12 respondents - hence well below 50 percent - needed access to 
Polish shops or shops with Polish products. Finally, only two persons mentioned Polish 
restaurants (one of them was not even sure if there were any). Six respondents (two of which 
had not lived in Poland before coming to Brussels) explicitly stated they had no need for any 
of the above. 
It can be concluded that my respondents are predominantly interested in keeping 
contact with the Polish culture. Given that a much higher number of the interrogated EU 
officials showed interest in Polish services than in Polish shops, it can be presumed that the 
language element prevails in their motivation over the need to remain in the Polish 
surrounding. They seem to act on a purely rational motivation: choosing Polish servicemen 
ensures not only the quality and lower price, but also facility in communication, which might 
be considered as an important feature of a service. By contrast, they are not particularly 
attached to Polish products or Polish food - one could note that the contact with a salesman is 
much shorter and more ritualized than the contact with the serviceman, where the tasks, 
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timing or (in case of medical services) diagnosis often needs to be discussed, well understood 
or even negotiated. 
Acquiring simple services is an important (in terms of time) part of life. If, after work, 
my respondents were, to a significant extent, in contact with Polish service providers, one 
might argue that it could not remain without impact on their integration in Brussels. On the 
other hand, the relevance of their regular access to the Polish services “network” should not 
be exaggerated, as long as it is limited to the economic dimension and does not extend to 
other forms of collective life of the Brussels’ Polish population. 
4.5.1.5. Close friends: in Belgium or in Poland? 
In order to refine the data obtained from the answers to previous questions, I asked my 
interviewees where their closest friends are. Indeed, the knowledge of different circles of 
friends and their nationality seemed incomplete, as long as I did not know whether the most 
important contacts, in emotional terms, remained in Poland or had been developed in 
Brussels. 
It is again difficult to identify a dominating pattern of replies to this question, as 
groups of persons who had their closest friends in Brussels and in Poland are nearly equal in 
numbers. The replies of those who had their closest friends in Brussels were either very 
succinct (Stanislaw: “At the moment, here”; Filip: “Here”) or put emphasis on the rarity of 
contacts, different experiences and relatively long period they had lived in Brussels. For 
instance, Darek explained:  
Definitely in Brussels, it’s been almost eight years I live here and I had the time to come to 
know certain persons really well, while in France I have not had such good, close friends, as I 
moved often, I changed universities, or even cities and there was no time to maintain 
friendships. In Poland, I have one good friend, from the time of my childhood and, of course, 
some family. (Darek) 
 
Low frequency of contacts seems to be the major reason for the relaxation of the ties with the 
Polish friends for Patrycja:  
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I think, with time I describe [those living here] … as [close] friends, because, yeah, we see 
each other more often and with friends from Poland that stayed there, it’s a bit more difficult, 
so yes, I still participate in the main events of their lives, like births of children or marriages 
… but it’s much more difficult to be involved on a daily basis. (Patrycja) 
 
Bernard wondered whether the impression of closeness he had of his friendships in Poland 
should not be put into question because of the distance:  
I have two very close friends back in Poland, or even three, but it’s hard to say … They used 
to be close, but because of the distance it’s hard to say whether this is still the case, because I 
have a certain image and a picture, but it’s hard to tell until we meet. (Bernard) 
 
Klara indicated that the mode of contact with her friends in Poland does not permit to keep 
them very intense:  
Well, now, it is mostly here. ... Well, perhaps in numbers it would be the same, but the 
contacts with my friends in Poland are rare and mostly through email. (Klara) 
 
Adrian reported that even the persons he knew in Poland were somehow related to Brussels:  
I have the impression that it is here. Although I still have contacts in Poland, I feel these are 
weaker and weaker, I do not meet them so regularly any more, while I regularly meet a 
[Polish] friend who had come from here [Brussels]. So, I was in contact with him in Brussels, 
he came back to Poland and I am in contact with him more often than with acquaintances 
from Poland. But the interesting thing is that some of my acquaintances from Poland, I meet 
them here, as they are sent, professionally, to Brussels. (Adrian) 
 
Those who had their closest friends in Poland referred sometimes to distinction between “real 
friends” and “close friends” left in Poland and more superficial acquaintances in Belgium. 
Kamil explained it in the following manner: 
In my understanding - the real friends you don’t have so many, it can even be one or two. So 
if you take this into account, then, I can say, that the real friends I still have them in Poland, 
but this is only one or two people. But close acquaintances … I think most of them are here, 
and in Poland it’s just like, you know, less than ten people plus some of them moved from 
Poland to Brussels for example, so this solved the problem [laughter]. (Kamil) 
 
Maksymilian was even more radical in the distinction: 
Well, definitely my close friends are in Poland, as I’ve said no one of my friends here can be 
described as a close friend really; in the sense that I would really trust these people, that I 
would share with them my secrets … I still have a couple of friends in Poland whom I 
consider as close friends, and … I definitely have very strong emotional ties with them, even 
if we see each other twice or three times per year, so, of course the close character of our 
relationship suffers from the fact that we don’t actually see each other anymore and we live 
very different lives, but as I said, I still consider them as very close friends and I trust them 
much more than anybody met in Belgium. (Maksymilian) 
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Clearly, the responses given by the interviewed Polish EU officials diverged on this 
issue. Those who claimed that their close friends were in Brussels can be considered as 
people truly anchored in the city, as their links with the “old country” were weak. On the 
other hand, those who identified their close friends as those living in Poland might be 
considered as having strong ties with this country. However, it is difficult to judge if these 
declarations were true statements of their strong links with friends staying in Poland or, 
rather, a declaration of their attitude to their life in the new country. 
4.5.2. Mental connection 
The second part of this section deals with the mental connection with the home country, thus 
interest in Poland-related matters and the impression (or its absence) of understanding the 
country they had left a few years earlier. Are they growing mentally distant from their friends 
and relatives in the home country? If yes, what are the reasons? Indeed, during my previous 
research some of the respondents mentioned they felt increasingly distant from their Polish 
friends. That is why I asked about the frequency and quality of their contacts with friends in 
Poland. I also inquired about the reasons of possible change. 
4.5.2.1. Main sources of information 
The question on the sources of information of my respondents was aimed at permitting a 
better understanding of their centre of interest and perspective. First of all, I asked the 
respondents whether they were interested in public issues concerning Poland, Belgium and 
the European Union. Do they still mentally live in their home country, following the political 
news, Poland-centred social and cultural journalism and “faits divers”? Even more 
importantly, are they looking at the reality through the prism of Polish media? Or instead they 
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tuned into the Belgian reality? Or maybe they are exclusively interested in Europe-in-making, 
alienated from any national reality?  
During my previous study (Rozanska 2009), most of respondents (23) declared being 
interested in public issues concerning both Poland and Belgium. Only six persons denied 
being interested in public issues related to Poland, while only one respondent declared a total 
lack of interest in public issues concerning any of these countries.  
As the present data have shown, all the 30 respondents from the new group were 
looking for information about public issues concerning the EU, while 29 about Poland. 
Twenty persons were also interested in public issues concerning Belgium.  
According to the data retrieved from the previous study (Rozanska 2009), Polish 
Internet websites were the most important source of information (28 indications), followed by 
“other” (neither Polish nor Belgian) websites (16). Belgian Radio and “other” newspapers 
were regularly listened to or read by 15 persons, followed by “other” TV (14), and by Belgian 
newspapers (12). Polish newspapers and Belgian TV, both indicated 11 times, were the next 
most often mentioned sources, followed by Belgian Internet websites (8). Surprisingly, Polish 
radio (6) and Polish TV (4) were less popular.184  
The present study has revealed, quite interestingly, out of 22 persons watching TV at 
all, only seven watched Polish TV, while six persons admitted they followed Belgian TV. As 
much as 12 persons indicated they watched channels “other” than Polish or Belgian. It may 
be presumed that these embrace the international English - and French speaking news 
broadcasting channels. By contrast, radio seems to be the preferred source of information 
about the host country: as much as 18 persons declared they listened to the Belgian radio (out 
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184 However, in certain areas of Brussels, satellite antennas are banned (Rozanska 2009:84). 
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of 22 who listened to the radio at all), as opposed to three persons listening to the Polish radio 
and only two – to other radio channels.  
Only three persons did not indicate that they read any newspaper at all. Out of the 
remaining 27 persons, only eight read Belgian newspapers, against 19 readers of Polish 
newspapers and 15 reading “other” newspapers (e.g., British and American). Internet was the 
source of information quoted by all 30 respondents. As much as 26 out of them declared 
looking for information on Polish web pages, while 22 – on “other” websites, including 
British and French. Only eight respondents consulted the Belgian Internet.  
Overall, it seems that the Polish EU officials look for information predominantly in 
Polish and international Internet websites and newspapers. However, the majority of them 
listen to Belgian radio, remaining therefore in certain contact with the developments in the 
host country. Only six persons do not use any Belgian source of information. It should be 
noted that this group did not count any person residing in Belgium long before the 
recruitment. By contrast, only one person does not look for any information in Polish media 
or newspapers. 
It can be concluded that the Polish EU officials generally are interested in situation in 
both the “old” and the “new” country, as they follow both the events in Poland and in 
Belgium. Many of them follow also other media (e.g., English - or French speaking), 
especially TV. Concerning their interest in the situation in Poland, the next question provides 
with an insight to what kind of news they follow and what their perception of the home 
country is. 
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4.5.2.2. Following the developments in Poland and understanding Poland today 
All of my 21 interviewees declared following news concerning Poland, although with 
different intensity and sometimes selectively. With regard to this question, they can be 
roughly divided into two categories. 
The first category is composed of those who, although they were not completely 
disconnected from the situation in Poland, followed the Polish news rather selectively or 
superficially. Most of them were simply not interested in politics or headline stories, although 
the lack of direct concern was also mentioned. 
Maja said she was following the situation in Poland, but only to the extent that she 
was interested in public affairs in general:  
No. I mean, I do follow, but, I must admit, very few, but really few, do I follow the news, in 
general, as my concept of life is very “intimistic” and so is my attitude to civic life. So, I do 
not follow, but not because it is Poland, but [I do not follow] in general. (Maja) 
 
Similarly as many other interviewees, Maja seemed disgusted by the political situation in 
Poland in mid - 2000s, a period of ascension of right-wing, conservative parties and of 
intensive “cleansing” of the Polish political life from people accused (sometimes abusively) 
of corruption or links with the communist ancien regime:  
And there was a period [in my life] when I did not read Polish newspapers at all, I did not 
watch TV, as a principle, as the political life in the years 2005-2006 seemed so stupid to me 
that it was getting on my nerves. So, I stopped. (Maja) 
 
She also distanced herself from more popular phenomena in the Polish press and media, 
which also appeared and grew eminent in the same period: 
Well, then I started again, so as to know something, still, although I certainly do not know 
about various events, I do not know who “Madzia’s mother”185 is - reportedly everyone 
knows [laughter]. I mean, now I know, as I was [in Poland] for holidays, but I had not known 
until then, before I saw so many articles [about her], I didn’t know what it was about, or 
different silly things, well, no, even those more serious, concerning the political life, I rather 
tend to read only titles in the newspaper, every two days. So, I do not know what is going on, 
but this is my fault, so to say, not because there is something strange going on there. (Maja) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 A presumed infanticide mother, a negative character from the tabloid stories in Poland, become a symbol of 
“tabloidisation” of the Polish press and of the intellectual decline of the readers, indulging in cheap emotions. 
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Emilia’s involvement in following the Polish news seems to be of a similar intensity, 
although with less conscious selectivity and with less expressed criticism: 
[I follow the developments in Poland] to some extent, yes. So, I look on the Internet, not 
regularly, but from time to time. I’m interested of course; I visit Poland - maybe not too often 
... but for slightly longer periods. So, yes, I’m interested in what’s happening in Poland, but 
I’m not, you know, living as if [I were] mentally in Poland. I’m not really closely following 
and giving so much attention to things that are happening in Poland. (Emilia) 
 
Also Darek admitted that he kept distance with the present-day Poland, openly claiming that 
he is interested rather in history than in the present day developments, but still checked the 
news:  
Actually, I am interested not that much in contemporary Poland, but old Poland, the history of 
Poland, then. I have no TV, so I do not watch TV, either Polish or other. But in the Internet, I 
check the same things for Poland that I check for Belgium or France. Especially concerning 
economy or politics. Although, while browsing the Internet newspapers and these portals, I 
have the impression that the Poles are particularly interested in sport and fashion, these 
things, “people”, do not interest me at all. I am more interested in literature, and also the older 
one. (Darek) 
 
Similarly, Bernard followed the Polish news in a pretty superficial manner, but in his case, 
this was clearly related to the fact that he did not live in Poland anymore:  
Very superficially. I don’t watch any Polish TV, I go to Polish websites just to check on the 
latest news, what’s new, but I do not necessarily click to read; I just check the headlines and if 
there is nothing major going on, I don’t even click. So, I do not really follow that much. … 
I’m not concerned first of all by it directly, so I don’t feel that ... As I’ve just said, sometimes 
I don’t even check what’s behind the headline, so I’m very cool about it and I follow 
superficially just the headlines. (Bernard) 
 
Also Aleksandra indicated that the lack of immediate concern was at least one of the reasons 
for her diminished interest in public affairs in Poland:  
I follow a bit. I don’t follow the news as much as I maybe would like to … At the moment I 
haven’t got one, but I’m going to have access to Polish TV. It is a bit distant, for sure, because 
living in Poland of course, one is in the middle of all the developments, here my 
developments are what’s going on in Brussels, not even in Belgium nationally, but EU issues, 
work, personal life. So actually, I find myself discussing, thinking about politics very little. 
Unless, there are things like the Euro Championships were, it’s a big thing that happens in 
Poland, then of course I’ll be more interested and I will look into it. So I’m sure that I know 
less, but it’s the personal thing. I know that there are friends here who know just as much as 
Poles living in Poland, but yes, because I don’t watch news as much, for instance they would 
watch every night … In Poland I would watch TVN24,186 here I’ll watch BBC World, so 
okay, I will try to make up maybe on Internet; the basic news that I get are different than my 
friends in Poland. (Aleksandra) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Poland’s first 24-hour news channel launched in 2001. 
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The second category of interviewees was composed of people who, despite living in 
Brussels, were vividly interested in what is going on in their home country. 
Beniamin, although his links with Poland in the purely private sphere seemed weak 
(he notably declared having no more close friends in Poland) and his social life was focused 
in Brussels, surprised me with a very strong statement concerning his interest in public life in 
Poland:  
I feel Polish, and that is why I follow closely all developments in Poland. I watch Polish 
television, I read Polish newspapers, I watch Internet, Polish websites and I listen to the 
Polish radio, so, I feel like, I’m involved in Polish political, social and economic life in the 
same way as when I was living there. Nothing has changed. (Beniamin) 
 
Ksawery considered that he was as much in touch with the situation in Poland as any person 
living in this country:  
Yes, I read Polish on-line newspapers sometimes and I watch Polish TV almost everyday, so I 
have a feeling that I have the same kind of access to the media as if living in Poland. 
(Ksawery) 
 
Ula thought that she might know even more about the Polish public life than an average 
Polish person:  
I sometimes think I know more than they in Poland [laughter] … We watch Polish TV, we 
listen to Polish radio, so we know politics and my husband is interested in politics, Polish 
politics, so I know it on a daily basis, this is not the problem, so I feel as living still in Poland 
[laughter] I would say. (Ula) 
 
Also Kamil said he was making his best to stay up to date:  
I try to be connected in terms of being up to date with what’s going on, so I read Polish 
newspapers, I mean, magazines, some of them. When I come to Poland, I take a good number 
of them with me to Brussels so that I can read it for the next few months, plus of course the 
Internet, plus the radio. (Kamil) 
 
Stanislaw claimed that he was more in touch with the Polish reality than in the time he still 
lived in his home country, as his knowledge of the functioning of political mechanisms 
enabled him to better understand the present and to predict the future: 
[In the past] it was my duty to make a press release and press verification on daily basis. Even 
right now, I’m starting a day by browsing Polish news, but I’m also looking for some 
reference point in various … media. No, I cannot say that I’m coming to Poland and I don’t 
understand it. Actually, it’s something opposite. Thanks to knowing the process of the 
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creation of law in the EU and thanks to knowing the Polish political field and having 
experience in politics in Parliament, reading a lot, in many cases, I don’t want to boast, but I 
can easily predict what will happen, having in mind the current development in Poland and 
the EU. (Stanislaw) 
 
Laura, who had lived in Brussels already for many years, described how the events 
related to the Polish membership in the EU inspired her to follow the Polish reality more 
closely:  
Yes, [I follow the developments in Poland] the more and more ... Once, I was cut off to the 
extent that my Polish was disappearing and now I have Polish TV and the Internet, I read 
newspapers every day, so I am making an effort now. I was, for instance, very happy when 
there was Polish presidency, as it had a very rich cultural offer and in general, I am excited 
about this kind of Polish events. I am trying to participate whenever I can ... For instance, 
from the cultural point of view, there was a separation, as I lived in a completely different 
world, not much was heard about Poland and I am trying hard so as to make everything work 
in parallel. When I go to Poland, I am trying to go to the theatre and so on, and I also talk a lot 
to people about such various things, so I am slowly catching up. (Laura) 
 
The case of Laura is unique, but might nevertheless be a starting point for reflection. 
Laura came to Belgium as a migrant, not because she was Polish, but “despite” she was 
Polish. It may be presumed that she perceived integration into the Belgian society as the best 
possible option. Maintaining mental connection with the old country could be perceived as 
likely to slow down this process. By contrast, she became EU official precisely because she 
was Polish, she passed the concours and entered into her new function as a national of a new 
EU country. She still lives in Belgium, but her strategies towards different communities could 
not be the same. In fact, tightening links with Belgium was not that important anymore, she 
did not need to aspire to become someone else - she could be happy staying an inhabitant of a 
pluricultural, international city, a member of the cast of conscious Europeans and a Pole. In 
this context, the old country and the old identification have become attractive to her again.  
It is also interesting that in case of some interviewees, their employment in the 
Commission actually prompted more interest in Polish political and social life, as the new 
perspective they gained offered them better possibilities to understand it. It might be deduced 
that for them, moving to Brussels was not that much a “horizontal” move to another 
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European country with it own national perspective, but rather a “vertical” move to the capital 
of Europe with its “meta” perspective. Such impression may be due to the nature of their 
work – interviewees whose tasks were purely “internal” (such as HR or logistics) referred to 
a “broader perspective” somewhat less often than those involved in contacts with member 
states on a regular basis. 
The second question I asked to my interviewees in relation to the previous one 
concerned the manner they looked at the Polish reality. Most importantly, I was interested in 
whether the fact that they worked in the EU institutions and had stayed abroad for 
considerable time, has influenced their perception and analysis of the situation in Poland, 
whether they could notice significant differences between their understanding or perception 
and the understanding by their Polish friends and acquaintances. In other terms, I wanted to 
know whether there was any “mental evolution” triggered by the employment in the 
institutions in Brussels and if so, in which direction. 
Only very few of my interviewees considered that all years spent abroad had not 
affected their perception of the Polish “reality”. This is the case of Klara, who said:  
I think that this has not changed, no. It is not that I observe things now from the perspective of 
a person who is not attached to the home country, who has left long time ago and does not 
understand anymore what it is about, no. I think I still sense these problems as I did earlier. 
(Klara) 
 
Emilia admitted that perhaps her perception is a bit wider since she had left the country, but 
still considered that she understood in a pretty similar way to her compatriots back in Poland:  
No, I think it’s similar. I wouldn’t say that I have a different perspective. Okay, maybe I have, 
you know, a bit wider view, because I learned about realities in other countries … But 
normally, I would not say that I have a different perspective and I think I have the same 
understanding as I used to have, so I don’t think it has changed. (Emilia) 
 
Also Filip stated that he had the same perception as once he lived in Poland. 
However, the majority of the interviewees who answered this question considered that 
their perception had changed. In certain cases, this impression was not very strong and did 
not concern a total lack of understanding, but rather a different angle of looking at things, due 
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to slightly different information assimilated, different experience or a broader perspective 
offered by their life in Brussels. For instance, Adrian said: 
I would like my perception to be the same as if I were in Poland, but I know that this is 
impossible and, independently of whether I would wish so or not, I certainly have a different 
perception to what I would have if I were in Poland …. I do not know Polish advertisements, 
Polish billboards, I do not know Polish stuff, that I could have heard at work from 
acquaintances living in Poland, now I can only learn what is going on in Belgium. (Adrian) 
 
Dominika found this different way of looking at things perfectly natural, but also mutually 
enriching in the context of her friendly relations in Poland:  
We discover different things. Of course, if you don’t evolve very close to people who are 
surrounding you then, well, you’re evolving in different ways, but it’s something very 
enriching in a way because then when we really need, we cross our latest discoveries, so I … 
like it. (Dominika) 
 
Ksawery also referred to the broader perspective he had acquired since he had begun his 
career in the institutions, which made him perceive certain things in a more critical manner:  
I also see that my perspective and my point of view is different than the one of my 
compatriots, because, maybe, of our experiences here in Brussels and here in the institutions. 
Definitely I’m more critical about what’s going on in Poland, because I know other cultures 
and I know other countries and I also appreciate certain values that exist in Poland and that 
emanate through the media, which I have personal reflections on. There is also a group of 
issues and subjects that interest me the most – those are in principle the issues that I’m 
dealing with as a professional in the institutions. And those issues, I observe similar processes 
in my country through the media, so I’m becoming more critical about them, because of my 
present experiences. (Ksawery) 
 
The same idea – although expressed differently - came back in the testimonies of several 
interviewees. Otylia said:  
I perceive it differently. To understand, well, it is difficult, to make some kind of analysis, but 
I am concerned by various issues and events, in a way ... Some of them drive me crazy and I 
think that in contemporary Europe or the World, certain things should not take place at all. 
However, I must admit that it pleases me, (as I don’t like saying that I am proud of it), 
[laughter], … that Poland is well perceived. ... And I follow [the news] ... actually, every day, 
I read the Polish press on the Internet. (Otylia) 
 
Maja gave a practical example of this difference of perspectives: 
I certainly perceive things differently from the others, I don’t know, my family who stayed 
there, as I have a different perspective. For instance, such issues as immigration, or say, some 
Muslim issues. Sometimes when my dad, who is very intelligent, enlightened and open, when 
he speaks about Muslim people, it gives me the creeps, as it seems to me these are very racist 
views, although he is not racist. So these are the experiences I have, different from theirs and 
thus, I see it in a different way, don’t know if it’s better ... (Maja) 
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Patrycja, by contrast, harshly (although indirectly) criticized the Polish attitude to their 
individual fates, although she also expressed pride of the recent Polish achievements and 
praised certain qualities of her compatriots:  
Yes, there are some issues that I don’t understand anymore, like the complaining mood, I 
think that, for me it’s difficult to hear how my Polish friends or family complain about how 
Poland looks, or about Polish development, because I’m very proud of Poland and how it 
changes while we’re not there, and I’m just really proud about how we develop and how 
energetic we are, how eager to work and to have a business and so on. But on the other hand, 
I see also the differences in the approach between me and my friends who stayed in Poland. I 
see less flexibility on their side and they’re a bit more afraid about change. I remember a 
recent discussion when my best friend’s boyfriend was at risk of losing his job, and so she 
was worrying a lot of what they would do, and my answer was: “Well, you will search for a 
job”, and she said: “No, in our city it is not that easy”. Then I said, “Well you will go to 
another city, you could go to Warsaw” and she was like frightened what I was talking about 
and it’s not far away, it’s like two hours by car from my city, and for her it was a shocking 
perspective, for me it was natural. (Patrycja) 
 
Patrycja was not the only one to appreciate changes but also criticise attitudes in the 
old country. Stanislaw elaborated on his understanding of Poland (as an outsider) in 
comparison to the compatriots living there, whom he described as “the most complaining 
nation in Europe”: 
No, of course, that [my understanding of Poland] is different … but here I have to touch two 
issues. First, the evidence that my understanding of Poland is correct. Listen, I’m signed on 
Gazeta.pl forum under one nick, I don’t want to boast again, but whenever I place a comment, 
I’m receiving top ten comments, after few hours, okay? And I will not give you the nickname, 
but trust me, this is it. ... [The second issue is that] Poles as the most complaining nation in 
Europe, they are demanding. ... Many people who are here, they are complaining about 
Poland; they go to Poland, they are complaining about Belgium or vice versa. … Maybe it’s 
again due to the fact that I knew a little bit of this “political kitchen” and I know what is real, 
what is not real; what is feasible, what is not feasible. There is a lot of people who are 
demanding maximum things and they don’t know that in reality it’s impossible. For example, 
look, classical case: is a glass half full or half empty? And the example with the Polish 
motorways. Do you know that Poland has tripled the kilometres of its motorways within the 
last ten years. This is my way of thinking, but we have still the people, who are saying: “yeah, 
but they are in delays, there are problems” ... and I’m saying: “come on, we were waiting for 
one hundred years … for these motorways and now you’re complaining for these six months 
[of delays]? “And quality is wrong”. No! Quality is not wrong, there are guarantees”. I was 
responsible for motorways in Poland. So there are guarantees for 15 years for a quality of 
motorway and if something happens, the guy who was producing this will do it. So, you see, 
this is the question of approach. Poles are very demanding. I only see one good thing in this 
picture. They are demanding because without any superstitions, they are comparing directly 
Poland to the best countries in Europe. … Poles are ambitious and they are trying to keep up 
Poland with the rest. You know, even a few years ago, we could only dream to be compared 
to Greece and Portugal, now we are … . We are developing faster than we expected and we’re 
already at this level … . So it’s good that Poles are comparing themselves to the best: to 
Norway, to Sweden … . (Stanislaw) 
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In certain cases, differences and the lack of understanding had their roots not that 
much in the expatriation or in the EU institutions, but rather in differences of convictions or 
certain cultural differences which might be due to the upbringing and, as such, might very 
well concern also people living in Poland. Maksymilian said:  
Well, I think that, and it will certainly sound a bit strange, maybe, someone may think that 
I’m a conceited person, but, actually I’ve never really understood most of my compatriots 
even when I lived in Poland. I definitely understand people from the same circle and people 
from, maybe let’s say the same social class, I mean educated people … Probably the way I 
chose my friends made them finally quite homogenous from the point of view of their 
interests or the way they look at, or perceive the reality and these ways were pretty similar to 
mine. So I think that even in Poland I lived in a kind of cocoon and I perfectly understood 
people I frequented on a daily basis, and I didn’t really understand the interests or reactions of 
most of my compatriots in Poland and this has not changed. I still do understand people from 
the same circle let’s say, … people who are similar to me … and the rest I’ve never really 
understood. (Maksymilian) 
 
The testimony of Kamil focused on the political issues discussed in the Polish media. 
As he admitted, some people in Poland could have the same perspective as he had:  
Do I understand? Yes, I think so … However, the whole process, which I could observe in the 
Polish public and political life spheres in the last decade, so starting from early years 2000s, I 
mean the orientation in which it goes, for me it’s not completely comprehensible, especially 
taking into account the things which are getting most attention in the media … But this is not 
only for me, also for some people in Poland, they are just fed up with all this bullshit like you 
know, this crash in Smolensk or about the church all the time, or about the Pope and all these 
stupid affairs, like who killed whom. No, no, this I don’t understand, but I suppose, this is not 
only the Polish case, it’s a general tendency in the whole EU, where the media rather tend to 
focus on issues which are more events and scandal driven than anything else … And in 
Poland of course the weak public sphere, weak media, low quality of media, it adds to this 
overall picture. But fortunately, you have now Internet and you can find your own sources, 
portals, whatever, … where you can … actually get some quality information. (Kamil) 
 
Laura expressed her lack of understanding of Poland in a pretty radical way:  
Totally different it is. I have very serious problems to talk to the Poles, as they, I think, 
perhaps I’m wrong, but I think this is [because of] indoctrination by the Polish press, public 
opinion and I, being outside, I know both [realities] and I can coin a more balanced view of it. 
Especially that I am in a very international environment and this is also a resultant of different 
mentalities. By contrast, in Poland, I think this is a hermetic circle and I have difficulty to find 
a common language, not only when it comes to political topics, but in general, on all topics. 
And with the people who once were very close to me, are educated and very open, we see the 
world in very different manners and we cannot come to terms. (Laura) 
 
Overall, many interviewees admitted they understood their home country less since 
they had come to Belgium. The reasons for this phenomenon were diverse and related to, i.a. 
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“a wider perspective” gained by my interviewees since they had left Poland and the 
remoteness of the Polish affairs shaping the conversations and influencing the lifestyle of 
their friends and relatives. A different perspective could be related not only to their work and 
the distance from Polish affairs, but also to increased exposition to and stronger adherence to 
European integrationist ideology, as well as to ideas predominant among the EU officials and 
in the Western European media. In any case, their mental connection with Poland has started 
to fade away. In the same time, it is worth mentioning that many of the interviewees attached 
more importance to positive aspects of this separation resulting in a broader view and 
detachment from every-day Polish reality of which they sometimes had a critical view.  
4.5.2.3. Would they come back to Poland?  
Subsequently, I asked my interviewees how they would feel about coming back to Poland if 
their working and living conditions were to remain the same. The answers can be broadly 
divided into three categories.  
The first type of answer is unconditional (or almost unconditional) “yes”. Laura or 
Ula simply confirmed, without elaborating thereupon. Filip added that he “would move 
within a month or a week”. Stanislaw explained briefly:  
I would do it. I’m open for Europe. I treat Europe as … a mother of regions. I think I’m 
universal enough, at the same time, patriotic enough, and it would be not a problem for me to 
go back to Poland, the same position, the same salary? Not a problem at all. (Stanislaw) 
 
Beniamin said jokingly: “I would like to come back, because I think that girls are 
prettier there”. Some other respondents gave a more elaborate and serious explanation. Emilia 
admitted: “I think it would be tempting”. She further explained:  
It’s nothing concrete and I’m sure that we would stay here for … another couple of years ... , 
but it’s ... not only because of Belgium or not only because of the European Commission that 
I like or I want to be here. Maybe, if similar conditions were available in Poland, maybe I 
would go [back]. (Emilia) 
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The reasons she quoted referred to her lack of attachment to Belgium and even to the 
European institutions. Kamil and Ksawery provided a more “positive” motivation, explaining 
not that much why they were ready to leave Brussels, but rather why they would consider 
coming back to Poland. Ksawery said:  
Yes, I would like to go back to Poland, I never excluded this totally. On the contrary, with 
time, I see more and more value in coming back to Poland, not only value for me that I would 
capitalize on the experiences that I gain here in Brussels, and while working for the EU 
institutions but also the value that I can bring back to my country and to the society as a 
whole. (Ksawery) 
 
Kamil quoted the same reason for him possibly coming back, but he elaborated more on the 
activist aspect of his motivation:  
Then, I would be in Poland already, if the salary and working conditions were considered the 
same, because I think there is still more to do for our generation in Poland than here. I mean, 
here the work is interesting and especially if you find something which you can do, and which 
is in accordance with your believes basically and in my case this is actually true. I work in the 
sector I really believe it should be developed, so it’s not like I’m doing something what is 
against me, because of the working conditions and good salary, and stuff like that. But, at the 
same time … , I think, I’m more needed in Poland than here, plus I was always inclined into 
some kind of civil activity, so this is not so straightforward here, because the work is very 
much demanding and you don’t have much time for anything else, plus the level of 
engagement that you can actually do here is not comparable with what you can do in Poland, I 
mean, you can engage here, and vote in some elections, you can be a member of some NGO, 
or club or whatever. But there is always this barrier, not of the language, but also of the 
cultural references which you don’t get necessarily, which actually you will never get 
entirely, and … plus I like Poland as a country, maybe not the society very much, but Poland 
as a country is a nice place to live and yes, so if I have the possibility, I would certainly work 
there. It’s not excluded that I would come back to Poland even if I don’t have similar position 
as I have here. (Kamil) 
 
Adrian and Darek assured that they were willing to come back even on slightly less 
favourable terms of employment. However, Darek, who left Poland as a child, was not 
interested in coming back to Poland permanently: 
I think that, perhaps even with slightly worse financial conditions, but I do not know if it 
would be forever. Certainly not forever, perhaps for a couple of years. For how many? Up to 
three-four years, as, frankly, I can’t imagine myself in Poland after so many years abroad, 
perhaps even the surrounding is annoying to me, the neglected houses, streets. I would not 
like to live in a place, which resembles a ghetto, or some enclave of wealth, supposing my 
income would be the same. I assume I would be able to afford living in a nice neighbourhood, 
such as Wilanów or Mokotów,187 but this is no real Poland, as whenever I go to Poland, I 
want to see the real Poland, not the touristic places, but what is beyond the curtain – and I do 
not like it, and I think I would not feel well in Poland with the income I have here, seeing that 
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187 Districts of Warsaw. 
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not everybody has it, and that they are far behind me [in terms of wealth]. While in Brussels, I 
do not feel rich. I feel like an ordinary working man, who has to work hard to buy a flat, after 
more than ten years. And I do not see the extreme poverty which is, unfortunately, visible in 
Poland. … I have never encountered anything like that here. And this distance seems too big 
in Poland, so independently of how much I would earn and wherever I would live, it wouldn’t 
be rewarding, if, in parallel, I was seeing all these people, who would also like to, but they 
can’t. But I would come back after I retire; I am already getting ready for that. (Darek) 
 
Zofia, who had a foreign partner, was hesitant although leaning towards “yes”. The 
doubts she quoted were not, however, directly linked to her partner:  
Well, that’s very theoretical [laughter], so I’m not sure. To be honest, I don’t know. At the 
beginning when I left Poland and for the first years I felt very much about not coming back, 
because I could see the bad sides of Poland and I could compare with other countries and 
there was more in the spirit of discovering, you know, the world and travelling and I have 
learned quite a lot, and I think if I have a good job in Poland and I would travel a lot, for the 
work and have contacts with people of different nationalities that could be something that 
could interest me. Maybe not now, maybe in a few years’ time, maybe if I have kids one day, 
I would maybe like them to grow up in Poland, I don’t know. Because I still think that - with 
the age you somehow feel a bit more connected to your roots, where the roots are, so maybe, 
when I’m older, I would like to go back. (Zofia) 
 
The second category consists of those interviewees who would like to come back to Poland, 
but they would not do it because of an objective obstacle related to them being in couples 
with non-Polish people. This is, for instance, the case of Dominika:  
I would, but … I have a family, so I have to think about my husband’s professional situation 
as well, so I don’t think that coming back would be that easy. (Dominika) 
 
Patrycja had a similar concern, but added that otherwise, she would be willing to come back:  
Because of my personal situation, I think it would be difficult, because my boyfriend is Italian 
and I don’t know if he would like to come back to Poland with me. But maybe if the working 
conditions are there also with the same salary, and there is also possibility for him, then 
maybe yes. If I was single, I would definitely come back, at least to try for few years to see 
whether it is what I’m searching for. (Patrycja) 
 
Aleksandra was slightly more optimistic about the possibility to come back to Poland, 
although she could not exclude other expatriation options:  
I think that option is always open. At the moment I haven’t got a very clear idea of what the 
job would involve, but if there was an interesting offer, then I’m not tight to necessarily 
staying. At some point in the future it’s an open thing, but because my husband isn’t Polish, 
it’s equally open that we’ll go to his country. (Aleksandra) 
 
Klara was actually quite enthusiastic about the idea to come back, but she noted objective 
problems concerning her husband’s employment:  
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Well, in my case, this is more like a family problem, as it would depend on whether my 
husband could work there. As far as I am concerned – absolutely yes. (Klara) 
 
Finally, the last category includes those of my interviewees who answered negatively. 
However, the levels of certainty and motivations quoted varied. Some of them seemed to 
hesitate, like Otylia who spent most of her adult life abroad:  
Not any more. No, I am too well rooted [here], I have links, etc. There was a moment … it 
was one year ago, that I tried, more out of curiosity of what they offered than ... because I’d 
have had a problem if I’d been accepted, then I hindered it myself. The Information Office of 
the Parliament was opened in Wrocław, I am Wratislavian and then it suddenly came to my 
mind that perhaps I could ... It is just that it would have been a reverse situation; I would have 
had to come back here in my spare time. But there was such a moment [I admit]. (Otylia) 
 
Bernard was not very categorical, but he raised a number of reasons related to his life in 
Belgium (and not to the institutions):  
Not necessarily. Not necessarily, because I would lose some aspects of my life that are 
specific to this city: international friends, it’s better connected to other major cities. So not 
necessarily. I would have to really consider that then. Because it would mean changing my 
life once again and as I’ve said I’m pretty settled now. (Bernard) 
 
Yet another interviewee, Jeremi, doubted about the probability of being offered the same 
conditions. Although he finally said he was planning to come back to Poland after the 
retirement, the negative tones were dominant in his answer:  
Well, the first thing is that I don’t believe that [laughter] any company in Poland would offer 
me such money for what I’m doing right now. Of course, I’m not talking about, you know, 
calculations, like okay, “now I gain such amount of Euro, okay, multiple it by four and I want 
exactly the same amount of Złoty”. But, you know, taking into account the prices, etc., for the 
moment – no. I don’t like to change, I would say, my life too frequently. Now I live here for 
more than five years. I have a group of friends here, I’m thinking about, you know, settling 
myself up here, so changing it again … rather not. (Jeremi) 
 
As he mentioned in the questionnaire he was considering going back to Poland, I insisted to 
know whether he had such plans for the future. He answered:  
Yes, yes, but what I had in mind, it was after my retirement, but it’s again, for the moment. 
Because, you know, it’s still, … [laughter], maybe 20 or 25 years from now, so the situation 
can change. I’ve always said to my friends, you know, if someone seven years ago would tell 
me that “Jeremi, you will leave your lovely work, you will leave your friends from work and 
you will move to another country to work in a strange organization, in a strange country, in a 
strange language”, I would have told him, “come on, what are you telling me, it’s not 
possible” … But you know, only few years passed and okay, I’m here. So, for the moment 
I’m saying yes, after retirement, I’m considering the return to Poland. (Jeremi) 
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Sebastian justified his preference for staying in Belgium, rather than for the reluctance to 
come back. However, his testimony cannot be qualified as enthusiastic:  
It’s a very theoretical question. I came here because of professional reasons, right? So, it’s 
inseparable. But, okay, if I wanted to go back, if I wanted to work in Poland, I could. I’m 
quite happy here, so I’m not, you know, in any way pushed to, I don’t feel any need, pressure, 
anything. I don’t want to. For the moment I think that I don’t want to die here, but I hope that 
it’s not going to happen tomorrow, so I don’t need to worry for the nearest couple of weeks at 
least, I hope [laughter]. (Sebastian) 
 
Maksymilian argued that he had already got accustomed to Brussels and was afraid of 
re-starting his life in his natal country. Strikingly, he had this fear despite the fact that both 
his family and his closest friends still lived in Poland:  
I don’t think so. I mean, I got used to living in Brussels, I’m quite a conservative person, in 
the sense that I don’t get used quite easily to a new environment and I don’t like changes very 
much, and it cost me really a lot to start feeling more or less at home in Brussels. And I don’t 
really feel like going back to Poland and to start my life again over there, even if, as I’ve said, 
my close friends are there. Well, these are like just a couple of people and …, honestly, I 
mean, I’m sure that things would not look similar, I mean, to the situation before I left Poland, 
and I think this would cost me again another effort to recreate kind of my own universe in 
Poland and feel at home, even if my parents, and my friends are there. I think it would be 
quite challenging … I mean, I could live in Poland again, but it’s not that I would like to go 
there again and stay. (Maksymilian) 
 
Maja formulated the reasons why she would not like to come back in a pretty direct manner:  
I do not think so, precisely because Poland seems to me too provincial, unfortunately. This is 
not about earnings, as this in not a decisive criterion for me. Unless I would find a job, 
different from the job I have, and unless it would be in a completely different part of Poland, 
then maybe so, but not like “coming back to Poland”, but as a new experience, and that could 
be everywhere. (Maja) 
 
Overall, the majority of the interviewees expressed their readiness to come back to 
Poland, should they have such a possibility without having to compromise on their lifestyle 
(even if for some, this would not be possible for family reasons). This group included also 
some of the interviewees who, based on other answers, seemed to be already well rooted in 
Belgium (e.g., Adrian, Filip, Stanislaw or Patrycja, who e.g., claimed that their best friends 
were now in Belgium). Also those who had come to Belgium many years before the 
enlargement were split: Laura was ready to come back, Otylia excluded such a possibility, 
while Maja would consider leaving Belgium, but not in the perspective of “coming back” to 
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Poland. This difference can be explained by their different experiences with integration in 
Belgium (for Laura it was a failure, while Otylia seemed to be well rooted) and with mobility 
(Otylia and Maja had moved several times in her life).  
Although the exact nature of their supposed occupation in Poland was not mentioned 
(so they might assume that they would still work there to foster European integration), it is 
nevertheless worth noting that my interviewees did not explicitly refer to the ideological 
aspect of their job, did not say they would stay for Europe. Meanwhile, a couple of them 
mentioned possible benefits that Poland could get from them coming back to their 
motherland. On the other hand, it is interesting that those who said they did not want to come 
back, motivated it often by their reluctance to move and change their life, rather than by their 
preference for Brussels or by the lack of appeal of Poland.  
4.5.3. Conclusions on transnationalism 
To sum up, the links of my interviewees with Poland seem to be rather strong overall. Most 
maintain an important “tangible” connection with their home country through visiting it, 
regularly spending Easter and Christmas there, buying Polish services and products, and 
consuming Polish culture in Brussels. I have also come across (at “Wild Geese”) economic 
links with Poland, such as acquisition of real estate in the home country. However, in the case 
of Polish EU officials, the importance of social networks in the home country (Hyvönen 
2008) seems only to be moderate, as they admit that ties with friends are progressively 
weakening. Although their mental connection with Poland appears to become increasingly 
weak over time, with a lot of interviewees admitting that they were progressively losing their 
understanding of Poland (because of the distance, but also because of the “broader 
perspective” they were acquiring), most of them still seem ready to come back were it not for 
financial and professional issues.  
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This pattern confirms the opinion of Vertovec, according to which a certain degree of 
integration in a new country (in this case, in a specific segment of the population, namely EU 
officials and expatriates) can perfectly coexist with “the strongest senses of cohesion and 
belonging” remaining with the home country (2009:78). The widespread and frequent use of 
modern means of communication and frequent visits to Poland may illustrate Brettell’s 
analysis, who argues that the development of means of transport and communication have 
“shortened the social distance between the sending and the receiving society” (2008:120; see 
also Castles and Miller 2003:47; Vertovec 1999:451- 452). Although today this may appear 
obvious, this observation is meaningful in the context of several decades of Polish migration 
to Belgium: things looked very different even at the beginning of the nineties.  
Referring to the distinction between the bi-national and “cosmopolitan” type of 
transnationalism (Colic-Peisker 2006), my research does not permit me to come to a 
conclusion on this issue. On the one hand, Polish EU officials maintain very strong relations 
with their home country (and, in line with Favell (2008a), it is mostly with family and not so 
much with friends). On the other, they do not integrate into Belgian society, but instead into 
the community of EU officials which is, by definition, cosmopolitan. 
4.6. Identification patterns 
The commonality of symbols may form a basis for social identification as Poles and 
Europeans and as EU officials. In case of the EU officials, the symbols on the basis of which 
the community might be created are not national myths or cultural items, but an ideology of 
integration and the myth of de-nationalised, “supranational” pre-Europeans. The choice of 
symbols, their significance, and the intensity of attachment to these symbols vary from one 
individual to another. This concerns the understanding of both symbols related to their 
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national identification (such as language, history, tradition) and those related to their role in 
the construction of the integrated Europe.  
4.6.1. Identification of Polish EU officials: different levels 
Eriksen observes that Eastern European identity is typically built on the ethnic elements, 
often appealing to the criterion of blood (1997:254). 
The analysis of the national self-image of the Polish EU officials should start – 
logically - with asking to all participants a basic question about their identification and 
subsequently elucidating the understanding of the very concept of Polishness by my 
interviewees: whether, in their view, it is related to their ancestors, their culture, or their 
choice. The question was also supposed to give a hint on their identification. 
As to the first question, as much as four-fifth of my respondents indicated that they can 
be “very relevantly” described as “Poles” and nine out of ten remaining persons found this 
description “relevant”. This is in line with an observation made by Eriksen on Western 
Europeans, according to which national belonging remains to many of them a “basic 
foundation of subjective identification” (1997:255). 
Half of those, who did not consider the reference to Polishness as “very relevant”, did 
not recognise any of the proposed qualifications as “very relevant” (neither did they attribute 
such qualifier to any other, non suggested category that they were free to propose). The 
others usually described themselves, in the first place, as European (four cases), Expat (three 
cases), Eurocrat (two cases), “World’s citizen” (two cases) and Slav (one case). 
The identification as a Pole was closely followed by the European identification: 29 
persons out of 50 (almost three-fifth) found this description “very relevant” and further 20 
persons found it “relevant”. In the same time, none of my respondents qualified the Polish or 
European identification as “not relevant”. The strong feeling of Europeanness is usually 
!364!
associated with a strong link with Polishness: as much as 25 respondents enumerated both 
Europeanness and Polishness as very relevant for the description of their identification. 
Much less respondents felt strongly about being Eurocrats: only seven persons found it 
“very relevant” and 13 - “relevant”. On the other hand, only one-fifth considered this 
description “not relevant” at all, while 19 persons referred to it as “somewhat relevant”. The 
persons describing themselves as Eurocrats (indication “very relevant”) always gave the same 
status to Europeanness and usually also to their Polishness (five out of seven respondents). 
Thus, professional identification is strongly co-related with strong European, but also 
national identification. 
After the most obvious identifications, such as those related to the nationality, 
Europeanness or the professional status, a relatively high number (50 percent) of the 
respondents identifies themselves by reference to their expatriate status. Eight respondents 
considered that they can be “very relevantly” described as “expats”, while as much as 17 
considered this description as “relevant”. On the other hand, only seven respondents declined 
any relevance to this qualification. 
Curiously, 11 persons considered the identification as a Slav “very relevant” and seven 
other persons found it “relevant”. Eighteen respondents considered it “somewhat relevant” 
and only 11 persons rejected any affiliation to this qualification, finding it “not relevant”. 
Contrary to what one might presume, being “Slav” by no means can be considered as 
remaining in the opposition to being “European”, as those two qualifications often conjunct: 
as much as ten out of 11 persons who considered the description “Slav” as “very relevant” 
gave the same importance to being European. 
Slightly more members of the research group adhered to a more universal 
identification: nine persons felt strongly about being “World’s citizen” (“very relevant”), 
! 365!
while further ten persons acknowledged this description as “relevant”. However, 15 
respondents felt it was “not relevant at all”.  
Numerous internal migrations experienced by Poland in 20th century, the absence of a 
strong regional tradition, the relatively recent emergence of local self-government, as well as 
a relatively strong presence of persons with double nationality, often born or brought up 
abroad might have been among the reasons for the rather weak local or regional identification 
of my respondents. Eight respondents found themselves described in a “very relevant” 
manner by reference to the specific region of Poland from which they originated, while 
further 11 persons found this “relevant”. On the other hand, as much as 16 respondents found 
it “not relevant at all”.  
Very few respondents used the possibility of introducing additional identifications. 
Only one person referred to the religious identification, two persons referred to their political 
convictions (“green”, “left wing liberal”). 
There is a strong correlation between indications of Polishness and Europeanness, with 
only a few cases of mismatch. The Polish identity does not appear as a rival of the European 
one. Based on the Risse’s classification, multiple identities can be nested or cross-cutting 
(Risse 2004:251-252). On the basis of these answers to the initial question, it would be 
difficult to establish the relationship between the different identifications. Is Europeanness a 
corollary of Polishness or it is only concurrent? The overall strong prevalence of answers 
indicating European and Eurocrat identity seems to confirm the strong Europeanizing profile 
of my respondents. 
4.6.2. Polishness 
Several authors emphasize the role of the “myth of origins”, enabling the creation of a group 
identity based on an invented past (see e.g., Hobsbawm 1983; Eriksen 2010; Koczanowicz 
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2008). My research query on the approach of the Polish EU civil servants to their national 
identification can be roughly divided into two sub-questions. Firstly, I tried to understand the 
nature of the national tradition to which the Polish EU officials adhere. I found this question 
very important for a rather peripheral nation, torn apart between the European center and a 
more “nationalistic” tradition focusing on genuine ethnic features. Indeed, as Zubrzycki 
(2001) reminds us, there are different variants of Polishness “construed” on the basis of the 
attitude to religion, to certain founding myths and national symbols. The tension between 
these models has accentuated especially after the downfall of the communist dictatorship and 
the consequent shift to the West. The purpose of this part of the research is not to attempt any 
categorization, but rather to check whether their identitary references and the content of the 
collective imaginary of the Polish EU officials predisposes them to adopt a European 
identification. It is also important to understand what factors contributed to the formation of 
their identity (official “Polishness” shaped by the educational system?) and what was the 
influence of the “Europeanizing” ideas present in the official debate during the decade 
preceding the accession. 
The second, more important, sub-question concerns the attitude of my respondents to 
their Polishness. What is their collective self-image? Do they need to embellish it, cultivating 
illusions? How strong is their national identification? Do they feel equal to other (Western) 
Europeans?  
The notion of social identity includes both the elements of “sameness” and 
“distinctiveness” (Jacobson-Widding 1983). The element of “sameness” draws on 
experiences transmitted between generations and, in general, on national history (Marody 
2003).  
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4.6.2.1. Important historical events 
Having this in mind, I interrogated my respondents on the historical events they considered as 
the most important and on historical figures they appreciated most. 
Firstly, it should be observed that the question on “important events” was apparently 
understood either as a question on objectively most decisive moments in the history of a 
nation or as the moments of “subjective” importance (“defining the world where I live now”, 
“the ones that first came to my head”, “these events shaped/made the Poland I was born in & 
know, the Poland that is my home country”). The latter group usually referred mostly to the 
events from the recent past or from the 20th century. The events quoted by respondents from 
this category were sometimes of clearly symbolic nature, such as “the Warsaw Uprising 
1944”, or “the events in Wujek [coal mine]”, recalling the Polish Romantic tradition of 
“struggle and martyrdom”. Other events, such as “the election of Pope John Paul II” or “the 
founding of Solidarność” also seem to be important mostly for the mindset of the respondents 
and people from their generation. The other group referred to events judged important 
because of their “objective” impact on the history of the nation. This approach transpires 
from the explanations of their choices, such as: “important for Polish culture and science” or 
“without this Poland could have not existed”. 
This dichotomy may partly be due to the lack of precision in the formulation of the 
question, but also reveals the attitude of my respondents to the Polish history. Indeed, it might 
be argued that the memory of historic events played a more important role in shaping the 
identity of those who gave a “subjective” interpretation to the question. 
Five persons did not respond to the question. Out of the remaining 45, 25 persons 
considered the entry into the EU as one of the five most important events in the Polish 
history. However, even more respondents (32) indicated the regain of independence (also 
referred to as the “round table negotiations” or “the end of communism”) in 1989 and 
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somewhat less mentioned the regain of independence of 1918 (also referred to as “the end of 
the 1st World War”). The latter is considered as a crucial date for the existence of the Polish 
nation-state, while the former can be considered as the date on which Poland became a 
democratic state of law it currently is, but also the date on which, symbolically, Poland 
ceased to be a satellite state of the Soviet Union. From this perspective, it can be considered 
as a necessary condition for the accession and the road to the accession started soon thereafter 
(with the Treaty of association signed only two years later). Some respondents who did not 
quote the accession of 2004, referred to the change in 1989, as they saw this date as the 
turning point after which Poland moved westwards, and of which the accession was only a 
logical consequence. 
Those who referred to the independence of 1918 usually referred also to the events of 
1989 or/and to the accession to the EU. Therefore, in the perception of my respondents, there 
is no opposition between the acknowledgement of importance of the Polish independence 
(nation state) and of the attachment to the Western values and institutions. 
Curiously, only seven respondents referred to the accession to NATO, usually quoting 
it together with the accession to the EU. This low “popularity” of this event can be explained 
not only because of a relatively diminished role played by the military alliance these days and 
of the lack of imminent threat to Poland’s security,188 but also to the fact that the accession to 
NATO was seen as a symbolic rooting of Poland in the West and as such, it was somehow 
“consumed” by the later accession to the EU. 
Some respondents quoted only the events that could be seen as positive, beneficial for 
Poland or the Poles – what might suggest that they understood the question as referring to 
positive events only. Nevertheless, slightly more than one fourth indicated the partition of 
Poland in the 18th century, while 21 persons referred to the World War II (although 
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188 The research was conducted before the annexation of Crimea by Russia. 
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sometimes to “the end of the second World War”, which, in Polish historiography, is 
associated with both positive (end of the carnage) and negative (beginning of the communist 
dictatorship and Soviet domination) aspects). 
The Romantic tradition is also present, however, its manifestations are not always easy 
to identify and interpret. One could consider as romantic the references to the Warsaw 
Uprising or to the Battle of Vienna which have been considered as the moments of national 
glory or (in case of the Warsaw Uprising) of the national trauma, despite their rather 
relatively low impact on the history of Poland. However, it is difficult to judge if references 
to these events are indeed driven by a romantic vision of the Polish history or they are a 
simple repetition of stereotypes inculcated in the primary school, abstracted from any more 
general historical considerations.189  
Another notable observation is the importance attached to the role of individuals, 
especially John Paul II. Almost one fourth of the respondents considered that his election was 
one of the most important events in the history of Poland. However, this cannot be seen as a 
manifestation of a strong attachment to the religion or to the Catholic Church, as the 
conviction of the importance of the Pope for the downfall of the communism is widespread in 
Poland, also among people with rather liberal views. The Pope has become an icon for both 
the liberal and the European part of the society (he was in favor of the accession of Poland to 
the EU) and the conservative Catholics (most of the upper ecclesiastic officials he appointed 
in Poland were very conservative). Several years after his death, at the moment I conducted 
my research, the informal self-censorship excluding any possible criticism with his regard 
was still respected in the mainstream public debate.190  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 In case of the Warsaw Uprising, there is also a third possibility: this event has also become, for some Poles 
both on the right and on the centre-left side of the Polish political spectrum, a strong anti-romantic symbol, 
associated with the absurd, suicidal hecatomb of the patriotic youth. 
190 However, very recently, the taboo related to any criticism of the Polish Pope seems to be melting. (see e.g., 
an interview with the former Polish jesuit priest, Stanislaw Obirek in Le Soir :!http://archives.lesoir.be/%AB-l-
image-d-un-catholicisme-exotique-%BB_t-20050404-
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To sum up, the choices of my respondents show the importance they attach to the 
accession to the institutions of the Western World in general and to the European Union in 
particular. This is, nevertheless, accompanied by a strong national conscience. Their visions 
of the Polish history are broadly concurrent and bear a strong influence of the Polish 
education and the Polish public debate. In the same time, they seemed to be less infused with 
the romantic tradition that one could expect. 
4.6.2.2. Important Polish historical figures 
Not all respondents were able to name the Polish historical figures they appreciated most, a 
few of which openly stated there are no such figures.  
The objective of the question was to identify the ideals of my respondents. Historic 
figures are national symbols. These symbols differ depending on the political and personal 
convictions, but most importantly, they may be indicative of the nature of one’s 
identification, or, more precisely, the national myths and traditions one chooses to define 
Polishness.  
One third of my respondents (from both groups) referred to Lech Wałęsa, the symbol of 
the democratic change of 1989 (“his role in transformation”, “combat against the 
communism”, “his strong willingness to bring democracy in Poland”). In the same time, he 
may be regarded as a symbol of egalitarianism and resourcefulness: a simple electrician 
outsmarting the generals and defeating the dictatorship (“even small ones can do big things”, 
“one of the best examples how one person can change the world”); and symbolizes 
charismatic and efficient leadership, breaking a stereotype that many Poles have about 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Z0QFTD.html?query=Obirek&firstHit=0&by=10&sort=datedesc&when=-
1&queryor=Obirek&pos=2&all=3&nav=1 ; http://archives.lesoir.be/parabole-sur-la-liberte-de-pensee-dans-la-
pologne_t-20060527-005GHW.html?query=Obirek&firstHit=0&by=10&sort=datedesc&when=-
1&queryor=Obirek&pos=0&all=3&nav=1 ). 
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themselves: the stereotype of impotent, inefficient people who always fall into a trap of the 
History (“he managed to mobilise masses”, “politically efficient”). 
Surprisingly, only about one fourth of the respondents mentioned John Paul II. Indeed, 
although the Pope came second, this score cannot be regarded as particularly high among 
representatives of a society where he enjoys a genuine cult, shared by both conservative and 
liberal circles of the society. He has always (since 1989) been presented in the Polish media 
as the Polish national hero, his pilgrimages to Poland were re-transmitted by the public TV as 
great events. His “low” popularity among the Polish EU officials can be explained by the fact 
that many of them had lived abroad for many years, got acquainted with the criticism of his 
pontificate and they do not have the same perspective of the Pope which had been, to a 
certain extent, shaped by the press and the media in Poland. Those who chose John Paul II as 
one of the most appreciated historic figures, justified it e.g., by “his strong advocacy for good 
and equality”, “his courage in change management” or by his “becoming one of the most 
influential people in the world and for all the good he did for Poland”. These explanations are 
pretty general and rather similar to the statements about John Paul II which are widespread in 
the Polish media. 
Other choices, although significantly less frequent, included the politicians representing 
the center and left-wing democratic opposition to the communist regime, notably Bronisław 
Geremek,191 Jacek Kuroń,192 Tadeusz Mazowiecki.193 These choices were sometimes 
motivated with reference to the ideals of solidarity, compromise, open society and political 
activism (“peacefully putting a regime to sleep”; “their vision of Poland as an open, 
progressive society which has risen above its traditional national grievances”; “symbolizes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 A paramount figure of the Polish democratic opposition against the communist dictatorship and Member of 
the Polish Parliament 1989-2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1997-2000, Member of the European Parliament 
2004-2008, dead in a car accident in 2008.!
192 A left-wing intellectual, the icon of the democratic opposition, active since the late 1950s, the founder of the 
Committee for the Defence of Workers in 1976.!
193 The first non-communist Prime Minister, a prominent figure of the democratic opposition before 1989.!
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the most respectable features of the Polish intelligentsia – altruism, courage and activism, but 
not suicidal self-sacrifice, idealism, but still very human and down-to-earth, insistency, but 
also ability to forgive and compromise”).  
The choice of Jagiellon Dynasty may be motivated (and – in one case - it explicitly 
was) by the fact that their rule is widely considered to be not only the “golden age” of the 
nation, but also the time of political inclusiveness, religious tolerance and ethnic diversity 
(the heritage of the multi-ethnic, tolerant Commonwealth is one of the national myths). 
Other characters from the national pantheon of political figures that were mentioned 
include Leszek Balcerowicz194 and Józef Piłsudski. One person quoted general Wojciech 
Jaruzelski – 195 still quite a provocative statement in the contemporary Poland. 
Some respondents mentioned also artists (Chopin) and scholars or scientists: such as 
philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, Copernicus or – very often - Maria Skłodowska-Curie. 
The pantheon of important Polish figures quoted by my respondents is not typical for 
the conservative, religious and “messianic” national tradition, but certain figures quoted, like 
John Paul II, Chopin, Copernicus and even Lech Wałęsa could be important symbols also for 
the Poles identifying with this tradition (but not exclusively for them). By contrast, 
Kołakowski, Skłodowska-Curie, Balcerowicz, Kuroń or Geremek could serve as a reference 
rather for the tradition emphasizing the “civic” heritage, more European, laic and progressive. 
4.6.2.3. What does it mean to be Polish? 
In the next step, I asked the interviewees about their understanding of Polishness. With this 
question, I mostly sought to find out if the understanding of Polishness by my interviewees 
was rather “civic”, thus referring to the idea of an “open community” of people loyal to its 
institutions and adhering to its rules, or rather “ethnic”, based on the concept of a “closed and 
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194 The author of the liberal economic reforms in the years 1989-1991, paving the way from the centrally-steered 
economy to the free-market one.!
195 The strong man of the communist dictatorship in the years 1981-1989.!
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bounded organic social group”, determined by its blood, culture, language, etc. (Jaskułowski 
2012:185, 187). Is Polishness inborn or freely chosen? Or maybe it is something hybrid? 
All of the interviewed officials felt Polish in one way or another and responded with 
reference to their own feeling of belonging. It appears that the “ethnic” understanding of 
Polishness prevailed. Those who adhered to this view in the most radical way referred to the 
concept of Polishness based on common ancestry, emphasizing that they were born Polish or 
that their parents where Polish: 
For me it’s just who I am. I was born Polish, so I’m Polish. (Ula) 
 
Being a Pole is having Polish ancestors … . Someone who has got no Polish blood from one’s 
ancestors, [he] may have the passport and the ID, but [he] is not fully Polish to me. (Darek) 
 
I feel Polish, because I have Polish parents. (Patrycja) 
 
The majority saw their Polishness as something determined by their experience, the fact they 
were brought up in Poland, in the Polish culture, that they use the Polish language. Several 
interviewees answered using almost exactly the same words. For Dominika, Polishness was 
“the link with the Polish culture”, Klara, Kamil and Emilia all referred to the language and 
the culture, sometimes associated with lifestyle, history, religion and “the whole set of values 
related to it”. Sebastian developed slightly more on the issue, with a drop of sarcasm at the 
end: 
I think it is related to the culture in which you are socialized, so that’s the whole story, … 
You’re socialized in a certain culture, educated [in a certain culture]. First, the first thing that 
comes is the language you use. You cannot drop it, lose it ... Second, it’s the all history you 
are learned, the values you are learned, associations you have, way of thinking, all those 
prejudices, everything ... . Polish language, knowing Polish culture, knowing Polish history, 
being a bit racist and anti-Semitic, altogether, being Polish. (Sebastian) 
 
Also Zofia explained her understanding at length: 
 
What does it mean to be Polish? Well, I don’t know. I think it’s having been raised in a 
certain country within a certain culture and traditions that are [in this case] typical to Poland, 
that are neither better or worse than others, but this is just, you know, a Polish way of life, if I 
can say. It’s also the language for me. You know, I think you perceive so many things 
through your education but also through the language and I think this is really unique to each 
language ... . I would definitely like (in the future) my children to speak Polish ... . Other than 
that, I don’t know, I’m not too enthusiastic about Poland, I’m not too pessimistic, ... it’s my 
country, so it’s just a fact for me ... [laughter]. (Zofia) 
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Beniamin seemed to attach much importance to this identification: 
I feel Polish very much, but I’m not nationalist. In the sense that I really feel Polish, I’m 
proud of it, I’m proud of the history, of the culture. (Beniamin) 
 
Adrian and Filip responded with reference to the same elements, but chose to clarify also the 
relation between this “ethnic set” and their feeling of Europeanness: 
I mean, the definition is very similar to the definition of Europeanness. This means that I was 
born in a certain cultural circle and this is a more narrow circle, identified mostly by means of 
the language, the common history and the common territory, but also by means of broadly 
conceived culture, meaning: culinary culture, film, art, the ... language. (Adrian) 
 
Again, this is a cultural aspect. I am Polish while also being European ... The Poles ... have 
common values with the Europeans, so they are Europeans, but they also have some specific 
attitudes, like: we like bigos196 and schabowy,197 we know that Marie Skłodowska-Curie was 
born in Poland and, in addition, that she was Skłodowska, not only Marie Curie, etc. So, yes, I 
am Polish. This is a set of common values and memories, etc. Which are not in contradiction 
to the set of values [we have] in common with the Frenchmen, the Spaniards, the Portuguese 
and the Belgians. (Filip) 
 
It is [something] in my roots, really. ... I’m sure that the way I sometimes behave or observe 
the world, it’s all because of the way I was brought up in Poland, so the Polish culture and the 
Polish experience fit into that. (Aleksandra)  
 
Maksymilian explained the concept mostly with regard to the common experience, 
introducing additional nuances as to the different types of Polishness: 
On the other hand, it is true that being a Pole implies, let’s say, [having] certain type of 
experience, which means living and being born in Poland and growing up in this country. 
From this point of view, I suppose, that not all but many Poles ... may have certain similarities 
and ... perception of things and ways of thinking and maybe certain values. But again I think 
that in Poland there is nevertheless a huge row between what I would call elite ... in a broad 
sense of the word, and the rest of the society. I honestly think that the Polish intelligentsia, 
which means either educated people or people practicing certain lifestyle (which means they 
are people who are interested in the world, who read, who ... do not consume … the popular 
culture, and the masses), I think that this row is just enormous. (Maksymilian) 
 
Aleksandra also emphasized the role of personal experience and clarified that in her case, the 
fact of living abroad could influence her Polishness, stressing the relational character of her 
identity: 
I’ve spent also a number of years abroad, [that is why my thinking, but also traditions are] not 
only purely Polish I suppose ... And being abroad, sometimes one becomes more patriotic, 
because being in Poland it’s obvious that one does certain things, one does not have to think 
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196 Polish dish similar to la choucroute. 
197 Polish pork breaded cutlet. 
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about. Here, especially, when it comes to bringing up children, and wanting to pass on the 
culture, then one may put a bigger pressure on it to make sure that they understand what the 
culture is about. (Aleksandra) 
 
Certain accounts, although clearly referred to Polishness in terms of culture, traditions or 
lifestyle, put emphasis on the actual practice, adding an element of what could be described 
as “Polishness as an attitude”. Jeremi drew a particular importance to the awareness of the 
historical past, but also to the current interest in events in Poland: 
For me being Polish is, of course, to be interested in what’s going on in Poland, to have 
knowledge about the current events in Poland, in business, in politics, etc. Just to still have 
interest in my country. Being Polish means to me, to be proud about what my country has 
achieved during the last 20 years. Well, being Polish means to me as well to go from time to 
time to Polish pubs to eat Polish food, to drink Polish beer and to meet with my Polish 
friends. Yeah, being Polish means as well, what’s happened to my country during World War 
II and after, just to know history of my country. But for sure, being Polish doesn’t mean that I 
feel that I am someone special. I don’t believe that the history of my country means that I 
have special rights amongst other Europeans, but it doesn’t mean as well that I feel worse 
than them. I just feel, you know, a citizen of a medium European country, not worse, not 
better than others, just European. (Jeremi) 
 
It is unclear how the interviewee understood the question: his answer might be read as 
referring to obligations or implications of being Polish, rather than to the actual definition, 
although it might also be understood as defining Polishness as a specific attitude rather than 
as a set of characteristics. Also Stanislaw emphasized the role of practicing the national 
tradition: “it’s important for me to practice Polish traditions to [remain] Polish, but again, 
those that I consider as positive.” 
 On the other hand, some others seemed to conceive Polishness in more “civic” terms, 
considering it as a matter of choice, something one can choose or reject. In addition to his 
statements about the role of experience, Maksymilian also presented his understanding of 
Polishness from “the political point of view”. For him, although the specific national 
experience determined the “initial” Polishness, it neither carved one’s belonging forever, nor 
was it a necessary condition for it: 
It is something you can choose - in the sense that you can … choose to become a member of a 
community, and take the Polish citizenship and decide to be Pole. (Maksymilian) 
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 A slightly different approach to the meaning of “being Polish” was presented by Ksawery, 
according to whom:  
Being Polish, it is first of all to declare my relationship with this country, with its nation, with 
its government, with its language, and also use the opportunities and rights that this passport 
gives me - like voting in the elections, and also openly discussing the important issues that are 
valid for my country, this is in the first place why I feel and how I feel Polish. (Ksawery). 
 
Many accounts did not refer to any of the elements traditionally associated with a basis 
for national belonging. Some referred to their emotions, without attempting to explain where 
they come from. For Maja being Polish simply meant “something one is – independently of 
how one feels in a given moment”. Her account referred to what might be qualified as 
“everyday Polishness”, something referred to by Michael Billig (1995) as “banal 
nationalism” (see also Edensor 2002). As Maja explained,  
But I must say that after so many years abroad, in various circumstances, before the institutions 
and in the institutions, and in Italy (which is the third country and the third kind of 
circumstances in which I happened to live), I [still feel Polish]. Certainly I do not feel so 
patriotic as they write in newspapers, and I do not fit the models promoted by some political 
parties; however, for sure, being a Pole, is something from my past, but in a positive sense, as 
some kind of a catapult or some basis. And being a Pole, it is certainly being manifested ... , for 
instance, during a [football] match - I always support Poland – even against Italy [laughter] (as 
Italy is my second homeland). I certainly understand a “fanatic” approach of certain countries, 
as we are a bit special in Poland, and this specificity, we are keen on it. And I understand it, 
although I do not have inclinations to this specificity. (Maja) 
 
Bernard gave an impression of indifference, quoting the fact of living outside Poland as a 
factor alienating them from their home country: 
I am [Polish], but not to the fullest extent, because I don’t know my home city that well any 
more. Because I do not go there that often. Because I don’t follow the news, because I don’t 
have that many Polish friends, because I do not feel concerned about the latest governmental 
decisions, so it’s hard for me to say that I’m Polish in that respect. (Bernard) 
 
Laura seemed to consider her Polishness as something accessory: “I feel rather European, but 
in one way or another, I try to cultivate my Polishness, as I find it enriching.” For her, 
“Polishness” was something that in fact “complemented her” as she found Poles “so distinct 
from the others”. However, Laura also argued that being a Pole for her was “certainly not the 
lifestyle”, as she “did not cook, or ... did not, in particular, behave as a Polish person and 
! 377!
[she] had never had”. She even added that “for many years [she] could have done virtually 
without the Polish language”.  
Certain Polish EU officials quoted the fact that they were born in Poland as decisive. 
However, if some of them, as for instance Patrycja, seemed to use it as a proxy for being 
impregnated with the Polish culture, (“I feel Polish, because … I was born in Poland and I 
lived most of my life there”), some others saw it as a proof of small importance of the 
national belonging: 
This is the place of birth and this is what my daughter made me realize. She has three 
nationalities and they are all, if I can say, justified, as she is born in Poland from a Polish 
mother and a German father and she lives, since she was born, in Belgium and she got her 
education in Belgium. However, when she has to answer with one word who she is, she says 
she is Polish, as she was born in Poland. And I guess that’s it. That is why I will never accept 
that people are proud of their origins, as it is only an accident which makes that we are born 
there and not in another place, while we can be proud with all the rest, what we do with it. 
(Otylia). 
 
4.6.2.4. Polish national features 
The question was important to complete the analysis of the element of “sameness” (Jacobson-
Widding 1983). I wanted to know what exactly the Polish EU officials thought they had in 
common with other Poles and what their self-image was. 
Inquired about the national features they could ascribe to Polish people, overall, almost 
40 percent of the respondents (out of the 48 persons)198 considered that Poles were hard-
working people. This was, by far, the most popular indication. It is difficult to judge to what 
extent this opinion was influenced by the situation of Brussels, where the economic migrants 
are often referred to by the local population as particularly laborious. On the other hand, the 
Polish press and media repeatedly published/broadcasted information on the statistics of the 
average working time in Poland which is, reportedly, among the highest in Europe. The 
impact of this information and of this judgment is probably strengthened by the fact that, in 
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198 Two persons did not answer the question, although some respondents gave less than three characteristics and 
some other more than three.  
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the past, there was a widespread conviction in the Polish society that Poles were considered 
lazy in Germany, where many of them worked. Therefore, the contrary judgment by the 
Brussels population, as well as all kinds of statistics falsifying this negative stereotype199 may 
have been well remembered and has apparently strongly influenced the declared self-image 
of the Polish EU officials.  
The next most often appearing features were “proud”, “capable/resourceful” and 
“traditional/conservative” - more than 16 percent of the respondents gave this answer. The 
second feature corresponds to the well-rooted conviction of the Poles about themselves, 
fortified during the years of the communism when this characteristic was particularly 
positively valued. The popularity of the third feature mentioned may be interpreted in the 
context of the cultural change slowly taking place in Poland where the reaction of the 
conservative part of the population is very strong and noticeable. Actually, any reader of 
Polish electronic media is confronted, on a daily basis, with the affirmation of the traditional 
values, usually associated with pestering against any perceived “leftists” or “communists”, 
gays, feminists, “gender ideology”, etc. On the other hand, both Western and Polish media 
emphasize the conservativeness and traditionalism of the Polish society.200 
The other features quoted can be roughly divided into “positive” and negative” on the 
basis of semantic connotations widely associated with the words at stake. Thus, the Polish EU 
officials see the Poles as “hospitable” (slightly below 15 percent), as well as “adaptable”, 
“friendly” and “cheerful”. Several respondents emphasized “the Polish sense of 
entrepreneurship”, “openness” and “ambition”.  
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199 See examples of articles referring to OECD and Eurostat statistics: 
http://www.polskieradio.pl/10/3959/Artykul/1450487,Polacy-w-czolowce-najciezej-pracujacych-narodow; 
http://superbiz.se.pl/wiadomosci-biz/polak-pracuje-425-godziny-tygodniowo-wyprzedzaja-nas-tylko-
grecy_591752.html  
200 see e.g., 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,18219100,Polacy_za_panstwem_opiekunczym_i_konserwatywnym__59.html?disab
leRedirects=true  
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On the other hand, slightly below 15 percent admitted that the Poles have “a tendency 
to complain”, which is another well-rooted conviction that the Poles maintain about 
themselves. Several respondents indicated that the Poles have “a low self-esteem” and that 
they “tend to be intolerant” or “xenophobic”. Other negative features included “being 
envious/jealous” and “distrustful”: again, the tendency to envy other people, especially other 
Poles, is among the “traditional” set of features belonging to the negative Polish self-image. 
A couple of respondents indicated that their compatriots are “unruly”, “quarrelsome” and 
“irrationally courageous”.  
Finally, the characteristics quoted which can be considered neutral included 
“religiousness” (relatively high number of quotations) and “stubbornness”.  
Although the features quoted by my respondents were mostly concurrent with the 
stereotypical characterizations popular in Poland, they were neither particularly negative nor 
positive. There was no clear tendency to idealize Polishness, or to present it as a shameful 
burden. Negative or neutral features heavily relied on bearded stereotypes (quarrelsome, 
religious, envious, etc.). By contrast, among the positive features quoted, one finds opinions 
that Poles have forged about themselves during the last 20 years of economic transformation 
and vigorous development.  
4.6.2.5. Polish traditions and ways of maintenance of Polishness 
Subsequently, to obtain a better insight into the relations between the Polishness (as 
understood by my interviewees) and the cultural practice, I inquired about the importance of 
practicing the Polish traditions for “remaining Polish”. 
Only five out of 21 interviewees did not find practicing Polish traditions important to 
remain Polish. One person found it important, although, as she said, “in a moderate way” 
(Otylia).  
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Most of those who found it important (for example Zofia, Ula, Ksawery and Filip) 
referred to religious celebrations, such as Christmas and Easter, but not necessarily to their 
strictly religious character: 
Yeah, I think it is [important]. Not all the traditions and not too heavily, but celebrating 
Christmas or Easter in Polish way with certain traditional food, that’s quite important. I don’t 
follow necessarily all the calendars, so I don’t always know when there is Tłusty Czwartek201 
or, you know, Andrzejki202, I do not sometimes notice this [laughter]. But big celebrations, 
yeah, definitely. (Zofia)  
 
This is part of my culture and I believe being Polish also means understanding the tradition and 
following the tradition despite the fact that we’re here in Belgium and in Brussels where those 
traditions are not the same. (Ksawery) 
 
Yes, although I do not know what exactly you understand under “Polish tradition”, but there are 
different things from Poland that I am used to, [such as] eating schabowy203 and … the Morning 
Resurrection mass during the Easter; here in Belgium, people would not go for Resurrection. 
(Filip)  
 
 Some of the interviewees emphasized the religious aspect of the tradition, together with its 
distinctively Polish character: 
I’m Catholic, so, as you know, in Poland on Fridays … it’s forbidden to eat meat for 
Catholics, but, maybe you don’t know it. It’s a rule said by the Polish Episcopate and it’s not 
enforced here in Belgium, but I decided to keep this …, well it’s a tradition. (Jeremi) 
 
Some others, although aware of the religious origin of some Polish traditions, tended to 
dissociate their practice from the question of faith: 
I’m Christian, but I don’t go to the church ... Whenever … we have Christian celebrations, 
like Easter or … Christmas, then I always go to Poland, so I don’t have to do anything in fact. 
So these customs, events are very important. (Beniamin) 
 
Yes, I have the impression I do [find it important to practice Polish traditions to “remain” 
Polish]. I must admit I have never spent such feasts as Christmas or Easter outside Poland … 
Certainly, I am very happy that there are such traditions as, I don’t know, blessing food, 
which are very Polish and very interesting (independently from the religious aspect of it, as 
this is a topic apart). So is sharing the wafer during the Polish meetings which can be 
separated from religious devotion. It is more a question of practicing popular traditions rather 
than religion as such, but I believe that practicing it is very important and I am sure I will do 
it. (Adrian) 
 
Many admitted to go for these events back to Poland, to spend that time with family 
and friends. For instance, Kamil said: 
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201 Fat Thursday. 
202 Saint Andrew’s Day. 
203 Polish pork breaded cutlet. 
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I always go to Poland for those kind of things, so I don’t maintain them here, but I assume by 
going to Poland to celebrate them somehow. This is how I maintain them. Even though for me, 
it’s an occasion rather to meet with family and friends, than to respect some … traditions. 
(Kamil) 
 
Those having children found maintaining and transmitting traditions to the younger 
generation especially important: 
Very much. Especially that my children have two nationalities and I am very keen on them 
learning Polish, so as to transmit Polish tradition, definitely. (Klara) 
 
Yeah. We have very often Polish food at home and I speak Polish to my kids as well. 
(Dominika) 
 
Yes, I mean, well, I pick and choose the traditions that I like or that I’m able to continue, but 
definitely it’s important for me that my husband who is not Polish speaks Polish, that my child 
finds out as much about the culture to be able when they grow older, so yes, it’s important. 
(Aleksandra) 
 
Some interviewees admitted they were practicing Polish traditions, but dissociated it 
from any attempt to “stay Polish”, explaining it by the attachment to their childhood or 
simply by their taste for these traditions, independently from their Polish character: 
This is important to me rather from a private point of view, to remain my mummy’s child and 
to keep continuity with my childhood and my family and, for sure … also with Poland. (Maja) 
 
No, it is not important to me to do it in the sense that I don’t think that I should be doing it in 
order to stay Polish, but of course, I mean, there are certain traditions which I inherited after my 
parents and which I practiced when I was a kid, and these are traditions that I simply like…, so 
I practice them. (Maksymilian) 
 
Yes, yes, but I would say that it’s not that we have to practice really the Polish traditions. It’s 
not the stress that it’s so Polish. Just the traditions that we know so we practice them. My 
attitude is that I find it important to practice traditions in general, so for example for Christmas 
or for Easter it is important for me to celebrate these events the way that I was celebrating them 
as a child and so on. So I want to teach my kids to do the same, I want them to have the same 
experience as for traditions. But it doesn’t mean that it’s because it’s Polish. It’s just because it 
is a tradition that I think is worth keeping. (Emilia) 
 
Although for Laura, in general, practicing Polish traditions was not important to remain 
Polish, she added: 
I mean, [except for] those which I like the most, like Christmas, which is completely different. 
For me, it has a very special taste, even though I am not religious or very tradition-oriented but 
this is something so unique and so full of charm that yes, gladly. But this is on the basis of 
choice, and not ideology. (Laura) 
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Those who, similarly as Laura, claimed that they did not consider practicing traditions 
as important to remain Polish either did not explain their stance (Sebastian: “No, absolutely 
not”) or argued that they did not need to act in a specific manner, as they were born Polish. 
These were the same respondents who viewed their Polishness as something related to the 
blood or the place of birth, denying the importance of the cultural aspect of it: 
Not for me, because I’m naturally Polish because of the fact my both parents are Polish and I 
was born in Poland, so the fact that I’m not eating Polish food everyday, doesn’t make me feel 
foreigner, so I’m fine with it, but maybe in the long term, I don’t know, maybe it will be more 
important. (Patrycja) 
 
Darek opposed the real, fixed character of his identity based on ancestry to the 
“constructed” cultural aspects of Polishness:  
No, all of this is not important at all. I am not at all interested in some national feasts, 
celebrations, the grave of the Unknown Soldier, or the 3rd May, all this is unimportant for me, 
as far as Polishness is concerned, as this is a creation of the establishment and of the whole 
culture. I am a Pole because of my ancestors who were Poles and have lived there for a 
thousand years, they lived, they died and no one can tell me that I am not a Pole or [that I am] a 
worse Pole because I, say, do not pray in the church, if this is the part of the culture, or, … do 
not celebrate some national feasts because this is all artificial, constructed and this can change, 
as the feasts and the political orientations. (Darek) 
 
Bernard went even further: 
And tradition, it doesn’t mean anything to me. There are not that many Polish traditions and 
not that different. There is nothing I observe. And there is nothing to observe that much, what 
are these traditions specific to Poles? (Bernard) 
 
Overall, the majority of my interviewees do practice Polish traditions and find it 
important to continue. However, they quoted also other motivations: some of them liked the 
related rituals and habits, without seeing them necessarily as important for their Polishness.  
During my research, I attended numerous gatherings of Polish EU officials celebrating 
important Polish events or feasts. For instance, in November 2011, I participated in the 
celebration of St. Andrew’s Day in the “Wild Geese”, where the Polish EU officials, together 
with other Polish expats, practiced the tradition of reading the future from the forms taken by 
hot wax coagulating in cold water. The event was very popular, there were many people 
pouring the wax in turns. However, the purpose of the fortune telling was to read the future of 
! 383!
Europe. One of the EU officials interpreted the wax form as imminent disruption of the 
European Union, or at least a split of the UK.  
4.6.2.6. Feeling European versus feeling Polish 
As it can be concluded from the above, my interviewees have mostly kept their Polishness, 
while developing in parallel the feeling of being European. It is not uncommon that 
individuals have multiple social identities, the European one being one of them (Risse 
2004:253). I could presume that these belongings must coexist, becoming more or less 
salient, depending on the context (see e.g., Jenkins 2002; Herrman and Brewer 2004). Indeed, 
Eugeen E. Roosens stresses the changeable and contextual character of the hierarchy of 
identities (1989:15-16). Richard Jenkins argues that identity depends on the context, and adds 
that often, it is closely related to a possible advantage (2002:121-122); whereas Stuart Hall 
acknowledges its “strategic and positional” character (1996:3-4). Likewise, Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen stresses that social identities are “fluid, negotiable, situational, analogic (or 
gradualist) and segmentary” and may contain several degrees of belonging (2010:214-215). 
Herrmann and Brewer specify that the preponderance of one belonging or another depends on 
the circumstances and give example of Europeans feeling more European in America 
(2004:4). 
In case of my respondents, European identification seemed to be related to their 
intercultural experience, as well as to their professional life, while the feeling of Polishness 
appears strongly related to the practice of certain traditions. In order to explore this 
situational aspect of identification further, I interrogated my respondents (via questionnaires) 
whether there were moments when they felt more European and moments when they felt 
more Polish.  
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A number of persons indicated that it is impossible for them to make a clear distinction 
between the Polish and the European identity and that these two identities are interrelated (“I 
feel a Pole, Poland is part of the EU and so to this extend I feel European”; “it is impossible 
to be only European (not Polish) or only Polish (not European)”). 
Only two persons felt always more European (one of them being only half Polish) than 
Polish, a couple of respondents felt always more Polish or even exclusively Polish (two 
persons). However, the majority felt in certain situations more Polish and in some others - 
more European. Certain answers were recurrent: many felt more European either in Poland or 
outside Europe: in these situations they probably feel they represent Europe (“possibly 
European when I am on another continent and nobody knows where Poland is”). Another 
frequent answer was that a respondent felt more European in the professional context. 
Finally, certain respondents felt strongly their European belonging in the situations of 
conflict: “when I am confronted with Polish people criticizing the Commission or the Union, 
I tend to feel solidarity with other EU officials and the Union”; “when I’m in Poland, during 
some discussions I have a more distant point of view, so I feel more European”; “when one is 
attacked by the other I feel more the first one”. Some respondents also indicated that they felt 
European in most of situations of the daily life. 
Feeling more Polish, is often related to situations of national drama (Smolensk air crash 
of the presidential plane had taken place quite shortly before, death of the Pope) or, on the 
contrary, important, but joyful events, such as the election of Jerzy Buzek for the post of the 
speaker of the European Parliament. Some respondents underlined their strong sensation of 
Polishness while celebrating Polish traditions (“Polish traditions - I feel more Polish. 
Otherwise - I feel European”). Moreover, many respondents admitted they felt more Polish in 
situations involving foreigners or being outside Poland, especially in case Poland is criticised. 
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One person remarked she felt particularly strongly Polish when she could oppose the 
communist dictatorship experience to the allegedly leftist sympathies of Western Europeans. 
As the catastrophe of the presidential plane was relatively recent and regularly 
reminded in the Polish political debate (as well as by the Polish EU officials, notably on the 
“EPS” list), I asked the respondents whether they felt any particular link with other Poles 
after the tragic event. Only ten out of 50 respondents denied that they felt particularly linked 
with other Poles at the moment of the Smolensk tragedy. Some flatly answered “no”, some 
others felt necessary to explain that they considered the event as very sad or traumatising but 
it did not provoke a particular feeling of unity with other Poles:  
I felt a general grief for people who died and especially some of them that I knew personally. I 
cannot see any link with grief and nationality. I think this is a supranational feeling. One 
mourns and is sorry for the tragedy in general and mourning is a private emotion deprived for 
me from any national (nationalistic) contexts. 
 
Not really, I was just very sorry about the tragedy.  
 
Not really, it was shock for all of us. 
Some of those who confirmed their particular link with other Poles tried to minimize 
their emotional involvement: “Initially yes, but when the mass hysteria started I felt ashamed 
of being Polish”; “Yes, however, I was not participating in any public ‘Brussels show-off’ of 
the grieve, as I found it exaggerated”; “Only a short while, the time of a real grieve, then it 
became more dividing than unifying”; “Yes, for a short while, but then this event rapidly 
gave rise to very deep divisions and acrimonious arguments”. Many others tried to give an 
additional explanation. Some underlined the fact that they were in Poland in that time, 
whereas some others tried to downplay the national character of the tragedy, emphasizing its 
human dimension. 
The opinion on the origin of the Smolensk crash has become the vector of political 
division in Poland. This research does not concern this issue. Based on the answers, it might 
only be concluded that the death of the 96 people including the President of Poland visibly 
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constituted a very strong community experience.204 This experience could be even 
underreported, given that the right wing of the Polish political scene defines itself, to a 
significant extent, by their lasting grief after the Smolensk crash. For this reason, some of my 
respondents, especially those with more left-wing or centrist political views, could choose not 
to recount or simply not remember their emotions after the crash, by fear of amalgamation 
with this political camp. 
4.6.2.7. The past and present performance of the Poles in different domains 
As every national identification, the Polish one certainly relies on certain common myths, 
common symbols and emblems, but also certain vision of common past. People working in 
multinational environment, “united in diversity” for the common European interest, must 
have inevitably asked themselves a question on the actual past contribution of Poles to the 
common scientific and cultural European heritage. To the extent that the feeling of 
Europeanness is a corollary of their sense of Polishness (as it was suggested in many 
responses), the judgment on the common Polish past in the context of the European past may 
reveal something about how confident my respondents feel in Europe with their Polish 
identification and how they position themselves in the entanglement of national and 
supranational identifications. With the following set of questions, I tried, for the reasons 
explained above, to make my respondents assess the past and present performance of the 
Poles, adding to my understanding of their attitude to the Polishness.  
Interrogated over the contribution of the Poles to the European heritage, 20 out of 45 
persons205 gave a rather negative answer, considering the Polish contribution inadequate to 
the country’s size. A few respondents more answered affirmatively, claiming that the Polish 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204 For an interesting analysis of these and subsequent events, see: Jaskułowski (2012). 
205 Five respondents did not answer the question. 
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contribution was undoubtedly important or at least as important as the contribution of the 
other nations.  
Interestingly, only a limited number of respondents (7) named any examples of 
important contributors except for Chopin (13 respondents), Maria Skłodowska-Curie (14 
respondents) or Kopernik (Nicolaus Copernicus): a rather standard selection typically learnt 
already at a primary school, but having a merit of being of truly European notoriety. A few 
people mentioned Lech Wałęsa, John Paul II, (Joseph) Conrad-Korzeniowski or Józef 
Piłsudski. One person mentioned Magdalena Abakanowicz,206 Jerzy Nowosielski,207 
Krzysztof Warlikowski.208 Another person enumerated a handful of writers, musicians, 
scholars and scientists (the only quotation of scientists other than Maria Skłodowska-Curie): 
Paweł Włodkowic, Jan Łukasiewicz, Stefan Banach, Wróblewski/Olszewski, Ignacy Jan 
Paderewski, Krzysztof Penderecki, Leszek Kołakowski, Zygmunt Bauman, Alfred Tarski. 
Nobody mentioned Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki, the “heavy weights” of the 
Polish Romanticism, who traditionally have been mentioned in this context, despite being 
rather unknown to the wider public outside Poland.  
Skłodowska-Curie and Chopin were mentioned not only by those respondents who 
claimed that Poland had much contributed to the EU heritage, but also by those who claimed 
the contrary: 
Even if “we had” Chopin or Skłodowska, these are only outstanding individuals, there were not 
many Polish schools or movements of art, literature or music or significant scientific centres 
which brought much into the European heritage. 
 
Those who considered that Poles contributed substantially often deplored a rather low 
notoriety of the Polish artists and scientists abroad (e.g., “However it is not widely 
recognized. Especially the scientific aspect seems to be neglected”). Those who made the 
opposite judgment referred sometimes to the reasons for what they considered as 
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206  A sculptor and fiber artist. 
207 A painter, graphic artist, stenographer, and illustrator. 
208 A theater director. 
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underperformance (“taking into account that Poland was ‘no country’ for more than 120 
years and a lot of Polish inventors, scientists and artists were just citizens of other European 
countries”). 
Interrogated about their assessment of Polish achievements in various domains, almost 
80 percent of my respondents valued high the economic achievements of Poland, that they 
considered as “very important” (17 respondents) or “important” (22 respondents), while only 
two respondents were of the opposite opinion. Polish EU officials praised also the cultural 
achievements of Poland: 35 respondents considered them, altogether, as very important (8) or 
important (27), while only two persons found them unimportant. Only slightly less 
enthusiastic was the assessment of the political importance of Poland: 31 respondents 
considered it as “very important” (7) or “important” (24), while three found it unimportant. 
The assessment of scientific and technological advancement of Poland was much more 
moderate. Nine persons found it “unimportant”, while only eight and nine respondents 
considered it, respectively, “very important” or “important”. The worst notes were distributed 
for the Polish performance in sport, with almost as much of those who found it “unimportant” 
(15) as those who found it either “very important” (two) or “important” (15). A few persons 
referred to other very important achievements, notably in the field of “social development” or 
“social self-consciousness”.209 
Subsequently, I asked my respondents if there were any aspects in contemporary 
Poland, which they felt ashamed of as Poles, followed by a question whether they happened 
to criticize Poland or the Poles as a nation while talking to other Europeans. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
209 However, it should be borne in mind that the question was formulated in a quite imprecise manner and some 
respondents could have understood it not as valuation of the performance of Poland in the proposed fields, but 
as the assessment of one’s individual attitude to the achievements in these areas. In other terms, while putting 
“very important” in the column “culture”, respondents could have meant that they assessed the Polish 
achievements in this field as outstanding or that they attached a lot of importance to achievements in this field, 
although their assessment of the Polish performance in this discipline could be actually low. 
!
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Eighteen out of 50 participants were not ashamed of anything in Poland. This, of 
course, cannot be understood as denying any negative aspect of Poland and Polishness. It 
may simply mean that the respondents do not identify themselves with Poland sufficiently to 
feel ashamed of anything related to it, but also that they do not feel responsible for these 
negative aspects and thus do not feel ashamed. Finally, some respondents explained that 
“there is nothing you would not find in other countries too” or that “the more you know about 
other nations, the easier you see that there is nothing to be ashamed of”, relativising 
potentially negative aspects by comparison with other countries. 
Those research participants who admitted they were ashamed of certain aspects of the 
contemporary Poland, focused mostly on the political issues. As much as 12 officials (out of 
32 who were ashamed of certain aspects) referred to bad quality of politics in Poland, 
stigmatizing mostly strong political division (notably strengthened by the quarrel over the 
responsibility for the presidential airplane crash in Smolensk), aggressive and non-
constructive nature of the political debate and the lack of competence of the Polish 
politicians. The issue of the influence of the Catholic Church on the public issues in Poland 
deserves a separate mention: as much as seven persons complained about this fact. Finally, 11 
respondents were ashamed of the Polish intolerance, also described as xenophobia, 
homophobia or anti-Semitism. 
Very few respondents referred to the economic aspects, such as “decreasing wages” or 
“young people agreeing to junk jobs”. A few persons criticised, in more general terms, 
backwardness or excessive traditionalism or narrow-mindedness of the Polish society. 
Only 11 out of 50 research participants strongly denied that they ever criticize Poland 
or the Poles while talking to other Europeans. Some of them added explanation for this, such 
as: “I tend to give a good opinion about my compatriots”; “there are enough bad opinions 
about Poles, I don’t want to contribute to that”. Some others were less categorical and 
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admitted that it happens sometimes, although they tended to minimize the incidence and the 
scope of such criticism: “Yes, but just political issues”; “Generally, no, although sometimes, 
after events on the political scene”; “Not really, maybe in a way of comparing the national 
special features”; “yes it happens but I do it more mildly than when I talk to other Poles”; 
“very seldom I criticize Poland or the Poles. Most often it concerns Polish politics and not 
society in general”; “Yes, but only when I am sure, when something is obvious and when I 
am asked. I am trying to avoid such debates with other nationals”; “only in private 
conversations with friends”; “Yes, but always in a moderate way and, frankly, I don’t let 
others do it easily in my presence always trying to remind the context of our past and our 
difficult geopolitical position”; “Possibly only about the xenophobia”. Finally, around two-
fifth of the respondents answered affirmatively without additional reservations. Some of them 
added explanations for this position: “of course, sometimes it’s objectively necessary”; “yes, 
because although the idea of a big and important nation is deeply rooted, the independence of 
thoughts and opinions does not follow”; “Of course. If I consider something deplorable, I do 
not think it serves any purpose to remain silent only because it concerns Poland. Firstly, if 
more people criticize it, it is more likely to change, secondly, I would lose personal 
credibility if I do not try to be fair. [Thirdly], if everybody defends one’s “nest” only for 
nationalistic reasons, no genuine dialogue is possible. Finally, nations which are able to look 
critically on their own past are better considered than those who keep denying any 
wrongdoing”; “Only mature nations can be critical of themselves. I talk (when there is a 
need) critically about myself as a Pole and my fellow countrymen/countrywomen. We are not 
perfect and I hate when we sound “pompous” when we talk about Poland. We need to get 
some distance to ourselves and our country”. 
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A lot of respondents made a reservation that they criticized mainly the politics and the 
politicians. Certainly, this kind of criticism must appear less stigmatizing than discussions 
about, for example, Polish anti-Semitism or inclination to heavy drinking.  
4.6.2.8. Attachment to Poland and different aspects of Polishness 
At the last step, I asked the research participants to evaluate the degree of their attachment to 
different things related to Poland. By far, the dearest to the Polish EU officials proved to be 
the Polish language. Thirty-four out of 50 respondents indicated they were “very attached” to 
it, while all the rest admitted they were “attached” to it. The overall attachment to the Polish 
nation, Polish high culture, Polish history and tradition was significantly lower. Still, only 
one person indicated “no attache[ment] at all” to the Polish nation to Polish high culture or 
Polish history and the majority considered itself either “attached” or “very attached”, while 
only two persons were “not at all attached” to the Polish tradition. These findings seem to 
confirm the observation made by Marody and Mandes, according to whom, Polish national 
identity is based on language and religion (2005:61) and not on political factors. 
Much lower “score” was registered by the Polish landscape, while the lowest 
attachment was claimed with regard to the Polish national ceremonies and Polish popular 
culture. For example, in case of Polish national ceremonies, as many as seven persons stated 
they were not attached to them at all. However, 18 persons said they were either “attached” or 
“very attached” to national ceremonies and 20 persons were “attached” or “very attached” to 
the Polish popular culture (while ten were “not attached at all”). 
4.6.3. Europeanness 
While researching on the European identity of the Polish EU officials, I started by elucidating 
what “being European” means to them. As a result, I obtained information on whether they 
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feel European and how they understood it. To complement the picture, I inquired about what 
the Polish EU civil servants consider as European values and what distinctive features they 
have in common. Once it was possible to establish how they understand their Europeanness, I 
tried to examine how the fact of working in the EU institutions, with their ideology and 
pragmatics, influenced their identification.  
I also found it important to verify if they considered themselves as the European avant-
garde, the pre-figuration of the European nation, as they are often presented in the scholarly 
literature, thus whether they saw themselves as more European than average people in 
Belgium or in Poland. I continued gathering data on the relation between their status and their 
identification by asking whether they had become more European since they had started 
working in the EU institutions. Subsequently, I asked them if their job required pro-European 
attitude and if they felt that their work had a tangible impact. I also asked them a more 
general question on how they understood the European integration. 
Finally, I inquired on their understanding of their Polishness in the context of their 
European identification, via a question whether Poles are more or less European than 
Belgians or other Western Europeans. 
Certain questions asked during the interview, as for instance the last one, were not 
formulated exactly so as to target the response I intended to obtain. Their slightly 
provocative, sometimes somewhat simplistic formulations were intended to trigger 
spontaneous reactions. Obviously, the very notions of “European” or “Europeanness” could 
be, and indeed were, understood differently: as conscious political subscription or a total of 
objective cultural features. This ambiguity was not always possible to eliminate and, in this 
particular case, could provide me with additional information on the intuitive understanding 
of the concept by my interlocutors.  
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4.6.3.1. Being European: inborn or chosen?  
Abélès and his colleagues draw attention to frequent situations of particularly European 
predilection among the EU officials who happen to be born in mixed couples or from parents 
who are Community officials or who have been living in culturally mixed or “europeanising” 
environments (1993:16). However, such situations must be less frequent among Poles who 
lived in a relative isolation from other EU member states, not only because Poland was not 
yet in the European Union, but also because of the “Iron Curtain”. 
Interrogated on the meaning of “being European”, only six out of 21 interviewees 
clearly declared they were born European, while as much as ten others suggested that 
Europeanness is a question of choice, something acquired, developed or gained with 
upbringing in certain culture. Several persons did not clearly answer the question on whether 
Europeanness is inborn or chosen, limiting themselves to defining themselves vis à vis this 
concept. Some others did not choose between “birth” and “choice”, but proposed other 
considerations on this subject, often reflected in academic writing. Importantly, some of the 
interviewees emphasized the importance of making distinction between Europe as a continent 
and Europe in the context of European Union (Klara, Aleksandra).  
 Some of those who considered being European as a question of birth stressed that 
although they were not born as Europeans, their children certainly are (e.g., Ula, Maja). As 
Ula puts it:  
Well, I was not born with it [laughter]. It was a long time ago, so it’s different. I would say, my 
daughters were born Europeans, because this will be the attitude nowadays. I think we still 
learn. For us it’s not that difficult, for my generation ... We had to adjust and it was nice, 
because we know times, our parents told us how it was before, we were not Europeans, … I 
mean we were, but not like today, not mentally just on the map. I think we become Europeans, 
we learn how to be Europeans, but our children will be Europeans, I guess. (Ula) 
 
Likewise, Maja stated: “some day, people will be born with it. Perhaps they are already being 
born with it”. Furthermore, children from mixed couples were seen as even more 
“advantaged” as regards being born European. Moreover, Kamil suggested that “maybe, if 
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you are born in Brussels out of two Eurocrats, then you feel European from the very 
beginning”.  
The abovementioned responses are characterised by a conviction that “Europeanness” 
is a particular feature which one can aquire or be born with in the particular circumstances. 
Although they were not specific about the nature of these circumstances, it may be inferred 
from their statements that this is related to the integration with the Western world (Ula) or to 
the advancement of the European integration (Maja). In this context, the onset of 
“Europeanness” is seen as something natural and inevitable.   
By contrast, Maksymilian argued: “This is on the one hand something you are born 
with, but on the other hand you can also choose to abandon it and you can also choose to 
become European”. He suggested that he didn’t think that immigrants are less European than 
he is. As he explained: “if they live here and of course if they subscribe to the same core 
values as most of the Europeans.”  
The understanding of Europeanness by Maksymilian referred to a political factor 
(nationality at birth), but also to the attitude (subscription to the European “core values”). 
One of the respondents who considered that Europeanness can be chosen added further 
conditions: 
I’m waiting for the people from Mongolia, Nigeria and Morocco, as long as they will be 
committed to my identity, okay. I’m officially against all those individuals who are coming 
from outside of the EU, using economic power, work and the stuff, but they say [voice 
stylised]: “oh, my religion doesn’t allow me to agree with a rule of law in the European Union.” 
You don’t like it, leave it. Take it or leave it. And for me, this is equal, if you want to come 
here, for me it doesn’t matter what’s your race, what is your background as long as you are 
contributing, willing to offer something to Europe … . You can be whatever, but you have to 
respect. I’m against all the immigrants who are not respecting the law. (Stanislaw) 
 
Stanislaw clearly perceived the Europeanness as an attitude determined by the already 
existing culture, implicitly: autochtonous. Yet others recognized that cultures are hybrids 
(e.g., Darek), that what is now European is also a mix of other, external cultures:  
I think this means to be Greek, Italian, Pole, German, to be a person belonging to one of the 
cultures of the European countries. It does not mean, of course, that you have to, although this 
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culture of Europe, it evolves and it is difficult to identify, as it does not necessarily refer to the 
Judeo-Christian Europe, because our values evolve and, perforce, we have opened to other 
influence, especially from Africa or from India, if you look at Great Britain, or from Turkey, if 
you look at Germany. I think this is to know the culture of one of these countries, this is to be 
European. (Darek) 
 
One of the women did not know whether “being European” is something to be born 
with or chosen (Zofia). She stressed the fact she originated in a small village and was raised 
in a communist period what made it impossible to be “born European”. This opinion suggests 
that Europeanness and living under dictatorship were antithetical for her. This might mean 
that, for Zofia, one can be European only if one lives in a European – thus based on European 
values – society. She emphasized the importance of the pre-accession period, when even kids 
at school could learn a lot about the European Union. 
Ksawery felt first of all Polish, although he also felt European in parallel, exemplifying 
the concept of the “kit of identities” described for example, by Romaniszyn (2003): 
I was born Polish, and I probably will die Polish, but there is a certain concept of European 
citizenship that I can easily associate with and this concept is in me, it coexists with the concept 
of nationality or citizenship, it’s not predominant, probably it’s a kind of a bit theoretical 
structure that helps me understand how we are working together and abandoning some bad 
ideas that we had in the past, but it is really coexistent with the concept of national identity or 
citizenship. (Ksawery) 
 
Several authors emphasized the link between the intra-European mobility and feeling of 
Europeanness. Indeed, many of my interlocutors underlined the importance of leaving the 
country (Patrycja, Otylia), of moving around and seeing other cultures (Patrycja, Emilia, 
Beniamin): “It is difficult to [observe] when you are inside, but it is sufficient to leave and 
then, while meeting a fellow European in the US, you feel that you’ve met a sister soul” 
(Otylia). As Beniamin revealed:  
I think I was not born European, but I became European when I came here, … when I started 
working for the EU, when I started travelling around, going to France in one weekend and 
going to Germany in the other weekend. I felt that I’m really European, that this European 
dream came true. (Beniamin) 
 
Klara emphasized that she did not really feel European, that it was not an important 
criterion of identification for her. 
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Some pointed at the importance of comparison with the “Other” (here America, Asia, 
Africa) to feel European (Bernard, Maja, Otylia, Aleksandra). As Bernard observed:  
one feels European as opposed to other cultures - non-Europeans. Then we realize that we are 
different from them, from those other cultures and we have more in common with other 
European nations and with other civilizations. (Bernard) 
 
Some others (e.g., Filip, to a certain extent Kamil) suggested that being European is 
neither something with what one is born, nor something one can choose. As Filip suggested, 
it is rather something one can acquire with upbringing. In line with an opinion expressed by 
Filip, Kamil observed: “No, no identity is natural of course, because everything is being 
socialized to you through education and upbringing, so there is no such a thing as a natural 
identity.” Upbringing in a certain cultural area was also important to Adrian:  
[being] brought up in certain culture, in the culture which, despite a big number of atheists and 
people of other confessions, is dominated by Christian tradition, so, above all, the Greek-
Roman tradition, this for sure, especially, I would emphasize the Roman tradition, definitely 
more than the Greek one. (Adrian) 
 
4.6.3.2. European values  
Several interviewees, while expressing their opinion on whether being European is inborn or 
can be chosen, referred to European values to which one needs to subscribe if one chooses to 
be European. 
Zygmunt Bauman, while pointing at the predominance of discourse emphasizing 
diversity rather than common features of European nations (2004a:5-12), proposes to focus 
on European “values”, as “identity is more fully defined by the values Europeans cherish than 
by any other of their characteristics” (Bauman 2004a:125). Also Shore and Black stress the 
need for “common cultural heritage” involving also common values for the formation of 
identity (1994:294). 
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Inquired about the common European values, those respondents who gave meaningful 
answers210 were quite unanimous concerning the European values. The same indications were 
much more recurrent and a couple of values were mentioned by an important part of the 
respondents. Most importantly, this is the case of democracy (almost 40 percent) and freedom 
(30 percent), followed by human rights, tolerance and social cohesion/solidarity (slightly less 
than one fourth each). More than 15 percent of the respondents mentioned other values such 
as: compromise/cooperation, peace and the rule of law. Other values mentioned by several 
persons included respect for the other, unity/integration and prosperity, followed by equality, 
diversity and security. 
It should be added that the indication “freedom” encompasses “freedom” or “liberty” 
without qualifiers, as well as freedoms and liberties concerning a particular sphere of life 
(e.g., “individual liberty”, “freedom of conscience”, “freedom of expression” political 
freedoms”, “freedom of religion” or “lifestyle freedom”). For my respondents, these different 
types of freedom were sometimes seen as distinct and enumerated as different values.  
These indications are hardly surprising. Such values as “peace”, “human rights”, 
“democracy” or “rule of law” are obvious foundations of the European constitutional and 
political systems and could be hardly contested. Valorisation of “compromise and 
cooperation” must, at least to a certain extent, flow from a daily experience of those of my 
respondents who are involved or directly concerned by the EU decision taking processes. 
However, indication of “tolerance” and “solidarity” has a more noticeable political colour. 
4.6.3.3. Features all Europeans have in common: distinctiveness from the “Others” 
In addition to their understanding of European values, I found it useful to ask my research 
participants about their “self image” as Europeans. Indeed, Caporaso sees identity as “self-
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210 Six out of 50 respondents did not give any answer to this question, few gave only one or two examples of 
such values, while one person clearly misunderstood the question. 
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conception rooted in society”, placing it in a clearly relational context (“who we are” as 
compared to “the other”) (2005:66; see also Shore and Black 1994:293; Shore 1996:487-488; 
2000:63). Also Castiglione insists that that European identity requires a sense of 
distinctiveness (2009:36), while Evans-Pritchard (1940), more generally, argues that the 
identity formation involves creation and consolidation of boundaries distinguishing the 
categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Shore 2000:63). 
I asked the respondents to enumerate at least three out of the main features all 
Europeans have in common, which generally distinguish the Europeans from non-Europeans. 
A few respondents stated that Europeans have nothing in common.211 One group of responses 
focused on features related to the objective situation of Europeans, e.g., to history and its 
consequences, or material status of the Europeans‚ wealth, good standard of living. More than 
one fifth of the respondents quoted past common heritage and/or common history as the main 
distinctive feature common to all Europeans. A few research participants mentioned common 
values, common tradition, or, more specifically, Christian tradition or Greco-Roman roots. 
Another relatively numerous group referred to multi-linguism. 
An important number of respondents referred to the attachment to privileges and social 
security (more than one seventh of the total), sometimes contrasting it with the alleged lack of 
business-oriented attitude. In the same vein, several persons indicated such attitudes and 
convictions as high importance attached to private life (as opposed to work) as well as 
solidarity and egalitarianism. On the other hand, a few respondents quoted individualism and 
liberalism. More than one seventh of the respondents pointed at the attachment to human life, 
human rights and democracy, as well as to peacefulness, the latter often in the context of the 
tumultuous history of the past century. More than one sixth of the persons who answered the 
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211 Five out of 50 respondents did not answer the question. 
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question considered that a distinctive feature of the Europeans is their attachment to 
education and culture. 
A number of answers contained references to positively valued attitudes related to the 
social life, such as taste for diversity or multiculturalism, a sense of compromise and 
openness. Other characteristics quoted included interest in global issues or self-criticism.  
The query confirmed, to a certain extent, the truthfulness of the latter: some other 
attitudes identified might be read as self-criticism. Indeed, several respondents indicated at 
the sense of superiority of Europeans towards other nations, euro-centrism, but also euro-
scepticism. 
Overall, it is quite striking that the replies varied a lot and the most common answer 
was shared only by one fifth of the respondents. Thus, “feeling European” actually seems to 
mean different things to different respondents.  
As it clearly results from other questions, the Polish EU officials do feel European. 
Thus, to a certain extent, the question at stake reveals their European self-image. This image 
does not seem to be particularly influenced by their job or their specific situation. References 
to the importance of culture and education, attachment to democracy and human rights or 
taste for diversity belong to a common set of positive characteristics of the Western-European 
ideal, as presented by the pro-European cultural and political elites of Poland since early 
1990s (thus, since the question of the European integration came to the fore). The myth of the 
European quality of life, as opposed to the American cult of the work and “rats race” have 
been quite common among the young educated Poles. On the other hand, also the criticism 
does not sound genuine: complaints about European economic “socialism” and insufficient 
sense of entrepreneurship are typical clichés employed in the liberal and “free-marketeer” 
discourse, both in Poland and in the Western part of the continent. As to self-accusations of 
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Euro-centrism and sense of superiority, they have been common in the narrative of the 
Western intellectuals and the political left, especially in the post-colonial context. !
4.6.3.4. Employment in the EU institutions as a “rite de passage”: becoming more 
European since working for the EU?  
The impact of institutions on building of the European identity, both inside and outside their 
confines, has been recognized by Bellier and Wilson (2000a:17). As Shore and Black claim,  
The question has been raised by EU supporters and integration theorists of whether or not a 
supranational European-consciousness capable of transcending the ties of nationhood might 
be emerging among those bureaucrats who work in the institutions of the Community. Our 
evidence … suggests that this may be happening (Shore and Black 1994:281). 
 
 As Bellier and Wilson observe, the EU officials (of all institutions), whose “European 
life is defined by status, personal commitment or professional assignment”, are perceived as 
“the new ‘true Europeans’” (2000a:17). In particular, the authors consider the European 
Commission, with its ideology and “modes of integration”, as the “‘avant garde’ of a new 
society in the making” (Bellier and Wilson 2000a:11). 
 Benson-Rea and Shore recall the neo-functionalist “spillover” assumptions according 
to which the EU officials “drawn into the EU’s institutional milieu and webs of relations” 
progressively acquire loyalty towards the EU and its institutions (2012:480). The authors 
label it as “socialization to Europe” (2012:480). This phenomenon is also referred to by 
Bellier and Wilson who observe that those, who support the integrationist efforts of the 
European Commission, tend to strongly “believe” in European identity (2000a:7).  
However, the authors point at heterogeneity and complexity of this “identification 
idealistically undertaken for professional purposes” (Bellier and Wilson 2000a:7). 
Having these theories in mind, it is preferable to approach the issue without pre-
conceptions. In fact, the previous research was performed upon officials of different age, 
having joined the institutions in different moments and having spent there often much more 
! 401!
time than my respondents. Moreover, the studies referred to above did not focus on any 
specific nationality.!
I started by asking the question to all respondents (50) on whether they consider that 
EU officials are more European than Belgians and Poles in average. The purpose of this 
question was to find out whether they considered that their specific role infused them with 
any special sense or degree of Europeanness. Based on the data collected from 
questionnaires, it seems that the majority (over three-fifth of the entire group) of the 
respondents considered that the identity of the EU official (irrespectively from their 
nationality) is more European than it is the case of average people in Belgium or in their 
home country. Almost one fifth of the entire group affirmed the opposite. The remaining one-
fifth either did not respond to the question or admitted they did not know or did not 
understand the question.  
Certain persons added explanations for the reasons justifying a stronger European 
identity of the Eurocrats. Some explanations referred either to the ideological stance (“For 
sure, otherwise, we wouldn’t be here”; “Eurocrats are more European than others, most of 
them really believe in what they do”) or to the loyalty to the European cause developed as a 
result of dealing with the EU matters (“It is more European due to the fact of dealing with the 
‘European’ issues at work in opposition to working on national issues while in Belgium or 
other EU national administrations”; “the Eurocrats mostly operate on this dimension either at 
work or outside of work”; “Eurocrats are much more consciously involved in the European 
case and life. It’s our job and our reality”). Other respondents explained that this feature is 
due to the specific social situation of the EU officials, who “have more contacts with other 
Europeans” and “live here in a very international and multicultural atmosphere, which is not 
the case with the people in other countries”. 
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One person clearly referred to the idea that the EU officials are a pre-figuration of the 
future “European man”: “The families of Eurocrats are often the closest approximation of a 
(non-existent) European nation: usually multilingual, often mixed couples, and moving 
smoothly between various European cultures and/or blending them”. 
For some others it was a question of better knowledge of EU matters, as “people 
working for EU institutions have usually much more knowledge and understanding about EU 
policies and issues than “average people” in member states – and in many cases this 
translates into a more European identity”. On the other hand, one respondent, although 
acknowledging the fact of “having better knowledge”, did not see it as factor making the EU 
officials more European conscious: “No, they are just more involved and informed”.  
Another person explained that the “most Eurocrats keep to their national circles.” 
I went more in depth with this issue during the interviews, asking my interviewees if 
they have become more European since they joined the institutions. As a preliminary remark, 
it is worth noting that, according to Kaelbe, no more than a half of Europeans, in average, 
sees themselves as Europeans and admits any identification with Europe (2009:203). 
Moreover, this situation has not been evolving for the last 30 years (see also Kraus 2008:53-
54). Again, it is important to note that this might apply to the Poles to a much lesser extent, as 
Poland is a new member state and, as explained elsewhere in this thesis, that its accession to 
the EU was perceived as a major political and historic development, anchoring Poland in the 
West.  
During the face-to-face interviews, many interviewees admitted that working in the EU 
has increased their identification with Europe, although in numerous cases it remained 
unchanged or the opposite process took place. Certain common patterns could be identified in 
the justifications advanced. Some interviewees emphasized that they had gained better 
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understanding of the EU, its policies and its mechanisms. This additional knowledge 
sometimes made them feel more European: 
I’m definitely more in touch with European topics and that’s why in a way, yes, I’m more 
aware and more interested than if I had worked on something completely unrelated in one 
member state. (Aleksandra) 
 
Those interviewees who confirmed that they had become more European, often referred 
to the experience of representing, defending the European interest, permitting them to look at 
things from a different perspective or to identify with the European stance, often different 
from the one of their own member state, as well as a specific feeling of ownership: 
Yes, … perhaps. I know more and I am able to analyse some events from the European point of 
view and not only from the Belgian, or my own or Polish point of view. Yes, and I feel a bit 
responsible as an official, this is mine [laughter]. (Maja) 
 
I think that what must have changed in me a lot is the fact that ten hours per day basically I 
work for Europe and not for Poland. … The fact that you pursue European interests which are 
often in opposition to Polish interests ... , you perceive your home country as an external power 
in a way, which is sometimes friendly, sometimes neutral, sometimes hostile, certainly changes 
to a certain extent your perspective of your home country… And certainly, I identify myself 
much more now with the European interest and European Union than I did in the past. 
(Maksymilian) 
 
In the same vein, one interviewee mentioned that she felt a strong identification with the EU 
and her institution in situations of misunderstanding or manipulation of the “European” 
message:  
I’ve got moments when I become much more European being here, for instance when I see how 
national newspapers can misrepresent what is being done by the Commission ... So there I get a 
bit patriotic for the Commission or European purpose, just by seeing how the messages get 
misrepresented and badly presented to suit the national government. (Aleksandra) 
 
Aleksandra and Maksymilian do not only speak about the attachment to the European 
common interest, but clearly refer to the emotions they experience and attitudes they adopt 
vis-à-vis the “Other” – in this case the national instances, such as the government. 
 Among the reasons for becoming more European, some people quoted the 
multinational working environment and the opportunity to discover other European cultures: 
Because of meeting people from other countries I really like that, because it makes your work 
more interesting, you meet other cultures. (Ula) 
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Yes, definitely, because I met others, I became more knowledgeable and I know other European 
cultures better. So, in a way, yes, definitely, because of that and my horizons expanded. 
(Bernard) 
  
Yes, for sure, for sure, I mean the observations and, precisely, accommodating to the 
cooperation with the others have taught me a lot about people, about Europeans. (Otylia)  
  
It’s because of the fact that once you are here, you meet all these different people from different 
countries, you talk to them on daily basis, you go abroad on daily basis, and you really, because 
of that, you feel European. (Beniamin) 
 
However, the mere circumstance of living and working among other Europeans is, to a 
certain extent, common to the EU officials and other migrants, such as Polish workers 
migrating to Brussels which is a multinational city. In this regard, some interviewees made 
interesting precisions, suggesting that the accrued feeling of Europeanness is conditioned not 
only by the surrounding, but also by one’s position in this multinational crowd, namely the 
feeling of being equal to other Europeans, being subject to the same rights and expectations. 
On my explicit question whether, for reasons he mentioned in the statement quoted above, the 
Polish workers had also become more European, Beniamin answered:  
The higher level you have, the [higher your] social status …, the more you feel European, 
because, then you can really enjoy all these rights, which stand for being a European. 
(Beniamin) 
 
Another respondent elaborated on this point:  
Yes, I think I did [become more European since working in the EU institutions]. I’ve really 
developed this feeling of belonging to Europe because previously, either I was just a Polish 
person living in Poland, or I was a Polish person living in France. And in France, there was this 
perception of Eastern Europe … with all the stereotypes coming with this, not necessarily 
positive. So, whether I was Polish or Czech or whatever, it didn’t matter. I was just from 
Eastern Europe, almost Russia, you know, like this. Okay, it didn’t bother me too much, but I 
think here the advantage is that we are all at the same level. And even [one] Commissioner … 
said it once in an interview, while he was defending European public sector, he said that it’s so 
amazing that after just eight years after the accession of the ten new countries, all those new 
people came to work here and now you can never say, you know, who is from the old member 
states or who is from the new member states. They are just doing the same jobs and when you 
visit the offices you would never say who is from where by just looking at them or looking at 
the quality of their work. So I think working here creates really a very strong sense of 
Europeanness, definitely! (Zofia). 
 
A minority of interviewees denied having become more European since the 
employment in the EU institutions.  
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Better understanding of the functioning of the EU, quoted as a factor enhancing one’s 
European identification, was also the reason for disappointment for some:  
I think I became a little less European in a sense that I’ve understood some mechanisms that 
first of all reveal that the concepts and the values that are enshrined in the treaties and in the 
political declarations are not always shared by governments or also by the European officials of 
certain nationalities, or certain member states. So, in this sense I feel a bit less European and 
more sceptical. (Ksawery) 
 
I am a bit more sceptic because I could see how the EU institutions work from the inside, so I 
know that sometimes it’s just, you know, normal work like in any … big organizations. Same 
problems, same issues, same attitude. (Jeremi).  
 
Finally, in certain cases, better understanding produced both positive and negative results:  
Yes, I think so. I think I understand better the mechanism of functioning of Europe despite that 
I have, in certain sense, become also less [European], as from the outside, I couldn’t see what is 
wrong in it. (Laura) 
 
Some of those, who denied having become more European indicated, however, on 
some important changes that they would not (or hesitated to) qualify as increased adherence 
to Europeanness, mainly of the same nature as those quoted by the EU officials cited above, 
thus related to the increased understanding of the integration and to the intensity of contacts 
with other Europeans: 
Maybe a bit - I became more used to moving from one culture to another, but these are really 
not the cultural differences within Europe … Yeah, the cross-cultural contacts, maybe that’s the 
most important. So, for me it’s kind of natural to contact people of other European cultures and 
communicate with them and understand them, … so in this sense, I’ve became a bit more 
European-wide oriented person, but, okay, then, I don’t think that it’s any … distinction of any 
importance, it’s not important at all. (Sebastian) 
 
No, but I think it made me more conscious of the need for integration in the economic field and 
of the need for cooperation (not integration but co-operation) and co-existence, peaceful co-
existence between the nations of Europe. (Darek)  
 
Overall, if the majority of my interviewees confirmed that working in the institutions 
made them more European, the analysis of the factors they proposed as the explanation of 
this process requires caution in drawing conclusions. Indeed, if such factors as working in the 
common European interest (often against the immediate, short-term interest of their own 
country), or even better understanding of the European integration could indeed stimulate the 
European consciousness and hence identification of my respondents (this phenomenon 
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labelled as engrenage has already been abundantly described, notably by Shore (2000, 1996, 
2005, 2007)), such factors as working in the multi-cultural environment and the related 
empowerment (equal status) could enhance a general cosmopolitanism of my respondents (in 
the sense given to this term by Colic Peisker (2006)), and not necessarily specifically their 
Europeanness. On the other hand, however, these accounts go in the sense of the conclusions 
of Shore who considered that a multi-national and multi-lingual environment, combined with 
their status and privileges fuel the emergence of European identity amongst the EU officials 
(2000:140). It should also be observed that the experiences of Zofia or Beniamin seem to 
echo, on the micro-level, the description of the empowerment of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, which considered the accession as a realisation of their long-term 
aspirations and for which becoming European was, in a certain sense, a proxy for “becoming 
equal” or raising their international status (Laffan 2004:80). 
On the other hand, the “minority report” was also interesting in the sense that it 
sometimes revealed a certain disappointment with the European project.  
4.6.3.5. Relevance of the pro-European attitude for the job 
Liesbet Hooghe remarks that candidates to work in the institutions are usually supportive for 
the European institutions and what they represent (2005:869). The author considers this “self-
selection” as an important element of the selection of future EU public officials. However, 
despite a wide recognition of the effect of working for the EU on the individual feeling of 
Europeanness, most of my interviewees considered that their work does not require 
particularly strong euro-enthusiasm. Some indicated that engagement for Europe might help 
to achieve good results: 
I think it is certainly preferable that someone has a favourable attitude. If one’s attitude is 
indifferent, it would probably not change anything, if one’s attitude is negative, then probably. 
(Dominika) 
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If you don’t believe in what you are doing then … for sure, you will be a worse worker than 
another one who believes. (Ula) 
 
 In case of some persons, the answers were influenced by the nature of the specific job:  
 
In my work, there is no ideology, only pure free market principles. (Darek)  
 
I mean, specifically mine, as I am a kind of in-house lawyer in our Directorate, 99 percent of 
my contacts are with other employees of my directorate or of another Directorate, so I do not 
have such ... metaphysical dilemmas. (Maja)  
 
I’m not in contact with the member states normally. … I don’t have this kind of pre-occupation 
really. (Zofia)  
 
I think, everyone could do this, maybe because it’s a rather technical position, so the technical 
knowledge, and technical abilities are more required than knowledge about, I don’t know, 
European Law or how the European Union works. (Jeremi)  
 
Some others considered that their work could be done by anyone, or anyone with the 
necessary qualifications, irrespectively of their convictions: 
Technically speaking, I think that anybody with required qualifications in terms of education, 
or experience could do the job. (Maksymilian) 
 
Just need to be a hardworking person. It’s not a rocket science, so everybody can learn it. 
(Beniamin) 
 
 Others put the stress rather on intercultural skills, openness, ability to function in a 
multi-national environment (Zofia, Emilia). Another group of interviewees believed that EU 
officials should have a pro-European attitude, although this is not always the case in practice: 
I think there are a lot of persons who don’t know why they are here. Probably only because it 
pays some [good] money, some prestige … I’ve lived here for 20 years, I know what is the real 
impact of the Union on [people’s] life, I do not know why the Poles don’t [have a pro-European 
attitude] ... I do not see it, they do not verbalise it at all, I do not hear it among certain persons 
who are so frustrated that they do the paperwork. (Laura) 
 
I would like every Eurocrat to be pro-European, and it is not so, I know it. Many people 
actually ... have no stronger pro-Europeanness in themselves, and consider it simply as a job, 
while I would like it to be so, as this pro-Europeanness would certainly entail greater 
effectiveness, one would feel a real impact on the reality one shapes. (Adrian) 
 
Finally, an important group among my interviewees considered that a pro-European 
attitude or at least understanding of the overall purpose of the integration is indispensable in 
their job: 
Yes, my job needs … some kind of understanding of the objectives of the European Union as a 
community of countries and citizens that share certain common values and are able to mobilize 
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some resources to work together and to provide mechanisms to implement those ideas in 
reality. (Ksawery) 
 
For sure, it is required to have this pro-European attitude, because you are not allowed to favour 
your own country … you have to learn to treat every country in the same way and forget about 
the national interest. (Patrycja) 
 
That’s natural if you work in the Commission, you must have a certain sense of working for the 
good of the EU, so it doesn’t mean that you necessarily need to be EU Federalist, but at least ... 
you must know what’s the purpose of all of this. (Kamil) 
 
One needs to believe in the principles of free movement and then have liberal, I suppose, 
economic approach. (Aleksandra) 
 
The reason for such divergence of answers received may lie in the fact that most of the 
jobs in the EU institutions are at the expert level and only very few (including the managerial 
level, commonly referred to by EU officials as “the hierarchy”) are of political nature. 
Therefore, although these jobs certainly require the understanding of the objectives of the EU 
integration, they do not require particular ideological zeal. The work of assistants, human 
resources managers, IT or logistics specialists certainly requires specific expertise, but not 
even the understanding of the European integration. 
4.6.3.6. “Cogs in the wheel”: making a difference through work in the EU 
institutions? 
Several authors stress the role of the EU officials in furthering the European integration, 
referring to them as to “active agents of change” (Herrmann and Brewer 2004:15) and 
emphasizing their role in promoting their “vision of ‘European consciousness’” (Shore 
2000:1).  
Indeed, most of the interviewees had the impression that their work actually “made a 
difference”, had an impact on the reality. Again, their responses were very much dependent 
on their actual position in the EU institutions. Those who had more technical positions, 
related to the functioning of the institutions, saw their contribution in terms of a “cog in the 
wheel”: 
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It doesn’t have much to do with policy, but it has to do with all these important services for all 
the officials. … I think that making a difference for me is just making sure that this whole 
machine … is running smoothly and whenever there is a problem somewhere, we detect it very 
quickly and try to find a solution. And I think … it doesn’t make a difference for the European 
Union as such, but it just gives, how to say, the standards for the others to work, and I think it’s 
also important ... It’s not like working in the spotlights, it’s like working in the shadow, behind 
the scene. (Zofia) 
 
I do not belong to those persons telling you bullshit that work in the administration is about 
sorting papers. If I did not believe in it, I would not work here and I feel pity for these people 
who are telling you this bullshit that their work does not correspond to their education, etc.). I 
think that, at my level, I do a good job and my job, I am able to explain what it is for and what 
its impact is in the real life. (Laura) 
 
It’s hard to say that my work makes a difference because I see myself as … [a cog in a wheel] 
[laughter], because well, I am a part of a team, so I have my responsibilities, I can see how 
results of my work can influence work of my team, I can imagine, how this can influence 
outcome of my team, but, to say that, yeah, I see something that I can change the Europe, no, 
it’s definitely not this case. (Jeremi) 
 
We are little bones, or some cogs in the wheel; I hope it changes something on a long run. For 
sure. (Maja) 
 
I hope that what I do educates and enlightens our officials here, who bring some new values to 
their everyday life, what impacts, on its turn, the political life. So, I am a little “cog in the 
wheel”. Well, otherwise, I wouldn’t be able to stand this work, if I didn’t believe in it 
[laughter]. (Otylia) 
 
 By contrast, those who were more directly involved in the policies of the EU had the 
impression of having a more direct influence on the course of things:  
I see quite an immediate impact … I participated in adoption of a few decisions [thanks to 
which] … the situation of consumers improved, because they have better choice and better 
prices. But, yes, well it takes time, so it’s not immediate effect, I see effect once per year, it’s 
not like every day I go home and I know that I did something useful, I see usually after at least 
one year of work on the project. (Patrycja) 
 
I think it makes a bit of difference, because my regulations, which I draft, save lots of money 
for consumers and also save lots of money for the industry and I also protect environment … 
So I think that my work really brings something to people. I don’t build the bridges or houses, 
but I think my work contribute to the wellbeing of this planet. (Beniamin) 
 
In this DG the work is very legal, so one can hope that the laws that are produced are making it 
simpler for people to move around in the single market. (Aleksandra) 
 
I definitely think so, I think that what I’m doing contributes to the construction of the internal 
market which is at the very heart of the European integration … . Overall my work makes a 
difference in the sense that it will probably contribute to a better implementation of free 
movement of services and freedom of establishment, … and in this sense it contributes to the 
establishment of internal market and generally enhances the economic efficiency and 
contributes to the welfare of the consumer, of the European consumer. (Maksymilian) 
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I have satisfaction, when I see that this is tangible … . Nobody knows it, but I am behind it. 
(Darek) 
 
Those of my respodents who worked in DGs dealing with the functioning of the 
internal market often referred to the “European consumer” or to the “consumer welfare”. 
Their sense of the mission was strongly impregnated by the functionalist approach of the 
founding fathers of the European integration: for them, working for Europe meant: working 
towards the integration of the markets and their better functioning. This attitude mirrors the 
views reported by McDonald (2012:544) from her fieldwork in the Internal Market 
Department (DGIII) in early 1990s. This might serve as an example of how daily work and 
exposure to the ideology of a particular service shape the vision of Europe of “new” EU 
officials leading, in case of my interviewees, to similar results as in case of “old” EU officials 
in the past (unless we assume that they had all chosen the particular DG based on their prior 
understanding of priorities of the European integration).  
However, a number of interviewees put into question their capacity to influence the 
reality, drawing attention to the fact that the important decisions are taken by their 
“hierarchy” or the politicians: 
Very few because politicians who do have influence, in this case, would need to read what I 
make … for my job to have impact on something. (Filip) 
 
No, I don’t think it makes any difference. ... Because I’m just a small part in a bigger whole and 
I really don’t have any impact because decisions are made at the higher level and I just execute, 
I assist, I follow, I stay informed, but I do not make any decisions at all. (Bernard) 
 
Most of my interviewees were convinced that their work had impact on the reality, 
either indirect, by contributing to the optimal functioning of the European institutions (as the 
metaphoric “cogs in the wheel” referred to by several interviewees) or direct, by their 
contribution to legislation or policies. The satisfaction with which they talked about it makes 
clear that they believed in the beneficial effects of the institution’s actions. Those who did not 
believe in such an impact, referred to their limited capacity to influence the political level.  
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4.6.3.7. What does the European integration mean? 
As Jack Citrin and John Sides state, European integration is a process that has been furthered 
by the elites (2004:163). It is thus interesting to investigate how the European elites 
themselves understand this process.  
Ginette Verstraete observes that “physical and virtual mobility” is at the heart of the 
European integration, as one of the four freedoms proclaimed in the EU Treaties (Verstraete 
2010:4). In practical terms, the possibility to cross borders without controls has been 
introduced with the Schengen system in the 1990s. The free passage of borders was extended 
to Poland a few years after the accession. Favell qualified this freedom of movement as 
“perhaps the EU’s single greatest achievement, after the securing of peace and prosperity in 
post 2nd world war Europe” (2005:2).  
In fact, many of my interlocutors inquired about the European integration referred to 
associations with mobility – freedom to move and work in the space without borders: 
Being Polish, you can see those things more easily, because it’s kind of new to us, I mean the 
fact that you can travel without the passport. Or there are no controls on the borders, you don’t 
have to ask for visas. (Dominika) 
 
Giving people economic freedom, so enabling them to move around and benefit from the 
opportunities in other countries. (Aleksandra) 
 
For me it means that you can really freely move in Europe either to travel or to work. (Emilia) 
 
There are no borders. There are countries, but there are no borders. Meaning that you can freely 
move from one country to the other country. You can live where you want, work where you 
want and it really doesn’t matter where you come from, or where you were born. (Beniamin) 
 
Indeed, my research participants clearly belonged to a group which could clearly 
benefit from the mobility opportunities and – given their strong links with the home country – 
practiced intra-European mobility on a daily basis. They could appreciate this aspect of 
European integration even more than average inhabitatnts of Western Europe, as they were 
often born and had grown up in a closed country – as citizens of the communist Poland they 
encountered strong administrative and financial barriers to movement abroad. 
!412!
Some others emphasized the economic aspect of integration, the Internal Market and 
the coordination of the economic policies:  
For me a lot about European integration, which I value a lot, is the single market. (Aleksandra) 
 
I see it much more in economic terms. I think this is about integration of the economies … . I 
see it much more as leveling the principles of economy, so as to have a single solid territory, 
something like the United States. (Darek) 
 
Some referred to the political and international dimension of the European integration and 
expressed a conviction that it was something inevitable, resulting from globalization or 
become necessary for the European countries to keep their position in front of the growing 
economic superpowers, such as China or India: 
I do believe that European integration is absolutely necessary for the European countries … to 
count in the world today. I mean, definitely, each of European states taken separately is not 
strong enough … in economic terms to be able to … influence the way the world is being 
designed, and definitely in order to influence things in terms of … world trade. 
(Maksymilian) 
 
[It’s] a process resulting more from the globalisation, from the fact that we have a global 
village now, … and that we have new players in the international relations, such as China or 
India, which were not active before, while the role of the European countries has decreased. 
In my opinion, if Europe is to count in the World, it has to go as deep as possible. For me, this 
is a struggle maybe not to survive, but to maintain the position not only of the states, not only 
of the European economy, … but also the European culture. (Adrian) 
 
These accounts did not include any definition or even description of integration, but it 
might be understood from the context that they referred to the economic or political aspects 
of the European integration. 
Certain respondents referred to the unifying factors, such as common values (“social 
progressive ideas, protection of environment”) or common goals. Some others focused on the 
objectives or the benefits of the integration, quoting, for instance, “safety”, “freedom”, 
“peace”: 
The first benefit, and absolutely the most important type of benefits, these are political benefits 
and saying political benefits, I mean safety. Safety at the global level… (Sebastian)  
 
So it’s Europe, different countries, but without borders, and freedom. Freedom - I think, that’s 
the right word. (Beniamin) 
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My interviewees did not talk about the full integration of different European nations 
into one nation of Europeans, although they are sometimes referred to as the pre-figuration of 
such a society. A minority explicitly expressed scepticism with this regard: 
For me, the European integration as integration of identities, “unity within diversity”, I mean, I 
do not see it coming through in practice. (Klara) 
 
I do not see the [European] integration in the sense that we will all integrate, mix up with each 
other, become some kind of mutants and there will be a single European who will be an 
“integrated” European and that this will be the end, the ultimate creation of the European 
Union. (Darek) 
 
Finally, a number of interviewees described the European integration in terms of 
benefits for the Poles: either in its economic or symbolic aspect as, for instance, Stanislaw, or 
in terms of social and cultural progress: 
The happiness for my people, happiness for Poland, great opportunities, great opportunities! 
It’s not the money. It’s, first of all, opportunities that we are the members of this family where 
we wanted to belong. If I now think about these times of the Soviet Union when the communist 
propaganda wanted to say that Poles, Bulgarians and Russians are brothers. We are mentally 
not brothers, we are different. (Stanislaw) 
 
Overall, one could easily notice that all of my interviewees perceived European 
integration as something utterly positive: 
I think it brought, probably this is not a right term, some kind of civilization, progress. 
Civilization not in terms that it brought some new machines, but progress in terms of 
progressive thinking and ideas. (Kamil)  
 
[European integration means] my life. Otherwise I wouldn’t be here. … I’m quite convinced 
that this is a good way. Okay, I’m still amazed with the phenomenon, right? It never happened 
in the history. (Sebastian) 
 
The explanations of my interviewees covered a range of aspects of integration, but they 
remained quite sober and down-to earth, relating either to the much cherished (especially by 
nationals of a former mobility restricting dictatorship) possibility to travel without borders, or 
to less tangible on the individual level, but widely reported and acclaimed economic and 
political common benefits. As insiders, they are sufficiently well informed to realise that the 
melting of the European populations into one nation is not imminent and thus abstained from 
daydreaming about this remote possible outcome of an “ever closer Union”. If, indeed, they 
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are a pre-figuration of a future European nation, they seem to believe that they will remain it 
for quite a long time.  
4.6.3.8. Europeanness of Poles 
John Hutchinson suggests that the relation between the European and national identities has 
always been intimate and that many of the latter developed “alongside or in relation to a 
sense of Europeanness”, and, conversely, the concepts of the European identity are informed 
by “national views of the world” (2003:37). As Eriksen points out, “while in Western Europe, 
meticulously planned attempts at fashioning a supranational identity [we]re presented”, “in 
Eastern Europe, many citizens ha[d] clutched onto ethnic identities after the fall of the old 
regimes (1997:252). 
During the interviews, I inquired about the general perception of Poles in terms of their 
“level” of Europeanness in comparison to other Western Europeans and Belgians. Given that 
the Western Europeans may perceive the Eastern cousins through certain streotypes and, 
openly or implicitly, qualify them as “different”, the question was meant to reveal how the 
Polish EU officials perceive the population of their home country from the point of view of 
their European characteristics and identity. Moreover, being European may also mean a 
slightly different thing depending on a country. The question referred to the quality or 
intensity of Europeanness, but many of my interlocutors preferred to focus on the issue of the 
pro-European attitude. Indeed, the question, as I conceived it, presupposed the understanding 
of Europeanness in terms of certain features and values. Responding to this question required 
a similar understanding of Europeanness by the interviewee, while many of my respondents, 
as it seems to result from their answers to other questions, conceived Europeanness along 
purely political or geographical categories. This must have been the reason why it was often 
understood in terms of support for the European integration. 
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Those who understood the question as concerning the support for the integration often 
considered that Poles are more pro-European than most of the “old” European nations, for 
reasons of freshness of the outstanding opportunities brought by the enlargement, but also 
because the accession to the EU was an old dream come true. The recent date of the 
enlargement and the radical nature of the related changes permit the Poles to compare the 
situation before the accession with the present one, in the EU: 
Poles are more Euro-enthusiastic than other nations. Maybe because we’ve just joined and we 
are still receiving, we still see more positive sides of the European Union, instead of more 
negative sides. I think it depends on the age, because older people … sometimes can see the 
European Union … like the Soviet Union that it was before - something we were forced to join, 
we have nothing to do with it, we have no rights to vote, to decide about this. And younger 
people especially those who were born after 1989 or around 1989, they have grown, I would 
say, in the normal country, they see EU rather positive, because they know that thanks to the 
European Union, they can travel across the whole Europe only with their Polish ID, they can 
work in any EU country, they can call home for less than it was three or four years ago and they 
know that it is thanks to European institutions and European Law. (Jeremi) 
 
I don’t think that they are more or less European. I think they are more conscious about what it 
brings on a daily basis. (Dominika) 
 
I think … it’s a more conscious way of becoming European. Because for older countries, they 
take thing for granted, yeah. They are now in the European Union among others for a long time, 
so for them it’s not that important, it doesn’t make a difference, but for us, I think, it does. (Ula) 
 
Poles, … especially young Poles, are very European … It’s confirmed by these all statistics that 
Poles are a very European nation because we see the chances and benefits which we receive. 
(Stanislaw) 
 
Oh, this I don’t know, but I think the attitude, like being proud of being European or saying I’m 
European it goes with the situation of a … specific country in the EU at a [given] moment. So I 
think that now Polish people are more eager to say they’re European, because I think there is a 
lot of benefits because of joining to the European Union, but other countries, especially old 
member states, I think, … they still feel European, but they don’t want to say it loudly, because 
they see Europe now more as a burden and a danger for their national interests. So I think there 
is a slight difference now, especially with this financial crisis, there are countries, which want 
to feel less European or are afraid of what is going on here. (Patrycja) 
 
Such opinions were sometimes associated with a reservation that the situation is likely 
to evolve in the future and the “fatigue” typical for the people in “old” member states will 
inevitably catch up Poland as well: 
And I suppose it also depends on when one is looking at. My feeling was that as a new member 
state, we were keener and … more interested in the EU and less critical. … [T]he longer the 
country is a member, this enthusiasm fades a bit, but yes, I suppose, the spirit is probably still 
stronger in Poland definitely, than it is [for instance] in the UK. (Aleksandra) 
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We are more European than many older member states’ citizens and I feel that this is kind of 
phenomenon that exists with all the new enlargements and then of course, after a couple of 
years we understand better how it works and what is good and what is bad and then of course 
we not only strengthen our enthusiasm to the enlargement, to the concept of European 
integration, but also we find some mistakes or some drawback in this and then of course, we 
establish some kind of relationship that is far less enthusiastic than at the beginning. (Ksawery) 
 
Finally, some of the interviewees denied the existence of differences in the attitude 
towards the EU based on nationality, attributing it to other parameters, such as age, level of 
education or other circumstances: 
I think it depends not on the country one lives in, but rather on the level of education and on the 
environment you descend from. The more educated people are, the more pro-European they 
are. (Maja) 
 
It’s really hard to say, because I thought that maybe okay, we still have a lot to catch up as 
Poles but looking at, or listening to some people now or reading about people in different 
countries, I think it’s so individual that it is really hard to say or, yeah, that in one part of 
Europe the attitude is different than in the other. So I think it can be really a small place in Italy, 
where people … don’t really feel Europeans and [it] can be a city in Poland where yes, people 
will feel Europeans. It depends on the age, on many other things, so I don’t think there could be 
a pattern like that. (Emilia) 
 
Some of those who (probably) understood the question as referring to some cultural 
features, tended to claim that Poles are as European as people in other member states. This 
was the opinion of Beniamin, Bernard and Filip. Filip added: 
The question is whether [they are European] in the same manner. Perhaps differently, but 
neither more nor less. … Every nation has its specificity, but cultural attachment to the ideas, 
even if someone does not call oneself “European”, but has the same ideas ... so, I would say, 
neither more or less, [but rather] to the similar extent. (Filip) 
 
Some others, interestingly, put into question the suggested comparison, either pointing 
at particularly and outstandingly European features of Belgians, or indirectly putting into 
question the the notion of Europeanness: 
The Belgians are not a good example. The Belgians are an amalgamate (Otylia) 
 
No, … Belgians are outstandingly European, for the reason that the institutions are here, but 
also for the reason that they are ethnically diverse, what, in Poland, is not the case, for good or 
for bad, hard to say. There is no ethnic diversity. So, the Belgians are, after the 
Luxembourgians, probably the most European. (Adrian) 
 
For instance, are British really very European? I think that’s really an example of a country that 
has never found its place between Europe and the US and somehow they are proud of feeling, 
you know, so different and unique and when you ask a British person, I’m not sure if they will 
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say spontaneously that they are European. When you ask a Polish person, I think they would be 
proud to say this. (Zofia) 
 
This is a very interesting topic, for example, I look at it through the prism of what my husband 
thinks about it … It is interesting, for instance, that the Greeks do not consider themselves 
European. They always say: “you, the Europeans”, they consider that they belong to the 
Balkans, and they always speak about the Western Europe, perhaps not in the negative terms, 
but as about something distinct, so there is a row already here. We do not realise it ... Of course, 
we’ve always been behind the Iron Curtain, for us, the Western Europe has always been one 
entity, and suddenly it turns out that the Southern countries, they identify themselves with the 
Mediterranean Basin, they identify themselves with the Balkans and they absolutely do not 
identify themselves with the Western Europe. Belgium, France, Netherlands. For them this is a 
completely different world and a different mentality that they do not understand. … From this 
perspective, I think we are different as well, as the Poles have much in common with the East 
and there is some Slavic spirit that distinguishes us from this “Western Europe”, but, warning! 
In this Western Europe, let us not count, e.g., the Mediterranean countries. (Klara) 
 
The idea that there may actually exist different “Europes” was not isolated. Darek 
acknowledged that  
the Poles are obviously on the border of Europe which belongs to the culture which was subject 
to the influence of Vatican, which is Catholicism, or, later, Protestantism, Evangelisms, we 
belong to the part of Europe which neighbours the Europe influenced by the old Byzantium, 
Constantinople, where [there is] a slightly different culture, in Russia, and we are somehow 
within the borderland of this other Europe. This is also Europe, but it is slightly different – 
where there were other influences - Tartar invasions and those of various Mongol tribes – and 
we are a bit different because of it, as we know something else, a bit different culture, but this 
does not contradict the first part of my response, as the way we are, with these Tartar or 
Russian elements which are familiar to us ... , this is our Europeanness which is the component 
of a larger European culture. (Darek) 
 
This idea of a “decentralized” Europe of different cultural circles differs from another 
vision of Polish Europeanness presented by one of my respondents, namely the one shaped 
by the “center-periphery” relations. Maksymilian explained:  
Historically speaking, I think that Belgium contributed more to coining these [European] values 
than Poland and in this sense we’ve always been a bit peripheral, whereas Belgium, Germany, 
France or Italy, were in the very heart of Europe and they were producing, you know, 
Europeaness if I can say, that we were subsequently adopting. On the other hand, even today 
the ideas are born and are disseminated first in Western Europe, and Central and Eastern 
Europe; in a way, we just adopt it. So, in that sense, I think that we still are peripheral and 
maybe we adopt these values, we take up the trends born in the West, but in the same time, it 
takes more time than in Western Europe and … , well, to put things bluntly, there are certain 
European values to which, I’m afraid, an important part of my compatriots  do not subscribe, so 
in this sense you can say that Poles and other Eastern Europeans are little bit less European than 
Western Europeans. … For example, tolerance. I think that Poland is still a country where you 
can be persecuted for your sexual orientation, the colour of your skin or your religion. I mean, 
for the religion, I’m afraid that in the West they also have a problem with this, but I think that 
there is much more racism and homophobia in Poland than in France, or especially in such 
countries as the Netherlands or Belgium. (Maksymilian) 
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The question revealed a practical problem related to the plurality of meanings of the 
word “European”. If, in other questions, the word seemed to be understood in the same way, 
probably thanks to a clearer context, the question on the Europeanness of the Poles was 
understood in several manners, revealing probably the most intuitive understanding of the 
notion by my interlocutors. The first group responded according to the political 
understanding of the term, usually claiming that Poles were more supportive to the EU and 
the European integration. The reasons for this (unintended) understanding could also be the 
imprint of my respondents’ despair face to the growing Euroscepticism that they already 
witnessed in that period. This might have directed their attention to Europeanness understood 
as support for the European integration. On the other hand, they spent most of their time 
surrounded by fellow EU officials and expatriates, including Poles. This environment could 
present sufficient uniformity to make the question of cultural differences rather abstract. 
However, another part of the interviewees understood the question as referring to the 
cultural features, mostly claiming that the level or the type of Europeanness is the same or 
similar in Poland and in Belgium, although dissenting voices indicated to certain differences 
due to the historic cultural influences from the East and the South. Finally, certain persons 
understood the Europeanness in terms of European values governing the society and referred 
to the Polish backwardness and peripherality. 
4.6.4. Conclusions on Polishness and Europeanness 
The question of the identity of my research participants concerns not only their declared 
attachments to Polishness or Europeanness, but also the perceived relation of these 
identifications to their work with the EU institutions and the actual meaning of “Polishness” 
and “Europeanness”, as they refer to it.  
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The map of attachments of Polish EU officials looks quite complex in the light of my 
research. What is most striking is the very clear majority attaching primary importance both 
to being Polish and being European. The professional identification (being Eurocrat) was 
slightly less often declared, perhaps due to the negative connotations related with this label. 
Even Slavic identification, strengthening the “ethnic” side of identity, seems to correlate with 
the attachment to Europeanness and does not appear a rival to the latter. The responses of my 
research participants confirm they do have several identifications, something that 
Romaniszyn (2003) referred to as “a kit of identities”.  
The understanding of Polishness by my research participants can be analysed against 
the distinction between ethnic and political (Western) nationalism, drawn by Smith (1981). 
Polishness is most often understood as determined by culture, language, and tradition. Some 
of my respondents even referred to the “blood” criterion, while only a limited number 
referred to the relation with the State. This seems to confirm the views of Marody (2003) and 
Kociuba (2009), who have claimed that Polishness is predominantly ethnic, as there was no 
time in the past to develop stronger links with the State (which historically was rarely 
perceived as a Polish State). However, the founding myths and symbols referred to by my 
interviewees were rather inclusive, often related to the recent history of the fight for freedom 
and democracy, and usually with clear reference to the European vocation of Poles. 
Importantly, the “fight for freedom” myth does not bear redemptory and victimising 
“messianic” features (Koczanowicz 2008). This should not be surprising considering that, as 
emphasised by Janion (2007) or Davies (2001), belonging to the West (as opposed to the East 
which is represented mostly by Russia) has always been an important element of Polish 
identity. At the same time, the responses of my research participants do not bear any 
particular resentment towards western Europeans, as observed and described by Janion 
(2007) and Pogonowska (2002). Also, their self-perception as Poles seems to be, in general, 
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rather sober, suggesting the lack of excessive complexes, but also the absence of an 
idealization of the Polish people. Therefore, the identification of Polish EU officials does not 
seem to be affected by any stronger feeling of inferiority, such as observed by Janion (2007) 
and Sztompka (2004). This does not exclude a possible idealisation of the West at the 
moment of arrival.  
Most of my research participants also feel European. The hierarchy between these two 
identifications was often difficult to establish, as many interviewees declared that it changes 
depending on a situation. This confirms the view according to which identity is fluid and 
negotiable, continuously re-defined (Eriksen 2010; Easthope 2009; Bauman 1996, 2004b). 
Constantly fluctuating self-ascriptions seem to present a strongly relational character: not 
surprisingly, situations involving non-European “others” were the ones during which the 
European identification was most strongly felt (such views were expressed notably by Bellier 
and Wilson 2000a and by Borneman and Fowler 1997). However, my research does not 
provide evidence for a constant tension between the national and supranational 
identifications, as observed by Bellier (1993, 2000a, 2002). Such tension is probably more 
likely to appear in a strict work context, which was outside the scope of my research. 
The aforementioned plurality and fluidity of the Polish EU officials’ identifications 
can be partly explained by the factors which may concern everybody living in a multicultural 
society and being exposed to globalisation: as Delanty and Rumford point out, “the nation 
state is no longer the primary reference for … identities” (2005:88). Eriksen (1997) saw 
hybridisation as a phenomenon particularly concerning Western Europe. Would a Polish EU 
official have more identities than an ordinary urban European? This is difficult to verify 
without doing similar research on a control group, but many testimonies of my respondents 
seemed to confirm the findings of Bellier (2000a) and Shore and Black (1994) on the 
Europeanism of EU officials: most of my interviewees have become more European since 
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they joined the EU civil service. The reasons quoted were quite diverse, including everyday 
contact with fellow Europeans from different cultures, what led to their empowerment, and 
what could contribute to the emergence of some kind of European cosmopolitanism. Many of 
the explanations refer to their professional identification: a professional focus on EU matters, 
a better understanding of the Union and its policies. Even though my interviewees thought 
that their profession did not require particular Europeanizing zeal and could be done by 
anybody with the required skills, it is important to note in this context that many of them had 
the impression of actually contributing to the realisation of the European project, with a 
metaphor of “cogs in the wheel” being particularly recurrent. This “feeling of ownership” 
indicates deep involvement in European affairs. 
Moreover, the research led to two interesting conclusions. Firstly, most of the 
research participants considered Europeanness as something acquired, chosen, and not 
inborn. This seems to suggest that, unlike Polishness, Europeanness is considered more as a 
political attachment, with a dominant “civic” rather than cultural aspect of identity, in line 
with the arguments of Bruter (2004b) and Citrin and Sides (2004). This will be further 
confirmed by responses to other questions.  
Furthermore, given that national identities rely on myths of origin and a particular 
interpretation of history (Hutchinson 2003), I tried to identify the “historical myths of 
continuity” (Vermeulen and Govers 1996) that were shaping the Polishness of my research 
participants. In many cases, these symbols and myths which related to their Polishness (the 
most important events in the Polish history, the most significant historical figures) were 
somehow related to the Polish road to joining Europe and the European Union. The symbols 
mentioned by my participants often related to recent history and notably to the Polish journey 
to inclusion in the West (understood not only as the EU, but more generally as liberal 
democracy and freedom). This mainly belongs to what Zubrzycki (2001) qualified as a 
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“distinctively Polish civic narrative”, emphasizing the link with European culture and history, 
with reference to constitutionalism, the fight for “our freedom and yours”, and religious 
tolerance. It might therefore be concluded that the main elements determining the Polishness 
of my research participants were also those confirming the European vocation of the nation. 
If Polishness is predominantly “cultural”, what is “civic” in it is precisely the European 
vocation, the germs of Europeanness. This seems to suggest an answer to the question of the 
relation between the two identifications in light of the classification of Risse (2004): 
Europeanness appears as the essential part of the variant of Polishness characterizing my 
interviewees, as if it was nested therein. This is also in line with Delanty and Rumford, who 
claim that “both European identity and national identity are embroiled in each other” 
(2005:54). 
By contrast, it may be a starting point to nuancing the view of Eriksen (1997) who 
opposed the strong ethnic identity of Eastern Europeans to increasingly supranational 
Western-European identities. Góra and Mach, in the same vein, opposed the ethnic concept 
of the nation - exclusive, conservative, family and religion oriented, and “oriented to the 
past” to a more “open to further changes”, inclusive, civic model, claiming that the first is 
counter-productive as regards European integration (2010:17). However, “ethnic” identity 
does not need to be “hostile” and intolerant towards other possible identifications. The 
understanding of Polishness based on “cultural” and “ethnic” features is accompanied, in the 
case of Polish EU officials, by a “civic” element which is very Europeanizing in nature: their 
founding myths and historical references confirming the eternal “Western” destiny of the 
nation. This corresponds to the distinction between a “private” and “semi-private sphere”, 
where ethnic and cultural Polishness takes over, and a “public” sphere, where the civic aspect 
of their identification implies Europeanness. Thus, as such, its “ethnic” Polish identity does 
not seem to exclude the emergence of a supranational, European identity. This might be even 
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more plausible if we understand it as a sort of “meta-identity”, as proposed by Risse, who 
argued that the European and national propositions are not zero-sum propositions (2004:260). 
However, the characterization of Europeanness by my research participants proved to 
be a somewhat laborious exercise. They largely differed in the features they considered 
common for all Europeans, their distinctive features. They were more in line with each other 
as concerns European values, although the catalogue quoted was rather a standard set of 
values to be found in political declarations and legal documents. 
This picture largely confirms the previous findings in this chapter. Indeed, a growing 
cultural diversity may be at the origin of the lack of a cultural basis for the European 
identification (Castells 2010 [1998]). Reference to common values of a clearly political 
nature confirms the “civic” nature of the Polish EU officials’ European identification. 
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Chapter 5. General conclusions: “Europlanet”?  
 
The analysis of the results of my research suggests that the response to my first research 
question, concerning the adaptation and social life of the Polish EU officials in Brussels, 
must be more nuanced than the conclusion drawn after my first research (Rozanska 2009). 
The situation during the first years after their arrival in Brussels was relatively 
straightforward: the results strongly suggested the image of a bounded community of EU 
Polish officials, not yet fully acquainted either with Brussels or with Belgian society or even 
with the community of the “old member states” EU officials. As a result, they socialised 
intensively among themselves, quickly building community institutions (such as the “EPS” 
mailing list or the monthly “Old Oak”/ “Wild Geese” meetings) and strong and extensive 
social networks. A few years later, the situation has become much more complex.  
Before reflecting on the outcomes of my research as regards the integration of Polish 
EU officials in Brussels, I will briefly note the characteristics of the incoming group and of 
the host population, as perceived by the participants in my research.  
The reason for the arrival of Polish EU officials in Belgium was not to join their 
compatriots in the quest for the means of subsistence. They have come in order to take up a 
specific job and could not care less about the fact it is located in Belgium. This, as well as 
their professional and material status and their lifestyle, allow us to qualify them as high-
skilled foreigners, but they constitute a distinct group from the Brussels expatriates. Indeed, 
they have arrived with a clear intention to stay at least for some time, even if many of them 
do not exclude the possibility of further mobility in the future.  
Since the host population is heterogenous, the question arises of what the actual 
“target” of any integration/adaptation might be. Eriksen (2007) referred to the possibility of 
integration with the society or with the (ethnic) community (Gesellschaft or Gemeinschaft). 
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However, in the case of Brussels, the local population is even more diverse, as it covers not 
only Belgians (who are considered by my respondents and interviewees to be the host 
society), but also other EU officials, expats, and other groups of Poles, as well as other ethnic 
communities distinct from the main French- and Dutch- speaking population. Of course, this 
is a typology rather than classification and these categories may also overlap (e.g., Belgians 
working in the EU) and the lines of distinction between them may be blurred.212 However, 
these nuances, although important, do not seem to be essential for my analysis and my 
research participants do not seem to have taken them into account in their responses.  
As could be anticipated, the research has shown the existence of certain dominant 
patterns, but has left the picture very much blurred. Indeed, the Polish EU officials are not a 
fully homogenous group as regards their attitude to integration in Brussels. Certain fractions 
of the researched Polish EU officials were more open to integration to the host society than 
others and their perception of the attitude of the locals also varied significantly. Similarly, 
their relations with their own community (which can be assumed to exist) varied to a large 
extent, ranging from intensive socialisation within the Polish “EU bubble” to loose contacts 
with one or several circles of friends and acquaintances, existing in parallel to other circles 
involving other Eurocrats and expats. The analysis along the lines of the complexity approach 
proposed by Eriksen (2007) can give a hint as to how different factors influenced and shaped 
the models of these multiple relations.  
Eriksen (2007) remarks that groups exist from a certain point of view, based on 
certain criteria. My research participants perceive themselves in terms of belonging to an 
ethnic group (Polish), as well as to the corpus of the EU civil service. At the same time, 
depending on the situation, they may expect to be categorised by other people as Poles, 
Eastern Europeans, EU officials, or expats. They certainly see themselves as a community, 
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212 For example, there may be Italians who are expatriates and those born in Belgium, belonging to an ethnic 
community and feeling both Belgian and Italian, yet both may feel they belong to the same community. 
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but they are conscious that they are not perceived as such by Belgian society, for whom they 
belong to a larger Polish community (which, from their own perspective, does not exist) or 
are amalgamated to and stigmatised as EU officials.  
The sense of belonging to the community of Polish EU officials is certainly partly 
based on the ethnic element. After all, most of my research participants participated in 
different forms of community life reserved for Polish people, such as monthly meetings or 
the Polish mailing list. However, two other factors, which are at least equally important, are, 
in my view, related to their status as highly skilled foreigners and the community of interest 
and experience related to their employment in the EU institutions. At the same time, as 
reminded by Blackshaw, today, communities are not “absolutist” any more and do not “make 
a total claim on the individual” (2010:23). Also, in this case, the sense of belonging to the 
Polish EU officials’ community (which could be deduced from the majority of participants’ 
accounts) does not determine their social contacts, circles of friends, and acquaintances and it 
is far from being for them “the world in miniature” (Blackshaw 2010:23, emphasis in 
original). At the same time, they clearly feel part of a larger community of EU officials.  
5.1. Boundaries or “criteria of exclusion and inclusion” 
The role of boundaries is paramount in community building (or imagining) by the Polish EU 
officials. This phenomenon (boundary construction and submission to boundaries in the 
expatriate world) has been abundantly described in the literature on expats, both in culturally 
distant contexts (see e.g., Fechter 2007a, 2007b; Butcher 2009; Beaverstock 2002, 2011; 
Farrer 2010; Leonard 2010a, 2010b) and in the Western context (see e.g., Favell 2001a, 
2008a; Gatti 2009; Beaverstock 2005). Despite all the differences (not least including power 
relations) between the situation of expats in Indonesia, as described by Fechter (2007a, 
2007b), and the situation of Polish EU officials in Brussels, certain – at least superficial – 
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similarities are striking. If European expats consciously build boundaries separating them 
from the local people, who are perceived as culturally and socially different, in order to 
emphasize their high status (see e.g., E. Cohen 1977), the Polish Eurocrats are also separated 
by boundaries that they construct. However, the case of Polish EU officials in Brussels 
presents interesting specificities.  
Firstly, Polish EU officials clearly maintain a boundary separating themselves from 
the majority of Polish people in Brussels. This is related not only to the cultural (lifestyle), 
social (class), and professional differences between the two groups (or even communities, 
since my respondents often emphasized the high level of functional organisation of the 
population of Polish economic migrants in Brussels). Based on several accounts both during 
this research and the previous one, I have suspected that the Polish EU officials, even if they 
often praise the industriousness and professional reliability of Polish cleaners, construction 
workers, or plumbers, fear that they might be amalgamated by Belgians (or other EU officials 
and expatriates) with this category of Poles, consigned (as documented by Siewiera 1995; 
Grzymała-Kazłowska 2001b, 2005; Kuźma 2010, 2012-2013, 2013; Leman 1997; 
Paspalanova 2006) to a relatively low social status and considered (as one of my research 
participants put it) “uncultured”. Therefore, building a boundary is crucial for the affirmation 
of their different, higher status. This might recall the interpretation of E. Cohen (1977) who 
claimed that the expats maintained boundaries in order to preserve their privileged status. 
However, in the case of Polish highly-skilled movers in Brussels, these boundaries are aimed 
at separation from a minority group, another category of foreigners (and not the host society), 
and they are instrumental for the affirmation of the status vis-à-vis the local population and 
other expats. 
This phenomenon cannot be considered unusual and remains in line with the existing 
literature. Notably, Amit remarks that “geographic mobility does not override and may even 
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exaggerate status distinctions of class, gender, nationality, or race” (2007:10), while Salazar 
notes that accrued mobility related to globalisation comes together with boundaries based on 
“social class, gender, age, lifestyle, ethnicity, nationality, and disability” (2013:60). My study 
constitutes a good illustration of this phenomenon, as there are clearly at least two different 
communities, internally organised, relatively populous, and made distinct by their 
professional status and social class. It can be argued that the boundary drawn by the Polish 
EU officials to separate them from the other Poles plays a significant role in the very 
definition of their community. 
Drawing boundaries between the Polish EU officials and Polish economic migrants is 
not only useful but indeed easy. In the narratives of some of my research participants, the 
“Siemiatycze” people are described as a very different genre, with distinctive behaviour, 
interests, lifestyle, mentality. It would be much more difficult to find “index features” (Nash 
1989) permitting to draw a boundary between Polish EU officials and Polish highly skilled 
mobile professionals from outside the institutions. Indeed, the aforementioned exclusionary 
practices do not concern the latter group, although, at least in certain situations, they are 
occasionally reminded of their non-institutions status (as they are not informed of certain 
events or cannot fully participate in work-centered converstaions). However, as they are not 
holders of the primordial stigma, EU officials have no interest in emphasizing their 
distinctiveness. 
Another important boundary is the one drawn between Polish EU officials and 
Belgians. The obsessive “pestering” about Belgium, Belgian institutions, and Belgian 
“mentality” may – to a certain extent – correspond to the actual emotions and judgments of 
my respondents and interviewees. Having moved from Warsaw to Brussels, I had very 
similar opinions on the quality of services in Brussels (usually of much lower quality than on 
the very competitive Polish market). However, the ritual, total, and very much exaggerated 
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character of this criticism (which sometimes resembled my own spontaneous reactions or 
those of my friends) seemed completely disproportionate and – in my view – played the role 
of a vocal boundary marker. Indeed, recurrent criticism of the local order is a prominent part 
of the conversations of expatriates and EU officials in Brussels and seems to stand for an 
important element of “us-them” narrative building. It confirms belonging to the privileged, 
globally mobile class of high-skilled professionals on the one hand and to the community of 
EU officials on the other. Furthermore, boundary building by the Polish Eurocrat community 
seems to serve yet another purpose – it is being done as an act of their empowerment as 
Poles, a reaction to the boundaries imposed by Belgians. Therefore, it also facilitates the 
rebuttal of the anticipated negative stereotyping by the Belgian society (i.e. as being 
“uncultured” Eastern Europeans from a poor and underdeveloped country).213 Indeed, the 
apparent criticism of the local reality and the indifference manifested towards the local 
people are associated with even higher boundaries being imposed (at least in the perception 
of my respondents) by the host society. Building their own boundary based on ritual verbal 
rejection of the ways of the host society both protects them from the lower status associated 
with stereotypes about Poles and encloses them in the preferred, empowering category of 
Eurocrats.  
This phenomenon can be best observed in the example of Poles living in Belgium 
before Poland’s accession to the EU and their consequent employment in the institutions. 
Before the enlargement they had to submit to the boundaries imposed on them by the local 
society, boundaries which they tried, in vain, to cross or level. As EU officials, however, they 
enjoy a more elevated status which permits them to “strike back” and impose their own 
boundaries which perform a double function: to separate them from the host community 
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213 The anticipation of stereotypes does not necessarily imply the anticipation of a negative attitude (only a 
minority of my research participants expected negative attitude of Belgians to Poles). During my previous 
research, Polish EU officials sometimes referred to frequent cases of amalgamation with the low-skilled Polish 
workforce (“we are a country of cleaning ladies and construction workers”). Obviously, this is not how the 
Polish EU officials see themselves. 
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which rejected them in the past and to cement their accession to the community of EU 
officials or expats, privileged movers who do not need to exist at the margins of the local 
society but can afford an independent status “in a different dimension”. From this 
perspective, further research on the actual perception of Polish EU officials by EU officials of 
other nationalities could usefully complement my findings. 
Although the aforementioned mechanisms of boundary making seem to apply to most 
of the researched Polish EU officials, the case of those interviewees who had lived in 
Belgium before joining the EU institutions appears particularly interesting. Indeed, their 
accounts illustrate the situation where members of migrant communities enjoying a relatively 
low status in the host society are presented with an opportunity of “upgrading” their status. 
This requires a different approach to boundary making (based on different diacritical 
features), liberates them from any integrative pressure and implies a totally different relation 
with the host society. This aspect of the use of boundaries for community making has not 
been explored in the literature. Such cases might be further explored with a more tailored set 
of questions and with a wider group of research participants who had previously been living 
in Belgium. Such future research (ideally completed with the accounts of the other side, the 
host society) might provide interesting information, notably about the process of altering the 
power relations between the minority and majority groups in the context of migration and 
mobility. 
The aforementioned elements allow us to answer the question evoked by Eriksen 
regarding “criteria of exclusion and inclusion in a group” (2007:1060) and to better 
understand the initial conditions for any form of integration of Polish EU officials into the 
plural society of Brussels. From this perspective, it appears understandable that Polish EU 
officials perceive integration with the larger society (Gesellschaft) as useless given that the 
conditions of such integration would appear unfavorable. Indeed, the majority of their 
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accounts confirm that they considered such integration unnecessary. Following the same 
reasoning, they have absolutely no interest in integration with the ethnic Polish population of 
Brussels. However, they might be interested in becoming a part of another Gemeinschaft, 
notably of the EU officials in Brussels. Indeed, responses to several questions suggest that 
my research participants perceived EU officials as a single tribe and that they had developed 
a strong professional identification. At the same time, most of them do not anticipate negative 
stereotyping (based on their ethnicity or nationality) from their colleagues. Again, further 
research could usefully focus on the dynamics of integration within the community of EU 
officials based on accounts of other EU official (and not only on the perception of Polish EU 
civil servants).  
This seems to be a major difference compared to the examples provided by Eriksen 
(2007). Pakistanis in Norway, Maghrebians in France, or Turks in Germany are all examples 
of ethnic minorities faced with choices (or coercion) to integrate into a “larger society” or a 
dominant culture. In the case of Brussels, Belgians are much less visible from the perspective 
of EU officials, as their respective worlds hardly ever intersect. Still, asked about “the local” 
my interviewees and respondents intuitively referred to Belgians, but their presence is more 
symbolic than real. Certainly, one might argue that this is also the case for any ethnic 
immigrants strongly embedded in their ethnic communities in other cities. But, writing about 
Brussels, Favell (2001a, 2003b, 2008a) has emphasized the specificity of Brussels in this 
respect, drawing attention to the absence of integrative pressure, partly due to the absence of 
the real dominant culture. EU officials (or other expats), unlike ethnic minorities, do not even 
belong to the local labour market and have less to do with Belgian administration (e.g., they 
do not need to declare their earnings and many official contacts with administration pass via 
dedicated services of their institution). This situation can be compared to the renting of a flat 
in a block of flats. A tenant is aware of the fact that the flat belongs to a landlord, but the 
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contact with the landlord – if such is the tenant’s choice – is incidental. As years pass, the flat 
becomes a familiar space, the tenant starts to feel at home, identifies it as his place. At the 
same time, the tenant does not need to care about reparations or refurbishment, as this is the 
landlord’s task. Landlords and tenants can become friends, but this is by no means expected 
or considered natural by any of the parties. Staying within this housing metaphor, one might 
compare ethnic minorities to a fille au pair or a distant nephew living with a family. They 
also keep their autonomy and can – to a certain extent - choose how much they want to be 
involved in the household’s life. But some interaction is inevitable and its intensity also 
depends on the expectations of the family. They may live a relatively independent life in their 
boudoir, or, on the contrary, end up as a full member of the family.  
5.2. Social integration 
These general orientations are not mutually exclusive with the eagerness to participate, to a 
certain extent, in the social or political life of the local population which many of the Polish 
EU officials declared. Their model of integration broadly corresponds to what Favell (2001a, 
2008a) has referred to as “integration into the city”. At the same time, many of them strongly 
criticise Brussels and see the advantages of living in the city mainly in its multicultural 
character and proximity to other, more attractive destinations.  
As even Favell et al. (2007) admit, the situation of people integrated into a parallel 
reality of international, multicultural Brussels is not ideal. Despite comfortable living and 
working conditions, EU officials remain strangers in the city and hence remain, as inhabitants 
of Brussels, relatively powerless and fragile as they have no influence on (e.g.,) decisions 
concerning the urban space around them. Contacts with Belgians are difficult – most of the 
research participants who have ever tried confirmed this. Life in “another dimension” has its 
limits – they can adapt and prosper in the local reality, but cannot influence it. Indeed, in 
spite of having developed different forms of participation in the life of the capital and 
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following the events of public life in Belgium, many of them show indifference towards 
public matters concerning their immediate surroundings. Also, only a very small minority of 
my interviewees declared that they had voted in local elections. Polish EU officials perceive 
the living conditions in the city as a completely external factor, something they cannot 
influence in any way, much as they cannot stop the rain. They seem to exemplify the negative 
aspects of “integration à la carte”, mentioned by Favell et al. (2007).  
If Polish EU officials are not particularly interested in any form of deeper integration 
into Belgian society, it is also because they do not perceive Brussels as fully Belgian– “this is 
the city of expats”, as one of them said, after all. This is why they see absolutely no need to 
penetrate local networks or to participate in decision making on important matters concerning 
their neighbours. Indeed, the international character of the city makes it less necessary and 
more difficult to integrate into the Belgian society as such. 
It can be presumed that more ample involvement in public life – such as voting or 
activity in local associations or non-governmental organisations – might accelerate the 
disappearance of old stereotypes (about Poles) and new stereotypes (about Eurocrats) on the 
Belgian side of the boundary and help the Polish EU officials fully participate in city life. 
After all, it is paradoxical to see that even in such a cosmopolitan city as Brussels, the pre-
figuration of the future European nation lives in a bounded community, largely ignoring the 
public life and jealously protecting its “tribal” distinctiveness.  
For the time being, however, there is not only little appetite for such deeper social 
integration on the part of the host society, but also no palpable pressure to do so or, indeed, 
even readiness to accept such attempts. The link between the negative sides of living in 
Brussels and inadequate influence on public life was mentioned by only a few of my 
interviewees. The accounts of many of my informants suggested perfect indifference towards 
the society living a parallel life in the same city. Therefore, referring to the analysis by 
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Eriksen (2007), this “model” appears to be chosen and not “imposed” from the perspective of 
the researched group.  
However, some of my interviewees made an effort to vote or participate in the 
associative life. Further research could focus specifically on such pre-selected individuals and 
compare them to another group following more typical patterns of social integration. Such 
research could elucidate the reasons why certain EU officials decide to engage more than 
others and the consequences of such involvement for their functioning in the host society. Do 
they manage to penetrate Belgian social networks? Do they disengage, with time, from the 
international environment?  
It should be specified that the aforementioned ritual rejection of “Belgianness” for 
boundary building reasons has a purely symbolic character – the Polish EU officials would 
certainly have nothing against incidental participation in Belgian “activities ... and 
institutions”, as Eriksen has defined social integration (2007:1062). They simply do not feel 
the need for this and they do not think they would be welcome. Thus, they choose not to 
make any effort to this effect, rather than deliberately choosing to stay apart, as may be the 
case of certain minority elites mentioned by Eriksen (2007). 
On the other hand, as was mentioned before, Polish EU officials perceive fellow 
Eurocrats largely as belonging to the same “tribe” as themselves. According to Suvarierol 
(2007, 2008, 2009, 2011; see also Shore 2000; Abélès 2004), outside work, Eurocrats avoid a 
multi-national environment, joining “national” clubs and networks. This is not the case of 
Polish EU officials. Even if they still count many compatriots among their friends – usually 
other EU officials or expats – they also maintain intensive social contacts with other 
expatriates and EU officials of other nationalities. It is important to note that the dated 
suggestions of Spohn and Triandafyllidou (2003) concerning the reluctance of “old” member 
states’ nationals to accept Eastern Europeans and the recent findings of Ban (2013) 
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concerning divisions between Eastern and Western European Eurocrats do not find 
confirmation in the perception of the Polish EU officials I researched. Indeed, the closeness 
due to intensive socialisation at work, common tangible interests and work-induced similar 
ways of thinking – the elements of the much-researched phenomenon of engrenage (Shore 
1996, 2000, 2005, 2007) – make such divisions improbable. As I mentioned before, my 
research participants intuitively considered other EU officials to be a homogenous category, 
seeing in them their fellow Eurocrats more than persons of any specific nationality. Further 
research might reveal whether other EU officials share this view.  
Based on the above, it seems that the social integration of Polish EU officials is 
targeted mainly at other EU officials or expats, not necessarily of Polish origin. 
5.3. Cultural integration 
Much of what my research participants referred to as “adaptation” – the ability to function 
smoothly in a host society – can be interpreted as what Eriksen meant while referring to 
“cultural integration” (the existence of “shared references” and “mutual intelligibility”) 
(2007:1062). Most of my research participants found such adaptation easy or unnecessary. 
Indeed, on the one hand, they perceive Brussels as a place “without local culture”, 
emphasizing the international, pluricultural character of the city. On the other, however, as 
Europeans, they would not feel any need to undertake any specific adaptation effort, as the 
common European cultural background is sufficient to function smoothly in the city.  
Those who considered adaptation problematic referred to language as the major 
problem. However, many of my research participants have learnt at least one of the official 
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“local” languages, usually French. In any case, French is also a part of their international 
world in which they evolve as this is a working language of the Commission.214  
At the same time, without making a specific effort in this direction, Polish EU 
officials follow the latest news concerning their host country and occasionally frequent 
Belgian public celebrations. This, as well as language skills, certainly enhance their “mutual 
intelligibility” (Eriksen 2007) with at least part of the local population. Their attitude, again, 
as in the case of social integration, is characterised by chosen passivity, rather than 
intentional, active separation. 
By contrast, my interviewees seemed perfectly culturally integrated into the group of 
expatriates and other EU officials in Brussels (strikingly, when asked about the merits of a 
hypothetical situation of living in a city inhabited only by EU officials, they criticised this 
idea by pointing to a lack of cultural diversity [sic] which would reign in such a place). 
5.4. Transnationalism 
On the one hand, the life of my research participants remains strongly tied to Poland and 
infused with elements of Polish culture (in the broadest sense of the term). Polish EU 
officials still travel regularly to Poland, ritually spend Easter and Christmas in their Polish 
homes, maintain contacts with their families in Poland, remain interested in the Polish news 
and events, and seek regular access to Polish culture.  
On the other hand, they are not enclosed in any Polish ethnic “ghetto” and are not 
circular migrants, for whom the primary point of reference remains their own country with its 
culture, lifestyle, and tradition. Some of them were internationally mobile even before joining 
the EU public service and their lifestyle is strongly influenced by their new situation, the 
multicultural environment in which they live and socialise. Over time and with new routines 
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214 Conversely, according to the results of the Language Barometer for Brussels released in 2013 by the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, English has become the second most spoken language in Brussels. See: 
http://www.briobrussel.be/assets/onderzoeksprojecten/brio_fiche_taalbarometer_3_2013.pdf    
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their lifestyles, interests, and perceptions start to become increasingly hybrid, accommodating 
elements brought by new cultural experiences. They are not so interested in daily access to 
Polish goods and if they use Polish services it is for the same reasons as Belgians or other 
expatriates. If their social life is not always very intensive due to long working hours or 
family obligations, they usually frequent the same bars or restaurants as other expats or 
Belgians instead of concentrating on Polish events or parties. Also, on the level of mental 
links with the home country, things change. Polish EU officials seem to progressively 
disconnect from the Polish reality, including politics or fait divers. More importantly, they 
often have a feeling of not fully understanding Poland anymore. Even if they maintain 
contact with their Polish friends, they are growing distant. Many of my interviewees said 
their best friends are already in Brussels. The perspective from which they see the world has 
changed.  
All these changes are not specifically due to their contact with Belgian society. 
Interaction with the local population, ethnic minorities, and expats are just a part of their 
transnational experience. If we refer to the binary distinction between the “ethnic” (bi-
national) transnationalism of the working-class migrants! and the “cosmopolitan” (trans-
national) transnationalism of the middle-class professionals, as proposed by Colic-Peisker 
(2006), one could probably find elements of both in the transnationalism of Polish EU 
officials. However, it would be difficult to judge whether one could apply the term 
“cosmopolitanism” to EU officials in the meaning given to it by Hannerz (1990) or Ley 
(2004) and thus an interest in and openness to other cultures. My respondents, based on their 
own self-assessment, are rather selective: for example, their attitude to other ethnic 
communities in Brussels is rather indifferent or negative.  
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The second question I wanted to elucidate throughout the research concerned the changing 
identity and identification patterns of the Polish EU officials since their arrival in Brussels 
and entry into the European public service. 
This part of the research aimed at verifying whether phenomenon expected by Bellier 
and Wilson (2000a), Shore and Black (1992) – the emergence of a prototypical European 
identity – is taking place. The fact that my respondents and interviewees are Poles is not 
without relevance in this regard – according to Smith (1981), Polish migrants often feature 
particularly strong national and religious traditions and tend to retain their identity when 
confronted with a dominant culture. 
5.5. Remaining Polish  
Definitions of ethnic groups usually refer to “notions of shared culture” (Eriksen 2010:42), 
common memories, language, or religion (Weber 1997:20) which permit members of the 
group to maintain the feeling of ethnic affinity. Such a “feeling of belonging” is crucial for 
ethnic identity (Banks 1996:9). As it was easy to predict, almost all the researched Eurocrats 
firmly confirmed their Polish identity. The primary categories of reference for my 
respondents were Polish culture, Polish language, and Polish history and religion. The 
attachment to the Polish landscape and the Polish nation (a feeling of communion) were 
commonly declared. While defining Polishness, they typically referred to the fact of having 
grown up in the Polish cultural environment, although some even referred to the criterion of 
blood.  
As the literature review has suggested, Polish national identity is predominantly based 
on the ethnic component (see e.g., Kociuba 2009; Batt 2001; Jaskułowski 2012). Indeed, very 
few of my respondents believed that being Polish is something to be chosen. Only one person 
referred to the link with the Polish State and its institutions. Another striking feature is the 
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attachment to Polish traditions and the very widespread link perceived between cultivating 
Polish traditions and remaining Polish. This aspect seems more important for the 
identification of my research participants than political allegiance or Polish ascendance. 
Clearly, their self-identification with Polishness mainly passes through cultural elements. 
Again, this is fully in line with the findings of Marody (2003) and Janion (2007) – in the 
absence of a Polish nation state for most of the 19th century, and given all the difficulty of 
clearly identifying with the communist dictatorship, Polish identification has remained 
predominantly ethnic, with a limited role for State-related loyalty and rituals.  
What are the key features of the traditions and culture on which the identity of my 
research participants relies? Based on the past research and taking into account how Polish 
school curricula transmit national myths which have been cultivated to preserve Polishness 
for over two hundred years up to the present, one would expect that the vision of a shared 
history, instrumental to the Polish “we” consciousness, will be more “romantic”, spotted with 
references to national uprisings and romantic heroes. This does not seem to be the case. The 
predominant founding myth in the collective consciousness of the researched Polish EU 
officials is the opposition to the communist dictatorship and the post-1989 process of 
successful westernisation, culminating in the accession to the EU. The main reference among 
the historic figures was Lech Wałęsa, sometimes together with other prominent dissidents or 
founders of modern Polish prosperity during the last quarter century. Also, the most 
important events of the shared history were often related to the anchorage of Poland in the 
West – for example, the fall of communism or (most importantly) accession to the European 
Union. Polish EU officials do not seem to attach much importance to national martyrdom or 
post-messianic concepts (such as clergy-inspired visions of Polish re-evangelisation of a 
materialistic Europe), still cherished by certain factions of the conservative and nationalistic 
right in their home country. Moreover, their attitude to religion seems to be rather moderate – 
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although the religious aspects of Polish traditions were sometimes mentioned, it seems that 
their Catholicism remains, at best, in the private sphere. Even the cult of John Paul II seems 
to be less overwhelming among the Polish Eurocrats – although the acknowledgment of the 
position of the Polish Pontiff in the national pantheon is related rather to his international 
fame and recognition and his alleged contribution to the downfall of communism and Polish 
accession to the EU than to the importance of the Catholic religion for Polish identification. 
These patterns recall the observations of Leman (2000) who argued that, unlike in the 
case of indigenous ethnicities, immigrant ethnicities are characterised by references to a 
recent past, rather than a distant past, while drawing ethnic boundaries. However, in the case 
of my research group, they also say a lot about the type of national traditions that are 
essential for the definition of their national identity. The historic references quoted are those 
of the Poles’ longing to belong to the West, it is about the history of Poland becoming (or 
becoming again) a Western nation, a natural member of the community of European nations 
such as the European Union. It is difficult to judge if this is shaped by the ideological climate 
pervading the political and media narratives in the period in which most of them grew up (the 
pre-accession decade of the 1990s) or by the values and understanding of Polishness 
cherished by Polish liberal elites, or even by their own Europeanizing ideology which 
prompted them to start a career in Brussels. The latter included a strong imaginary, partly 
referred to by Janion (2007) and Pogonowska (2002), long rooted in Poland, present in the 
media, but also in everyday conversations, namely “the West”, a metonymy for Western 
Europe, associated with prosperity, civilisation, culture, and order, but also predictability and 
the optimal organisation of society. In any case, the kind of Polishness based on such 
common references is likely to favor the emergence of a European identity, as Europeanness 
is already an inherent part of it. My research participants seem to be saying: we are Poles, 
because we are part of the West, because we are democratic, liberal, and European. 
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Finally, it is also important to mention the national self-image of the Polish EU 
officials. Again, the positive stereotypes they cultivate about the Poles remain in the spirit of 
the times – they are mostly proud of their alleged industriousness. Traditional positive 
stereotypes that can be deemed of aristocratic origin (“bravery”) or of peasant origin 
(“resourcefulness”) were also quoted, but more rarely. Overall, the self-image of my 
respondents based on their responses to questions on national features and the Polish 
contribution to the European heritage suggests the lack of complexes, but also sobriety and 
proneness to national self-criticism.  
However, many authors emphasize that, in addition to self-ascription, identity comes 
into being also by categorisation (De Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1995; Eriksen 2010; Jenkins 
2008). In the literature review I referred to the understanding of identity by Jenkins (2002), 
who saw it as a process resulting from identification. As Jenkins further argued, identification 
results partly from the categorization of others, while categorization by others affects one’s 
internal definition (1997:57). This phenomenon strengthens the relational nature of 
identification (and hence identity) and explains why ethnic or national identity usually 
becomes particularly relevant in the migration context.  
In this regard, it is worth referring to the findings of Ban (2013) and Abélès et al. 
(1993) who claimed that in the EU institutions the awareness of one’s own identity and the 
identity of others is strong. Ban (2013) also argued that there is a division between the 
officials from the old and the new member states. My research participants are clearly aware 
of their colleagues perceiving them as Poles, but they do not feel stereotyped or discriminated 
against. They notably happened to express satisfaction from their equal status, enabled by the 
framework of the EU institutions. These circumstances are likely to strengthen their national 
identity not only in the sense of often being reminded of it by contact with other nationalities, 
but also in the sense of a stronger feeling of belonging to a positively valued group.  
! 443!
5.6. Towards European identity?  
When different authors expressed the expectation that EU officials would forge European 
identity for the Union, as the national elites constructed the national ones in 19th century, 
they obviously did not limit their hopes to a professional identity of EU public servants, 
which has already emerged, at least according to Bellier (2002), Shore (2000, 2007), or 
Abélès et al. (1993) referring to the commonly used metaphor of the “House”. Such 
European identity would first be adopted by EU officials themselves, as the European elites 
working in the common European interest, and would then be further inculcated among the 
“common people”, be it in the form of a “cultural identity” based on allegedly common 
cultural features and lifestyles, or a “civic identity” based on shared values and allegiance to 
a European polity. My research aimed at verifying whether such a supranational identity was 
emerging among Polish EU officials and, if so, on what it was based. 
Most of the Polish EU officials researched confirmed that they had become more 
European since they joined the EU institutions. This phenomenon provides confirmation for 
the findings of Shore (1996, 2000, 2005, 2007) who described the mechanism of engrenage. 
Indeed, their professional identification, fuelled by an integrationist ideology and hardened 
with the necessity of sometimes having to further the European interest against the short-term 
interest of Poland, must have given birth to a genuine European identification, not only with 
their institution, but also with a larger European interest. This must have been even more so 
given that the Polish Eurocrats generally claimed to be convinced that their work makes a 
difference, often referring to the metaphor of “cogs in the wheel”. In this regard, scholars 
(e.g., Risse 2004; Bellier 1993, 2000a, 2002) have remarked that there is often tension 
between national identity and allegiance to European institutions. In the case of my research 
participants, their identifications proved, to a significant extent, situational, as many claimed 
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that they felt more European than Polish in certain specific situations, notably while 
representing Europe, either outside the EU or vis à vis its member states. 
In this context, it is particularly interesting to establish what the Polish staff of the EU 
institutions actually understand as “being European” and, consequently, what the nature of 
their “European identity” is. 
Several scholars refer to Europeanness as a community of values (see e.g., Shore and 
Black 1994; Bauman 2004a; Citrin and Sides 2004; Kaelbe 2009). This vision of 
Europeanness refers to a certain standard catalogue of values reflected in several political and 
legal documents. The research participants identified such values as “human rights”, 
“democracy”, and “rule of law” as common to all Europeans. Similarly, their idea of 
distinctive features common to Europeans seemed to be rather of political or ideological 
inspiration, as it was limited to relatively trivial, abstract, and idealistic propositions such as 
“taste for diversity”, or attachment to culture and education, or, on the contrary, negative 
stereotypes, such as “socialism”. Overall, these tentative definitions of Europeanness, by 
reference to shared characteristics or by contrast to non-Europeans, did not read or sound 
very convincing and seemed to confirm the statement of some scholars who claim the main 
problem with Europeanness is the absence of common memory, but also of a clearly defined 
Other. 
More importantly, the understanding of these European commonalities by the Polish 
EU officials interogated differed substantially. References to such commonalities were often 
superficial, shaped by common stereotypes, but definitely not suitable to serve as a founding 
myth and a collective symbol triggering identification. This says a lot about the nature of 
their European identity which is clearly political and “civic” rather than cultural. Perhaps, 
working and socialising with other Europeans could result in a feeling of cultural closeness, 
but the lack of a clear point of reference (such as “the Other”) made it difficult to agree on the 
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cultural features that all Europeans have in common. This seems to be in line with their 
widely shared conviction about the “chosen” or “acquired” character of Europeanness. 
To conclude, the European identity of the studied Polish EU officials has indeed 
emerged, but its basis is determined by the conditions that prompted its development, notably 
working on the realisation of a political integration process. Being European is collectively 
perceived as adhering to the values corresponding to the catalogue officially proclaimed as 
“European”, as the allegiance to the European polity. By contrast, the understanding of 
“cultural” aspects of being European seems to be a matter of individual feelings or reflections 
and does not refer to any potent symbol or founding myth, the absence of which Eriksen 
(1997) and Giesen (2003) deplore.  
The question is whether this model of identity can, in the future, be spread among a 
larger population which is not directly involved in ensuring the functioning of the European 
polity. 
5.7. How much Polishness in Europeanness? 
Certainly, the European vocation of my research participants has not resulted in the atrophy 
of their national identification. If the European identity were to come into being to the 
detriment of the national one, my research does not provide any evidence to this. On the 
contrary, as was mentioned, the national identity of my research participants has arguably 
become even stronger.  
However, on the other hand, another Europeanness is possible: as Smith (1993a) 
argued, European identification can emerge “at a different level” and co-exist with the 
national one as some kind of meta-identity, not following the model of the national identity 
constructed to serve the nation state. Risse (2004) has proposed a model of multiple identities 
describing various relationships between the national and European identities as “nested”, 
“cross-cutting”, and “separate”, while Romaniszyn (2003) has referred to the concept of “a 
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kit of identities”. Indeed, my research participants do not perceive their European identity to 
be in opposition to their Polish identity. On the contrary, if Polish EU officials feel very 
much European without being able to clearly define it, it is perhaps also because they 
perceive Polishness as a sufficient condition of Europeanness. The latter is a corollary of the 
former, not an opposite concept. Indeed, as was explained above, the national myth 
commonly referred to by my respondents relates to accession to the EU. This is perceived as 
an integral part of the Polish national experience, apparently more important than the 
“romantic” tradition or even religion. This provides an answer to the question regarding the 
relations between national and European identity according to the classification proposed by 
Risse (2004): if Europeanness is a component of Polishness, then (at least as long as one 
shares in the type of Polishness displayed by Polish EU officials) European identity is 
“nested” in Polish identity.  
As has been mentioned, for some of my research participants, joining the institutions 
was a consequence of the nation’s lengthy efforts to join the West on the personal level. It 
empowered them and made them feel equal to Western Europeans. Seen from this 
perspective, identification with Europe is an essential part of Polish identity.  
5.8. Why do I refer to “Europlanet”?  
This metaphor stands for a complete, relatively isolated world, with its own, specific 
atmosphere and ecology. Inhabitants of a planet may be interested in other planets, moons 
and asteroids, but their interest is not vital, they could be happy without any notions of 
astronomy, building on their land, extracting its resources, etc. They do talk about aliens that 
they may find fascinating or dangerous, but they find it difficult to imagine what they are 
like, how they feel and function.  
Are Eurocrats inhabitants of such “Europlanet”? I have to insist on the question mark 
following this term in the title of my thesis. My study does not confirm that the metaphor 
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perfectly fits the description of their life. Indeed, their world is very different from the outside 
world – thanks to its size, long history, multicultural character and ideological origins, it is 
more prolific in production of its own habits, professional identity and specific social 
relations than any other corporation or administration. However, their isolation is only partial, 
as their circles of friends and acquaintances include expatriates from outside the EU circle, 
they keep ties with their families, their identification patterns are complex, including both 
original ethnic and European elements. One might rather think of some modified version of 
the concept, drawn from science-fiction movies or books, such as a planet–colony, where 
inhabitants come from various parts of the Galaxy, keeping ties with their planets or lands of 
origin. One might think of a planet–capital of an interstellar empire, populated by various 
snail- or frog-like officials and diplomats, invented by George Lucas, united by their destiny, 
their common interests and a specific habitus, but distinctive by their picturesque tails, horns, 
shucks and trunks.!
5.9. In a nutshell … 
To conclude, I will re-state my main research findings and reflect on the broader contribution 
of my research to anthropology. I will also try to reflect on avenues for further research in this 
field.  
 My research participants can be qualified as a category sui generis in between 
immigrants and expatriates. Although their arrival is perceived as potentially leading to a 
long-term settlement, they feature certain types of behaviour often described as typical for 
expats, for example consciously constructing boundaries which separate them from the local 
population. At least in the case of those living in Brussels before the Polish EU accession, this 
boundary building helps them escape from the negative social categorisation they suffered as 
economic migrants. Polish EU officials tend to restrict their social activity to other EU 
officials and expatriates, not necessarily Poles. At the same time, they feel they are also 
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subject to stereotypes and exclusionary practices by the host society. They build boundaries 
between themselves and the host society for two purposes: to retaliate against the boundaries 
they perceive the host society to be imposing (and in the process confirm their status in 
Brussels), but also to confirm their adherence to the category of EU officials. 
 The aforementioned findings constitute yet another modest contribution to the extensive 
literature on boundaries and their functions in the context of mobility and migration.  
Applying Eriksen’s (2007) distinctions (as proposed at the beginning of this thesis) to 
my research participants must go beyond the traditional criteria of social exclusion, such as 
religion, colour, and access to the labour market.  
From the social point of view, Polish EU civil servants integrate into an elitist social 
class of Polish and non-Polish EU civil servants (also counting Belgian EU officials). 
Culturally speaking they remain attached to Polish practices concerning food, language, and 
so on. However, they are able to smoothly function in the new environment and are culturally 
adapted to the host society. 
One may call their cultural situation a “semi-permeable membrane” (Eriksen 
2007:1061). Often approached with reluctance by members of the Gesellschaft, and paying 
relatively little attention to their relations with the Gesellschaft, they cannot be considered a 
culturally closed community: there is a strong ambition for mobility (supported by their elite 
status) and a meritocratic dynamic, but centered on their own community. 
The application of Eriksen’s (2007) perspective on complexity to the analysis of the 
relations with various communities or groups living in Brussels hopefully adds to the existing 
research on social and cultural integration. It also illustrates the irrelevance of methodological 
nationalism in studies on migration and mobility. 
A factor undoubtedly fostering their Europeanness is the engrenage in the typically 
inter-ethnic European labour market segment, to which they are subject on a daily basis for a 
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minimum eight working hours a day. Some of them also identify with Europe as a personal 
mission that gives sense to their life. Another factor is the relations at work with other 
colleagues from other countries. This Europeanness is typical for the public realm (Lofland 
1998) where they are active. What remains Polish are the aspects of private culture and semi-
private spaces they occupy. In other words, there seems to be a split between European public 
and Polish private and semi-private life. The semi-public spaces, such as sports clubs and 
certain places for leisure time are the spaces where some of them have contact with Belgians. 
But what does the word “Belgian” mean for Polish civil servants in Brussels? For most of 
them it concerns native Belgians, or Belgians originating in other EU countries. Contact with 
immigrants of non-EU provenance remains very limited. 
 As concerns their identifications, they can be described as ethnically Polish and strongly 
attached to the Polish culture and language. At the same time, they perceive their Polishness 
as a crucial element of their European identity. The latter has a clearly political and 
“constitutional” rather than a cultural character. Indeed, as people involved in or at least 
witnessing European policy-making, Polish EU officials perceive the existence of European 
identity as something very real, and this is certainly what distinguishes them from other EU 
member states nationals for whom “Brussels” stands for a distant and alien force. The analysis 
of the understanding of Polishness and Europeanness, as well as of the complex relations 
between various identifications, is yet another input to the debate on the emergence and nature 
of supranational European identity and its relations with national identities. Given the 
dynamic character of these processes, this research should be subject to follow-up.  
  The present research may be considered as a (no doubt imperfect) proposition for a 
feasible model of how to perform a research among communities with very restrictive access 
such as EU officials. If there are not many anthropological publications on the different EU 
civil servant communities, it is perhaps because access to this kind of population is rather 
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difficult. In this situation, the combination of techniques that I used might make 
anthropological study possible, up to a point, even if these techniques have – speaking in 
traditional anthropological terms – strong limits, in particular from the perspective of those 
attached to traditional, Malinowskian anthropology.  
5.10. Questions for further research 
The very concept of my research concerning the integration of Polish EU officials into 
Brussels was to base it exclusively on the analysis of the perception of this issue by my 
research participants. This approach could be complemented by research performed on the 
groups with which Polish EU officials interact. As to the local population, it would be useful 
to verify their perception of and their attitude towards Polish EU officials. During my 
research, I heard some speculations by my research participants as to why Belgians have low 
interest in social contact with EU officials. It would be interesting to verify what these 
reasons are from the perspective of the autochthonous population. Would they be ready to 
accommodate EU officials in the circles of their friends or acquaintances? Is it a question of 
the characteristics of the incomers or rather of Belgian lifestyle and their model of social 
networks? Do they really have stereotypes about Poles and EU officials, and what are these 
stereotypes? Do they perceive Polish Eurocrats differently from those originating in “old 
member states”? Is the perception of Poles the same as the perception of other Eastern 
Europeans? Such research might allow us to foresee what the actual prospects for integration 
of Polish EU officials are in the future.  
Similarly, additional research on Polish EU officials could be performed. Having in 
mind that the main problem here seems to be the absence of any contact due to the different 
lifestyles of EU officials and locals, it might be interesting to verify if establishing 
“institutionalised” zones of contact could change the picture. To this effect, comparative 
research could be performed between those Polish EU officials who sent their children to a 
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Belgian school and those whose children go to a European one. Similarly, such comparative 
research could be performed on those Polish EU officials who are active in local public life 
(in various associations and political parties) and those who do not engage in such activities.  
 It would also be interesting to verify how the perception of other EU officials and 
their attitudes by my research participants corresponds to the views expressed by EU officials 
from other member states. Do they also see themselves as “one tribe”? Are their relations 
with and perception of the local reality similar to those expressed by my research 
participants? 
 The research took place in the period preceding the anti-European or Euro-sceptical turn 
in the politics of Poland and several other member states. The possibility of Brexit was not 
even seriously discussed. Today, when the future of Europe looks uncertain and discussions 
on the shape and nature of the European polity burst out again, the feelings of my 
interviewees could be quite different. On the other hand, the increasing presence of non-
European migrants and refugees in Polish and European media and political discourse and the 
proliferation of the associated imaginary may contribute to an increased awareness of cultural 
commonality in the face of the Other, as suggested by Eriksen (2010), Shore (2000), 
Romaniszyn (2003), Bellier and Wilson (2000a), Goddard et al. (1994), Borneman and 
Fowler (1997), and Castiglione (2009).  
 Furthermore, important changes have recently occurred in Poland. The spectacular 
electoral victory of the conservative, somewhat nationalistic, and euro-sceptic Law and 
Justice party (PiS) have visibly changed the social climate in Poland. Society is now split into 
roughly two camps: supporters of the “Good Change”, as PiS labels its conservative 
revolution, and opponents of the Government, mostly left-wing, liberal, and Christian-
democrat voters. The conflict appears fundamental, concerns such issues as the constitutional 
order, geo-political orientation, and even the principal values that the Polish State should 
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protect and promote (religion, nation, family, tolerance, open society, freedom, etc.). The 
conflict is exacerbated by the political situation in Europe (Brexit, the so-called “refugee 
crisis”). Polish media supporting both camps report on these developments, sometimes even 
galvanising the radical and fundamental nature of the conflict. Also, the national symbols and 
founding myths of Poland are once again subject to heated debates. With reference to the 
issues debated in this thesis, one might say that the new government hopes to alter not only 
the current policies, but also to fundamentally alter Polish identity, neutering it further from 
the civic elements and confirming the hegemony of a primordial, essentialising ethnic 
identity.  
 The impact of both the current European turmoil and the conservative, nationalistic 
offensive in Poland on the identity of Polish EU officials could be an interesting subject for 
further research. One may wonder if, when confronted with this new “narrow” and 
sometimes xenophobic nationalism, their own national feelings remain unchanged. How do 
they live with the criticism of their country by the Commission on the one hand and the harsh 
criticism of the Commission by the authorities of their own country on the other? Will Brexit 
intensify their Europeanism or, on the contrary, make Poles more skeptical about 
identification with Europe? 
 Another interesting research question would be the one to be analysed and responded to 
in a couple of years. Some of my research participants, even if they understood their 
Europeanness in predominantly civic terms, suggested that their children may already be 
“born European”. It would be interesting to see how the children of Polish EU officials, born 
and raised in Brussels, sometimes from a non-Polish father or mother, will embrace European 
identity. Will they perceive it in more cultural terms than their parents? What would be the 
basis of such (future) Europeanness?  
!
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Follow-up questionnaire 
 
I would kindly request to fill in this follow up questionnaire by ticking (or highlighting) right answers and 
giving explanation when it is needed. The questionnaire is part of a doctoral research on “The Community of 
Polish EU officials in Brussels” conducted under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Johan Leman at the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (IMMRC). 
The data collected is confidential and will only be used for research purposes at the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. Your help is highly appreciated!  
For further enquiries please contact julia.rozanska@student.kuleuven.be 
 
1.! Do you plan to leave the EU institutions one day? 
 Yes □   No □   I don’t know yet □  
 
2.! Would you consider staying in Belgium after leaving the EU institutions?  
 
Yes □   No □   I don’t know yet □  
 
3.!  In which area do you live now? If you moved during the last 3 years, what was the motivation?   
 
4.! Do you master both of the official languages in Brussels? If not, are you learning them? 
 
5.!Do you feel well integrated in Belgium now? Please, explain. 
 
6.!Is your social life more developed than 3 years ago? Please, explain. 
 
7.!Are your contacts with the local population more intensive now than 3 years ago? 
 
8.! Has the “composition” of your friends changed significantly during these years? In what way? 
 
9.! Have the intensity, form and frequency of your contacts with your relatives and friends from Poland changed 
significantly? Please, explain. 
 
10.! Have you encountered any stereotypes related to ‘Eurocrats’ or have you ever been a target of xenophobic 
attitude because of being a ‘Eurocrat’? To what extent are these views justified? 
 
11.! According to you, what is the attitude of the EU officials from “old” member states: 
 highly 
positive 
positive neutral negative 
 
highly 
negative 
 
toward the Polish 
EU officials 
     
toward Poles in 
general? 
 
     
 
12. How often do you attend social events of the Polish EU institutions community? 
 
13. Do you consider the “EPS” google list as an important source of information?  
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14. With which of the following “identifications” would you describe yourself? 
IDENTIFICATION very 
relevant 
relevant somewhat 
relevant 
not 
relevant 
European      
Slav     
Pole      
Inhabitant of a specific region or local community in Poland     
World's citizen     
     
‘Eurocrat’     
Expat     
Other      
 
15. Which of the following things are important for you?  
 very 
important 
important somewhat 
important 
not 
important 
Family     
Friends     
Education     
Religion     
Prosperous life     
Career     
Public activity (politics, charity 
etc.)  
    
 
16. Please, list at least three main Polish national characteristics. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
17. How do you assess the performance of Poland or Poles in the following fields? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Are there any aspects in contemporary Poland, which you feel ashamed of as a Pole? If this is the case, 
please, specify and explain. 
 
Yes □ No □ 
 
  
 very 
important 
important somewhat 
important 
not 
important 
at all 
Political importance of Poland     
Economic achievements     
Science and technological 
achievements 
    
Achievements in sport      
Cultural achievements      
Other      
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19. Which of the Polish historical events do you consider as the most important? Please, restrict your answer to 
max. 5. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
20. To which of these things do you feel the most attached?  
 very 
attached 
attached somewhat 
attached 
not attached at 
all 
Polish nation     
Polish landscape      
Polish history      
Polish high culture      
Polish popular culture      
Polish language     
Polish tradition     
Polish national ceremonies     
 
21. Which of the Polish historical figures (past or present) do you appreciate most? Why? 
 
22. Are there situations where you feel more European, or, on the contrary, more Polish? Please explain. 
 
23. Did you feel any particular link with other Poles during the grieve after the air crash in Smolensk? 
 
24. Does it happen to you to criticize Poland or the Poles as a nation while talking to other Europeans? Please 
develop your answer, if possible. 
 
25. Do you think that Poles have contributed much to the European cultural and scientific heritage? Please 
explain. 
 
26. What are the main features all Europeans have in common, which generally distinguish the Europeans from 
non-Europeans? Please, indicate at least three. 
1.   
2.  
3.  
  
27. Do you think that the identity of the ‘Eurocrats’ (irrespectively from their nationality) is more European than 
it is the case of average people in Belgium or in your home country? 
 
28. What are the most important European values? Please, indicate at least three. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
Background information 
 
Age:  
Do you have a permanent post (official)?  Yes □ No □ 
 
Since when have you been living in Belgium?  
Since when have you been working for the EU institutions?  
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire: 
 
I would kindly request to fill in this questionnaire by ticking (or highlighting) right answers and giving 
explanation when it is needed. The questionnaire is part of a doctoral research on “Polish EU Community in 
Brussels” conducted under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Johan Leman at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
(IMMRC). 
 The data collected is confidential and will only be used for research purposes. Your help is highly 
appreciated!  
 For further enquiries please contact julia.rozanska@student.kuleuven.be 
 
1.! Why did you decide to migrate? 
 
2.! What were the reasons for taking part in the competition and working at the EU institutions?  
 
3.! What did you think of Brussels before coming here? How has your perception of Brussels changed after 
you settled here? 
 
4.! Do you plan to leave: 
 
-  Belgium?  Yes □   No □   I don’t know yet □ 
 
-  the EU institutions one day? Yes □   No □   I don’t know yet □ 
 
5.! Where do you live? In case you live in Brussels, please indicate in which district do you live and why you 
chose it? 
 
6.! Is it important to you to have access to: (Please, tick the right answers) 
 Yes No 
 Shops with Polish products   
 Polish restaurants   
 Club for Polish people   
Polish services (Please, indicate which. e.g., medical 
care, plumbers, hairdressers, etc.? ) 
  
Polish culture (Please, specify e.g., books, journals, 
films, theater, music) 
  
 
7.! Please, indicate which of the official languages in Brussels you spoke when you arrived in Belgium?  
 
□ French 
□ Dutch 
□ None of them 
 
8.! Do you find it important to learn both of the official languages in Brussels?  
Yes □   No □ 
 
9.! Which language do you speak most often outside the office? 
 
□ Polish 
□ English 
□ French 
□ Dutch 
□  Other……………… (Please, indicate which) 
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10.! With whom do you live?  
 
□ alone  
□ with a Polish partner 
□ with another expat partner  
□ with a Belgian partner  
 
11.! Do you find it difficult to adapt to the local culture? Please, explain. 
 
12. What is your perception of bilingualism and biculturalism of the host society?  Do you think it may 
influence your adaptation in Belgium? 
 
13. With representatives of which group do you spend your free time most often? Please, rate the answers from 
3-0, where 3 stands for “very often”, 2 for “often”, 1  for “seldom”, while 0: “not at all”. 
Polish people (not employed in the EU institutions)  
Belgians (not employed in the EU institutions)   
Belgian EU officials  
Polish EU officials  
Other EU officials  
Other foreigners not employed in the EU institutions   
 
14. Do you find it difficult to make Belgian friends? Please, explain. 
 
15. Have you already encountered any stereotypical views on Poles personally while living in Belgium? In 
which situation? To what extent are these views justified? 
 
16. Have you encountered any stereotypes related to ‘Eurocrats’ or have you ever been a target of xenophobic 
attitudes because of being a ‘Eurocrat’? To what extent are these views justified? 
 
17. Could you specify main advantages and disadvantages of living in Belgium. Please, indicate at least three of 
each, if possible)? 
Advantages of living in Belgium Disadvantages of living in Belgium 
1. 
 
1. 
2. 
 
2. 
3. 
 
3. 
 
18. Has your lifestyle changed significantly since moving to Belgium? In what way? 
 
19. If you are Catholic, do you attend: 
 
 □ Belgian mass 
 □ Polish mass 
 □ not relevant? 
 
20. Where do you spend traditional festivities (Christmas, Easter, etc.) most often? 
 
□ in Belgium 
□ in Poland 
□ in another country   
 
21. Do you usually participate in Belgian public celebrations (e.g., Carnival, Ommegang-Public Parade, etc.)?   
 
Yes □    No □ 
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22. What are your main sources of information? Please, tick the right answers. 
  Polish Belgian Other 
TV    
radio    
newspapers    
Internet    
other    
 
23. Are you interested in public issues concerning: 
 YES NO 
Belgium   
 Poland    
EU   
 
24. How often do you visit your home country? 
 
25. How often are you in contact with your relatives and friends from Poland and what is the main way you 
keep contact with them: Internet□        by phone □         e-mail □          mail □        other □ ? 
 
26. Do you feel homesickness? Yes □         No □   
 
27. What are your main sources of information in case you are looking for a doctor, or a plumber, etc.?  
 
28. Do you find your co-nationals working in the EU institutions critical regarding the local reality?  
Yes □             No □ 
Why? Please, explain. 
 
29. In your opinion, what is the attitude of the majority of Belgians:  
 highly 
positive 
positive neutral negative 
 
highly 
negative 
 
toward the EU 
officials 
     
toward Poles in 
general? 
 
     
 
30. What is the attitude of the EU officials from “old” member states: 
 highly 
positive 
positive neutral negative 
 
highly 
negative 
 
toward the Polish 
EU officials 
     
toward Poles? 
 
     
 
31.  Do you find the Polish EU community open (eager to socialize with) for: 
 Yes No 
Belgians   
other expats   
ethnic minority groups   
other Poles in Belgium that do not work in EU 
institutions? 
  
 
32. Do you attend any social events restricted to EU employees? How often? 
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33. With which of the following “identifications” would you describe yourself? Please rate the answers from 
“very relevant” to “not relevant at all”.  
IDENTIFICATION very 
relevant 
relevant somewhat 
relevant 
not 
relevant 
European      
Slav     
Pole      
Inhabitant of specific region or 
local community in Poland 
    
World's citizen     
‘ Eurocrat’     
Expat     
Other (Please, specify)     
 
34. Which of the following values are important for you? Please rate the answers from “very important” to “not 
important at all”.  
VALUE very 
important 
important somewhat 
important 
not 
important 
Family     
Friends     
Education     
Religion     
Prosperous life     
Career     
Public activity 
(politics, charity, 
etc.) 
    
 
 
35. Please, list at least three main Polish national characteristics. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
 
36. What is your personal assessment of the following phenomena related to Poland?  
 
 
37. Are there any aspects in contemporary Poland which you feel ashamed of as a Pole?  
Yes □         No □   
 
If this is the case, please, specify and explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 very 
important 
important somewhat 
important 
not 
important 
at all 
Political importance of Poland     
Economic achievements     
Science and technological 
achievements 
    
Achievements in sport      
Cultural achievements      
Other(which?)     
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38. Which of the Polish historical events do you consider as the most important? Please, restrict your answer to 
max. 5 and explain. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
39. To which of these things do you feel the most attached? Please rate the answers from “very attached” to “not 
attached at all”.  
 very 
attached 
attached somewhat 
attached 
not 
attached 
at all 
Polish nation     
Polish landscape      
Polish history      
Polish high culture      
Polish popular culture      
Polish language     
Polish tradition     
 Polish national ceremonies     
 
40. Which of the Polish historical figures (past or present) do you appreciate most? Why? 
41. Are there situations where you feel more European, or, on the contrary, more Polish? Please explain. 
42. Are there any views or values that you have abandoned or adopted since  
- you left Poland? 
- you started to work in the institutions? 
 
43. Did you feel any particular link with other Poles during the grieve after the air crash in 
Smolensk? 
 
44. Does it happen to you to criticize Poland or the Poles as a nation while talking to other Europeans? Please 
develop your answer, if possible. 
 
45. Do you think that Poles have contributed much to the European cultural and scientific heritage? Please 
explain. 
 
46. Do you think Poland or the Poles can serve as a positive example to other Europeans? If yes, in what 
aspects?  
 
47. What are the main features all Europeans have in common, which generally distinguish the Europeans from 
non-Europeans? Please, indicate at least three. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
  
48. Do you think that the identity of the ‘Eurocrats’ (irrespectively from their nationality) is more European than 
it is the case of average people in Belgium or in your home country? 
 
49. What are the most important European values? Please, indicate at least three. 
1.  
2.  
3.  
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The respondents who do not have children scholarized in Belgium are kindly requested to go directly to 
the “background information section”  
 
50. In case you have children at school age, do they attend to European school? Please, explain your motivation.  
 
51. Which language do you speak with your children? 
 
□ Polish 
□ French 
□ Dutch  
□ English 
□ Other……………………….. 
 
52. Who are their friends (You can choose more than one answer)? 
 
□ Belgians  
□ Polish  
□ Other foreigners 
 
53. Was it difficult to your children to accommodate in a new culture, new society? Please, explain. 
 
Yes □  No □  
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Age: …………… 
Gender: Male □  female □ 
Do you have a permanent post (official)?  Yes □ No □ 
 
How many people live (approximately) in your home city/town/village? ……………… 
 
Have you done university studies?  Yes □   No □ 
 
Do you have any experience of studying or working abroad? Yes □  No □ 
If yes, for how long? 
 
How long have you been living in Belgium? 
 
How long have you been working for the EU institutions? 
 
Thank you very much for filling the questionnaire!  
!
!
!
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Appendix C 
The interview guide 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Details about myself and the research (purpose of the study) 
Permission, to record, to take notes, and quote - anonymity and blurring identities guaranteed  
Promises: copy of report, final thesis, articles. 
Rights of the research participants: At any point of the research, if you want to drop out of the research group, 
you are free to do it without any justification. 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1.! Could you tell me a little bit about your way to where you are now?  
 
SOCIAL NETWORKS  
 
2.! Was it easy to make friends here? How did you meet them, at what occasions?  
3.! Could you describe the circles of your friends? There is one or more? (Do your work-related 
friendships stretch to your private life?)  
4.! Have these contacts evolved significantly during last years? Which networks faded away and how 
come?  
5.! Do your compatriots here in Belgium (still) play important role in your social life?  
6.! Where do you know more persons that you would describe as close friends, here or in Poland?  
 
CONTACTS WITH POLAND 
 
7.! Some of respondents mentioned they felt increasingly distant from their Polish friends. That is why I 
would like to ask about the frequency and quality of your contacts with friends in Poland? Are they 
really growing distant? What are the reasons? (To what extent is it due to the fact you live in Brussels 
and to what extent is it simply related to different professional experiences, new roles (family), etc.).  
8.! Do you understand Poland today?  If you read Polish Internet or watch TV, do you have the impression 
that you are interested in the same things as your compatriots in Poland, do you see the reality in the 
same way? Please develop.  
9.! How would you feel about coming back to Poland, if your salary and working condition would be 
similar as here?  
DAILY LIFE  
 
10.! What kinds of social activities are you involved in?  Are you a member of any associations (social or 
sport clubs)?   
11.! Are the places you attend (clubs, bars, restaurants) in your free time expat oriented/ popular amongst 
Belgians?  
12.! Do you have any interest in the issues of your quarter: cultural activities, political life, infrastructural 
projects, etc.  
13.! How much do you work and why? Do you work extra time? If yes, why? (As far as I know there is no 
extra pay, and the limit of number of extra hours you can recover, so why are you staying? Is it about 
your boss? Is it about the work ethics? Or, you think that what you are doing is important for EU and 
you are ready for this sacrifice? Or, maybe, just what you are doing is interesting for you quite apart 
from the ideological considerations?). 
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ADAPTATION  
 
14.! What does the term adaptation mean to you?  
15.! Where do you feel you belong? Which place you identify with? Please, develop your response.  
16.! If the whole Commission was transferred to another city, such as Paris, Prague or somewhere on 
Canary Islands, would you bother? Would you miss Brussels?  
17.! Would you like to live in a city inhabited only by ‘Eurocrats’ and expats?  
POLES IN BELGIUM  
 
18.! What is the attitude of the Polish ‘Eurocrats’ towards the manual workers/other categories of Polish 
migrants in Belgium? Has the attitude evolved across the time? Why?  
19.! Would you say there is a Polish community in Belgium? Who is included? Who is out?  
IDEOLOGY 
 
20.! Do you think   your work makes a difference and in what terms?     
21.! Does the job require specific attitude (pro-European) in your view?  
22.! What does the European integration represent to you?  
EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
 
23.! What does it mean to be a European? Is it something you choose or something you are born with?  
24.! Are Poles more or less European or the same as Belgians and other Western Europeans?  
25.! Have you become more European since working for the EU? In what way?  
POLISHNESS 
 
26.! What does it mean to be Polish? Is it related to how you live or maybe something you feel? Or, is it just 
something you are, independently of how you feel about?  
27.! Is it important to you to practice Polish traditions, to remain “Polish”?  
 
CLOSING QUESTIONS 
Can we stay in touch by e-mail in case of any further queries? 
Thank you! 
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Summary 
 
This doctoral dissertation explores the issues of adaptation and integration of the Polish EU 
officials in Brussels, as well as of their evolving identification.  
The present work partly builds upon my previous study of this group of highly skilled 
migrants. While drawing on the Eriksen’s (2007) complexity approach to the social and 
cultural integration, I analyse attitudes, elements of daily life and socializing patterns of the 
researched group to find out, inter alia, whether they make or belong to any community, 
what their attachments are and how they draw and are subject to boundaries. I also verify if 
they are, as some scholars suggested, becoming an embryo of a future, supranational 
European nation: to what extent they remain Polish, what Polishness actually means in their 
case, and whether they are developing any European identification. If so, how can the latter 
co-exist with the ethnic component? 
To this effect, I adopted the emic perspective: I let my research participants speak; I 
noted their experiences, confessions and reflections. Studying EU officials is not easy – the 
research presented many challenges characteristic for the anthropological study of elites. 
Thus, despite my “quasi-insider” position, I needed to rely more on the interviews, 
questionnaires and informal accounts than on traditional anthropological participant 
observation. 
 The researched group constitutes a separate category, in-between immigrants and 
expatriates. Despite their potential long-term settlement, they tend to limit their social activity 
to other EU officials and expatriates. Contrary to previous research findings in this field, they 
are rather inclusive – their social circles comprise representatives of various nationalities, not 
only compatriots. However, they hardly socialise with Belgians. In fact, it may be argued that 
they construct boundaries separating them from the local population. This may be related to 
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the legacy of real or imaginary stereotypes they feel they are prey of, but also a symbolic act 
of adherence to the category of EU officials. Overall, they do not seem interested neither in 
the integration with the larger society nor with other Poles, but rather with a larger community 
of EU officials. In the same time, although they adapt easily to the functioning in the 
multinational Brussels and in the Belgian “reality”, culturally they remain Polish and maintain 
strong transnational links with the home country.  
 As to the identification patterns, my research participants remain attached to the Polish 
culture and language. They also see their Polishness as an important aspect of their European 
identification, in addition to their professional identification and the attachment to the 
common interest, developed in the process of engrenage in the EU institutions. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Deze doctorale scriptie onderzoekt de adaptatie en integratie van de Poolse EU ambtenaren in 
Brussel en de ontwikkeling van hun identificatie.  
Het huidige werk bouwt deels verder op mijn vorige studie van deze groep van hoog 
geschoolde migranten. Steunend op  Eriksen’s (2007) complexiteitsbenadering van de 
sociaal-culturele integratie, analyseer ik houdingen, elementen uit het dagelijkse leven en 
socialisatiepatronen bij de onderzochte groep om onder andere te achterhalen of zij een 
gemeenschap zijn of tot een gemeenschap behoren, welke hun gehechtheid is en hoe zij 
grenzen uittekenen of er zich aan onderwerpen. Ik ga ook na of zij, zoals sommige 
onderzoekers suggereren, een embryo worden voor een toekomstige, supranationale Europese 
natie: tot op welke hoogte blijven zij Polen, wat betekent het Poolse in hun geval, en 
ontwikkelen ze een Europese identificatie? En als dat het geval is, hoe kan dit samen bestaan 
met de etnische component? 
Met dat voor ogen, nam ik een emic perspectief aan: Ik liet de mensen uit mijn 
onderzoek spreken; ik nam nota van hun ervaringen, van wat zij bekenden en wat hun 
overdenkingen waren.  EU ambtenaren bestuderen is niet gemakkelijk – het onderzoek stond 
voor veel uitdagingen die kenmerkend zijn voor de antropologische studie van elites. Spijt 
mijn “quasi-insider” positie moest ik meer op inteerviews, vragenlijsten en informele 
gesprekken steunen dan op de traditionele antropologische participerende observatie.  
 De onderzochte groep maakt een aparte categorie uit, tussen immigranten en expats. 
Spijt hun potentiële lange-termijn verblijf, hebben ze de neiging hun sociale activiteiten niet 
verder uit te breiden dan tot de andere EU ambtenaren en expats. In tegenstelling tot vroegere 
onderzoeksbevindingen op dit terrein, zijn ze naar mijn inzien eerder inclusief – hun sociale 
cirkels bevatten mensen van verschillende nationaliteiten, niet alleen landgenoten. Maar zij 
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socialiseren nauwelijks met Belgen. Men mag stellen dat ze grenzen opbouwen die hen 
afgescheiden houden van de lokale bevolking. Dit kan te wijten zijn aan wat blijft leven van 
reële of ingebeelde stereotiepen waarvan zij zich slachtoffer voelen te zijn, maar het kan ook 
teruggaan op een symbolische act, het besef  van te behoren tot de categorie van EU 
ambtenaren. Algemeen gesproken hebben ze geen belangstelling noch voor de integratie in de 
bredere samenleving noch met andere Polen, maar ligt hun interesse veeleer in de bredere EU 
“gemeenschap” van EU ambtenaren.  Tegelijk, alhoewel ze zich gemakkelijk aanpassen aan 
het functioneren in het multinationale Brussel en aan de Belgische “realiteit”, blijven ze 
cultureel gesproken Pools en houden ze vast aan sterke transnationale banden met hun land 
van herkomst.   
 Wat verder de identificatiepatronen betreft, blijven mijn onderzochte personen gehecht 
aan de Poolse cultuur en taal. Zij zien hun Pools-zijn ook als een belangrijk aspect van hun 
Europese identificatie, wat zich voegt bij hun professionele identificatie en bij de gehechtheid 
aan het algemeen belang, zoals dit ontwikkeld wordt in het proces van inkapseling in de EU 
instellingen. 
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